


POETICS *and* RHETORIC
Aristotle



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TIMELESS WORKS. NEW SCHOLARSHIP. EXTRAORDINARY VALUE.

From the Pages of the Poetics and the Rhetoric

The same distinction marks off Tragedy from Comedy; for Comedy aims at representing men as worse, Tragedy as better than in actual life.

(from Poetics, page 7)

Tragedy is an imitation, not of men, but of an action and of life, and life consists in action, and its end is a mode of action, not a quality. Now character determines men's qualities, but it is by their actions that they are happy or the reverse. Dramatic action, therefore, is not with a view to the representation of character: character comes in as subsidiary to the actions.

(from Poetics, page 19)

Coincidences are most striking when they have an air of design. We may instance the statue of Mityos at Argos, which fell upon his murderer while he was a spectator at a festival, and killed him. Such events seem not to be due to mere chance. Plots, therefore, constructed on these principles are necessarily the best.

(from Poetics, page 29)

In general, the impossible must be justified by reference to artistic requirements, or to the higher reality, or to received opinion. With respect to the requirements of art, a probable impossibility is to be preferred to a thing improbable and yet possible. Again, it may be impossible that there should be men such as Zeuxis painted. 'Yes,' we say, 'but the impossible is the higher thing; for the ideal type must surpass the reality.'

(from Poetics, page 85)

Rhetorical study, in its strict sense, is concerned with the modes of persuasion.

(from Rhetoric, page 99)

Of the three elements in speech-making—speaker, subject, and person addressed—it is the last one, the hearer, that determines the speech's end and object.

(from Rhetoric, page 121)

There are three things which inspire confidence in the orator's own character—the three, namely, that induce us to believe a thing apart from any proof of it: good sense, good moral character, and goodwill.

(from Rhetoric, page 245)

We are now to proceed to discuss the arguments common to all oratory. All orators, besides their special lines of argument, are bound to use, for instance, the topic of the Possible and Impossible; and to try to show that a thing has happened, or will happen in the future. Again, the topic of Size is common to all oratory; all of us have to argue that things are bigger or smaller than they seem, whether we are making political speeches, speeches of eulogy or attack, or prosecuting or defending in the law-courts.

(from Rhetoric, page 327)

We must not carry its reasoning too far back, or the length of our argument will cause obscurity: nor must we put in all the steps that lead to our conclusion, or we shall waste words in saying what is manifest. It is this simplicity that makes the uneducated more effective than the educated when addressing popular audiences—makes them, as the poets tell us, 'charm the crowd's ears more finely.'

(from Rhetoric, page 349)

In making a speech one must study three points: first, the means of producing persuasion; second, the style, or language, to be used; third, the proper arrangement of the various parts of the speech.

(from Rhetoric, page 397)

As to jests. These are supposed to be of some service in controversy. Gorgias said that you should kill your opponents' earnestness with jesting and their jesting with earnestness; in which he was right.

(from Rhetoric, page 501)

For the conclusion, the disconnected style of language is appropriate, and will mark the difference between the oration and the peroration. 'I have done. You have heard me. The facts are before you. I ask for your judgement.'

(from Rhetoric, page 503)

POETICS AND RHETORIC

Aristotle

*With an Introduction and Notes
by Eugene Garver*

George Stade
Consulting Editorial Director



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FIRST PRINTING

Aristotle

Aristotle was born in 384 B.C.E. in Stagira, on a Macedonian peninsula in northern Greece. His father, Nicomachus, was the court physician to the king of Macedonia, and Aristotle was likely trained in that profession at a young age. Nicomachus died while Aristotle was young, and the boy came under the care of a guardian, Proxenus. When Aristotle turned seventeen, Proxenus sent him to Athens, Greece's intellectual capital, where he entered Plato's Academy, remaining there until Plato's death in 348. During his years at the Academy, Aristotle distinguished himself as a brilliant student of philosophy and rhetoric, eventually giving lectures himself and writing dialogues in the style of Plato.

Though Aristotle had risen to the highest circles of the Academy, his philosophy diverged from Plato's, and when Plato died his nephew became head of the school. Aristotle left Athens for what would be twelve years. He first journeyed across the Aegean Sea to Assos, accompanied by several students from the Academy. There he led an intellectual circle gathered under the patronage of the local leader, Hermias, and began to study the natural sciences, particularly biology, and developed his political theories. When Hermias was killed by Persian invaders, Aristotle fled to the island of Lesbos, where he resumed his scientific studies. It is said that in 343 King Philip II of Macedonia invited him to join the Macedonian court and become the tutor of the prince, thirteen-year-old Alexander.

Aristotle left the Macedonian court and in 335 returned to Athens, where the Academy and its Platonic teachings still dominated the intellectual scene. On the outskirts of the city he founded his own school, the Lyceum, based on the body of scholarship he had amassed during his years away from Athens, and established a broad curriculum that included biology, history, logic, rhetoric, and philosophy. Aristotle would walk about the grounds of the school, often lecturing in a covered walkway called a *peripatos*, and his followers thus became known as "peripatetics." It is likely that the many treatises attributed to Aristotle are records of his lectures at the Lyceum. In 323 political turmoil followed the death of Alexander the Great, and anti-Macedonian sentiment swept through Athens. Fearing persecution, Aristotle fled to Chalcis on the island of Euboea.

Aristotle died in 322 at the age of sixty-two, following a short illness. His major works include the *Organon*, the collective title for a group of works on logic; *On the Soul*, concerning the soul's relation to the body; the *Physics*; the *Politics*; the *Poetics*; and the *Rhetoric*. Aristotle's wide-ranging works, along with those of Plato, form the foundation of the Western philosophical tradition.

The World of Aristotle and the *Poetics and the Rhetoric*

c.470	Socrates, Plato's teacher and the central character in his philosophical writings, is born in Athens.
B.C.E.	
443	Pericles becomes the leading Athenian statesman.
431	The Peloponnesian War begins between Athens and Sparta.
429	Pericles dies.
428	Aristotle's teacher and principle influence, Plato, is born into an aristocratic Athenian family.
c.408	Plato becomes a student of Socrates.
404	Athens surrenders to Sparta, ending the Peloponnesian War.
399	Socrates, convicted on charges of impiety and corrupting youth, is ordered to commit suicide by drinking hemlock.
c.387	Plato begins teaching "philosophy" near the grove of the hero Academus on the outskirts of Athens, in a school that comes to be known as the Academy. His curriculum includes philosophy, political theory, ethics, mathematics, biology, and astronomy.
384	Aristotle is born in Stagira, on the Chalcidic peninsula of Macedonia, in northern Greece. His father, Nichomachus, is court physician to King Amyntas III of Macedonia, grandfather of Alexander the Great.

c.374

c.367

Nichomachus dies.

Aristotle is sent by his guardian, Proxenus, to Athens. Aristotle enters Plato's Academy, where he will spend the next twenty years studying and eventually giving lectures.

359

Philip II becomes king of Macedonia.

348

Plato dies. Aristotle has been one of Plato's distinguished students, but his philosophical views have diverged significantly from his master's, and Plato's nephew, Speusippus, will now head the Academy. Aristotle leaves Athens for what will be

twelve years. Several pupils from the Academy accompany him, including Theophrastus of Eresus and Xenocrates of Chalcedon.

Aristotle travels to Assos, across the Aegean on what is now the northwestern coast of Turkey; under the patronage of the local leader, Hermias, he develops his political theories.

347

Aristotle marries Pythias, niece of Hermias. The two will have a daughter.

345

Aristotle moves to the island of Lesbos, where he begins a systematic study of biology.

343

Philip II of Macedonia invites Aristotle to the Macedonian court, where he tutors the prince, thirteen-year-old Alexander.

339

Xenocrates becomes head of the Academy. Aristotle leaves the Macedonian court and returns to Stagira. Following the death of Pythias, Aristotle marries Herpyllis, with whom he will have a son, Nicomachus.

- 336** Philip II is assassinated, and Alexander ascends to the throne of Macedonia.
- 335** Aristotle returns to Athens, where Plato's Academy is the dominant intellectual institution. He opens his own school near the temple of Apollo Lyceus. At the Lyceum, as it comes to be known, Aristotle often lectures in a covered walkway called a peripatos, and his followers become known as "peripatetics." Over the next decade, the Lyceum will operate as a center for investigation of topics in biology, history, logic, rhetoric, and philosophy.
- 332** The city of Alexandria is founded in Egypt.
- 323** After Alexander the Great dies while on a military campaign in Babylon, anti-Macedonian feeling runs high in Athens. Aristotle leaves the city and takes up residence on a family estate in Chalcis, on the island of Euboea.
- 322** After a short stomach illness, Aristotle dies in Chalcis.

Introduction

Aristotle: His Life and Works

Aristotle's works, including the *Rhetoric* and the *Poetics*, do not try to lay down the law and declare, with a divine voice, eternal truths about some subject. These works are pictures of thinking in action. We get to see a great mind working through hard and fundamental problems. Aristotle is a teacher who doesn't hide his own struggles with difficult questions. The problems he faces, and the courage and intelligence with which he faces them, make it worthwhile to do battle against the condensed manner of writing these works offer. The *Poetics* and the *Rhetoric* give an opportunity for readers 2,500 years later to participate in a profound intellectual experience. Here is a great philosopher at work trying to understand two central facets of human life, tragic drama and persuasive political speech. The pleasures of reading Aristotle come from our being able to share in the hard work of exploring basic human problems.

We don't know much about Aristotle's life. He was born in 384 B.C.E. in northern Greece, in a town called Stagira. (All dates given in this essay are B.C.E.) He moved to Athens around 367 to study at Plato's Academy and stayed there until Plato died twenty years later. Soon after that he may have become tutor to Alexander, the young son of the Macedonian king, Philip. In 335 he came back to Athens and organized his own school, the Lyceum, where he taught until 323. When Alexander the Great died in that year, Aristotle's status in Athens probably became insecure as a part of an anti-Macedonian backlash. So he moved to the nearby island of Euboea, where he died within the year.

The works of Aristotle that we have survived through a series of lucky events. Aristotle bequeathed his library, including his own works, to his successor at the Lyceum, Theophrastus, who gave it to his nephew Neleus, who hid it in a cave in present-day Turkey. A couple of hundred years later the papyrus rolls were uncovered and edited by a philosopher named Andronicus of Rhodes.

Ancient lists of Aristotle's works tell us that what we have today is only a fraction of his entire output. Ancient testimony also tells us that Aristotle wrote two kinds of works—some meant to be read only by members of his school and some, like Plato's dialogues, designed for wider circulation. The works of Aristotle that we have were meant for the more select audience; of the rest, we have only fragments. Scholars have different opinions about just what these surviving works are. Some think they are lecture notes taken by students. Others think they are notes from which Aristotle lectured. My hypothesis is that our collection of Aristotle's works comprises notes that he put in the library to be consulted if a student missed that day's lecture, or fell asleep, or had some questions and wanted to refresh his memory. They are condensed, sometimes without obvious transitions and sometimes with transitions that seem confusing.

Whatever they are, they were designed to be supplemented by illustrations and oral explanations. They are therefore sometimes very frustrating to work with, but a few remarks in this introduction should help. Aristotle sometimes seems to belabor points that I'm ready to concede, and then jumps over the really important issues that I want him to spend time on. Often the issues he thinks we should be interested in are different from the questions we would naturally ask. In the *Poetics*, for example, he gives us a definition of tragedy and carefully defines beginning, middle, and end, as well as reversal and recognition, but he never defines *mimesis* (imitation, representation, depiction), *katharsis* (purgation), or hamartia (tragic flaw, error). Wouldn't any reader prefer to take for granted the meanings of beginning, middle, and end in exchange for definitions of *mimesis*, *katharsis*, and hamartia? (For unfamiliar, and especially Greek, terms, see "Glossary".) Often, this discrepancy between what we want to know and what Aristotle wants to tell us is a clue to seeing when his concerns are different from ours and when we share a subject for inquiry.

One more point about Aristotle's works, something that might not come through in even the best translations: Aristotle's works are the first that we can recognize as professional philosophy in a way that roughly matches our own ideas of what philosophy should look like. The people before Aristotle whom we, looking back, call philosophers wrote poems or dramas, not treatises. Aristotle was the first writer to separate different investigations, to make explicit his methodological assumptions, and to give technical definitions for critical terms. But there is one way in which he isn't as much a professional philosopher as it appears in translation. His language is much less pompous and professorial than it appears. For example, the first chapter of the

English translation of the *Poetics* says that imitations differ from one another in three respects: “the medium, the objects, [and] the manner or mode of imitation.” Instead, the Greek simply says “in-what,” “of what,” and “how.”

These are examples of three of Aristotle’s famous “four causes.” The medium, object, and manner of imitation are the material, formal, and moving or efficient causes of a tragedy. While a “doctrine of the four causes” might sound imposing and threatening, Aristotle’s own less formal language shouldn’t be as intimidating. We think we know, he says, when we know a cause, so all inquiry is a hunt for causes. Answers to “why” questions sort themselves out along four dimensions: (1) what something is made of—the material cause, (2) what that material is shaped into—the formal cause, (3) how the matter and form are put together by a moving cause, and (4) the purpose, end, or final cause of that unity of form and matter. The four causes are very useful because they can point us to more dimensions of inquiry than might occur to us on our own. When Aristotle says that someone is called a poet more for his plots than his verses, he is saying that the structure which organizes the sequence of incidents is more essential to the poet’s work than what the poem is made of. “If you string together a set of speeches expressive of character, and well finished in point of diction and thought, you will not produce the essential tragic effect nearly so well as with a play which, however deficient in these respects, yet has a plot and artistically constructed incidents” (*Poetics* 6.1450a29-33). “The poet or ‘maker’ should be the maker of plots rather than of verses; since he is a poet because he imitates, and what he imitates are actions” (9.1451b27-29).¹

Tragedy and Aristotle’s *Poetics*

Tragedy came into existence in Athens along with democracy in the late sixth century. Performing and watching a tragedy were political acts, part of the celebration of a festival in honor of the god Dionysus. But the political context and significance of tragedies are not obvious, and are certainly less apparent than that of rhetoric. Though they came into being as Athens became a democracy, modern democracies do not create a central role for tragedy, and Shakespeare’s England and Racine and Corneille’s France were not especially democratic places. The two—tragedy and democracy—are not necessary for one another.

Tragedy, according to Aristotle, has a double origin in nature: We take pleasure in imitating and in seeing or experiencing imitations. While “imitation” is its traditional translation, *mimesis* needn’t mean copying as in the modern word “mimeograph.” Since chapter 2 tells us that tragedy imitates people who are “better than in real life,” tragic imitation cannot be simply copying. *Mimesis* can just as well be translated as representation, depiction, or portrayal. Keeping those options in mind can help make us more flexible in understanding Aristotle’s meaning.

The history of tragedy, according to Aristotle, also had an ending at the time of Sophocles (496-406): “Having passed through many changes, it found its natural form, and there it stopped” (4.1449a15). I will talk about that beginning and ending later, but in between Aristotle traces what he sees as the crucial intermediate stages after the natural beginning in imitating and recognizing imitations :

Poetry now diverged in two directions, according to the individual character of the writers. The graver spirits imitated noble actions, and the actions of good men. The more trivial sort imitated the actions of meaner persons.... Tragedy—as also comedy—was at first mere improvisation. The one originated with the authors of the Dithyramb, the other with those of the phallic songs, which are still in use in many of our cities.... Aeschylus first introduced a second actor; he diminished the importance of the Chorus, and assigned the leading part to the dialogue. Sophocles raised the number of actors to three, and added scene-painting (4.1448b25-1449a18).

Other sources supplement what the Poetics tells us. Tragedies were performed before audiences that could contain half the citizens of Athens, perhaps up to 30,000 people, seated in sections divided according to their membership in political groups and military units. Non-citizens were present too, wealthy foreigners and resident aliens, and maybe—the question is debated—women. They were there to be witnesses to the power and greatness of the city, while the citizens in the audience were in a sense participants: Young men about to begin their military service constituted the chorus, while the citizens in the audience were war veterans. Each year three poets were chosen and each presented three tragedies and a satyr-play—plays that recounted the more grotesque parts of myths and heroic stories—in competition for a prize, as part of a religious and civic celebration in honor of the god Dionysus. The poets were well-known citizens: Aeschylus fought at the battles of Marathon and Salamis, and Sophocles was a general. (The author as professional didn’t yet exist, and the artist as society’s victim or as rebel had yet to be invented.) The importance of these performances to the city is signaled by the fact that poor people

received a public subsidy to allow them to attend, just as they were paid to attend juries and serve in the military. Paying for the actors, the choruses, costumes, etc. was a duty of the wealthy, in the same way that outfitting naval vessels was. (Instead of luxury taxes, the wealthy were expected to make heavy voluntary contributions, and there were penalties if they didn't.)

These facts about tragedy are important reminders that in the Greek world, there were no separate categories of the ethical, the political, the military, the religious, and the aesthetic. They also help us to see what a remarkable book the *Poetics* is. None of the facts in the last paragraph could be found in the *Poetics*. Plato had discussed drama and poetry in relation to the ethical and political effects that acting and watching had, as did Aristotle in the *Politics*. The *Poetics* by contrast seems to be a modern work: It considers only the aesthetic qualities of a work of art and says nothing at all about its ethical and political effects. While dividing our experiences into distinct categories of the political, the ethical, the religious, and the aesthetic is a recent development, Aristotle himself wrote the *Ethics*, the *Politics*, and the *Poetics* as separate works. We might naturally expect those distinct subjects to be covered in different books, but Aristotle separates them within a culture that didn't think of them as separate spheres of activity. Reading the *Poetics*, one would never think that there were gods involved in the stories of most tragedies or that tragedies took place as part of religious festivals. If it is easy for us to think of works of art in such isolation, we need to keep in mind how strange it was for a Greek of Aristotle's time.

Even at the time, Aeschylus (525-456), Sophocles, and, to a lesser extent, Euripides (485-406) were thought the three best tragedians—that is, they won the most prizes. Aeschylus may have written eighty-two plays, of which seven survive. Sophocles is supposed to have written 123 plays, of which seven survive. Euripides, we think, wrote ninety-two plays; seventeen of his tragedies have survived. While much of their dramatic output is lost to us, we do have the two plays Aristotle refers to most often, Sophocles' *Oidipous Tyrannos* (*Oedipus the King*) and Euripides' *Iphigeneia en Taurois* (*Iphigenia Among the Taurians*). By the time Aristotle wrote, Aeschylus had been dead for more than a hundred years, and Sophocles and Euripides for around fifty, but revivals of their plays occurred, so that there was by Aristotle's time some separation of their performances from the original religious and political context, and he could talk about reading plays as well as seeing them performed.

The *Poetics* is probably the most influential of all Aristotle's works. It is famous as the source of the following ideas. Many of them

actually appear in the Poetics, although not with the meaning that most people usually give to them. I will simply state them here and then go on to tie them back to the Poetics and show what I believe Aristotle really said and meant.

- Poetry is an imitation of action.
- Tragedies have to contain a unity of time, place, and action. The action has to take place within a single twenty-four-hour period.
- The plot is the soul of the tragedy.
- The experience of a tragedy is something called a catharsis, the purging of pity and fear.
- A good tragedy has a beginning, a middle, and an end, and has a reversal and discovery.
- Poetry is more philosophical than history.
- Tragedies are caused by a tragic flaw, which is something done by a tragic hero.
- Unlike Plato, who sees art only in terms of its moral and political effects, Aristotle focuses on specifically aesthetic emotions and values.

Consciously or unconsciously, when we read the Poetics we bring with us ideas like these eight, so I will tackle them head on. To give just one example before trying to put all eight into the context of the actual argument of the Poetics, Aristotle says that tragedy is an imitation (*mimesis*) of action. Most readers today would focus on the word “imitation” and wonder whether Aristotle’s emphasis on imitation doesn’t exclude imagination or expression as purposes of poetry. (It is always worth keeping in mind that “depiction” and “representation” convey as much of the meaning of *mimesis* as “imitation” does. *Mimesis* doesn’t have the connotations of copying and mimicking that imitation has for us.) We might read the thesis as “Poetry is an imitation of action”—that is, imitation as opposed to creation, expression, or something else. Aristotle expects his readers to understand it as “Poetry is an imitation of *action*.” *All* making imitates, and imitation is simply the general term for the relation between art and nature. The doctor imitates natural health by using drugs and surgery to produce health in a body that otherwise wouldn’t be healthy. My eyeglasses imitate the concavity and transparency of the natural lens found in a well-functioning human eye. A battle scene in a movie isn’t a real battle scene, but an imitation of one. For Aristotle the idea that all the arts imitate is non-controversial.

On the other hand, just what the object of imitation is is debatable. A well-made drama imitates a single, significant action and doesn’t try to imitate someone’s entire life. In addition, while a tragedy can

represent suffering, it is primarily the representation of action, not suffering. The tragic poet does not imitate earlier tragedies, in the way we could call *Apocalypse Now* an imitation of *Heart of Darkness* or *West Side Story* an imitation of *Romeo and Juliet*. Chapter 1 shows that other arts might imitate character or feelings, but tragedy is the imitation of an action. A tragedy might cause pity and fear, but it doesn't imitate these or other emotions. We of course have a perfect right to ask whether a treatment of art should simply assume that poems are imitations, but we should also remember that Aristotle was asking a different set of questions.

The Program of the Poetics

This introduction is not the place for a line-by-line commentary on the Poetics, but I want to spend a little time looking at the first sentence. "I propose to treat of Poetry in itself and of its various kinds, noting the essential quality of each; to inquire into the structure of the plot as requisite to a good poem; into the number and nature of the parts of which a poem is composed; and similarly into whatever else falls within the same inquiry." This announcement sounds like a college course catalog description but is worth exploring in detail. The first noun is poetry (*he poietike*), and the Greek has two ambiguities we don't see in English. First, *he poietike* is best understood as short for *he poietike technes*, the art of poetry, and it can mean either the study of poetry or poetry itself. But second and more important, "poetry" and related words refer for Aristotle to all products of human making, not just to the works of art we call poems. All human productions are poems, and all manufacturing is poetry. The man-made world is a world of poems! My refrigerator is a poem. The chocolate cake inside it is a poem. Equally, though, Greeks used "poetry" and related words in the narrower sense to refer to the things we call poems, although they included not only drama but music and even dance in this narrower meaning. Aristotle's claim that "the poet or 'maker' should be the maker of plots rather than of verses" (9.1451b27-29) assumes that the word for poet can refer to either, but he thinks it should apply primarily to the poet as maker of the plot. This usage allows "making" to be much broader than "poetry" (including drama) in English.

The first line of the Poetics announces a radical thesis that is easy to overlook. Works of art come in kinds (*eide*; *eidos* in the singular). This sounds uncontroversial. The Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences gives an Oscar for best foreign-language film. Are "foreign

films” a kind of film? Why should works of art be classified into kinds in any stronger sense than that?

Aristotle thinks that works of art come in kinds in a very strong sense. Tragedy, and other genres, have pleasures that are specific to them alone, and a good tragedy is one that achieves the unique pleasure of tragedy in an especially effective way. A work of art should try to achieve the characteristic pleasure of its kind and not aim at other effects on the audience, which will distract from the purpose specific to its kind (14.145 3b 10-12). Knowing what kind of thing a given work of art is enables you to know what is essential and critically important to it and to its evaluation. This is a very radical thesis, and it goes counter to how most of us actually experience works of art.

Think about the last really good movie you saw. What made it good? You might give answers like: “I really like X as an actor, and this was a perfect part for her.” “Every time I thought things were getting predictable, there would be a new twist.” “It was heart-warming ; it revived my faith in the power of love.” None of those would count as a response specific to the kind of art work in question. Unless these kinds of responses are related to the specific concerns of the kind of work of art, they aren’t very informative. Aristotle thinks that in a good tragedy, the other possible emotional experiences and pleasures should not overwhelm the essential tragic pleasure. Why is this one kind of emotion more important than others? What right does he have to tell me which of my emotions count more? If only tragedies can produce the catharsis that is the tragic pleasure (whatever catharsis might mean), does that mean that tragedies should aim at that emotional experience to the exclusion of all others? That seems as arrogant as my saying that since you are the only person in the world who can satisfy my lusts, you should do so.

Aristotle sees the fact that plants and animals in the natural world sort themselves out into kinds as one of the most noteworthy and important properties of nature. If someone asked a biologist how he knew that there were species in nature, and that what look like kinds aren’t just a projection of the scientist’s own need for tidiness, he could answer: Cats and dogs are species because cats come from cats, every time, and the offspring of dogs are dogs, every time. But tragedies don’t come from tragedies; they are made by poets. So Aristotle has to supply an argument to show that works of art have species, or kinds.

Species have functions and powers (“essential quality” in our translation; the Greek is *dynamis*). In biology Aristotle thinks that to be a good dog is to be good at the specific things that makes

something a dog, and a good hammer is a hammer that does well what hammers are designed to do, and he carries that way of thinking over to tragedies: A good tragedy is a tragedy that achieves the specific function of tragedies in a good way. We can't know what a good tragedy is until we know that function, but it is safe to say that liking a drama because "it is heart-warming" or "it revives my faith in the power of love" is from Aristotle's point of view something like thinking that Rex is a terrific dog because his color matches my carpet.

THE DEFINITION OF TRAGEDY

The first section of the Poetics, the first five chapters, lead up to the definition of tragedy in chapter 6: "Tragedy, then, is an imitation of an action that is serious, complete, and of a certain magnitude; in language embellished with each kind of artistic ornament, the several kinds being found in separate parts of the play; in the form of action, not of narrative; through pity and fear effecting the proper purgation of these emotions" (6.1449b25). The first three chapters of the Poetics show how different imitations are distinguished from each other by factors our translation calls the media, objects, and manners of imitation, differences that correspond to Aristotle's material, formal, and moving cause. Tragedies are first distinguished from instrumental music by their use of speech in addition to rhythm and melody. Therefore the phrase in the definition: "in language embellished with each kind of artistic ornament." Tragedy differs from comedy in its formal causes, the objects of its imitation, leading to the first part of the definition: "imitation of an action that is serious, complete, and of a certain magnitude." Tragedies and comedies both imitate people in action, but tragedies depict people who are better than we are, while comedies represent people who are worse (2.1448a1-17). These two distinctions, though, are not enough to separate tragedy from epics such as Homer's Iliad and Odyssey. Chapter 3 does that. In the definition, the manner of imitation is stated as "the several kinds being found in separate parts of the play." A poet can put form and matter together, use words to imitate serious action in two ways: either by narrating the action in his own voice or by dramatically letting the characters speak.

After presenting the definition of tragedy, Aristotle uses the medium, object, and manner of imitation to generate the six parts of tragedy. They are plot, character, thought, diction, melody, and spectacle—in Greek, *mythos*, *ethos*, *dianoia*, *lexis*, *melos*, and *opsis*.

Since tragedy is the imitation of actions, the first part, *mythos*—rendered as “plot” in our translation—is most important, and character and thought are dimensions of the object of imitation subordinate to plot. The medium (the words and music) supplies the next two, more subordinate parts, diction and melody. Finally, the manner—dramatic representation as opposed to narrative—generates the least essential part of all: spectacle. Chapters 7-22 consider those parts one at a time, organizing the discussion around plot, the principal formal part (7-18), and diction, the main material part (19-22). After the definition of tragedy, Aristotle is ready to explain that the plot is the soul of the tragedy.

Unfortunately, there is one more clause in the definition of tragedy, and one more of Aristotle’s four causes unaccounted for. Unlike the others, it’s hard to see where it comes from. The last part of the definition announces the fourth Aristotelian cause, the final cause or purpose: “... through pity and fear effecting the proper purgation of these emotions.” Specifying the first three causes as the medium, object, and manner of imitation might be enough to separate tragedies from all other works of art, but it doesn’t tell us what a tragedy does and what it is for, and therefore doesn’t fully tell us what a tragedy is. The trouble is, where does his mention of “purgation”—in Greek, *katharsis*— come from? I will discuss catharsis more below, but it is worth bearing in mind that the word is also legitimately translated as “clarification” and “purification.” The Poetics doesn’t mention catharsis again. We learn a lot more about pity and fear, and about how tragic plots can evoke these feelings, but nothing at all about how tragic plots can lead to a catharsis of pity and fear.

If the definition of tragedy really is collected from the preceding chapters, catharsis must come from the history of poetry in chapter 4. Two natural pleasures get that history going: the delight in imitating and the pleasure of learning in recognizing imitations. Nature, though, is also encountered at the other end of Aristotle’s history: Through the innovations of Sophocles, “having passed through many changes, [tragedy] found its natural form, and there it stopped” (4.1449a15). To see how nature can be both the beginning and the end of the history, an analogy to the start of Aristotle’s Politics helps. People by nature need to live in groups and naturally form themselves into families. That same impulse toward sociability and the same lack of self-sufficiency pushes people past families into villages, and ultimately some people come to live in cities (*poleis*; *polis* in the singular). The city is the culmination of a natural process; it is itself the most natural of communities, even though Aristotle thinks that only a small minority of people in fact live in cities. Humans are

political animals—that is, people who belong in cities—because the *polis* is the most self-sufficient, natural, and best form of community.

In the same way, the history of tragedy Aristotle offers in the *Poetics* starts from a pair of universal human impulses and ends with tragedy attaining a natural form. Tragedies, like cities, are self-sufficient and natural because they mark the culmination of a natural development. The purpose of the *polis* is to allow people to live the fullest possible human life. The *polis* doesn't have some purpose outside itself. The natural forms of the *polis* and of tragedy give each its purpose. The purpose of a cow is to live and function as a cow, not to supply material for my dinner. In a similar way, the purpose of a tragedy will not be like the purpose of a saw or a refrigerator—what it can be used for—but what important human good it supplies. What kind of inherently valuable experience can a tragedy provide?

If we see political participation as a means toward getting rich, we aren't treating it as something worthwhile on its own. In the same way, if we treat tragedies as the occasion for reflection on the human condition or as an opportunity to be seen with a better class of people, then we aren't viewing the tragedy as worthwhile in its own right. On the other hand, that it should be judged on its own doesn't mean that it is without ethical meaning or political effect, only that we can learn something about tragedy without thinking about those effects. After all, Aristotelian virtuous actions are their own end, but they benefit others too. In the same way, Aristotle's idea of tragedy as an object of value in its own right is not like accounts of beauty that distinguish aesthetic value completely from ethical value, as lawns are considered beautiful because no useful crop grows on the land, and lyric poems are beautiful because they exhibit a use of language that rises above mundane purposes. A catharsis, the pleasurable emotional response to a tragedy, can also have ethical and political effects, but those effects are not the standard for judging tragedies because those consequences do not exhaust the value of a tragedy. Catharsis must be the name for the self-sufficient experience, the proper pleasure, of tragedy.

CATHARSIS

The catharsis of pity and fear is the specific tragic emotion, an experience that can be caused only by tragedies. Catharsis is translated as "clarification," "purification," and "purgation," among other things, but none of those names by themselves explain what Aristotle is talking about. Scholars dispute whether the catharsis of pity and fear means that those emotions are purged from the

audience, or whether they are clarified and made pure. Aristotle promises to talk more about catharsis but, at least in the *Poetics* as it has come down to us, never does. The place to start is the observation that while people of course experience pity and fear themselves in response to real people as well as fictional events, the tragic catharsis is unique to the experience of these works of art (14.1453bl-13). The pity and fear we feel in response to the story of Oedipus is no different from what those emotions are like when we're responding to an actual person, even though we don't act on our feelings as we might if they were responses to a real person. But the catharsis and proper pleasure are felt only in response to a tragic plot, not to real events. The catharsis we experience in watching a performance of Oedipus the King has no counterpart in our reactions to actual events. But if we cannot use similar emotions felt toward real events to understand catharsis, how can we understand it?

We can understand catharsis by approaching it from its two sources. First, chapter 4 argues that the pleasures specific to different kinds of poetry come from the pleasures we take in seeing imitations and in imitating. (As Plato does, Aristotle wants to know about the experience of being not only a spectator to drama, but a participant as well. If they survive, the young warriors who dance in the chorus will someday be the veterans who sit in the audience.) Second, we have emotional reactions to actual people and actions. We pity real people who suffer undeservedly, and we fear painful things that happen to others that we think could happen to us. The catharsis doesn't imitate the pity and fear felt in response to actual events. It is a pleasurable emotion felt in response to an imitation of pitiful and frightening actions. Therefore it somehow combines its two emotional sources: pity and fear, and the pleasures of imitation. To know more about catharsis, Aristotle turns his attention to the kinds of plot that best provide it.

THE PLOT IS THE SOUL OF THE TRAGEDY

"Every play contains Spectacular elements as well as Character, Plot, Diction, Song, and Thought. But most important of all is the structure of the incidents.... The plot, then, is the first principle, and, as it were, the soul of a tragedy" (6.1450a 13-39). To understand this famous remark, we need to know what Aristotle means by soul. A soul is what makes a living thing different from a corpse. Trying to give a helpful analogy, Aristotle says in his psychology that if eyes had souls, vision would be the soul of the eye. A soul of a tragedy is what makes it live.

Cows differ from goats not because they are made of different materials, but because they have different kinds of soul. The soul of a tragedy is what makes it the kind of thing it is. You and I have two different human souls; two plays about Electra and Orestes will have different plots. Aristotle thinks that looking at tragedy will illuminate art in general; looking at plots will illuminate the essence of tragedy. In the *Politics* he shows how music imitates character, but because tragedy imitates actions, the plot is more important to tragedy's proper effects than character.

The discussion of plot begins in chapter 7 with a look at what a plot has to be like to be "complete, and whole, and of a certain magnitude," as the definition of tragedy demands. Probability and necessity, another pair of terms that Aristotle doesn't define in the *Poetics*, are the basic ideas that let us understand seriousness, completeness or unity, and magnitude. The probable (*eikos*), as Aristotle uses it, doesn't have anything to do with the modern idea of probability as a quantity that measures frequency of occurrence over a long run. In both the *Poetics* and the *Rhetoric*, what is probable is what is thought likely by the audience. It is what is believable, credible, plausible. Both rhetorical persuasion and tragedy deal with human action, a field without scientific necessities, and so the necessary means something more like the inevitable. Once it happens, we feel that it is the culmination of what came before.

Aristotle begins by discussing "the proper structure of the Plot" (7.1450b21). A tragedy has to imitate a "whole" action, and in explaining what a whole action is, Aristotle makes the famous assertion that "a whole is that which has a beginning, a middle, and an end" (7.1450b26). Then he defines them. "A beginning is that which does not itself follow anything by causal necessity, but after which something naturally is or comes to be. An end, on the contrary, is that which itself naturally follows some other thing, either by necessity, or as a rule, but has nothing following it. A middle is that which follows something as some other thing follows it" (7.1450b27-32). Human actions as they actually occur don't have beginnings and endings in this way; we are always in the middle. Any act can be seen and experienced as a beginning (I did it because I chose to) or as an end (I did it because of a sequence of experiences that led me to this particular choice). The plot gives shape, magnitude, and unity to actions that they don't have outside the work of art. The Greeks never referred to real events as tragic; they reserved the word for dramas. Aristotle looks for properties of tragedy that aren't derived from the actions imitated: If a play fails because the poet chose the wrong beginning point for the action, it's no excuse to

say that that's where the real action, the object of imitation, started. As with catharsis, the terms "beginning," "middle," and "end," and the unity of a whole action, apply to plays and thereby not to life.

Buried in the contrast to epic in chapter 5 is a remark—"Tragedy endeavours, as far as possible, to confine itself to a single revolution of the sun, or but slightly to exceed this limit; whereas the Epic action has no limits of time" (5.1449b 12-14) -that became the source of the idea that the Poetics demanded the "three unities," unity of time, place, and action. Chapters 7-11 elaborate a more supple and complicated idea of the unity of the tragic plot than that: The tragedy has to imitate a single action. The criteria for singleness and unity are specifically dramatic standards: There is nothing in the object imitated that comes labeled as a single or unified action, although of course some actions are better candidates for a successful mimesis than others, which is why tragedians keep coming back to the same set of stories. A tragedy imitates a single action, but it is the job of the poet to create the unity of action.

In chapter 9, Aristotle makes the famous statement that poetry is more philosophical than history is. It is more philosophical because it is governed by probability and necessity, rather than by what actually happened in a particular case. Probability and necessity apply to generalities: It is likely that this sort of person would respond in this way to this event. At the end of chapter 24 Aristotle says that the poet should prefer "probable impossibilities to improbable possibilities." That means that if something happened that the poet cannot make believable, it won't do simply to justify it by saying that that's what really happened. If someone hit four home runs in his major league debut and then died of a heart attack circling the bases for the last time, this probably wouldn't make a good drama because it is hard to make it believable. This is the difference between poetry and history.

While more philosophical than history, poetry is not the same as philosophy. Aristotle doesn't suggest that tragedies discover new philosophical truths. Trying to find in tragedy some moral lessons—pride cometh before a fall; moral conflict lies at the heart of moral experience ; even the best people are vulnerable to changes of fortune outside their control—turns tragic stories into rhetorical examples. Aristotle says that only the "weakness of the spectators" leads to the desire for poetic justice (13.1453a31-35). While the experience of a tragedy is an intensely cognitive one, the audience will not learn anything beyond what they already know. We will have to try to understand how experiencing tragedy is a mode of knowing without there being any lessons to be learned.

While tragedy imitates action, the audience does not respond by

imitating anything, as happens with a story that serves as a persuasive example. Plato worried that spectators would imitate the characters in a drama. Although of course one could imitate Antigone standing up to unjust authority or Medea avenging herself for mistreatment, these would be not responses to the tragedies and their plots, but to characters and thoughts. When plot becomes central, imitation drops out as a way of responding. The more we focus on the characters in a drama and treat them as models, the less we are open to the proper pleasures and effects of tragedy itself.

Because the poet, unlike the philosopher, has nothing new to teach, it is tempting to think that the power of poetry and rhetoric lie in their ability to repackage conventional wisdom in new and emotionally convincing ways. Different poets have learned to base their different plots on the same set of stories, mostly involving fights within royal families (13.145 3a 17-22). A tragedy about Ajax can't picture him as a coward, since the audience knows that he was brave. But different tragedies take the same material—what everybody knows about Ajax—and construct different plots about him. A good tragedy about Ajax differs from a bad one not by a better use of language but by constructing a different and better plot based on the same original story. Therefore Aristotle says that what makes someone a poet is his plots, not his language (9.1451b27-29). Different stories about Ajax have different plots, just as Socrates and I have different souls.

REVERSAL AND RECOGNITION

A tragedy imitates a single significant action, and the demands of unity and magnitude require that the plot of a tragedy should show someone undergoing a major change of fortune. Three principal devices of plot can effectively depict such a change: reversal, discovery, and *hamartia*, an error or weakness. Chapter 11 defines reversal and recognition, but not *hamartia*. “Reversal of the Situation is a change by which the action veers round to its opposite, subject always to our rule of probability or necessity” (11.1452a23). Where reversal is an external change, recognition is a change within the mind of the tragic agent. “Recognition, as the name indicates, is a change from ignorance to knowledge, producing love or hate between the persons destined by the poet for good or bad fortune” (11.1452a30).

All tragedies, and maybe all dramas, involve a change of fortune, but not all of them contain reversals. In the best tragedies, “the most powerful elements of emotional interest in Tragedy—Peripeteia or

Reversal of the Situation, and Recognition scenes-are parts of the plot” (6.1450a33). Good tragedies integrate the plot, the sequence of actions, with emotional power. In inferior plays, the story and the emotional impact are distinct. In what Aristotle calls a simple plot, without reversal and recognition, things simply follow each other, but in the complex plot, things follow from each other. As the sequence of incidents develops, each succeeding event becomes more and more inevitable. “It makes all the difference whether any given event is a case of *propterhoc* or *posthoc*” (10.1452a22)-that is, because of something else or merely after something else.

Even when the reversal or recognition is a surprise, in a good tragedy it will be governed by probability or necessity.

Tragedy is an imitation not only of a complete action, but of events inspiring fear or pity. Such an effect is best produced when the events come on us by surprise; and the effect is heightened when, at the same time, they follow as cause and effect. The tragic wonder will then be greater than if they happened of themselves or by accident ; for even coincidences are most striking when they have an air of design (9.1452a1-5).

HAMARTIA: THE TRAGIC FLAW

Every tragedy contains a change of fortune from good to bad: What is unique about reversals that exist only in complex plots? An answer begins to emerge in chapter 13, where Aristotle introduces the idea of the *hamartia*- “error or frailty” in our translation (13.1453a10)an apparently important idea that the Poetics never defines. Hamartia is the solution to a problem that the tragic author faces. If the fall from good to bad fortune is a piece of luck that has nothing to do with the protagonist, we don’t experience the change as tragic but as monstrous (14.1453b9). On the other hand, if the fall comes from something that is the character’s fault, then he only gets what he deserves, and there is nothing to pity or fear there either. So a tragedy has to represent a change from good to bad fortune that happens to a good but imperfect man because of something that he does, but does in such a way that his fall is undeserved. A hamartia is the kind of mistake that can fit into the narrow demands of tragedy itself. According to chapter 5, tragedy evolved out of poetry that praises heroes and famous men. just as comedy narrowed its focus from the laughable in general to harmless forms of ugliness, poets writing tragedies limited themselves to depicting the errors that allow someone respectable to fall while staying respectable. A *hamartia* has

to be an innocent enough mistake that we don't blame the agent, yet serious enough that he doesn't fully escape responsibility. Hamartia is the solution to the problem of reversal, how a change of fortune from good to bad can be tragic and evoke the tragic emotions of pity and fear.

The rest of the Poetics follows the same pattern of thought. Given the definition of tragedy, how can the different parts of tragedy—plot, character, thought, diction, melody, and spectacle—contribute to making a good tragedy? Aristotle highlights the different factors involved in moving from an abstract definition of tragedy in general to particular tragedies. For example, Medea is a tragedy without reversal, but it is still a great play, because the poet has constructed a powerfully moving plot from the story of a woman killing her children in an act of revenge. There can be no single model for the best tragedy, but an open future of opportunities for writers and audiences.

WHY READ THE POETICS TODAY?

The better I think I understand the Poetics, the more remote it seems from a set of rules for literary criticism or of instructions for poets. Part of the appeal of some of the clichés I started with, such as the tragic flaw and the three unities, comes from simplifying the Poetics into something more useful for those purposes. Instead, as its first lines indicate, Aristotle thinks that by focusing on this single kind of drama, we will learn a lot about poetry in general, and maybe about “making” (*poiêsis*) as a fundamental human activity.

One of the challenges the Poetics offers, then, is its focus on kinds of art, not art in general, and not a set of particularly revealing masterworks. Looking at drama in general might lead us to find significance in overall powers of empathy and sympathy that works of art can create in a viewer; Aristotle's word for such feelings is *philanthropia*, love of human beings. Or we can find that the insights of Hamlet or War and Peace explore something essential about the human condition. Aristotle has a different idea. While any good work of art might stimulate feelings of empathy, only tragedies produce the catharsis of pity and fear. He says in his conclusion that “each art ought to produce, not any chance pleasure, but the pleasure proper to it” (26.1462b14). That seems to me a highly debatable claim. It is worth seeing whether Aristotle is actually justified in making it.

The Poetics has something else to offer to us today. I began with a list of eight clichés that people commonly bring to Poetics, but I

haven't said anything about the last one. People often draw a contrast between Plato and Aristotle. Plato sees art only in terms of its moral and political effects, while Aristotle supposedly focuses on specifically aesthetic emotions and values. True, Aristotle insists that tragedies should aim at their own proper pleasures and should be judged by how well they achieve the specific tragic experience, but those feelings are not completely separate from the rest of human moral experience. The Poetics brings off the difficult job of showing the autonomy of art—that is, it refuses to judge tragedy as history or philosophy would be judged, as technical skill or as delivery device for important moral lessons—without denying the centrality of tragedy to ethical and political experience. The goodness of a tragedy is not to be measured by what it contributes to moral or political well-being. Tragedy imitates actions in which a good person suffers bad fortune, and so our experience of tragedy must be a moral experience, not one based on the idea of art for art's sake or a disinterested pleasure in beauty. Aristotle orients us to seeing the goodness of tragedy in what it is, not what it might lead to. The experience of tragedy has no moral lessons for its audience, but the philosophical examination of tragedy in the Poetics reveals a great deal to its audience about human beings. The Poetics shows someone taking poetry very seriously as a central human experience without regarding it as an especially powerful means to some further political or moral end. Aristotle doesn't invite us to worry about what tragedy is good for. Given that we take tragedy so seriously (or at least that his Greek audience did), what does that fact tell us about ourselves?

As I read it, the Poetics has to bring off a difficult balancing act. Making and experiencing tragic drama have to be important human phenomena. Yet the value of tragedy cannot be in how useful it is for some moral purpose outside itself. The value of tragedy has to be located in the experience itself and not in what it leads to, but that value still has to be a moral value, not a disinterested aesthetic value. In the Ethics Aristotle shows two things about the moral virtues. They are designed to achieve a further good outside themselves; I act generously so that you can benefit from my gift. But a generous act is good even if it doesn't lead to the benefits I expected to give. Generosity is simply a good way to live. The Poetics speaks about only one side of tragedy; it stays frustratingly silent about what further good actions it could lead to—whether, for example, one's capacity for feeling pity and fear is now directed toward the right objects, or whether we feel pity and fear more than before, or less. In the Poetics Aristotle shows only the less obvious side of tragedy as a moral experience: If the insights I see in a tragedy don't lead to an improvement in my behavior, it is still of moral value because having

the right experience of tragedy is part of a complete human life.

Rhetoric in Greece

The Greeks told many stories about the origins of rhetoric, the art of persuasive speech. My favorite locates its start as a response to tyranny in a Greek city in Sicily. Syracuse was ruled by such thorough tyrants that they controlled every possible source of power in their city. They were shrewd enough to recognize that the power of speech could be a threat, so they monopolized it too. Since people weren't allowed to talk to each other, they developed means of communicating through gestures of their feet, hands, and eyes. Eventually, with Zeus' help, the people were able to overthrow the tyrants and establish a democracy.

The citizens of this new democracy had to redistribute the property that the tyrants had confiscated. The assembled citizens had to decide who owned what, and parties to the dispute then had to persuade the public that they were in the right. Democracy made rhetoric necessary. Tyrants used force, but democrats persuaded each other.

The experience of tyranny marked the citizens of Syracuse. Now that they were able to speak, they didn't abandon the skills they had developed of communicating by gesture. Instead, they discovered ways of incorporating gestures into the speaking they were once again able to do by inventing figurative language, producing pleasurable metaphors and balanced sentences that supply rhythm and shape to prose. Poetry had of course made use of such devices, but their use in persuasion and political argument was novel. One citizen, Corax, mastered the crowd through new, technical devices with names like introduction, narrative, argument, digression, and epilogue.

Corax was not only a rhetorician successful at persuading the people; he also became a teacher, showing others how to become rhetoricians. One of his students, Tisias, couldn't pay in advance but instead promised to pay double the usual fee later. When his lessons were over, he refused to pay, and Corax took him to court. Tisias defended himself by saying that if he lost the lawsuit, then he clearly hadn't learned to speak persuasively and shouldn't have to pay, since that would show that Corax hadn't taught him anything. And of course if he won, he wouldn't have to pay. Corax replied that if he won, he should collect, but if he lost, he should collect too, because if his pupil was more persuasive than he, that would be proof that he

had taught him well.

This story shows that rhetoric is an ability to argue both sides of a question. Rhetoric's moral and intellectual values can be questioned—and are sometimes, on the contrary, celebrated—because it can prove opposites. Aristotle gives the example of a fight between a strong and a weak man in which each accuses the other of starting it. The weak will argue that it isn't likely that a weak man would start it, since he will clearly lose; the strong can argue that it isn't likely that he started it, since he would obviously be blamed (11.24.1402a17).

Not only does the story of Corax and Tisias make fun of the power of rhetoric to argue both sides of an issue—a power so impressive that we need mockery as a way of response; the ability to argue both sides of a question makes it possible to question the relations between argument and truth, and so opens up much more subtle considerations of how argument works—it also mocks the assumption that rhetoric is purely a skill, without moral implications. Tisias may have learned eloquence from Corax, but he didn't learn honesty. Did Corax fail as a teacher because his student tried to outsmart him rather than behave decently, proving that Corax taught only the skill of rhetoric and neglected its moral dimension? The history of rhetoric will give a range of answers to this question.

There is more that I want to tease out from this story to envision the problems of rhetoric. While in this case democracy needs rhetoric, at other times rhetoric leads to democracy or away from it. Rhetoric is a practice and a technique—Aristotle defines it as a *dynamis*, a power—and there is nothing inherently democratic or anti-democratic about it. The rise of modern democracy starting in the eighteenth century accompanied a decrease in the teaching of rhetoric and its replacement by scientific studies of society and human nature. Still, the Greek association of rhetoric and democracy is worth taking seriously, even though we aren't entitled to say anything as simple as that rhetoric is the friend or the enemy of democracy.

Corax's persuasive speech was elegant and artificial; it had an obvious structure of introduction, narrative, argument, etc., and used lots of metaphors and other figures of speech. Because stylized speech persuades, the power to plead is also always the power to deceive as well as to enlighten. Speakers will disguise their artifice and try to appear as though their speaking is natural. We are going to have to try to understand just why elegant speech persuades. Exactly what is the persuasive value of a phrase like Lincoln's "government of the people, by the people, and for the people"? Why is Jefferson's claim that "the tree of liberty must be replenished from time to time with the blood of patriots and tyrants" more persuasive than a statement that the

preservation of freedom sometimes requires sacrifices and even demands that we sometimes be willing to die and to kill? Lincoln's phrasing and Jefferson's metaphor certainly make things more memorable, but why does elegant phrasing make their statements persuasive? Different explanations of the persuasive power of artificial, elegant, well-constructed speech will lead to very different pictures of rhetoric.

Starting from this legendary foundation of rhetoric, there has always been an intimate relation between the practice and the teaching of rhetoric. And from the first, there has been an intimate relation between rhetoric and moral goodness. Corax failed as a teacher if Tisias wouldn't pay him what he owed. An art of rhetoric might sacrifice truth in order to aim at victory; on the other hand, people sometimes think that free competition is the best route to truth. Finally, from the beginning rhetoric has existed with a tension between language as a means of cooperation, which held democracy together and was a method of dispute-resolution that was superior to force, and speech as a means of competition, in which the clever speaker could obtain a victory.

The story of Corax and his student is enough to make clear the deepest paradoxes of rhetoric. When there is disagreement, persuasion is offered as an alternative to force as a way of settling disputes, making us rational animals. But quickly people find that speech can also be an especially effective kind of coercion. Rhetoric always has these two sides: as a preferred means of resolving disagreements, superior to force, endowed with moral value, and connected to the moral values of practical wisdom; and as a weapon alongside more obvious kinds of force.

Aristotle's Rhetoric

The reader of the *Poetics* has to fight against a list of clichés that shape our pre-conceptions about what the *Poetics* is about. The *Rhetoric's* reader has to face the prejudices that rhetoric is manipulative, that rhetoric and reason are enemies, that rhetoric is just another form of coercion, and that because rhetoric is artful, it is dishonest. Just as my clichés about the *Poetics* were half truths, these worries about rhetoric are only one side of a continuing argument. The story of Corax and Tisias might lead us to expect Aristotle, like any right-thinking person, to fight against the power of rhetoric, but he does no such thing.

While I tried to separate Aristotle's ideas from what others have made of the Poetics, in the Rhetoric we have to face permanent ambiguities about the relation between rhetoric, manipulation, and reason, and ask what the Rhetoric can tell us about them.

The Rhetoric speaks to us today because we have to face the same problems about practical intelligence in a democracy that people did in Aristotle's time. But in one way today we have a different orientation toward rhetoric than Aristotle's Greek audience had, and it is worth making that difference clear before showing how Aristotle confronts the problem. Democracy has appeared twice in history—once briefly in Greece for a couple of generations before Aristotle's time (to be mostly extinguished by the rule of his pupil Alexander the Great and his successors), and then again in western Europe and North America starting in the eighteenth century. Ancient Greek democracy was direct democracy, while modern democracies are representative democracies. In Greek society which didn't have lawyers or elected representatives, in which citizens were constantly taking each other to court and regarded lawsuits as entertainment, and in which political decisions were made by ordinary citizens arguing with each other—the natural first question to ask about rhetoric was: How can I do this well? In modern representative democracies, where citizens can vote but most don't otherwise engage in political activity, and where professional lawyers represent clients, the natural first question is, how can I protect myself against skilful rhetoricians? Therefore, today we study rhetoric as a matter of how to avoid being fooled—something like consumer protection and defensive driving. Aristotle's readers needed to know how to defend themselves against unscrupulous speakers too, but their ambition made them focus on how to engage successfully in the central civic activities of accusing and defending, recommending a policy, and proving and refuting ideas. The question of the relation between rhetoric and morality looks different with this change in orientation.

There were teachers of rhetoric before Aristotle, and he criticizes them in the second paragraph of the first chapter for concentrating on non-essentials and missing the only thing that truly belongs within the art of rhetoric, reasoning.

The framers of the current treatises on rhetoric have constructed but a small portion of that art. The modes of persuasion [*pisteis*, which can also be translated as “proofs” or even “beliefs”] are the only true constituents of the art: everything else is merely accessory. These writers, however, say nothing about enthymemes, which are the substance [soma, body] of rhetorical persuasion [*pistis* again, singular this time], but deal mainly with non-essentials. The arousing of

prejudice, pity, anger, and similar emotions has nothing to do with the essential facts, but is merely a personal appeal to the man who is judging the case (I.I. 1354a11-18).

Claiming that reasoning is the heart of rhetoric is one of the most audacious things in this book, and we will need to try to understand it carefully. (We will need to understand it carefully especially because, as we will see, Aristotle also says that there are three means of persuasion—reason, character, and emotion—and even says that of these, the speaker's character is the most authoritative.) Maybe Aristotle doesn't like speakers to arouse "prejudice, pity, anger, and similar emotions," and maybe we shouldn't like them either, but they are surely very effective in persuasion. At a minimum, Aristotle's insistence on proofs as the center of rhetoric shows that he is willing to say that most people misunderstand rhetoric, since most people would not rate the role of reasoning in persuasion that highly. Aristotle will say that most people misunderstand rhetoric in spite of the fact that persuading is a basic and common human activity. When I told the story of Corax, I raised the question of why eloquent speech is persuasive. The beginning of the *Rhetoric* asks even more penetrating questions: Why do people find reasoning persuasive? How effective is reasoning in persuading? How effective should it be? Can reason really be more powerful than people think?

The books marketed by rhetoric teachers before Aristotle were not complete presentations of what they had to teach but advertisements designed to attract people to the more expensive oral teaching they relied on. They would sell sample speeches or basic outlines. People wrote handbooks that tried to make the art of eloquence more widely available. Soon these handbooks became a discipline and tradition that regularized that teaching. The art of rhetoric, they announced, had five parts: invention, arrangement, style, memory, and delivery. What I think is most interesting is the fact that all five of these in fact persuade people. We should look carefully at how. Then I think we'll be in a better position to assess Aristotle's thesis that reasoning is the heart of persuasion.

It is no surprise that delivery leads to persuasion: The skills of an actor—the words for actor and for delivery both come from a Greek word, *hypocrisis*, most closely related to the modern English word "hypocrite"—keep the audience's attention, get people to feel the right emotions at the right times, etc. But delivery is more than a means to persuasion; a good delivery is itself a reason to believe someone. Poise is evidence of self-control and intelligence. While the skilled actor can pretend to have self-confidence grounded in knowledge and experience, such self-confidence is also a good sign of a trustworthy

leader.

Next, having a good memory can be persuasive too, not just because it helps the speaker remember what she is supposed to say, but because if I have a good memory, that shows that I am on top of the subject, know my way around it, keep a clear head, and don't get distracted. Therefore people with good memories are persuasive and believable. Like delivery, memory is both a sign of practical intelligence and a teachable skill distinct from practical intelligence. As Corax discovered, style and arrangement are persuasive too. We believe people who use impressive metaphors and other figures of speech, and who know what belongs in an introduction, what in a narration, and what in a conclusion.

Finally, and most surprisingly, knowing the right thing to say, grasping the relevant precedents, finding the important consequences of different choices—inventing, as Aristotle says, the available means of persuasion—is persuasive. The more we care and want to reach the right decision, the more we hope to be persuaded by intelligence rather than arrangement, style, memory, and delivery. If we are consumers choosing different brands of a product that either aren't really very different or aren't worth our effort in finding out their differences, we might be charmed by an amusing or stylish advertisement, but when the decision matters, we want to hear arguments. Of course, there is nothing automatic that insures that we actually will be more persuaded by reasons than by other sources of persuasion. But no one facing an important decision is going to say, "I'd prefer to put my fate in the hands of someone who has mastered the art of presentation instead of someone intelligent and thoughtful."

How exactly do arguments persuade? "Since he's been a success at building a profitable business, he will be good at being a senator." "Since trying to appease Hitler in the 1930s backfired, we know that it is never good to appease aggressors." "Since standing up to aggressors backfired in 1914, we know that appeasement works." "If I have to balance my household budget, shouldn't the government have to balance its budget?" "We used to think that discrimination on the basis of race was all right. We now know better. Isn't it time to treat women equally, just as we've learned to treat people of different races equally?" All these are arguments—they are examples of what Aristotle will call enthymemes, a term I will explain soon—or the basis for arguments, although not necessarily good arguments. You might think that none of them should be persuasive, but they are arguments. If you're not impressed, then you have a counter-argument to offer. When appeals like these work, speakers and hearers share some reasons for coming to a decision. I am persuaded by reasons

because I want my own decisions to be rational, and I can accept someone else's reasons as my own.

These typical and not terribly impressive arguments raise a further question: How much of our decision-making should be determined by argument? If they are bad arguments, is the solution to produce better ones? Aristotle says that reasoning—what he names the “enthymeme,” the rhetorical equivalent of a syllogism—is the center of the art of rhetoric. We now have two questions: Is reasoning really central to persuasion? Should it be?

The rhetorical devices of delivery, memory, style, arrangement, and invention persuade us because we take them as grounds for trusting the speaker. Eloquence, Hobbes says, is “seeming prudence,” apparent practical wisdom. Although you don't have to know Greek to understand Aristotle, here is one place where it helps. The same Greek word, *pistis*, can be translated as belief, trust, faith, and conviction, and also as persuasion. The Rhetoric asserts a strong connection between trust, reason, and persuasion. Of course the fact that the Greek language associates these words is no proof that they are connected, and Aristotle's criticism of earlier handbooks in the first chapter indicates that these ties between trust, reason, and persuasion were no more obvious to the Greeks than they are to us.

Persuasion [*pistis*] is clearly a sort of demonstration, since we are most fully persuaded [*pisteuomen*] when we consider a thing to have been demonstrated. The orator's demonstration is an enthymeme, and this is, in general, the most effective of the modes of persuasion [*pisteon*] (Rhetoric 1.1.1 355a4-7).

In his psychology he draws a similar connection between persuasion and reasoning:

All opinion requires conviction [*pistis*], conviction implies being persuaded [*pepeithail*, and persuasion implies discourse [*logos*]. Every belief follows conviction, conviction follows being persuaded, persuasion follows reason.... (*DeAnima* III.3.428a19-24).

Therefore Aristotle will call the enthymeme the “body” of persuasion (the “substance of rhetorical persuasion” in our translation), just as he called the plot the soul of the tragedy. Aristotle thinks that the most persuasive features of rhetoric are as persuasive as they are because they track practical intelligence. As the lawsuit between Corax and Tisias showed, rhetoric and practical intelligence bear a permanently contested relation to each other. Some later theorists, especially in Roman times, identified eloquence with practical wisdom. Others saw a complete separation between the skills of deciding what is best to do and the skills of persuading others to

agree. The Rhetoric offers a more complex interrelation.

Rhetoric masquerades as political science, and the professors of it as political experts—sometimes from want of education, sometimes from ostentation, sometimes owing to other human failings. As a matter of fact, it is a branch of dialectic and similar to it.... Neither rhetoric nor dialectic is the scientific study of any one separate subject : both are faculties for providing arguments (1.2.1356a27-34).

But there's more to persuasive power than practical intelligence, and more to practical intelligence than rhetorical power. The Ethics teaches that no one can be practically wise without possessing the virtues of character as well. Therefore, in deciding whom to trust, we look to more than practical intelligence; we want signs of moral goodness. In the opening section of the Rhetoric, Aristotle says that we look for three properties in a speaker that contribute to belief, apart from the cogency of the reasoning itself: "There are three things which inspire confidence in the orator's own character—the three, namely, that induce us to believe a thing apart from any proof of it: good sense [*phronesis*, also translated as practical wisdom, practical reason], good moral character [*arete*, virtue], and goodwill [*eunoia*]" (II.1.1378a6-9). When I am trying to make a sound practical decision, I try to deliberate intelligently, and therefore when I listen to someone else trying to persuade me, I look for evidence of intelligence at work. In the Ethics Aristotle says that "on any important decision we deliberate together because we do not trust ourselves (*apistountes*, another word that comes from *pistis*)" (111.3.1112b10-11). But deciding whom to trust is more complicated than deliberating for myself. I also have to make sure that the speaker and I share ends—therefore I look for moral character in the speaker—and I need to know that he or she is on my side and has goodwill toward me. I try to be persuaded by the same practical intelligence that I hope to use for myself.

But there is another, less optimistic, moral to draw as well. There is no technique that is reserved to the person who actually has and is using practical intelligence. That is why eloquence is a ground for both trust and suspicion. Not only is rhetoric a response to democracy in ways that my story of Corax and Tisias illustrates, but the Rhetoric is itself a peculiarly Aristotelian response to democracy. Democracy, after all, is an intellectual scandal, and rhetoric is a major part of what makes democracy intellectually troubling.

Here is the case against democracy to which the Rhetoric will respond. Democracy allows people without any intellectual credentials to make authoritative decisions. As Socrates poses the question to Protagoras, one of the leading rhetoricians of his time, if we wouldn't

decide issues of medicine or architecture by majority vote, why should we rely on such a decision procedure when it comes to important issues such as whether to go to war against Sparta, whether to have an alliance with Corinth, or whether to extend citizenship to rich resident aliens? Plato saw rhetoric as persuasion of the ignorant by the ignorant. Thucydides, writing a couple of generations before Aristotle, said that “for most people, searching for the truth is an indifferent activity; they incline to what is simply available” (History of the Peloponnesian War 1.11). In the twentieth century, Joseph Schumpeter raises a similar problem: “The typical citizen drops down to a lower level of mental performance as soon as he enters the political field. He argues and analyzes in a way which he would readily recognize as infantile within the sphere of his real interests. He becomes a primitive again” (Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, New York: Harper, 1942, p. 262).

These charges ring true. My university colleagues are dedicated and successful scientists and scholars. In their fields of expertise they cautiously weigh competing arguments and give different pieces of evidence the weight they deserve. But at a faculty meeting concerning the athletic program, they fall back on assertions without the same attention to evidence—for example, “sports builds characters—and the evidence they offer is purely anecdotal, not at all up to the standards they would themselves demand in their own fields. It is easy then to think of democracy as the aggregation of prejudices or preferences, with no room for intelligence. The more irrational I think democracy, the more irrational I will also think rhetoric. If there’s no place for rationality in democracy, then the only thing rhetoric can do is excite those competing prejudices and preferences. If, however, democracy is a collective exercise of practical intelligence, then we will need to persuade each other through good reasons.

The Rhetoric is a subtle response to the challenge that expertise poses to democracy. Aristotle begins with a defense, and then an elaboration, of the ordinary intelligence of citizens making political decisions, confronting the perennial attacks of people from Plato to Schumpeter. Everyone defends himself, accuses others, and upholds and attacks beliefs. Since, Aristotle goes on, everyone persuades, by experience or habit, there must be some way of doing it intelligently—that is, by an art.

WHAT IS RHETORIC? A THOUGHT-EXPERIMENT

The Rhetoric is so different from what a contemporary reader

probably expects that it's helpful to start with a thought-experiment. Since we all deliberate about the future, accuse and defend each other, and try to demonstrate and refute different ideas, how can we do it well? What is it to persuade and be persuaded intelligently? Imagine that you and some friends are deliberating together about how to work together to help a sick friend. The stakes are high; it's important to get the best decision possible. Assume goodwill all around, and assume that everyone has a common interest in the best result for all. How would you try to talk to your friends? How would you want them to talk to you? What are the kinds of talk you would especially want to avoid? Among the answers to these questions would be considerations like these:

- Since you are making a decision about something concerning which there's no certainty, you would want to explore several different possibilities.
- You would want the best view possible of the consequences of different choices, including their costs and benefits.
- You would want to know what had happened in similar situations in the past.
- You would want to keep on track and not be distracted by things that aren't really relevant to the decision.
- You would recognize that frequently people make bad decisions because their vision is clouded by emotions, although that doesn't mean that a good decision should be unemotional.
- You would want people's arguments to be easy to follow and understand, so that you could be sure you knew just what you were asked to agree to.
- You would want the importance of the decision to be reflected in the care with which you make it; all deliberation has to come to an end so that you can act, even though there is always more to think about.
- At least most of the time, you wouldn't want a view to have too much weight simply because of the person who expressed the view, rather than how useful and insightful the view was.
- You would notice that all practical reasoning is goal-directed, and that those goals sort themselves out into three main classes. We argue about what it is best to do: What is the most *useful* course of action we can adopt? Sometimes, instead, we argue about justice, and indeed insist that justice and utility are separate practical values. We debate about whether someone is guilty or innocent of a crime. Finally, we sometimes reason about and offer competing accounts of goodness, especially goodness of character, which is not reducible to either justice or utility. In a funeral eulogy, we may praise someone, even

though his courage and sense of honor led to a disastrous military defeat. Arguments appropriate in one context might not be relevant in another.

One could go on and pretend to “deduce” quite a lot of the Rhetoric from posing the basic question of what persuasion looks like at its best. However, you couldn’t deduce it all, for a reason I am about to give. But before doing that I want to notice two things that are missing so far from my picture of what the Rhetoric should contain. First, the kinds of answers I’ve been giving have nothing to do with formal rules of procedure like Robert’s Rules of Order. Aristotle says that well-run states have laws that prevent speakers from getting off the subject and playing to irrelevant emotions, but that sort of rule isn’t going to tell us much about how to do things well. If we want to know how best to deliberate and more generally how best to talk with each other about important practical issues, very little of our answer will have to do with rules.

Second, I haven’t said anything that comes close to a scientific method that someone might offer if the question weren’t one of decision-making but of exploring truths that are independent of human desires and opinions. It would be easy to imagine a completely different approach to my basic question, one that would try to model practical reasoning and decision-making on scientific thinking. If practical questions look different from scientific ones, that is only because of human ignorance and prejudice; as science progresses, things that used to be matters we debated about become subjects of calculation. The goal of practical reasoning should then be to approximate scientific thinking as closely as possible, given the restricted time limits and limited information we often have to live with in practical reasoning.

For Aristotle, though, we don’t make good decisions about how to act by imitating science. We don’t figure out how to make decisions under conditions of uncertainty, of limited and conflicting evidence, by modeling ourselves as closely as possible on how we should act when none of those conditions is present. Practical reasoning and rhetoric will have their own standards, not to be measured by how close we come to the standards of science. It is easy to assume that if something can’t be made into rules or method, then it isn’t rational. The Rhetoric offers a picture of practical reasoning that is not rule-governed or scientific but is still rational. That will be the beginning of a rhetorical response to the attacks on democracy for being irrational. I will develop the point a little more in the conclusion, but I think that one of the most important reasons to read the Rhetoric today is to see the development of this image of practical reason that

can be rational without being a matter of rules or scientific method.

I designed my thought-experiment to track Aristotle's actual argument in the *Rhetoric*. In particular, I followed Aristotle in making deliberative or political rhetoric, rather than forensic or judicial rhetoric, the center of his art of rhetoric. That is, people deliberating together to come to a common decision about what to do in the future is the model for rhetoric in general, rather than the more competitive persuasion of legal argument.

The same systematic principles apply to political as to forensic oratory, and although the former is a nobler business, and fitter for a citizen, than that which concerns the relations of private individuals, these authors say nothing about political oratory, but try, one and all, to write treatises on the way to plead in court. The reason for this is that in political oratory there is less inducement to talk about non-essentials. Political oratory is less given to unscrupulous practices than forensic (1.1.1354b22-30).

Teachers of rhetoric, though, before and after Aristotle, have emphasized judicial rhetoric instead. Forensic rhetoric is easier to teach, and probably also easier to advertise to attract clients. Rules will take you further in forensic rhetoric than in deliberation because they are more needed there. If I am a juror listening to a lawsuit, I might vote for the speaker I find most amusing or with whom I would most like to be friends, but, Aristotle thinks, when I am deciding what to do, I will be more attentive to good reasons, because in political rhetoric the audience is judging in its own interest and therefore has an incentive to get things right. Rules are designed to insure fair participation, not the best results. Rules therefore naturally have a home in judicial rhetoric but not in deliberation.

In arguing about the past, it is fair to think, "If I only had that missing piece of evidence, such as a tape recording of what she actually said, then that would settle the matter." In deciding what to do about the future, no such wishful thinking makes sense. When Aristotle makes deliberative rhetoric the center of his art, he makes the *Rhetoric* concern itself with situations in which we really are thrown back on our own resources. Imitating science makes less sense when deliberation is at the center of rhetoric. More knowledge won't help, which is why the speaker's character becomes so crucial.

Aristotle in the *Rhetoric* has to walk a very delicate line: Rhetoric concerns matters for which there is rarely a right answer that we can find by other methods and against which we can measure our rhetorical performances, but that doesn't mean that some arguments aren't better than others. This is a conception of rhetoric and of

practical wisdom that rejects modeling practical decisions on science, and yet equally avoids the relativism and skepticism of thinking that reason has run out and that without certainty we are left with the arbitrary.

However, my thought-experiment is in many ways too good to be true, and so can only take us so far in approaching the Rhetoric. A complete art of rhetoric has to go beyond my story in three ways. First, I assume that we all have the same interest in making the best collective decision. But if I suggest some policy as the best action for all of us, it's always possible that it will be best only for me and that you will come out behind by believing me. It's also possible that I am in favor of some idea just because it's my idea. Therefore, another big question to answer in deciding how best to make practical decisions is how much we are really a single community and how much a collection of individuals. Any art of rhetoric will be an art both of cooperation and of competition. Aristotle's Rhetoric emphasizes the cooperative side of rhetoric, but both sides will be present in different degrees in any vision of rhetoric.

Good decision-making requires trust, but we have very strong reasons not to trust other people, even our friends, too much. The more suspicious we are, and the more suspicion seems in order, the more appealing rules and methods will be, from rules of courtroom procedure to scientific method. On the other hand, too much suspicion and too many rules might prevent some abuses, but at the cost of not helping us get to the best possible answer to our problem. Rules have a cost.

For example, to make a good decision, everyone should be able to get a hearing, with no one shouted down or ignored. But making a rule that each speaker gets the same amount of time might advantage some speakers and harm others: Those who can condense what they have to say into a short speech might come out ahead of those who can't. Maybe those with less to say will come out ahead when everyone has time limits. The more formal and rule-governed a discussion, the more likely the decision-making process will be more of a competition than it would be otherwise. The more competitive, the less cooperative the procedure is. There's no reason to think that the winner of such a competition would have the best idea. The Rhetoric is a very unusual examination of persuasion that pushes into the background the fact that most rhetoric is used in competitive situations. Aristotle mostly talks about speaking to an audience, not speaking against an opponent, devoting only one chapter to refutation (II.25), as opposed to what is for him the more basic rhetorical act of proving something. Developing an idea, not attacking someone else's

idea, is the fundamental act of persuasion.

In addition, while I might agree that in general we should treat each other decently and remember that we will have to work together in the future, I also might think that this case is so important that it's worth winning at any cost, rather than worrying about the long run. Books II and III of the *Rhetoric* increasingly take into account different compromises with reality that the good speaker has to make. They recognize yet another tension within the art of rhetoric.

[Rhetoric's] function is not simply to succeed in persuading, but rather to discover the means of coming as near such success as the circumstances of each particular case allow. In this it resembles all other arts. For example, it is not the function of medicine simply to make a man quite healthy, but to put him as far as may be on the road to health; it is possible to give excellent treatment even to those who can never enjoy sound health (1.1.1355b10-15).

Although Aristotle doesn't say so, it is also possible for people to recover from an illness by something other than good medical treatment, through luck or through a natural recuperation. If the art of rhetoric is confined to reasoning, it is still true that people are often persuaded by something other than reasoning. Rhetoric's function may be to "discover the means of coming as near such success as the circumstances of each particular case allow," but if I am trying to persuade an audience I may well have to think about doing things outside that art in order to win.

In thinking about persuasion, we have to decide whether to think in terms of the best case, the worst case, or something in between. Rhetoric always looks as if it is torn between a race to the top (in a fair fight, the truth will prevail) and a race to the bottom (the wicked use weapons that truth cannot touch). For example, Aristotle tells us that rhetorical arguments should be short. "The duty of rhetoric is to deal with such matters as we deliberate upon without arts or systems to guide us, in the hearing of persons who cannot take in at a glance a complicated argument, or follow a long chain of reasoning" (I.2.1357a1-4). The speaker faces an ethical question of how to speak to an audience who knows less than he does without appearing to be condescending and without becoming irrational himself by descending to their level. Different visions of rhetoric will give different emphases to the twin goals of rhetoric: finding the available means of persuasion and actually winning.

There's a third way in which my thought-experiment is too good to be true. I imagined a group of us coming together to make the best decision. But "best decision" is ambiguous. If we're trying to sail safely

and quickly from one place to another, the best decision will be the course that safely and quickly gets us there. Not all practical decisions are that simple. Sometimes the safest course and the fastest course are not the same. Safety might be easy to measure in sailing, but it isn't always obvious how to tell whether a country is more or less secure after some choice we've made. In a practical decision, we often have the experience of thinking that our end is clear and agreed on, but we find when we start deliberating about how to achieve the end that we aren't sure at all what counts as success in achieving the end. Wanting the best possible education for my son might eliminate many possibilities, but I quickly discover that I have to make choices in specifying the "best possible education."

In deliberation, we often cannot truly know what the best decision is until it's too late, and yet we still have to decide, and still want to decide intelligently before all the evidence is in. But the situation is still worse than that. Even after the fact, the best decision isn't easy to identify. Corax and Tisias argue about whether Corax taught Tisias as he had promised. Historians and politicians continue to refight old wars: The verdict of history isn't a simple one. The fact that we can't easily identify successes and failures even after the fact sometimes becomes a reason for relativism: You think that Roosevelt was a great president—and so rate current candidates by how they measure up to him—and I think he was a disaster. Since we disagree and can't persuade each other, there can't be any real "truth of the matter." Since rhetoric lets us argue both sides of any question, rhetoric is, it seems, inherently skeptical or relativistic.

Two of the distinctive features of the *Rhetoric* are Aristotle's way of responding to this difficult predicament in which there is such a thing as good practical reasoning without sure tests for identifying it. First, he notes that rhetorical arguments are made up of probabilities and signs, not the kinds of necessary connections we find in science. "The materials of enthymemes are Probabilities and Signs" (1.2.1 357a34). And second, scientific principles are replaced by what he calls "topics," whose literal English translation is "places," sometimes known more specifically as "commonplaces." Probabilities and signs provide the material for the probable, refutable inferences of rhetoric and deliberation, while the topics lend a formal structure. The better we understand the rhetorician's use of probabilities, signs, and topics, the more we will understand practical reasoning as having its own standards, instead of simply failing to measure up to the standards of science. It is easy to understand why later philosophers who described rhetoric and dialectic tried to be more systematic than Aristotle in exploring the nature of topical reasoning.

THE THREE SOURCES OF BELIEF: LOGOS, ETHOS, AND PATHOS

If the art of rhetoric is to depend on the practical intelligence of ordinary citizens, as a way of avoiding both the rule of experts and the rule of prejudices and desires, it will have to understand rationality in its own way. An examination of the probabilities, signs, and topics I just mentioned is one way of confronting that problem. Another is Aristotle's unique way of relating reasoning to what he sees as the two other sources of persuasion: character and emotion. A speech consists of three things: the speaker, the subject that is treated in the speech, and the hearer to whom the speech is addressed (1.3.1358a37ff). Each provides a distinct means of persuasion or sources of belief: "Of the modes of persuasion [*pisteis*] furnished by the spoken word there are three kinds. The first kind depends on the personal character [*ethos*] of the speaker; the second on putting the audience into a certain frame of mind; the third on the proof, or apparent proof [*logos*], provided by the words of the speech itself" (1.2. 1356a 1-4).

Book I shows how argument persuades. The purpose of speaking is to lead to a judgment, and audiences can make judgments of three different kinds: They can decide what to do in the future, who is guilty or innocent of something in the past, or whether someone should be praised or blamed for currently existing qualities. These three are deliberative or political rhetoric of the assembly, judicial or forensic rhetoric of the law courts, and "the ceremonial oratory of display" in our translation. These three organize book I: Chapters 4-8 treat deliberative rhetoric, chapter 9 epideixis, and chapters 10-15 forensic rhetoric.

"Since rhetoric exists to affect the giving of decisions ... the orator must not only try to make the argument of his speech demonstrative and worthy of belief; he must also make his own character look right and put his hearers, who are to decide, into the right frame of mind." So begins book II, returning us to *logos*, *ethos*, and *pathos*. If book I showed us how argument persuades, we also know that reasoning isn't enough to determine how we should decide, since it can be used on both sides of any question. Will non-rational considerations make things even worse, or can they add something to the reasoning we find on both sides to lead to a definitive decision?

Will rhetoric be less coercive and manipulative and more rational if it makes room for emotional and ethical appeals? Should speakers and audiences try to make the best decision by narrowing their focus to reason and excluding, as much as possible, the attractions of the

speaker's character and their own emotion? Aristotle seemed to suggest that rationality should force out emotion in book I, chapter 1: "It is not right to pervert the judge by moving him to anger or envy or pity—one might as well warp a carpenter's rule before using it" (1.1.1354a24-25). That would make Aristotle's consideration of the emotions in book II a cynical concession to the realities of persuasion, and the same would hold true for his presentation of arrangement and style in book III. The Rhetoric begins by showing how reasoning persuades people; the more impressively Aristotle can demonstrate that thesis, the more reason will seem enough, and the harder it will be for him to make room for *ethos* and *pathos*.

Aristotle has a brilliant strategy for reconciling his idea of the centrality of reasoning to persuasion with the evident fact that people are frequently persuaded by non-rational considerations. The first eleven chapters of book II show that the art of rhetoric can incorporate emotional appeals by making those appeals rational. The speaker gives reasons for the audience to become angry or to pity the victim of a crime. In book III Aristotle will even show how arrangement and style can serve the ends of rational persuasion, while those factors are as subordinate to reasoning as diction, melody, and spectacle are to the plot in the Poetics. As manipulative as making someone feel anger or pity can be, it still is a rational activity. A speaker can intelligently make someone feel certain emotions. More important, an audience can rationally conclude that a certain emotion is warranted. For example, if I am angry with you because I believe you insulted me and then I discover that it wasn't really an intended insult but an intercultural miscommunication—I'm amazed to learn that Americans think nothing of showing the soles of their shoes to each other!—then my anger will start to dissipate. When I find that I shouldn't be angry, I will probably stop being angry. If emotions are that subject to rational persuasion, then it becomes an open question whether and how we should allow our emotions to influence important practical decisions.

We don't necessarily become irrational when basing our persuasive appeals or our decisions on emotions or character. Emotions should play exactly the same role in rhetoric as they do in moral and political decisions. If we morally should treat friends, strangers, and enemies differently, then emotions such as anger, hatred, love, friendliness, gratitude, and suspicion are fair game for the rhetorician. If assessing a situation as dangerous affects how we ought to think about it, then it is appropriate for speakers to try to stimulate, or dampen, fear.

Consider the following example. We the people have to decide what sorts of government policies we want to have toward poor people. We

can assemble statistics about how many people fail to meet a given standard of income or wealth. We can compile another set of statistics correlating poverty with crime, with infant mortality, with lower life expectancy. Such figures by themselves aren't enough to tell us how we should act. What more do we use and should we use in deciding what to do?

What if we added arguments about whether the poor, or some representative example of a poor person, is "deserving" or not? Aristotle says that we pity undeserved bad fortune, while there is an emotional satisfaction when we think people get what they deserve, which later people, not Aristotle, sometimes call poetic justice. We experience another emotion, translated as indignation—the Greek is *nemesis*—when we see undeserved good fortune. If I persuade you that poor people really have a pretty good life, getting all those food stamps and other welfare payments without having to work, you will feel indignation rather than pity and be less inclined toward an increase in payments to poor people. On the other hand, if I can persuade you that the misfortunes that made this particular person unemployed really were misfortunes, bad luck, that could happen to you, you would incline in the opposite direction. In a situation like deciding about welfare policy, wouldn't having the right emotions help in making the right decision? A sign that such emotional consideration is relevant and rational is the fact that we can argue about which emotion is appropriate. As Aristotle puts it:

When people are feeling friendly and placable, they think one sort of thing; when they are feeling angry or hostile, they think either something totally different or the same thing with a different intensity: when they feel friendly to the man who comes before them for judgement, they regard him as having done little wrong, if any; when they feel hostile, they take the opposite view (11.1.1377b30-1378a3).

Having appropriate emotions is an indispensable part of coming to the right decision. Therefore Aristotle looks in the first eleven chapters of book II at a series of emotions: anger and calm, love and hate, fear, shame and shamelessness, kindness, pity, indignation, envy and emulation. He defines each of them; the definition is the formal cause. Then he says that to know how to cause the emotion, we have to know the other three causes as well. Using anger as an example: "We must discover (1) what the state of mind of angry people is, (2) who the people are with whom they usually get angry, and (3) on what grounds they get angry with them" (11.2.1378a24-25). These three are, respectively, the material, efficient, and final causes. If we know those four things about anger, we will know how to make someone

angry and will understand what is happening when someone else tries to make us angry. The practical orientation of the rhetorician offers insights that might not be obvious without the practical thrust, so his treatment of the emotions is of interest beyond rhetoric.

What about *ethos*, the third source of belief alongside *logos* and *pathos*? The Rhetoric contains no section devoted to it the way book I considers *logos* and book II (chapters 1-11) looks at the emotions. Aristotle announced the importance of *ethos* when he said:

Persuasion is achieved by the speaker's personal character when the speech is so spoken as to make us think him credible. We believe good men more fully and more readily than others: this is true generally whatever the question is, and absolutely true where exact certainty is impossible and opinions are divided. This kind of persuasion, like the others, should be achieved by what the speaker says, not by what people think of his character before he begins to speak.... [The speaker's] character may almost be called the most effective means of persuasion he possesses (1.2.1356a5-13).

When I began this introduction to Greek rhetoric by telling the story of Corax, I noted that there could be no method of persuasion that cannot be exploited and abused. There is no sure, neutral test that could distinguish reasoning from rationalizing, practical wisdom from mere cleverness. The only test an audience could use in making that crucial discrimination is an ethical one. Rhetoric offers the power of arguing on both sides of any question; only our ethical judgments stop that ability from leading to relativism, the idea that since reason cannot decisively prove one thesis and decisively refute all others, then one has a right to believe whatever one likes. If I argue that the government should not assist the poor, regardless of what they deserve, because such assistance is shortsighted—it leads to “welfare dependence” rather than independence—the audience must decide whether I am being selfish and using that argument as a rationalization that masks my true intentions or using it as the basis for a serious and well-considered policy recommendation. We trust speakers, and are inclined to be persuaded by their arguments, when speakers display (1) practical wisdom or “good sense,” (2) ethical virtue or “good moral character,” and (3) goodwill. These three personal qualities “that induce us to believe a thing apart from any proof of it” are what make us think that an argument really is the argument it appears to be and not a rationalization that hides more cynical motives.

In his formulation of *ethos*, Aristotle walks a very fine line, one that has large implications for the relation between rhetoric and democracy. We are all influenced by the reputation of different

speakers, and deciding whom to trust based on their reputations is often a sensible shortcut. I don't have time to study seriously different strategies for reducing nuclear proliferation. So I believe people whose credentials seem to me strongest.

Note how undemocratic such a strategy potentially is. I don't have the time to listen to everyone, so I close my ears to anyone outside the elite of people with reputation. Anyone can speak, but the masses pay attention only to the elite. Limiting persuasion to reasoning seems a democratic impulse, while bringing in considerations of ethos seems to work in the opposite direction. This political dilemma has its counterpart in the structure of Aristotle's own thought. How can we square the common experience of judging speeches by thinking about the speaker with Aristotle's insistence that reasoning is the heart of belief, that the enthymeme is the "body" of persuasion? He tries to square this circle immediately after declaring that "we believe good men more fully and more readily than others" by insisting that "this kind of persuasion, like the others, should be achieved by what the speaker says, not by what people think of his character before he begins to speak." We come to trust speakers because of what they say, not because of some reputation they have in advance.

When the speech itself creates our beliefs in the credibility of the speaker, then how we are persuaded and how we should be persuaded come together. Rhetoric is potentially democratic in its emphasis on argument as the body of persuasion. But in any decision we have to choose to be persuaded by some and not others. If we ground our trust in argument, then, such discrimination does not have to be anti-democratic.

WHY READ THE RHETORIC TODAY?

Rhetoric had its origins with a birth of democracy, but like any technique it can be used for democratic or anti-democratic purposes. One feature of rhetoric central to Aristotle, though, highlights its affinity for democracy, in spite of Aristotle's own lack of affection for democracy. Rhetoric, like dialectic, is a universal art, practiced more or less well by everyone. There is no special knowledge necessary for deliberation. Since Plato, one of the arguments against democracy is that it allows ignorance or mere opinion to rule instead of the expertise of those who actually know. For Aristotle, when it comes to the things we deliberate about, there is nothing to know. "We call people practically wise about some [restricted area] whenever they calculate well to promote some excellent end, in an area where there

is no craft (*techne*)” (Ethics VI.5.1140a28-30). Practical deliberation shouldn’t imitate science and act as though there were truths that allow impersonal reasoning to take decisions out of the hands of the people. The fact that there is no craft for practical intelligence doesn’t mean that some decisions aren’t better than others, or that some decision-makers aren’t better, more trustworthy, than others. Democratic decision-making, like ethical deliberation in general, is an important philosophical problem because we are searching for a kind of rationality that cannot be codified into rules or methods. It is always tempting either to find rules (there must be some lessons we can find in effective practice) or to reject rationality (since you can’t explain yourself, you don’t know what you’re talking about).

Aristotle’s world was so different from ours that any attempt to use the Rhetoric directly would be to pretend that the political context of our own worries about rhetoric was irrelevant. I think it more useful to see Aristotle thinking hard and at length, wrestling with a problem we share, in spite of the difference in circumstances. It is the problem of the relation between persuasive power and practical intelligence. Rhetoric is a faculty for arguing both sides of any question. Rhetoric, like democracy, is always therefore in danger of sliding into relativism. On the other hand, rhetoric is not a neutral skill like medicine or commerce that is at the service of ends outside itself. Persuasive power is a sign of practical intelligence. The person who gives the best advice knows what he or she is talking about. “Whether our argument concerns public affairs or some other subject, we must know some, if not all, of the facts about the subject on which we are to speak and argue. Otherwise we can have no materials out of which to construct arguments” (11.22.1396a4-6). Rhetoric, like democracy, is always therefore in danger of sliding not only into relativism but into its opposite, rule by experts. The Rhetoric displays both sides of this peculiar ethical art.

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POETICS

translated by S. H. Butcher

BOOK I

-1-

Aristotle takes for granted that all works of art are imitations. He shows that what makes one imitation differ from another can be one of three factors: “the medium, the objects, (or] the manner or mode of imitation.” These are, respectively, the material, formal, and moving cause of a work of art. Missing from the process of isolating different kinds of art is the final cause. In other words, once you have identified the medium, the objects, and the manner or mode of imitation, you have separated one kind, such as tragedy, from all others. But isolating a kind of art is not the same as saying what it is for, what its purpose is. Aristotle says in the first sentence that he wants to display the unique power of such a kind of art; separating off the kinds is only a preliminary to finding such powers.

1447a8. of POETRY: In Greek the Poetics begins: *peri poietikies*. *Peri* means “about” or “concerning”; *poietikies* is probably short for *poietikies technes* (“the poetic art” or “the art of poetry”).

1447a9. STRUCTURE OF THE PLOT ... A GOOD POEM: In chapter 6 Aristotle will argue that the plot is the most important dimension of a tragedy. Here he seems to be assuming it, without defining plot. The word for “plot” is *mythos*, which elsewhere is translated as “myth.”

1447a14. DITHYRAMBIC: Songs sung by a chorus, dithyrambs began as songs sung in honor of Dionysus.

1447a15. of THE FLUTE AND OF THE LYRE: Aulos is usually translated, as it is here, as “flute,” but the instrument was more like a recorder. A lyre is a stringed instrument similar to a guitar.

1447a16. MODES OF IMITATION: The translation of *mimesis*, “imitation” has the same ambiguity in English as *mimesis* does in Greek. It can refer to the process of making: “My work is an imitation of a natural process.” And it can refer to the product: “My work is an imitation of a natural object.” That is, *mimesis* can refer to something that the poet does or to an object that the poet produces and that the audience can see or experience. However, *mimesis* does not have the connotation of copying. Reasonable alternative translations are “depiction,” “representation,” and “portrayal.”

1447a20. CONSCIOUS ART OR MERE HABIT: The Greek says “by art [*techne*] or habit.” Aristotle defines *techne* in the Ethics as “a rational power of making.” “Conscious” was added by the translator; there is no Greek word that can be translated as “conscious.”

1447a26. SHEPHERD’S PIPE: A shepherd’s pipe was a pan pipe—one that tradition says was invented by the god Pan, with seven separate reeds, each sounding its own note.

BOOK I

1

I PROPOSE TO TREAT of Poetry^o in itself and of its various kinds, noting the essential quality of each; to inquire into the structure of the plot as requisite to a good poem; into the number and nature of the parts of which a poem is composed; and similarly into whatever else falls within the same inquiry. Following, then, the order of nature, let us begin with the principles which come first.

Epic Poetry and Tragedy, Comedy also and Dithyrambico poetry, and the music of the flute and of the lyre^o in most of their forms, are all in their general conception modes of imitation.^o They differ, however, from one another in three respects,—the medium, the objects, the manner or mode of imitation, being in each case distinct.

For as there are persons who, by conscious art or mere habit,^o imitate and represent various objects through the medium of colour and form, or again by the voice; so in the arts above mentioned, taken as a whole, the imitation is produced by rhythm, language, or ‘harmony,’ either singly or combined.

Thus in the music of the flute and of the lyre, ‘harmony’ and rhythm alone are employed; also in other arts, such as that of the shepherd’s pipe,^o which are essentially similar to these. In dancing, rhythm alone is used without ‘harmony’; for even dancing imitates character, emotion, and action, by rhythmical movement.

There is another art which imitates by means of language alone, and that either in prose or verse—which verse, again, may either combine different metres or consist of but one

1447b10. SOPHRON AND XENARCHUS: In the second half of the fifth century B.C.E., Sophron of Syracuse (in Sicily) and his son Xenarchus wrote realistic depictions of ordinary people. Many of the people mentioned in the Poetics and the Rhetoric are mentioned more than once. Biographical information in these notes will be given at the

first mention. (Unless otherwise noted, all dates in the notes are B.C.E.)

1447b11. SOCRATIC DIALOGUES : Dialogues featuring conversations of Socrates were a popular literary form. Of these, Plato's are the most famous.

1447b18. EMPEDOCLES: A philosopher in Sicily, Empedocles (c.493-433) lived about a hundred years before Aristotle. If we should call Empedocles "physicist rather than poet," then not all language is imitative. Homer's verses imitate the actions of the Trojan War, but Empedocles' verses do not imitate the physical universe. Language that tries to assert the truth about something doesn't imitate what it talks about. In *On Interpretation*, Aristotle says that thoughts are likenesses of the things we think about, and that spoken words are symbols of our thoughts, and written words symbols of spoken words. When thoughts are images of things, they aren't imitations of those things. When words are symbols of thought, they aren't imitations of the thoughts. Therefore, although *mimêsis* ("imitation") is a much broader concept here than in modern usage—we usually don't think of music as an imitation of character, for example—it does have its limits.

1447b21. CHAEREMON: We possess only five lines of *The Centaur*, a play by Chaeremon, a poet contemporary with Aristotle.

1447b26. NOMIC POETRY: These were songs that set to music verses from epic poetry.

-2-

The first chapter began to locate tragedy by specifying its means of imitation. In this chapter Aristotle continues the process by specifying the objects of imitation.

1448a2-4. SINCE THE OBJECTS OF IMITATION ... MORAL DIFFERENCES: People are either "a higher or a lower type." The words Aristotle uses—*spoudaios* and *phaulos*—can refer to both moral quality and to social class. In explaining "for moral character mainly answers to these divisions, goodness and badness being the distinguishing marks of moral differences," he is saying that the crucial difference is moral, not sociological. On the other hand, the change of fortune that Aristotle will discuss later is a change in status and external prosperity, not in moral quality.

kind—but this has hitherto been without a name. For there is no common term we could apply to the mimes of Sophron° and Xenarchus* and the Socratic dialogues° on the one hand; and, on the other, to poetic imitations in iambic, elegiac, or any similar metre. People do, indeed, add the word ‘maker’ or ‘poet’ to the name of the metre, and speak of elegiac poets, or epic (that is, hexameter) poets, as if it were not the imitation that makes the poet, but the verse that entitles them all indiscriminately to the name. Even when a treatise on medicine or natural science is brought out in verse, the name of poet is by custom given to the author; and yet Homer and Empedocles° have nothing in common but the metre, so that it would be right to call the one poet, the other physicist rather than poet. On the same principle, even if a writer in his poetic imitation were to combine all metres, as Chaeremon° did in his Centaur, which is a medley composed of metres of all kinds, we should bring him too under the general term poet. So much then for these distinctions.

There are, again, some arts which employ all the means above mentioned,—namely, rhythm, tune, and metre. Such are Dithyrambic and Nomic poetry,° and also Tragedy and Comedy; but between them the difference is, that in the first two cases these means are all employed in combination, in the latter, now one means is employed, now another.

Such, then, are the differences of the arts with respect to the medium of imitation.

2

SINCE THE OBJECTS OF imitation are men in action, and these men must be either of a higher or a lower type (for moral character mainly answers to these divisions, goodness and badness being the distinguishing marks of moral differences),° it follows that we must represent men either as better than in 1448a5. POLYGNOTUS ... DioNysius: These men were painters who worked in the fifth century. It is interesting that Aristotle lists three painters who, respectively, painted people better, worse, and the same as they actually were, while drama only imitates people as better, as in tragedy, or worse, as in comedy.

1448a12. CLEOPHON ... NicocHARES : Cleophon was a tragedian in the fourth century. Hegemon and Nicochares wrote parodies of

Homer's epics in the late fifth century.

1448a15. TIMOTHEUS AND PHILOXENUS: Timotheus of Miletus and Philoxenus of Cythera wrote dithyrambs about the Cyclopes, one-eyed giants. Aristotle seems to be saying that Timotheus wrote about the Cyclopes as serious and Philoxenus treated them as grotesque.

1448a15. COMEDY AIMS... THAN IN ACTUAL LIFE : The same object, then, can be the subject for either serious or comic representation. Comedy and tragedy don't have to imitate different people but can imitate the same people as ludicrous or serious.

-3-

The final factor used in setting tragedy off from other *arts* is the manner of imitation.

1448a20. POET MAY IMITATE BY NARRATION : Just as the last chapter ended by ShOWing that we can imitate the same object both seriously and comically, so here we see that we can imitate the same object in both narrative and dramatic representation.

1448a26. SOPHOCLES : Sophocles (496-406) is said to have written 123 plays. Seven have survived, dating from 441 for *Antigone* to 401 for *Oedipus at Colonus*.

1448a27. ARISTOPHANES: Aristophanes (c.450-386) was the most famous and popular comedic writer in Athens of this time. Eleven of his plays, first produced from 425 to 388, survive.

real life, or as worse, or as they are. It is the same in painting. Polygnotus depicted men as nobler than they are, Pauson as less noble, Dionysius° drew them true to life.

Now it is evident that each of the modes of imitation above mentioned will exhibit these differences, and become a distinct kind in imitating objects that are thus distinct. Such diversities may be found even in dancing, flute-playing, and lyre-playing. So again in language, whether prose or verse unaccompanied by music. Homer, for example, makes men better than they are; Cleophon as they are; Hegemon the Thasian, the inventor of parodies, and Nicochares,° the author of the *Deiliad*, worse than they are. The same thing holds good of Dithyrambs and Nomes; here too one may portray different types, as Timotheus and Philoxenus° differed in representing their Cyclopes. The same distinction marks off Tragedy from Comedy; for Comedy aims at representing men as worse, Tragedy as better than in actual

3

THERE IS STILL A third difference—the manner in which each of these objects may be imitated. For the medium being the same, and the objects the same, the poet may imitate by narration°-in which case he can either take another personality as Homer does, or speak in his own person, unchanged—or he may present all his characters as living and moving before us.

These, then, as we said at the beginning, are the three differences which distinguish artistic imitation,—the medium, the objects, and the manner. So that from one point of view, Sophocles° is an imitator of the same kind as Homer—for both imitate higher types of character; from another point of view, of the same kind as Aristophanes°-for both imitate persons acting and doing. Hence, some say, the name of ‘drama’ is given

1448a30. DORIANS: The Dorians invaded Greece in the twelfth century. They spoke a different dialect from Attic Greek, the Greek spoken in Athens. Megara is a Dorian city near Athens. There was also a Megara in Sicily, a colony established by people from the original Megara.

1448a33. EPICHARMUS: A comedic poet in Sicily in the sixth and fifth centuries, Epicharmus wrote comedies earlier than Chionides and Magnes, the earliest comic poets in Athens, whose first comedies were produced in 486 and 472.

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This chapter continues to build toward a definition of tragedy by tracing a history that starts with the natural basis for imitation and ends with tragedy achieving its true nature. See the Introduction for a discussion of how nature could be both at the beginning and the end of a historical process.

1448b5-19. POETRY IN GENERAL ... OR SOME SUCH OTHER CAUSE: These two are causes of poetry in general, not of any

particular kind of poetry. Imitations are natural because they are rooted in natural human capacities. Tragedy, we will see, is natural in a very different sense. Tragedy has its own nature and is the development of these initial natural capacities.

The two natural causes are the pleasures people get in imitating and in appreciating imitations—that is, there is a natural source both for being a poet and for being an audience. Most contemporary theories of art or poetry look either at the powers of the author—such as imagination, genius, or expressiveness—or at the receptive powers of the audience, such as a sense of beauty or a capacity for sympathy or identification. The Poetics holds those two sides together. Plato was as much concerned about drama's ethical effects on the actors as about its effect on the audience, and Aristotle here sees poetry evolving from two natural causes of producing and experiencing imitations.

Moreover, both these pleasures are connected to learning. Imitating is natural to humans, even from childhood, since it is through imitation that the child “learns his earliest lessons.” And the pleasure we get from seeing imitations is cognitive too: “to learn gives the liveliest pleasure.”

However, Aristotle never says precisely what we are supposed to learn from tragedies or other specific kinds of art. And his explanation doesn't help. “The reason why men enjoy seeing a likeness is, that in contemplating it they find themselves learning or inferring, and saying perhaps, ‘Ah, that is he.’ We take pleasure in learning that this picture is a representation of that person. But we learn only when we already know what the person looks like. ”For if you happen not to have seen the original, the pleasure will be due not to the imitation as such, but to the execution, the colouring, or some such other cause.” It seems to be a very limited sense of learning. Just what it is that the audience learns or to such poems, as representing action. For the same reason the Dorians° claim the invention both of Tragedy and Comedy. The claim to Comedy is put forward by the Megarians,—not only by those of Greece proper, who allege that it originated under their democracy, but also by the Megarians of Sicily, for the poet Epicharmus,° who is much earlier than Chionides and Magnes, belonged to that country. Tragedy too is claimed by certain Dorians of the Peloponnese. In each case they appeal to the evidence of language. The outlying villages, they say, are by them called κῶμαι, by the Athenians δῆμοι; and they assume that Comedians were so named not from κωμάζειν ‘to revel.’ but because they wandered from village to village (κατὰ κώμας), being excluded contemptuously from the city. They add also that the Dorian word for ‘doing’ is δρᾶν, and the Athenian,

This may suffice as to the number and nature of the various modes of imitation.

4

POETRY IN GENERAL° SEEMS to have sprung from two causes, each of them lying deep in our nature. First, the instinct of imitation is implanted in man from childhood, one difference between him and other animals being that he is the most imitative of living creatures, and through imitation learns his earliest lessons; and no less universal is the pleasure felt in things imitated. We have evidence of this in the facts of experience. Objects which in themselves we view with pain, we delight to contemplate when reproduced with minute fidelity: such as the forms of the most ignoble animals and of dead bodies. The cause of this again is, that to learn gives the liveliest pleasure, not only to philosophers but to men in general; whose capacity, however, of learning is more limited. Thus the reason why men enjoy seeing a likeness

infers is obviously an important issue in understanding what Aristotle takes to be the cognitive and the moral value of tragedy.

This section on the natural causes of poetry also raises questions about the relation between nature and art. Imitating might be a natural human activity, so natural that children do it. Art (*technê*) is an intelligent and intentional way of making something. If we imitate naturally, does this mean that we don't do so artfully? Does art replace nature as a cause of making? One way to start looking at these questions is to notice that the natural causes of poetry are not causes that distinguish one poet from another, and Aristotle doesn't give any hint of how to say that one production is better than another.

What is the supposedly uniquely human power of imitation? How does it relate to two other features that are supposed to make people differ from other animals : rationality—the definition “man is a rational animal” never appears in Aristotle, but he does say that only humans have *logos*, which can be translated as “speech” or “thought”—and being a “political animal”? Aristotle never says.

1448b24. POETRY NOW DIVERGED ... INDIVIDUAL CHARACTER OF THE WRITERS: At this second stage in Aristotle's

history, the choice of whether to imitate serious or ridiculous actions depended on the character of the poet.

1448b28. HIS OWN MARGITES: The *Margites*, which has been lost, was a poem attributed to Homer. It was a burlesque whose hero was a laughable incompetent. If Homer was supposed to have written the *Margites* as well as the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, we must have entered a new stage in the history of poetry, in which how the poet imitated was not determined by his own moral character.

is, that in contemplating it they find themselves learning or inferring, and saying perhaps, 'Ah, that is he.' For if you happen not to have seen the original, the pleasure will be due not to the imitation as such, but to the execution, the colouring, or some such other cause.°

Imitation, then, is one instinct of our nature. Next, there is the instinct for 'harmony' and rhythm, metres being manifestly sections of rhythm. Persons, therefore, starting with this natural gift developed by degrees their special aptitudes, till their rude improvisations gave birth to Poetry.

Poetry now diverged in two directions, according to the individual character of the writers.° The graver spirits imitated noble actions, and the actions of good men. The more trivial sort imitated the actions of meaner persons, at first composing satires, as the former did hymns to the gods and the praises of famous men. A poem of the satirical kind cannot indeed be put down to any author earlier than Homer; though many such writers probably there were. But from Homer onward, instances can be cited,—his own *Margites*,° for example, and other similar compositions. The appropriate metre was also here introduced; hence the measure is still called the iambic or lampooning measure, being that in which people lampooned one another. Thus the older poets were distinguished as writers of heroic or of lampooning verse.

As, in the serious style, Homer is pre-eminent among poets, for he alone combined dramatic form with excellence of imitation, so he too first laid down the main lines of Comedy, by dramatising the ludicrous instead of writing personal satire. His *Margites* bears the same relation to Comedy that the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* do to Tragedy. But when Tragedy and Comedy came to light, the two classes of poets still followed their natural bent: the lampooners became writers of Comedy, and the Epic poets were succeeded by Tragedians, since the drama was a larger and higher form of art.

1449a11. PHALLIC SONGS: These were songs sung to Dionysius, the god of fertility.

1449a16. AESCHYLUS: Seven of the plays of Aeschylus (525-456)

survive, including the trilogy the Oresteia.

1449a20. SATIRIC ORDER: Each poet submitted four plays for the competition at the festival of Dionysius, three tragedies and a satyr-play. The satyr-plays recounted the more grotesque parts of myths and heroic stories. Members of the chorus were dressed at satyrs, with horses' tails and ears and goats' legs.

Whether Tragedy has as yet perfected its proper types or not; and whether it is to be judged in itself, or in relation also to the audience,—this raises another question. Be that as it may, Tragedy—as also Comedy—was at first mere improvisation. The one originated with the authors of the Dithyramb, the other with those of the phallic songs,^o which are still in use in many of our cities. Tragedy advanced by slow degrees; each new element that showed itself was in turn developed. Having passed through many changes, it found its natural form, and there it stopped.

Aeschylus^o first introduced a second actor; he diminished the importance of the Chorus, and assigned the leading part to the dialogue. Sophocles raised the number of actors to three, and added scene-painting. Moreover, it was not till late that the short plot was discarded for one of greater compass, and the grotesque diction of the earlier satyric form for the stately manner of Tragedy. The iambic measure then replaced the trochaic tetrameter, which was originally employed when the poetry was of the satyric order,^o and had greater affinities with dancing. Once dialogue had come in, Nature herself discovered the appropriate measure. For the iambic is, of all measures, the most colloquial: we see it in the fact that conversational speech runs into iambic lines more frequently than into any other kind of verse; rarely into hexameters, and only when we drop the colloquial intonation. The additions to the number of 'episodes' or acts, and the other accessories of which tradition tells, must be taken as already described; for to discuss them in detail would, doubtless, be a large undertaking.

In this last brief chapter before the definition of tragedy, Aristotle compares tragedy to comedy and epic. In the Poetics overall, because Aristotle sees the manner of imitation as so unimportant, tragedy and epic are often lumped together. Many of the examples that illustrate Aristotle's points about tragedy are examples from Homeric epics.

1449a35. THE LUDICROUS ... A SUBDIVISION OF THE UGLY: The ludicrous, the subject of comedy, “consists in some defect or ugliness which is not painful or destructive.” Aristotle says so little about comedy in the *Poetics*—there may have been a second part of the *Poetics* devoted to comedy, and we do have some fragments that may come from it—that we can’t put together a clear picture of how he thought about it. But the limitation of bad aspects of character to the ludicrous will have its parallel when we see that not all kinds of nobility can be the subject of tragedy. I suggest that part of Aristotle’s meaning becomes clear if we think about what happens when we are laughing at someone who stumbles and falls and then discover that his movements come from some “painful or destructive” disease. We stop laughing and are ashamed that we ever did.

1449b7. CRATES: Crates won his first prize in 450. Aristotle singles him out because he transformed comedy from ridiculing particular individuals to depicting general types of foolishness and ugliness.

1449b12-13. TRAGEDY ENDEAVORS ... A SINGLE REVOLUTION OF THE SUN: This is the source of the famous doctrine of Aristotle’s three unities: of time, of place, and of action. As I argue in the Introduction, Aristotle is indeed committed to maintaining the unity of action for tragedy but does not rule that tragedies have to all take place at the same place or time. Commentators disagree sharply about this passage, differing on whether it is the action imitated or the action as presented that is supposed to be limited to a single revolution of the sun. They also disagree on whether a single revolution of the sun means twelve or twenty-four hours. Aristotle revisits this issue in chapter 26. What is most interesting about this passage is the contrast to epic. Any work of art has to be unified, but the standards for unity differ from genre to genre. Epics can be unities without being confined to a single time, while the unity of tragedy requires a concentration of action and of attention by the audience.

1449b16-20. WHOEVER, THEREFORE, KNOWS ... EPIC POETRY: Aristotle will take up the comparison of tragedy and epic again in chapters 23-26.

COMEDY IS, AS WE have said, an imitation of characters of a lower type,-not, however, in the full sense of the word bad, the Ludicrous

being merely a subdivision of the ugly.^o It consists in some defect or ugliness which is not painful or destructive. To take an obvious example, the comic mask is ugly and distorted, but does not imply pain.

The successive changes through which Tragedy passed, and the authors of these changes, are well known, whereas Comedy has had no history, because it was not at first treated seriously. It was late before the Archon granted a comic chorus to a poet; the performers were till then voluntary. Comedy had already taken definite shape when comic poets, distinctively so called, are heard of. Who furnished it with masks, or prologues, or increased the number of actors,—these and other similar details remain unknown. As for the plot, it came originally from Sicily; but of Athenian writers Crates^o was the first who, abandoning the 'iambic' or lampooning form, generalised his themes and plots.

Epic poetry agrees with Tragedy in so far as it is an imitation in verse of characters of a higher type. They differ, in that Epic poetry admits but one kind of metre, and is narrative in form. They differ, again, in their length: for Tragedy endeavours, as far as possible, to confine itself to a single revolution of the sun,^o or but slightly to exceed this limit; whereas the Epic action has no limits of time. This, then, is a second point of difference; though at first the same freedom was admitted in Tragedy as in Epic poetry.

Of their constituent parts some are common to both, some peculiar to Tragedy: whoever, therefore, knows what is good or bad Tragedy, knows also about Epic poetry.^o All the elements of an Epic poem are found in Tragedy, but the elements of a Tragedy are not all found in the Epic poem.

-6-

This chapter presents the definition of tragedy. From the definition Aristotle infers that there are six parts. Three of the parts—plot, character, and thought—come from the object of imitation (chapter 2); diction and melody come from the means of imitation (chapter 1); and the manner of imitation (chapter 3) generates one, the spectacle. In the first three chapters, means, object, and manner looked like three independent variables that together set off tragedy from other kinds of imitations. Here, though, the parts of the tragedy derived from the object are more important, more essential to the tragedy, than those that come from the means, and while spectacle is part of the tragedy, it seems not to be part of the art of tragedy.

1449b23-28. TRAGEDY ... PURGATION OF THESE EMOTIONS: The definition of tragedy, Aristotle says, can be derived from what has been said up until this point. As I note in the Introduction, it is easy to trace each of the parts of the definition to earlier chapters, except for the last clause: “through pity and fear effecting the proper purgation of these emotions.” As I also note, the word “purgation” or “catharsis,” referring to pity and fear, does not occur again in the Poetics. A reader who wants to know more can look at book VIII of Aristotle’s Politics, which contains a discussion of catharsis in music.

1449b37. TRAGEDY IS THE IMITATION ... PERSONAL AGENTS: After giving and explaining the definition, Aristotle uses it to show that tragedy must have six parts. “Parts” here doesn’t mean “quantitative” parts (the division of a tragedy into episodes, or acts and scenes in later dramas), but “parts [that] determine its quality.” Parts are aspects of the drama that the author has to create.

1450a5. ARRANGEMENT OF THE INCIDENTS: Plot is defined as “arrangement of the incidents,” as well as the imitation of an action. The way Aristotle puts it, imitating an action and arranging incidents seem to be identical. Character and thought are the two further parts of tragedy that are subordinate to plot.

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OF THE POETRY WHICH imitates in hexameter verse, and of Comedy, we will speak hereafter. Let us now discuss Tragedy, resuming its formal definition, as resulting from what has been already said.

Tragedy, then, is an imitation of an action that is serious, complete, and of a certain magnitude; in language embellished with each kind of artistic ornament, the several kinds being found in separate parts of the play; in the form of action, not of narrative; through pity and fear effecting the proper purgation of these emotions.^o By ‘language embellished,’ I mean language into which rhythm, ‘harmony,’ and song enter. By ‘the several kinds in separate parts,’ I mean, that some parts are rendered through the medium of verse alone, others again with the aid of song.

Now as tragic imitation implies persons acting, it necessarily follows, in the first place, that Spectacular equipment will be a part of

Tragedy. Next, Song and Diction, for these are the medium of imitation. By 'Diction' I mean the mere metrical arrangement of the words: as for 'Song,' it is a term whose sense every one understands.

Again, Tragedy is the imitation of an action; and an action implies personal agents,^o who necessarily possess certain distinctive qualities both of character and thought; for it is by these that we qualify actions themselves, and these-thought and character-are the two natural causes from which actions spring, and on actions again all success or failure depends. Hence, the Plot is the imitation of the action:-for by plot I here mean the arrangement of the incidents.^o By Character I mean that in virtue of which we ascribe certain qualities to the agents. Thought is required wherever a statement is proved, or, it may be, a general truth enunciated. Every Tragedy, therefore, **1450a10. Two OF THE PARTS ... OBJECTS OF IMITATION:** Aristotle draws a connection between the six parts of the tragedy and the three causes he used in the first three chapters to isolate tragedy from other kinds of poetry. Plot, character, and thought come from the object of imitation, diction and melody from the medium or means of imitation, and spectacle from the manner. The first three are elaborations of the formal cause of the tragedy; diction and melody are elaborations of the material cause; and spectacle is an elaboration of the moving or efficient cause.

1450a27. ZEUXIS AND POLYGNOTUS: Zeuxis was a painter from southern Italy who lived in the late fifth century. Polygnotus was also a fifth-century painter from Thasos and then Athens.

must have six parts, which parts determine its quality-namely, Plot, Character, Diction, Thought, Spectacle, Song. Two of the parts constitute the medium of imitation, one the manner, and three the objects of imitation.^o And these complete the list. These elements have been employed, we may say, by the poets to a man; in fact, every play contains Spectacular elements as well as Character, Plot, Diction, Song, and Thought.

But most important of all is the structure of the incidents. For Tragedy is an imitation, not of men, but of an action and of life, and life consists in action, and its end is a mode of action, not a quality. Now character determines men's qualities, but it is by their actions that they are happy or the reverse. Dramatic action, therefore, is not with a view to the representation of character: character comes in as subsidiary to the actions. Hence the incidents and the plot are the end of a tragedy; and the end is the chief thing of all. Again, without action there cannot be a tragedy; there may be without character. The tragedies of most of our modern poets fail in the rendering of character; and of poets in general this is often true. It is the same in

painting; and here lies the difference between Zeuxis and Polygnotus.⁰ Polygnotus delineates character well: the style of Zeuxis is devoid of ethical quality. Again, if you string together a set of speeches expressive of character, and well finished in point of diction and thought, you will not produce the essential tragic effect nearly so well as with a play which, however deficient in these respects, yet has a plot and artistically constructed incidents. Besides which, the most powerful elements of emotional interest in Tragedy-Peripeteia or Reversal of the Situation, and Recognition scenes-are parts of the plot. A further proof is, that novices in the art attain to finish of diction and precision of portraiture before they can construct the plot. It is the same with almost all the early poets.

1450a33-b20. THE PLOT ... THAN ON THAT OF THE POET: After listing the six parts of the tragedy and showing how they relate to the medium, object, and manner of imitation, chapter 6 ends by putting the six parts into an order of importance. The parts are judged on how much they contribute to the end or purpose of tragedy, ranging from plot, the most crucial, to spectacle, which is barely relevant, Aristotle says, to the art of tragedy. Calling the plot the soul of the tragedy metaphorically calls it the principle of the play. Plot stands to a tragedy as a soul stands to a living thing.

The Plot, then, is the first principle, and, as it were, the soul of a tragedy: Character holds the second place. A similar fact is seen in painting. The most beautiful colours, laid on confusedly, will not give as much pleasure as the chalk outline of a portrait. Thus Tragedy is the imitation of an action, and of the agents mainly with a view to the action.

Third in order is Thought,-that is, the faculty of saying what is possible and pertinent in given circumstances. In the case of oratory, this is the function of the political art and of the art of rhetoric: and so indeed the older poets make their characters speak the language of civic life; the poets of our time, the language of the rhetoricians. Character is that which reveals moral purpose, showing what kind of things a man chooses or avoids. Speeches, therefore, which do not make this manifest, or in which the speaker does not choose or avoid anything whatever, are not expressive of character. Thought, on the other hand, is found where something is proved to be or not to be, or a general maxim is enunciated.

Fourth among the elements enumerated comes Diction; by which I mean, as has been already said, the expression of the meaning in words; and its essence is the same both in verse and prose.

Of the remaining elements Song holds the chief place among the

embellishments.

The Spectacle has, indeed, an emotional attraction of its own, but, of all the parts, it is the least artistic, and connected least with the art of poetry. For the power of Tragedy, we may be sure, is felt even apart from representation and actors. Besides, the production of spectacular effects depends more on the art of the stage machinist than on that of the poet.°

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A successful tragedy has to give the audience a complete experience,. In chapter 7 Aristotle develops two factors for such an experience. The plot has to have a beginning, middle, and end so that there are no loose ends that would make the experience, incomplete. "A well constructed plot, therefore, must neither begin nor end at haphazard, but conform to these principles.."

Second, the play has to have the right size to be kept in mind all at once. Aristotle establishes this point by one of his rare comparison of the excellence of a tragedy to the beauty of nature. In the case of nature, the right size for a beautiful object is the right size relative to human powers of perception. A tragedy has the right size, then, if it can be experienced and understood as a whole.

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THESE PRINCIPLES BEING ESTABLISHED, let us now discuss the proper structure of the Plot, since this is the first and most important thing in Tragedy.

Now, according to our definition, Tragedy is an imitation of an action that is complete, and whole, and of a certain magnitude; for there may be a whole that is wanting in magnitude. A whole is that which has a beginning, a middle, and an end. A beginning is that which does not itself follow anything by causal necessity, but after which something naturally is or comes to be. An end, on the contrary, is that which itself naturally follows some other thing, either by necessity, or as a rule, but has nothing following it. A middle is that which follows something as some other thing follows it. A well constructed plot, therefore, must neither begin nor end at haphazard,

but conform to these principles.

Again, a beautiful object, whether it be a living organism or any whole composed of parts, must not only have an orderly arrangement of parts, but must also be of a certain magnitude ; for beauty depends on magnitude and order. Hence a very small animal organism cannot be beautiful; for the view of it is confused, the object being seen in an almost imperceptible moment of time. Nor, again, can one of vast size be beautiful; for as the eye cannot take it all in at once, the unity and sense of the whole is lost for the spectator; as for instance if there were one a thousand miles long. As, therefore, in the case of animate bodies and organisms a certain magnitude is necessary, and a magnitude which may be easily embraced in one view; so in the plot, a certain length is necessary, and a length which can be easily embraced by the memory. The limit of length in relation to dramatic competition and sensuous presentment, is no part of artistic theory. For had it **1451a13. CHANGE ... OR FROM GOOD FORTUNE TO BAD:** The chapter ends with Aristotle mentioning in passing that a tragedy has to have the right size to present a change in fortune. This important idea will be developed extensively in succeeding chapters.

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Chapter 8 continues the theme of unity from chapter 7. This chapter emphasizes how to construct a unit out of the materials the poet is given. The contrast is between the unity of action that a tragedy must have and the unity of a life, which some people, wrongly think should be the standard for the unity of a tragedy. The difference Aristotle draws between dramatic unity and the unity of a life should make us cautious about moving back and forth between the properties of the lives of real people and the properties of events in a tragedy. The point of connection between drama and life is the play's action.

1451a16. UNITY OF PLOT DOES NOT ... CONSIST IN THE UNITY OF THE HERO: The tragedy has its own standards of unity, different from life itself-that is, an event can be crucial to someone's life but irrelevant to the tragedy told about the person.

1451a20. ALL POETS ... A HERACLEID, A THESEID: Just as people who wrote a Heracleid tried to include as many events from Heracles' life as possible, a Theseid contained anything that Theseus was supposed to have done.

1451a30. As THEREFORE, IN THE OTHER IMITATIVE ARTS:

Aristotle concludes chapter 8 with a generalization: Just as the unity of action is crucial to tragedy, so unity is also critical in all the arts. Every imitation, then, including music and dance, must have something that functions as plot does in tragedy.

been the rule for a hundred tragedies to compete together, the performance would have been regulated by the water-clock, —as indeed we are told was formerly done. But the limit as fixed by the nature of the drama itself is this:—the greater the length, the more beautiful will the piece be by reason of its size, provided that the whole be perspicuous. And to define the matter roughly, we may say that the proper magnitude is comprised within such limits, that the sequence of events, according to the law of probability or necessity, will admit of a change from bad fortune to good, or from good fortune to bad.°

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UNITY of PLOT DOES not, as some persons think, consist in the unity of the hero.° For infinitely various are the incidents in one man's life which cannot be reduced to unity; and so, too, there are many actions of one man out of which we cannot make one action. Hence the error, as it appears, of all poets who have composed a Heracleid, a Theseid,° or other poems of the kind. They imagine that as Heracles was one man, the story of Heracles must also be a unity. But Homer, as in all else he is of surpassing merit, here too—whether from art or natural genius—seems to have happily discerned the truth. In composing the Odyssey he did not include all the adventures of Odysseus—such as his wound on Parnassus, or his feigned madness at the mustering of the host—incidents between which there was no necessary or probable connexion: but he made the Odyssey, and likewise the Iliad, to centre round an action that in our sense of the word is one. As therefore, in the other imitative arts,° the imitation is one when the object imitated is one, so the plot, being an imitation of an action, must imitate one action and that a whole, the

This chapter continues the theme of unity but turns to the way the poet creates a unified object. Just as chapter 8 distinguished the unity of life

from the unity of action, this chapter distinguishes the kind of coherence that history presents and the coherence of tragedy.

1451b2. HERODOTUS: Herodotus, from Halicarnassus on what is now the coast of Turkey, lived from around 484 until around 430 or a little later. His history of the Persian Wars, which fortunately has survived and is commonly called *Histories*, was an original and monumental enough achievement that he is often called “the father of history.”

1451b5. POETRY... A HIGHER THING THAN HISTORY: “Higher” could also be translated as “more serious,” “more fitting for a serious person.” Historians tell what happened, while the plots of poems connect incidents through probability and necessity. The connections of probability and necessity make plots more general and therefore more philosophical than the purely factual connections of history.

1451b11. ALCIBIADES: Alcibiades (450-404) was an Athenian politician and military leader.

1451b21. AGATHON: Agathon, born around 440, was probably the most famous tragic poet after the trio of Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides. The *Antheus*, which has not survived, is the only tragedy we know about with a completely invented story. Plato’s dialogue *Symposium* takes place at Agathon’s house as people celebrate his winning the prize for his tragedies.

structural union of the parts being such that, if any one of them is displaced or removed, the whole will be disjointed and disturbed. For a thing whose presence or absence makes no visible difference, is not an organic part of the whole.

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IT IS, MOREOVER, EVIDENT from what has been said, that it is not the function of the poet to relate what has happened, but what may happen,—what is possible according to the law of probability or necessity. The poet and the historian differ not by writing in verse or in prose. The work of Herodotus^o might be put into verse, and it would still be a species of history, with metre no less than without it. The true difference is that one relates what has happened, the other what may happen. Poetry, therefore, is a more philosophical and a

higher thing than history:° for poetry tends to express the universal, history the particular. By the universal I mean how a person of a certain type will on occasion speak or act, according to the law of probability or necessity; and it is this universality at which poetry aims in the names she attaches to the personages. The particular is—for example—what Alcibiades° did or suffered. In Comedy this is already apparent: for here the poet first constructs the plot on the lines of probability, and then inserts characteristic names;—unlike the lampooners who write about particular individuals. But tragedians still keep to real names, the reason being that what is possible is credible: what has not happened we do not at once feel sure to be possible: but what has happened is manifestly possible: otherwise it would not have happened. Still there are even some tragedies in which there are only one or two well known names, the rest being fictitious. In others, none are well known,—as in Agathon's° Antheus, where incidents and names alike are fictitious, and yet they give none the less pleasure.

1451b25. POET OR 'MAKER' ... PLOTS RATHER THAN OF VERSES

: The poet makes both the plot and the diction of the tragedy, but making the plot is the essential activity of the tragic poet.

1452a3. TRAGEDY IS AN IMITATION ... of EVENTS INSPIRING

FEAR OR PITY: In the definition of tragedy in chapter 6, we encountered pity and fear, but Aristotle has not talked about this aspect of tragedy since then. Here he says that the effects of pity and fear will be heightened if the plot can satisfy a pair of demands that are almost contradictory: "Such an effect is best produced when the events come on us by surprise; and the effect is heightened when, at the same time, they follow as cause and effect." It is easy to make an event a surprise if it happens by chance and not as part of a necessary sequence, and it is easy to make events follow each other as cause and effect if they are completely predictable. But the emotional impact of any work of art is maximized if something can at the same time be a surprise and be inevitable.

We must not, therefore, at all costs keep to the received legends, which are the usual subjects of Tragedy. Indeed, it would be absurd to attempt it; for even subjects that are known are known only to a few, and yet give pleasure to all. It clearly follows that the poet or 'maker' should be the maker of plots rather than of verses;° since he is a poet because he imitates, and what he imitates are actions. And even if he chances to take an historical subject, he is none the less a poet; for there is no reason why some events that have actually happened should not conform to the law of the probable and possible, and in virtue of that quality in them he is their poet or maker.

Of all plots and actions the episodic are the worst. I call a plot ‘episodic’ in which the episodes or acts succeed one another without probable or necessary sequence. Bad poets compose such pieces by their own fault, good poets, to please the players; for, as they write show pieces for competition, they stretch the plot beyond its capacity, and are often forced to break the natural continuity.

But again, Tragedy is an imitation not only of a complete action, but of events inspiring fear or pity.^o Such an effect is best produced when the events come on us by surprise; and the effect is heightened when, at the same time, they follow as cause and effect. The tragic wonder will then be greater than if they happened of themselves or by accident; for even coincidences are most striking when they have an air of design. We may instance the statue of Mityros at Argos, which fell upon his murderer while he was a spectator at a festival, and killed him. Such events seem not to be due to mere chance. Plots, therefore, constructed on these principles are necessarily the best.

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This brief chapter introduces the distinction between two kinds of plots, simple and complex. Aristotle tells us that complex plots contain reversal or discovery, terms he will explain in the succeeding chapters. The emphasis on unity in the preceding chapters shouldn't make a plot monotonous, and the distinction between simple and complex plots begins to show how unity and dramatic interest coexist.

1452a12. PLOTS ARE EITHER SIMPLE OR COMPLEX: Aristotle will return to the distinction between simple and complex plots at the beginning of chapter 13.

1452a17. REVERSAL OF THE SITUATION AND WITHOUT RECOGNITION: Reversal—“of the Situation” is added by the translator—and recognition or discovery will be the chief devices of plot that allow the events to unfold as both surprising and inevitable. All tragedies involve a change of fortune. Reversal is limited to complex tragedies and so must be something more than just a change of fortune. It will be a change of fortune within a single event. The examples Aristotle gives in chapter 11 help to clarify the difference.

1452a18-22. BY SUCH REVERSAL, OR BY RECOGNITION ... PRECEDING ACTION: The goal in chapter 9 of having events be both surprising and necessary is developed here into the requirement that reversals and recognitions come “from the internal structure of the

plot.” Later chapters will show the variety of reversals and recognitions, as well as the difference between those that are part of the internal structure of the plot and those that are not.

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This chapter explains the nature of reversal and recognition or discovery. At the end of the chapter Aristotle adds that suffering (pathos) is an additional element of the plot, besides reversal and recognition.

1452a24. IN THE OEDIPUS ... PRODUCES THE OPPOSITE EFFECT:

Oedipus has run away from Corinth to avoid fulfilling the prediction that he will murder his father and marry his mother. The messenger brings Oedipus the good news that it is now safe for him to come back to Corinth, since his father is dead and he will now be king. Oedipus, he then says, need not be worried about marrying the queen, since she isn't really his mother. Oedipus fears that this isn't the good news the messenger thought it was, and in fact it leads to his recognizing that he has indeed fulfilled the prediction. 1452a27. LYNCEUS: Theodectes (400-334) wrote the *Lynceus*, which has been lost. The reversal here seems to go in the opposite direction from in the *Oedipus*, because the characters expect something bad, but things turn out well. Not all tragedies have to have unhappy endings, as Aristotle will stress later. But this example raises a problem (maybe if we had the *Lynceus*, we could better

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PLOTS ARE EITHER SIMPLE or Complex,^o for the actions in real life, of which the plots are an imitation, obviously show a similar distinction. An action which is one and continuous in the sense above defined, I call Simple, when the change of fortune takes place without Reversal of the Situation and without Recognition.^o

A Complex action is one in which the change is accompanied by such Reversal, or by Recognition, or by both. These last should arise from the internal structure of the plot, so that what follows should be the necessary or probable result of the preceding action.^o It makes all the difference whether any given event is a case of propter hoc or post

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REVERSAL of THE SITUATION is a change by which the action veers round to its opposite, subject always to our rule of probability or necessity. Thus in the Oedipus, the messenger comes to cheer Oedipus and free him from his alarms about his mother, but by revealing who he is, he produces the opposite effect.^o Again in the Lynceus,^o Lynceus is being led away to his death, and Danaus goes with him, meaning to slay him; but the outcome of the preceding incidents is that Danaus is killed and Lynceus saved.

Recognition, as the name indicates, is a change from ignorance to knowledge, producing love or hate between the persons destined by the poet for good or bad fortune. The best form of recognition is coincident with a Reversal of the Situation, as in the Oedipus. There are indeed other forms. Even inanimate things of the most trivial kind may in a sense be objects of recognition. Again, we may recognise or discover (understand how to solve the problem): How can we square the fact that all tragedy involves a change from good to bad fortune with the fact we find here that some reversals, in tragedies, make events turn out better than expected? **1452b6. IPHIGENIA:** The reference is to Euripides' *Iphigeneia en Taurois* (*Iphigenia Among the Taurians*), one of the plays, along with Sophocles' *Oidipous Tyrannos* (*Oedipus the King*), Aristotle refers to the most in the Poetics. The letter Iphigenia sends is a message to Orestes, her brother. Although she doesn't know it, the messenger to whom she gives the letter is Orestes himself. He then shows that he is Orestes by describing something that she had woven. So this is a case where "recognition should be on both sides."

-12-

Chapter 12 changes the subject. Chapters 7-11 looked at the plot as the organizing principle of a tragedy. But tragedies are organized in a different way as well. The action in a play is divided into what the Greeks called episodes, which are equivalent to the modern divisions of dramas: acts and scenes. Prologue, episodes, and exodes or exits are spoken, while the choral parts are sung or chanted.

1452b17. SEPARATE PARTS ... PARODE AND STASIMON: The *parode* was the song the chorus sang as it entered its place below the stage. It sang the *exode* as it exited. The *stasimon* was sung between episodes by the chorus in its proper place.

whether a person has done a thing or not. But the recognition which is most intimately connected with the plot and action is, as we have said, the recognition of persons. This recognition, combined with Reversal, will produce either pity or fear; and actions producing these effects are those which, by our definition, Tragedy represents. Moreover, it is upon such situations that the issues of good or bad fortune will depend. Recognition, then, being between persons, it may happen that one person only is recognised by the other—when the latter is already known—or it may be necessary that the recognition should be on both sides. Thus Iphigenia^o is revealed to Orestes by the sending of the letter; but another act of recognition is required to make Orestes known to Iphigenia.

Two parts, then, of the Plot—Reversal of the Situation and Recognition—turn upon surprises. A third part is the Scene of Suffering. The Scene of Suffering is a destructive or painful action, such as death on the stage, bodily agony, wounds and the like.

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THE PARTS OF TRAGEDY which must be treated as elements of the whole have been already mentioned. We now come to the quantitative parts—the separate parts into which Tragedy is divided—namely. Prologue, Episode, Exode, Choric song; this last being divided into Parode and Stasimon.^o These are common to all plays: peculiar to some are the songs of actors from the stage and the *Commoi*.

The Prologue is that entire part of a tragedy which precedes the Parode of the Chorus. The Episode is that entire part of a tragedy which is between complete choric songs. The Exode is that entire part of a tragedy which has no choric song after it. Of the Choric part the Parode is the first undivided utterance of the Chorus: the Stasimon is a Choric ode **1452b24. ANAPAESTS OR TROCHAIC TETRAMETERS:** Anapestic and trochaic verses were rhythms used for marching. Once the chorus was in place, they wouldn't use such rhythms. A *commos*

(or kommos) was a dirge or lament, sung in turn by the actors on the stage and the chorus below.

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Chapter 13 uses what has been established to this point to consider normative considerations—what the poet should aim at. It is the function of tragedy that tells the poet what to aim at.

1452b28. WE MUST PROCEED TO CONSIDER ... PRODUCED: What the poet should aim at, and how to create the specific effect of tragedy, are two ways of formulating the same practical question.

1452b31. PERFECT TRAGEDY ... ON THE COMPLEX PLAN: When Aristotle defined simple and complex plots in chapter 10, he didn't say that complex plots were better than simple ones, as he does here.

1452b34. IT FOLLOWS PLAINLY: Aristotle asserts two premises: that complex plots are better than simple ones, and that tragedies imitate fearful and pitiful actions. From these two premises he deduces that the action of the tragedy should be a change of fortune from prosperity to misery in a good, but not perfectly good, person.

1453a7-a10. CHARACTER BETWEEN ... SOME ERROR OR FRAILTY : In chapter 2 Aristotle said that tragedies imitate people who are better than we are, and comedies people who are worse. He says here that a tragedy is a story of a good person who makes a mistake of a kind that will evoke pity and fear. The phrase "error and frailty" is a translation of hamartia. Since it is contrasted to vice and depravity, it is a pardonable mistake. Hamartia was once translated as "tragic flaw," but Aristotle's meaning is more simple and concrete than that. The error that causes a change from good to bad fortune cannot be an accident and cannot be fully deserved, since neither of those would produce pity and fear. If I am blown off my feet by a sudden and violent wind, and carried along until I bump into you, and you, who happen to be standing on the edge of a cliff, get knocked over and killed, you might be pitied, but not me. It isn't enough my error for me to need to be pardoned. The mistake must be sufficiently the person's own action that he has some responsibility for it, but not enough that he deserves punishment.

Sophocles' Oedipus the King helps explain what Aristotle means by *hamartia*. Oedipus' error wasn't unknowingly killing his father and marrying his mother, but thinking that he knew who his parents were

and therefore unknowingly killing his father and marrying his mother.

without anapaests or trochaic tetrameters:° the *Commos* is a joint lamentation of Chorus and actors. The parts of Tragedy which must be treated as elements of the whole have been already mentioned. The quantitative parts—the separate parts into which it is divided—are here enumerated.

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As *THE SEQUEL TO* what has already been said, we must proceed to consider what the poet should aim at, and what he should avoid, in constructing his plots; and by what means the specific effect of Tragedy will be produced.°

A perfect tragedy should, as we have seen, be arranged not on the simple but on the complex plan.° It should, moreover, imitate actions which excite pity and fear, this being the distinctive mark of tragic imitation. It follows plainly,° in the first place, that the change of fortune presented must not be the spectacle of a virtuous man brought from prosperity to adversity: for this moves neither pity nor fear; it merely shocks us. Nor, again, that of a bad man passing from adversity to prosperity: for nothing can be more alien to the spirit of Tragedy; it possesses no single tragic quality; it neither satisfies the moral sense nor calls forth pity or fear. Nor, again, should the downfall of the utter villain be exhibited. A plot of this kind would, doubtless, satisfy the moral sense, but it would inspire neither pity nor fear; for pity is aroused by unmerited misfortune, fear by the misfortune of a man like ourselves. Such an event, therefore, will be neither pitiful nor terrible. There remains, then, the character between these two extremes,—that of a man who is not eminently good and just, yet whose misfortune is brought about not by vice or depravity, but by some error or frailty.° He must be one who is highly renowned and prosperous,—a personage like Oedipus, Thyestes, or other illustrious men of such families.

A well constructed plot should, therefore, be single in its

1453a13. A WELL CONSTRUCTED PLOT SHOULD... RATHER THAN DOUBLE: The difference between a single and a double issue (outcome) is not the same as a simple versus a complex plot. In a double issue, some characters end up happy and others miserable. The desire for a double issue is the desire for “poetic justice,” in which

everyone gets what he or she deserves. Such a feeling would interfere with pity and fear, and with their catharsis.

1453a20. ALCMAEON ... TELEPHUS: Of these figures, we possess only plays concerning Oedipus and Orestes. Alcmeon killed his mother in revenge for the death of his father. Meleager killed his uncles. Thyestes seduced his brother's wife, and his brother Atreus avenged himself by serving up his children in a feast. Telephus almost unwittingly married his mother.

1453a30. LIKE THE ODYSSEY, IT HAS A DOUBLE THREAD OF PLOT: Homer's Odyssey does have a double issue. Odysseus and Penelope are reunited, and the evil suitors are all killed. The fact that Aristotle is willing to call the plot of Homer's Odyssey second-best shows that he is willing to impose his own judgments over the judgments of his culture, for which Homer was without question the greatest of poets.

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This chapter concerns itself with the cause of the specific tragic effect, the tragic pleasure. The relation between chapters 13 and 14 has long been a subject of controversy. The most explicit contrast comes at 53b12, below.

1453b1-11. FEAR AND PITY ... INDICATES A SUPERIOR POET: If the same effect, the tragic pleasure of the purgation of pity and fear, can be accomplished either by spectacle or by the plot and "inner structure," why should Aristotle insist that the latter method "is the better way, and indicates a superior poet"? Why is achieving the tragic effect by spectacle "less artistic"? Aristotle's answer shows his way of thinking. The better way isn't better because it takes more skill and ingenuity by the artist, although it does. The better way isn't better for some extraneous moral reason, either. Those who try to achieve the tragic effect by spectacle wind up not achieving it at all; instead they achieve only something similar to pity and fear—namely, the horror we feel in response to the monstrous. When we respond to something horrible produced by spectacle, we are not responding to the drama as an imitation, but to the spectacle itself as horrible. The specific tragic pleasure cannot only be achieved only by tragedies; it is achieved only by the plots of tragedies.

issue, rather than double° as some maintain. The change of fortune should be not from bad to good, but, reversely, from good to bad. It should come about as the result not of vice, but of some great error or

frailty, in a character either such as we have described, or better rather than worse. The practice of the stage bears out our view. At first the poets recounted any legend that came in their way. Now, the best tragedies are founded on the story of a few houses,—on the fortunes of Alcmaeon, Oedipus, Orestes, Meleager, Thyestes, Telephus, ° and those others who have done or suffered something terrible. A tragedy, then, to be perfect according to the rules of art should be of this construction. Hence they are in error who censure Euripides just because he follows this principle in his plays, many of which end unhappily. It is, as we have said, the right ending. The best proof is that on the stage and in dramatic competition, such plays, if well worked out, are the most tragic in effect; and Euripides, faulty though he may be in the general management of his subject, yet is felt to be the most tragic of the poets.

In the second rank comes the kind of tragedy which some place first. Like the *Odyssey*, it has a double thread of plot, ° and also an opposite catastrophe for the good and for the bad. It is accounted the best because of the weakness of the spectators; for the poet is guided in what he writes by the wishes of his audience. The pleasure, however, thence derived is not the true tragic pleasure. It is proper rather to Comedy, where those who, in the piece, are the deadliest enemies—like Orestes and Aegisthus—quit the stage as friends at the close, and no one slays or is slain.

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FEAR AND PITY MAY be aroused by spectacular means; but they may also result from the inner structure of the piece, which is the better way, and indicates a superior poet. ° For the plot ought to be so constructed that, even without the aid of the eye, he who hears the tale told will thrill with horror and melt to pity at what takes place. ° This is the impression we should receive from hearing the story of the Oedipus. But to produce this effect by the mere spectacle is a less artistic method, and dependent on extraneous aids. Those who employ spectacular means to create a sense not of the terrible but only of the monstrous, are strangers to the purpose of Tragedy; for we must not demand of Tragedy any and every kind of pleasure, but only that which is proper to it. And since the pleasure which the poet should afford is that which comes from pity and fear through imitation, it is evident that this quality must be impressed upon the incidents.

1453b3-5. PLOT OUGHT TO BE SO CONSTRUCTED ... WHAT TAKES PLACE: This idea continues Aristotle's themes that plot is the soul of the tragedy and that spectacle is the least essential part. In the *Rhetoric* we will see the same elevation of argument-as the body of persuasion-over delivery. In both cases, Aristotle is separating the structure from the performance. Initially, in both poetry and rhetoric there was no distinction between the author and the performer. It is a distinction that makes sense only once we have written language, or at least an established and well-known text, and so can separate script from performance. If hearing the plot, apart from performance, allows the listener or reader to have the essential tragic experience, then it becomes easier for Aristotle to elevate his own judgments about tragedy above the verdict of a particular audience.

1453b12. CIRCUMSTANCES ... TERRIBLE OR PITIFUL: In chapter 13 Aristotle asked what sort of change of fortune could produce pity and fear. At this point in chapter 14 he asks a different question. In chapter 13 there were four possibilities: a good or a bad man going from good to bad or bad to good fortune. In chapter 14 there are eight possibilities. In chapter 13 Aristotle looked at the plot as a change of fortune in a single person, while in chapter 14 tragedy comes from the relation between people. The people involved can be friends or enemies. Only terrible action between friends and family can be tragic. Once that has been decided, there are four further possibilities. "The deed must either be done or not done—and that wittingly or unwittingly" (53b36). Three of the four possibilities can make for tragedies of different quality.

Let us then determine what are the circumstances which strike us as terrible or pitiful.^o

Actions capable of this effect must happen between persons who are either friends or enemies or indifferent to one another. If an enemy kills an enemy, there is nothing to excite pity either in the act or the intention,—except so far as the suffering in itself is pitiful. So again with indifferent persons. But when the tragic incident occurs between those who are near or dear to one another—if, for example, a brother kills, or intends to kill, a brother, a son his father, a mother her son, a son his mother, or any other deed of the kind is done—these are the situations to be looked for by the poet. He may not indeed destroy the framework of the received legends—the fact, for instance, that Clytemnestra was slain by Orestes and Eriphyle by Alcmaeon—but he ought to show invention of his own, and skilfully handle the

traditional material. Let us explain more clearly what is meant by skilful handling.

The action may be done consciously and with knowledge of the persons, in the manner of the older poets. It is thus too that Euripides makes Medea slay her children. Or, again, the deed of horror may be done, but done in ignorance, and the tie of kinship or friendship be discovered afterwards. The Oedipus of Sophocles is an example. Here, indeed, the incident is outside the drama proper;^o but cases occur where it falls within the action of the play: one may cite the Alcmaeon of Astydamas, or Telegonus in the Wounded Odysseus.^o Again, there is a third case,—to be about to act with knowledge of the persons and then not to act. The fourth case is when some one is about to do an irreparable deed through ignorance, and makes the discovery before it is done. These are the only possible ways. For the deed must either be done or not done,—and that wittingly or unwittingly. But of all these ways, to be about to act knowing the persons, and then not to act, is the worst. It is shocking without being tragic, for no disaster follows. It is, therefore, never, or very rarely, found in poetry. One instance, however, is in the Antigone,^o where Haemon threatens to kill Creon. The next and better way is that the deed should be perpetrated. Still better, that it should be perpetrated in ignorance, and the discovery made afterwards. There is then nothing to shock us, while the discovery produces a startling effect. The last case is the best, as when in the Cresphontes^o Merope is about to slay her son, but, recognising who he is, spares his life. So in the Iphigenia,^o the sister recognises the brother just in time. Again in the Helle,^o the son recognises the mother when on the point of giving her up. This, then, is why a few families only, as has been already observed, furnish the subjects of tragedy. It was not art, but happy chance, that led the poets in search of subjects to impress the tragic quality upon their plots. They are compelled, therefore, to have recourse to those houses whose history contains moving incidents like these.

1453b32. INCIDENT IS OUTSIDE THE DRAMA PROPER: Oedipus kills his father and marries his mother long before the action represented in Oedipus the King begins.

1453b33. THE ALCMAEON OF ASTYDAMAS ... THE WOUNDED ODYSSEUS: Both plays, by Sophocles, are lost.

1454a2. ANTIGONE: Aristotle is referring to Sophocles' Antigone, which we do possess. Haemon, who is Creon's son, was in love with Antigone, whom Creon, the king, ordered executed.

1454a5. CRESPHONTES: This play, now lost, is by Euripides.

1454a7. IPHIGENIA: We do possess Euripides' *Iphigenia* in Tauris, to

which Aristotle refers in chapter 11.

1454a8. HELLE: Not only is the plot Aristotle is talking about lost, but we don't know what play it is, who wrote it, or anything else about it.

Enough has now been said concerning the structure of the incidents, and the right kind of plot.

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Aristotle interrupts the discussion of plot with a chapter on character. In chapter 6 he said, "By Character I mean that in virtue of which we ascribe certain qualities to the agents" (1450a5-7). Later in that chapter, he says something more helpful: "Character is that which reveals moral purpose, showing what kind of things a man chooses or avoids" (1450b8-9), and he echoes that remark here when he says that "any speech or action that manifests moral purpose of any kind will be expressive of character" (54a17)-that is, character (ethos) is limited to the ethical aspects of a person and therefore is narrower than many modern uses of the term. In the Eudemian Ethics, Aristotle says that a "person is not said to be of a certain ethos because he is fond of sweet or bitter things" (II.10.1227b8-10). His criteria for the right kind of character for tragedy, though, extends to all the actors in a play, not only the one experiencing the change of fortune.

1454a29. As AN EXAMPLE ... MENELAUS IN THE ORESTES: The reference is to Euripides' *Orestes*. Menelaus, Orestes' father's brother, refuses to help Orestes. That refusal is not demanded by the plot, and so Menelaus is worse than he need be. The problem isn't that Euripides' depiction of Menelaus is not true to the "real" Menelaus, but that it is worse than the plot requires. Therefore Aristotle calls it a "motiveless degradation of character."

1454a30. LAMENT OF ODYSSEUS IN THE SCYLLA: This reference is to a dithyramb by Timotheus (whom we met in chapter 2) that has not survived. Aristotle has referred to Homeric epics to illuminate tragedy, but this is an unusual reference to a lyric poem. Scylla is the six-headed sea-monster Odysseus encounters in the *Odyssey*.

1454a31. SPEECH OF MELANIPPE: We don't have Euripides' *Melanippe the Wise*. Apparently, the speech was "indecorous and inappropriate" because it was so clever it didn't convince anyone.

1454a32. IPHIGENIA AT AULIS: In Euripides' *Iphigenia at Aulis*,

Iphigenia first rebels against being sacrificed for the sake of success in the Trojan War but later offers to die for the cause.

1454b1. NOT BE BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE DEUS EX MACHINA: A *deus ex machina* was literally a god coming onto the stage by means of a crane. The god was brought in to settle things, untangle complications, and tell the audience what would happen to the characters in the future. The term then became used to mean any unconvincing and improbable device a poet used to get out of complications he couldn't solve by more probable means—for example, at the end of Euripides' *Medea*, Medea escapes on a magical chariot.

1454b2. RETURN OF THE GREEKS IN THE ILIAD: This is a reference to Athena's intervention after the soldiers enthusiastically went along with Agamemnon's insincere suggestion that they give up and go home (IL 155-181).

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IN RESPECT OF CHARACTER there are four things to be aimed at. First, and most important, it must be good. Now any speech or action that manifests moral purpose of any kind will be expressive of character: the character will be good if the purpose is good. This rule is relative to each class. Even a woman may be good, and also a slave; though the woman ; may be said to be an inferior being, and the slave quite worthless. The second thing to aim at is propriety. There is a type of manly valour; but valour in a woman, or unscrupulous cleverness, is inappropriate. Thirdly, character must be true to life: for this is a distinct thing from goodness and propriety, as here described. The fourth point is consistency: for though the subject of the imitation, who suggested the type, be inconsistent, still he must be consistently inconsistent. As an example of motiveless degradation of character, we have Menelaus in the *Orestes*:^o of character indecorous and inappropriate, the lament of Odysseus in the *Scylla*,^o and the speech of Melanippe:^o of inconsistency, the Iphigenia at Aulis,^o -for Iphigenia the suppliant in no way resembles her later self.

As in the structure of the plot, so too in the portraiture of character, the poet should always aim either at the necessary or the probable. Thus a person of a given character should : speak or act in a given way, by the rule either of necessity or of probability; just as this event

should follow that by necessary or probable sequence. It is therefore evident that the unravelling of the plot, no less than the complication, must arise out of the plot itself, it must not be brought about by the Deus ex Machina° -as in the Medea, or in the Return of the Greeks in the Iliad.° The Deus ex Machina should be employed only for events external to the drama,-for antecedent or subsequent

1454b18. ENOUGH HAS BEEN SAID IN OUR PUBLISHED TREATISES: It is believed that Aristotle is referring to his dialogue On Poets, of which we have only a few fragments.

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After talking about character in chapters 15, Aristotle returns in this chapter to plot, and more specifically to the kinds of recognition. In chapter 9 we learned that the most satisfying plot combines probability. and necessity with surprise and wonder. Recognition should be as probable as Possible, while at the same time be unexpected. The different kinds of recognition are ranked according to how well they fulfill this dual demand.

1454b22. ‘THE SPEAR ... BEAR ON THEIR BODIES’: This passage seems to be a quotation from a lost tragedy.

1454b23. STARS INTRODUCED BY CARCINUS IN His THYESTES: The stars were hereditary birthmarks on the descendents of Pelops, including Thyestes. There were two tragedians named Carcinus, grandfather and grandson. The Thyestes, was probably written by the younger Carcinus in the fourth century.

1454b25. LITTLE ARK IN THE TYRO: In Sophocles’ Two, now lost, the boat on which two boys were abandoned was the key to their being recognized.

1454b26-30. IN THE RECOGNITION OF ODYSSEUS: The two recognitions are in books 19 (386ff) and 21 (Z05ff) of the Odyssey.

events, which lie beyond the range of human knowledge, and which require to be reported or foretold; for to the gods we ascribe the power of seeing all things. Within the action there must be nothing irrational. If the irrational cannot be excluded, it should be outside the scope of the tragedy. Such is the irrational element in the Oedipus of Sophocles.

Again, since Tragedy is an imitation of persons who are above the

common level, the example of good portrait-painters should be followed. They, while reproducing the distinctive form of the original, make a likeness which is true to life and yet more beautiful. So too the poet, in representing men who are irascible or indolent, or have other defects of character, should preserve the type and yet ennoble it. In this way Achilles is portrayed by Agathon and Homer.

These then are rules the poet should observe. Nor should he neglect those appeals to the senses, which, though not among the essentials, are the concomitants of poetry; for here too there is much room for error. But of this enough has been said in our published treatises. °

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WHAT RECOGNITION IS HAS been already explained. We will now enumerate its kinds.

First, the least artistic form, which, from poverty of wit, is most commonly employed—recognition by signs. Of these some are congenital, such as ‘the spear which the earth-born race bear on their bodies,’ or the stars introduced by Carcinus in his *Thyestes*.° Others are acquired after birth; and of these some are bodily marks, as scars; some external tokens, as necklaces, or the little ark in the *Tyro*° by which the discovery is effected. Even these admit of more or less skilful treatment. Thus in the recognition of *Odysseus* by his scar, the discovery is made in one way by the nurse, in another by the swineherds. The use of tokens for the express purpose of proof—and, indeed, any formal proof with or without tokens—is a less artistic mode of recognition. A better kind is that which comes about by a turn of incident, as in the Bath Scene in the *Odyssey*.

1454b32. IPHICENLA: The reference is again to Euripides’ *Iphigenia in Aulis*.

1454b36. TEREUS OF SOPHOCLES: This is another play that has been lost. Since Philomela’s tongue had been cut out, she wove a picture of Tereus raping her.

1455a1. CYPRIANS OF DICAEOGENES: No information has come down to us concerning this play.

1455a2. ‘LAY OF ALCINOUS’: This refers to book 8 of the *Odyssey* 521ff

1455a4. ‘SOME ONE RESEMBLING ME ... ORESTES HAS COME’:

These lines are spoken by Electra in Aeschylus' Choephoroi (Libation Bearers).

1455a6-8. POLYIDUS THE SOPHIST ... THE Tydeus OF THEODECTES: We know nothing of Polyidus or of his play about the Iphigenia/Orestes story, and nothing about the details of Theodectes.

1455a10. PHINEIDAE: This is another play we know nothing about.

1455a13. ODYSSEUS DISGUISED as A MESSENGER: Aristotle mentions here yet another play we know nothing about.

Next come the recognitions invented at will by the poet, and on that account wanting in art. For example, Orestes in the Iphigenia^{*} reveals the fact that he is Orestes. She, indeed, makes herself known by the letter; but he, by speaking himself, and saying what the poet, not what the plot requires. This, therefore, is nearly allied to the fault above mentioned: for Orestes might as well have brought tokens with him. Another similar instance is the 'voice of the shuttle' in the Tereus of Sophocles.^o

The third kind depends on memory when the sight of some object awakens a feeling: as in the Cyprians of Dicaeogenes,^o where the hero breaks into tears on seeing the picture; or again in the 'Lay of Alcinous,'^o where Odysseus, hearing the minstrel play the lyre, recalls the past and weeps; and hence the recognition.

The fourth kind is by process of reasoning. Thus in the Choephoroi:—'Some one resembling me has come: no one resembles me but Orestes: therefore Orestes has come.'^o Such too is the discovery made by Iphigenia in the play of Polyidus the Sophist. It was a natural reflexion for Orestes to make, 'So I too must die at the altar like my sister.' So, again, in the Tydeus of Theodectes,^o the father says, 'I came to find my son, and I lose my own life.' So too in the Phineidae^o: the women, on seeing the place, inferred their fate:—'Here we are doomed to die, for here we were cast forth.' Again, there is a composite kind of recognition involving false inference on the part of one of the characters, as in the Odysseus Disguised as a Messenger.^o A said that no one else was able to bend the bow; ... hence B (the disguised Odysseus) imagined that A

Chapters 13-16 looked at how tragedies could best achieve the tragic effect—the pleasurable experience of the purgation of pity and fear. Here Aristotle turns to what the poet can do. The idea of the best tragedy drops out, and the question becomes instead how the

tragedian can do his or her best.

1455a26. AMPHIARAUS: This play by Carcinus is also lost.

1455a29. POET SHOULD WORK OUT ... WITH APPROPRIATE GESTURES: Just as the poet should visualize the action, he should try to act out the external signs of the emotions he wants his characters to express.

1455a34. As FOR THE STORY: The word “story” translates *logos*. *Logos* is sometimes contrasted with *mythos*, the word we translate as “plot,” but sometimes the two words seem to be synonyms. We can fill in a little more of what Aristotle means in chapter 6 when he calls the plot (*mythos*) the soul of the tragedy. Different tragedies about the Iphigenia story have the same plot in the same way that all people have the same soul. This is what Aristotle refers to as the story, general outline, and general plan. Two different tragedies about Iphigenia have different plots in just the way you and I have different souls. This distinction between story and plot (*logos* and *mythos*) allows Aristotle to distinguish the incidents that are crucial to the plot from those that may be part of the story but not essential to the plot. That distinction will be crucial in the next chapter. Therefore he will state in chapter 18 (56a5-9): “In speaking of a tragedy as the same or different, the best test to take is the plot. Identity exists where the Complication and Unravelling are the same. Many poets tie the knot well, but unravel it. Both arts, however, should always be mastered.”

would recognise the bow which, in fact, he had not seen; and to bring about a recognition by this means—the expectation that A would recognise the bow—is false inference.

But, of all recognitions, the best is that which arises from the incidents themselves, where the startling discovery is made by natural means. Such is that in the Oedipus of Sophocles, and in the Iphigenia; for it was natural that Iphigenia should wish to dispatch a letter. These recognitions alone dispense with the artificial aid of tokens or amulets. Next come the recognitions by process of reasoning.

IN CONSTRUCTING THE PLOT and working it out with the proper diction, the poet should place the scene, as far as possible, before his

eyes. In this way, seeing everything with the utmost vividness, as if he were a spectator of the action, he will discover what is in keeping with it and be most unlikely to overlook inconsistencies. The need of such a rule is shown by the fault found in Carcinus. Amphiarus^o was on his way from the temple. This fact escaped the observation of one who did not see the situation. On the stage, however, the piece failed, the audience being offended at the oversight.

Again, the poet should work out his play, to the best of his power, with appropriate gestures;^o for those who feel emotion are most convincing through natural sympathy with the characters they represent; and one who is agitated storms, one who is angry rages, with the most life-like reality. Hence poetry implies either a happy gift of nature or a strain of madness. In the one case a man can take the mould of any character; in the other, he is lifted out of his proper self.

As for the story,^o whether the poet takes it ready made or constructs it for himself, he should first sketch its general outline, and then fill in the episodes and amplify in detail. The general 1455b10. POLYIDUS: We don't know anything about Polyidus, to whom Aristotle also refers in chapter 16.

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This chapter completes the treatment of plot that began in chapter 7. It follows chapter 17 in retaining the point of view of the poet but brings back the hierarchical classification of plots, similar to the kinds of recognition in chapter 16 and the kinds of plot in chapters. 13 and 14. The proportion of the Poetics that concerns plot mirrors the importance of plot in Aristotle's understanding of tragedy.

1455b25. EVERY TRAGEDY FALLS INTO TWO PARTS ... : "Unravelling" is a literal translation of *lusis*. "Tying" and "untying" would give the idea behind "complication" and "unraveling." In the next sentence ("Incidents extraneous to the action ..."), Aristotle's implication is that the complication can either be part of the plot or not, but the resolution should be in the plot.

plan may be illustrated by the Iphigenia. A young girl is sacrificed ; she disappears mysteriously from the eyes of those who sacrificed her; she is transported to another country, where the custom is to offer up all strangers to the goddess. To this ministry she is appointed. Some time later her own brother chances to arrive. The fact that the oracle for some reason ordered him to go there, is outside the general plan of

the play. The purpose, again, of his coming is outside the action proper. However, he comes, he is seized, and, when on the point of being sacrificed, reveals who he is. The mode of recognition may be either that of Euripides or of Polyidus,^o in whose play he exclaims very naturally:—‘So it was not my sister only, but I too, who was doomed to be sacrificed’; and by that remark he is saved.

After this, the names being once given, it remains to fill in the episodes. We must see that they are relevant to the action. In the case of Orestes, for example, there is the madness which led to his capture, and his deliverance by means of the purificatory rite. In the drama, the episodes are short, but it is these that give extension to Epic poetry. Thus the story of the Odyssey can be stated briefly. A certain man is absent from home for many years; he is jealously watched by Poseidon, and left desolate. Meanwhile his home is in a wretched plight—suitors are wasting his substance and plotting against his son. At length, tempest-tost, he himself arrives; he makes certain persons acquainted with him; he attacks the suitors with his own hand, and is himself preserved while he destroys them. This is the essence of the plot; the rest is episode.

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EVERY TRAGEDY FALLS INTO two parts,^o—Complication and Unravelling or *Denouement*. Incidents extraneous to the action are frequently combined with a portion of the action proper, to form the Complication; the rest is the Unravelling.

1455b27. TURNING-POINT: In Greek this is *metabasis* (“change”). The plot, then, has to include the change of fortune and its consequences. It doesn’t have to include things prior to the change of fortune. For example, in *Oedipus the King* the plot begins with the plague in Thebes, as *Oedipus’* fortunes turn worse. We don’t see his successes that made him king, and then a prosperous and beloved king.

1455b29. THE LYNCEUS OF THEODECTES: This play is lost.

1455b32. FOUR KINDS OF TRAGEDY... : The list of four kinds of tragedy has frustrated many commentators on the *Poetics*, because it doesn’t neatly correspond to other classifications Aristotle makes—the closest will come in chapter 24 and it is hard to figure out what four parts or elements Aristotle is referring to. The best tragedy is the one

that best achieves the specific purpose of tragedy—the pleasure of purging pity and fear. The three inferior kinds of tragedies should, if the argument of this chapter is coherent, contain less-good connections between the tying and untying of the plot.

1456a1. TRAGEDIES ON AJAX AND IXION ... THE PHTHIOTIDES AND THE PELEUS: In the *Ajax* of Sophocles, Ajax went mad and finally killed himself. We have no plays about Ixion. Ixion was the first Greek murderer. Sophocles wrote *Phthiotides*. Both Sophocles and Euripides wrote plays called the *Peleus*. All are lost.

1456a2. THE PHORCIDES, THE PROMETHEUS: Aeschylus wrote the *Phorcides* and a *Prometheus* trilogy. One play from the trilogy, *Prometheus Bound*, has survived.

1456a3-5. POET SHOULD ENDEAVOR ... CAVILLING CRITICISM OF THE DAY: I interpret this passage to mean that the best kind of plot, the complex plot, combines all the elements, and that something drops out of each succeeding kind. The second kind is called “the pathetic (where the motive is passion)” (56a1). “Pathetic” and “passion” both come from the word for “suffering and emotion” —“passion” in English conveys both those meanings. In this sort of plot and the next two there must be a change of fortune without reversal and discovery. Aristotle gives no reasons why the pathetic plot should be better than the ethical one.

1456a10. POET SHOULD REMEMBER ... : Chapter 18 ends with two more ways of thinking about the unity of a tragedy—first by comparison to epic, and second by the instruction that the chorus is to be treated like another actor. An epic can contain several different plots, but a tragedy cannot.

By the *Complication* I mean all that extends from the beginning of the action to the part which marks the turning-point^o to good or bad fortune. The *Unravelling* is that which extends from the beginning of the change to the end. Thus, in the *Lynceus* of Theodectes,^o the *Complication* consists of the incidents presupposed in the drama, the seizure of the child, and then again.... The *Unravelling* extends from the accusation of murder to the end.

There are four kinds of Tragedy,^o the *Complex*, depending entirely on *Reversal of the Situation* and *Recognition*; the *Pathetic* (where the motive is passion),—such as the tragedies on *Ajax* and *Ixion*; the *Ethical* (where the motives are ethical),—such as the *Phthiotides* and the *Peleus*.^o The fourth kind is the *Simple*. We here exclude the purely spectacular element, exemplified by the *Phorcides*, the *Prometheus*,^o and scenes laid in *Hades*. The poet should endeavour, if possible, to combine all poetic elements; or failing that, the greatest number and

those the most important; the more so, in face of the cavilling criticism of the day.^o For whereas there have hitherto been good poets, each in his own branch, the critics now expect one man to surpass all others in their several lines of excellence.

In speaking of a tragedy as the same or different, the best test to take is the plot. Identity exists where the Complication and Unravelling are the same. Many poets tie the knot well, but unravel it ill. Both arts, however, should always be mastered.

Again, the poet should remember^o what has been often said, and not make an Epic structure into a Tragedy—by an Epic structure I mean one with a multiplicity of plots—as if, for instance, you were to make a tragedy out of the entire story of the Iliad. In the Epic poem, owing to its length, each part assumes its proper magnitude. In the drama the result is far from answering to the poet's expectation. The proof is that the poets who have dramatised the whole story of the Fall of
1456a18. AGATHON: We met Agathon in chapter 9. **1456a22. SISYPHUS:** Sisyphus was condemned to roll a rock up a hill over and over again throughout eternity, only to watch it roll back down each time. He resembles the trickster figure found in many cultures.

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The Poetics turns to a brief discussion of thought and then a more detailed one for diction—the third and fourth parts of the tragedy that were listed in chapter 6.

1456a33. IT REMAINS TO SPEAK OF DICTION AND THOUGHT: Aristotle's announcement that it is time to turn to thought and diction implies that character as well as thought has already been treated. The word translated as "diction" is *lexis*, which will be translated as "style" in the Rhetoric.

1456b2. WHEN THE OBJECT IS ... IMPORTANCE, OR PROBABILITY: There is an interesting discrepancy between the list of what words can accomplish and what can be effected only by actions. A few lines above Aristotle notes that words can embody "proof and refutation; the excitation of the feelings, such as pity, fear, anger, and the like; the suggestion of importance or its opposite." On the other hand, dramatic incidents evoke the sense of pity, fear, importance, or probability. "Proof and refutation" cannot be accomplished by deeds, and probability cannot be shown by words.

Troy, instead of selecting portions, like Euripides; or who have taken the whole tale of Niobe, and not a part of her story, like Aeschylus, either fail utterly or meet with poor success on the stage. Even Agathon^o has been known to fail from this one defect. In his *Reversals of the Situation*, however, he shows a marvellous skill in the effort to hit the popular taste, to produce a tragic effect that satisfies the moral sense. This effect is produced when the clever rogue, like Sisyphus,^o is outwitted, or the brave villain defeated. Such an event is probable in Agathon's sense of the word: 'it is probable,' he says, 'that many things should happen contrary to probability.'

The Chorus too should be regarded as one of the actors; it should be an integral part of the whole, and share in the action, in the manner not of Euripides but of Sophocles. As for the later poets, their choral songs pertain as little to the subject of the piece as to that of any other tragedy. They are, therefore, sung as mere interludes, a practice first begun by Agathon. Yet what difference is there between introducing such choral interludes, and transferring a speech, or even a whole act, from one play to another?

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IT REMAINS TO SPEAK of Diction and Thought,^o the other parts of Tragedy having been already discussed. Concerning Thought, we may assume what is said in the *Rhetoric*, to which inquiry the subject more strictly belongs. Under Thought is included every effect which has to be produced by speech, the subdivisions being, -proof and refutation; the excitation of the feelings, such as pity, fear, anger, and the like; the suggestion of importance or its opposite. Now, it is evident that the dramatic incidents must be treated from the same points of view as the dramatic speeches, when the object is to evoke the sense of pity, fear, importance, or probability.^o The only

1456b10. ART OF DELIVERY : The art of delivery is the art of the actor. It is discussed more fully in *Rhetoric* III. 1 . While Aristotle doesn't think much of this art-its place in the *Rhetoric* is parallel to the place of spectacle in the *Poetics*-its study is currently known as speech act theory.

1456b15. PROTAGORAS: Protagoras (c.485-415) was one of the most famous sophists, traveling speakers who made money giving performances and teaching rhetoric to others. He made a name for

himself by criticizing the opening lines of the Iliad for not keeping straight his own distinction between a command and a prayer.

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Chapters 20 approaches questions of diction and style (lexis) by enumerating the parts of speech. Special note: While translator S. H. Butcher had indicated his belief that this chapter was not in the original Greek manuscript-a manuscript that is now lost-the current editor has chosen to retain the section.

1457a23. SENTENCE: The word translated as “sentence” is once again *logos*.

1457b23. A LETTER IS AN INDIVISIBLE SOUND: In Greek there was a direct correspondence between the sounds of spoken language and the letters of written language.

difference is, that the incidents should speak for themselves without verbal exposition; while the effects aimed at in speech should be produced by the speaker, and as a result of the speech. For what were the business of a speaker, if the Thought were revealed quite apart from what he says?

Next, as regards Diction. One branch of the inquiry treats of the Modes of Utterance. But this province of knowledge belongs to the art of Delivery^o and to the masters of that science. It includes, for instance,-what is a command, a prayer, a statement, a threat, a question, an answer, and so forth. To know or not to know these things involves no serious censure upon the poet's art. For who can admit the fault imputed to Homer by Protagoras,^o-that in the words, ‘Sing, goddess, of the wrath,’ he gives a command under the idea that he utters a prayer? For to tell some one to do a thing or not to do it is, he says, a command. We may, therefore, pass this over as an inquiry that belongs to another art, not to poetry.

Syllable, Connecting word, Noun, Verb, Inflexion or Case, Sentence° or Phrase.

A Letter is an indivisible sound,° yet not every such sound, but only one which can form part of a group of sounds. For even brutes utter indivisible sounds, none of which I call a letter. The sound I mean may be either a vowel, a semi-vowel, : or a mute. A vowel is that which without impact of tongue or lip has an audible sound. A semi-vowel, that which with such impact has an audible sound, as S and R. A mute, that which with such impact has by itself no sound, but joined to a vowel sound becomes audible, as G and D. These are distinguished according to the form assumed by the mouth and the place . where they are produced; according as they are aspirated or smooth, long or short; as they are acute, grave, or of an intermediate tone; which inquiry belongs in detail to the writers on metre.

A Syllable is a non-significant sound, composed of a mute and a vowel: for GR without A is a syllable, as also with A, GRA. But the investigation of these differences belongs also to metrical science.

A Connecting word is a non-significant sound, which neither causes nor hinders the union of many sounds into one significant sound; it may be placed at either end or in the middle of a sentence. Or, a non-significant sound, which out of several sounds, each of them significant, is capable of forming one significant sound,-as ἀμφί, περί, and the like. Or, a non-significant sound, which marks the beginning, end, or division of a sentence; such, however, that it cannot correctly stand by itself at the beginning of a sentence,-as μέν, ἤτοι,δέ.

A Noun is a composite significant sound, not marking time, of which no part is in itself significant: for in double or compound words we do not employ the separate parts as if each were in itself significant. Thus in Theodorus, 'god-given,' the δῶρον or 'gift' is not in itself significant.

A Verb is a composite significant sound, marking time, in which, as in the noun, no part is in itself significant. For 'man,' or 'white' does not express the idea of 'when'; but 'he walks,' or 'he has walked' does connote time, present or past.

Inflexion belongs both to the noun and verb, and expresses either the relation 'of,' 'to,' or the like; or that of number, whether one or many, as 'man' or 'men'; or the modes or tones in actual delivery, e.g. a question or a command. 'Did he go?' and 'go' are verbal inflexions of this kind.

A Sentence° or Phrase is a composite significant sound, some at least of whose parts are in themselves significant; for not every such group of words consists of verbs and nouns—‘the definition of man,’ for example—but it may dispense even with the

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Chapters 21 continues the examination of diction by looking at the parts of speech called words, names, or nouns, (onomata; onoma in the singular)-that have meaning by themselves. Neither Aristotle nor other Greeks of that time had a science of grammar as we understand it, so Aristotle’s lists of the parts of speech in different works vary with the purpose of analyzing speech.

1457a32. DOUBLE OR COMPOUND: In chapter 20 Aristotle has given an example of a compound word: “Theodorus” comes from words meaning “God” and “given.” »

1457a36. ‘HERMO-CAICO-XANTHUS’: This expression is made up of the names of three rivers, all in what is now Turkey, the area from which the founders of Marseilles, the Greek colony in southern France—it is a “Massilian” expression, one from Marseilles—supposedly originated.

1457b7. METAPHOR: Aristotle discusses metaphor in more detail in book III of the Rhetoric.

verb. Still it will always have some significant part, as ‘in walking,’ or ‘Cleon son of Cleon.’ A sentence or phrase may form a unity in two ways,—either as signifying one thing, or as consisting of several parts linked together. Thus the Iliad is one by the linking together of parts, the definition man by the unity of the thing signified.

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WORDS ARE OF TWO kinds, simple and double. By simple I mean those composed of non-significant elements, such as γῆ. By double or compound,° those composed either of a significant and non-significant element (though within the whole word no element is significant), or of elements that are both significant. A word may likewise be triple,

quadruple, or multiple in form, like so many Massilian expressions, e.g. 'Herma-caico-xanthus' who prayed to Father Zeus.'

Every word is either current, or strange, or metaphorical, or ornamental, or newly-coined, or lengthened, or contracted, or altered.

By a current or proper word I mean one which is in general use among a people; by a strange word, one which is in use in another country. Plainly, therefore, the same word may be at once strange and current, but not in relation to the same people. The word *σίγυννον*, 'lance,' is to the Cyprians a current term but to us a strange one.

Metaphor^o is the application of an alien name by transference either from genus to species, or from species to genus, or from species to species, or by analogy, that is, proportion. Thus from genus to species, as: 'There lies my ship'; for lying at anchor is a species of lying. From species to genus, as: 'Verily ten thousand noble deeds hath Odysseus wrought'; for ten thousand is a species of large number, and is here used for a large number generally. From species to species, as: 'With blade of bronze drew away the life,' and 'Cleft the water with the vessel of unyielding bronze.' Here *ἀρύσαι*, 'to draw away,' is used for *ταμεῖν*, 'to cleave,' and *ταμεῖν* again for *δρῶναι*,—each being a species of taking away. Analogy or proportion is when the second term is to the first as the fourth to the third. We may then use the fourth for the second, or the second for the fourth. Sometimes too we qualify the metaphor by adding the term to which the proper word is relative. Thus the cup is to Dionysus as the shield to Ares. The cup may, therefore, be called 'the shield of Dionysus,' and the shield 'the cup of Ares.' Or, again, as old age is to life, so is evening to day. Evening may therefore be called 'the old age of the day,' and old age, 'the evening of life,' or, in the phrase of Empedocles, 'life's setting sun.' For some of the terms of the proportion there is at times no word in existence; still the metaphor may be used. For instance, to scatter seed is called sowing; but the action of the sun in scattering his rays is nameless. Still this process bears to the sun the same relation as sowing to the seed. Hence the expression of the poet 'sowing the god-created light.' There is another way in which this kind of metaphor may be employed. We may apply an alien term, and then deny of that term one of its proper attributes; as if we were to call the shield, not 'the cup of Ares,' but 'the wineless cup.'

An ornamental word...

A newly-coined word is one which has never been even in local use, but is adopted by the poet himself. Some such words there appear to be: as *ἐρνύγες*, 'sprouters,' for *κέρατα*, 'horns,' and *ἀρητήρ*,

‘supplicator,’ for *ἱερεὺς*, ‘priest.’

A word is lengthened when its own vowel is exchanged for a longer one, or when a syllable is inserted. A word is contracted when some part of it is removed. Instances of lengthening are, *πόλῃος* for *πόλεως*, and *Πηληιάδεω* for *Πηλείδου*: of contraction, *κρί*, *δῶ*, and *ὄψ*, as in *μία γίνεται ἀμφοτέρων ὄψ*.

1458a17. NOUNS IN THEMSELVES ... ALSO IN V AND Σ: Editors note, Translator S.H. Butcher believed this paragraph not to be in the original Greek manuscript ; however, the current editors have chosen to retain it.

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Chapters 22 applies the classifications of the last two chapters, specially chapters 21, to the virtues of style.

1458a18. THE PERFECTION OF STYLE ... MEAN: “Mean” (tapeinen) here means “low” or “commonplace.” The challenge of style is to achieve clarity without being common. This is the stylistic equivalent of the challenge that the incidents in the plot be both necessary and surprising.

1458a20. CLEOPHON ... STHENELUS: We met Cleophon in chapter 2. Sthenelus was a tragic poet about whom nothing is known except that Aristophanes mocks his style.

An altered word is one in which part of the ordinary form is left unchanged, and part is re-cast; as in *δεξιτερόν κατὰ μαζόν*, *δεξιτερόν* is for *δεξιόν*.

Nouns in themselves are either masculine, feminine, or neuter. Masculine are such as end in, v, p, *Σ*, or in some letter compounded with *Σ*,—these being two, *ψ* and *Ξ* Feminine, such as end in vowels that are always long, namely *η* and *ω*, and of vowels that admit of lengthening—those in a. Thus the number of letters in which nouns masculine and feminine end is the same; for *ψ* and *Ξ* are equivalent to endings in *Σ*. No noun ends in a mute or a vowel short by nature. Three only end in *ι*,—*μέλι, κόμμι, πέπερι*: five end in v. Neuter nouns end in these two latter vowels; also in v and *Σ*.°

THE PERFECTION OF STYLE is to be clear without being mean.^o The clearest style is that which uses only current or proper words; at the same time it is mean:—witness the poetry of Cleophon and of Sthenelus.^o That diction, on the other hand, is lofty and raised above the commonplace which employs unusual words. By unusual, I mean strange (or rare) words, metaphorical, lengthened,—anything, in short, that differs from the normal idiom. Yet a style wholly composed of such words is either a riddle or a jargon; a riddle, if it consists of metaphors; a jargon, if it consists of strange (or rare) words. For the essence of a riddle is to express true facts under impossible combinations. Now this cannot be done by any arrangement of ordinary words, but by the use of metaphor it can. Such is the riddle:—‘A man I saw who on another man had glued the bronze by aid of fire,’ and others of the same kind.. A diction that is made up of strange (or rare) terms is a jargon. A certain infusion, therefore, of these elements is necessary to style; for the strange (or rare) word, the metaphorical, the 1458b9. The Greek translates as “I saw Epichares walking to Marathon.” 1458b]O. The Greek translates as “not if you desire his hellebore.” ornamental, and the other kinds above mentioned, will raise it above the commonplace and mean, while the use of proper words will make it perspicuous. But nothing contributes more to produce a clearness of diction that is remote from commonness than the lengthening, contraction, and alteration of words. For by deviating in exceptional cases from the normal idiom, the language will gain distinction; while, at the same time, the partial conformity with usage will give perspicuity. The critics, therefore, are in error who censure these licenses of speech, and hold the author up to ridicule. Thus Euclides, the elder, declared that it would be an easy matter to be a poet if you might lengthen syllables at will. He caricatured the practice in the very form of his diction, as in the verse:

Ἐπιχάρην εἶδον ^{Μαρά} *θῶνάδε βαδίζοντα*,^o

or,

οὐκ ἀνὺ ἑράμενος τὸν ἐκείνου ἑλλέβορον .

To employ such license at all obtrusively is, no doubt, grotesque; but in any mode of poetic diction there must be moderation. Even metaphors, strange (or rare) words, or any similar forms of speech, would produce the like effect if used without propriety and with the express purpose of being ludicrous. How great a difference is made by the appropriate use of lengthening, may be seen in Epic poetry by the insertion of ordinary forms in the verse. So, again, if we take a strange (or rare) word, a metaphor, or any similar mode of expression, and replace it by the current or proper term, the truth of our observation will be manifest. For example Aeschylus and Euripides each composed the same iambic line. But the alteration of a single word by Euripides, who employed the rarer term instead

1458b23. The Greek translates as “the tumor which is eating the flesh of my foot.”

1458b25. The Greek translates as “yet a small man, worthless and unseemly.” The substitution makes it “yet a little fellow, weak and ugly.”

1458b27. In the alternative versions, the Greek that translates as “setting an unseemly couch and a meager table” becomes “setting a wretched couch and a puny table.”

1458b29. In the alternative versions, the Greek that translates as “the sea shores roar” becomes “the sea shores screech.”

1458b31. ARIPHRADES: We know nothing about him.

of the ordinary one, makes one verse appear beautiful and the other trivial. Aeschylus in his Philoctetes says:

φαγέδαινα δ' ἣ μου σάρκας ἐσθίει ποδός .

Euripides substitutes *θοιναται* ‘feasts on’ for *ἐσθίει* ‘feeds on.’ Again, in the line,

vvv *δέ μ' ἐὼν ὀλίγος τε καὶ οὐτιδανὸς καὶ ἀεικῆς,*

the difference will be felt if we substitute the common words,

δέ μ' τε καὶ ἀσθενικὸς καὶ ἀειδής .

Or, if for the line, *δίφρον ἀεικέλιον καταθείς*

ὀλίγην τε τράπεζαν

we read,

δίφρον μοχθηρὸν καταθείς μικράν τε τράπεζαν .

Or, for *ἡμόνες βοόωσιν, ἡμόνες κράζονσιν* .

Again, Aripbrates° ridiculed the tragedians for using phrases which no one would employ in ordinary speech: for example, *δωμάτων ἀπὸ* instead of *ἀπὸ δωμάτων*, *σέθεν ἐγὼ δένιν*, *Ἀχιλλέως πέρι* instead of *περὶ περὶ Ἀχιλλέως*, and the like. It is precisely because such phrases are not part of the current idiom that they give distinction to the style. This, however, he failed to see.

It is a great matter to observe propriety in these several modes of expression, as also in compound words, strange (or rare) words, and so forth. But the greatest thing by far is to have a command of metaphor. This alone cannot be imparted by

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Chapter 23 begins the final section of the Poetics. The last four chapters compare tragedy to epic. Back in chapter 3, we learned that the difference between tragedy and epic was a difference between dramatic and narrative representation. Throughout the Poetics, Aristotle has used Homer's Iliad and Odyssey as examples to make points about the nature of tragedy. Tragedy and epic both have the power to cause a catharsis of pity and fear—that is, they are two distinct kinds of works of art that have the same purpose or final cause. No two natural species can have the same end: The end of human beings is to act in specifically human ways, and the end of cows is to act in specifically bovine ways. In other words, in nature, what a thing is and what it is for define each other. In art, that tie between formal and final cause is loosened. A knife and a pair of scissors can both cut cloth. Still, there are some things a knife can do that scissors cannot, and scissors have powers not possessed by knives. In the same way, Aristotle will ask in these chapters what tragedy can do that epic cannot, and what special powers epic has.

1459a17. AS TO THAT POETIC IMITATION ... IN FORM: In particular, in chapter 23 Aristotle compares the unity of epics and tragedies. Both can be about the same story (logos), as that was defined in chapters 17 and 18. On the other hand, some stories lend themselves more to the stricter unity of tragedy and others to the looser standards of epic. Tragedy and epic share “dramatic principles”: Even though an epic seems more loosely organized than a tragedy, it too should be a complete and unified whole.

1459a21. DIFFER IN STRUCTURE FROM HISTORICAL

COMPOSITIONS ... : Unlike tragedies, epics have to be distinguished from histories. Incidents from the story, which would be irrelevant and distracting in a tragedy, are admissible as digressions in an epic.

1459a2S. SEA-FIGHT AT SALAMIS ... CARTHAGINIANS IN SICILY: According to Herodotus, the great victories of the Greeks over the Persians at Salamis and over the Carthaginians at Himera occurred on the same day in 480.

another; it is the mark of genius, for to make good metaphors implies an eye for resemblances.

Of the various kinds of words, the compound are best adapted to dithyrambs, rare words to heroic poetry, metaphors to iambic. In heroic poetry, indeed, all these varieties are serviceable. But in iambic verse, which reproduces, as far as may be, familiar speech, the most appropriate words are those which are found even in prose. These are, -the current or proper, the metaphorical, the ornamental.

Concerning Tragedy and imitation by means of action this may suffice.

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As TO THAT POETIC imitation which is narrative in form° and employs a single metre, the plot manifestly ought, as in a tragedy, to be constructed on dramatic principles. It should have for its subject a single action, whole and complete, with a beginning, a middle, and an end. It will thus resemble a living organism in all its unity, and produce the pleasure proper to it. It will differ in structure from historical compositions, ° which of necessity present not a single action, but a single period, and all that happened within that period to one person or to many, little connected together as the events may be. For as the sea-fight at Salamis and the battle with the Carthaginians in Sicily° took place at the same time, but did not tend to any one result, so in the sequence of events, one thing sometimes follows another, and yet no single result is thereby produced. Such is the practice, we may say, of most poets. Here again, then, as has been already observed, the transcendent excellence of Homer is manifest. He never attempts to make the whole war of Troy the subject of his poem, though that war had a beginning and an end. It would have been too vast a theme, and not easily embraced in a **1459a37. ALL OTHER POETS ...** : Poets after Homer took his hvo epics and created a larger

body of epics that covered the entire Trojan War. The Cypria and the Little Iliad are both lost.

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Chapter 24 continues the comparison of tragedy with epic. Chapter 23 looked at the unity that the plots of tragedy and epic achieve. This chapter looks at the way tragedies and epics differently arrange the sequence of actions presented.

1459b7. IT MUST BE SIMPLE ... OR 'PATHETIC': The four kinds of epic reproduce the four kinds of tragedy described in chapter 18.

1459b10. EXCEPTION OF SONG AND SPECTACLE: Because epic is narrated, not represented dramatically, it doesn't have two of the parts that tragedy has: melody and spectacle. The narrative mode does not itself generate any further parts that would be unique to epic and missing from tragedy.

1459b14. EACH ... HAS A TWOFOLD CHARACTER: Every tragedy is of one of four kinds, but Homer's two epics each exemplify two of the kinds. The Iliad. has a plot that is both simple and pathetic (a plot of suffering), while the Odyssey is both complex and ethical (a plot of character). We saw in the last chapter that epics contain episodes that would be out of place in a tragedy. Therefore the epic poet has two problems of unity, while the tragedian has only one. The epic poet must unify the plot, as the tragedian does, but must also unify, in a looser sense, all the episodes related.

single view. If, again, he had kept it within moderate limits, it must have been over-complicated by the variety of the incidents. As it is, he detaches a single portion, and admits as episodes many events from the general story of the war-such as the Catalogue of the ships and others-thus diversifying the poem. All other poets° take a single hero, a single period, or an action single indeed, but with a multiplicity of parts. Thus did the author of the Cypria and of the Little Iliad. For this reason the Iliad and the Odyssey each furnish the subject of one tragedy, or, at most, of two; while the Cypria supplies materials for many, and the Little Iliad for eight-the Award of the Arms, the Philoctetes, the Neoptolemus, the Eurypylos, the Mendicant Odysseus, the Laconian Women, the Fall of Ilium, the Departure of the Fleet.

AGAIN, Epic POETRY MUST have as many kinds as Tragedy: it must be simple, or complex, or 'ethical,' or 'pathetic.' The parts also, with the exception of song and spectacle,^o are the same; for it requires Reversals of the Situation, Recognitions, and Scenes of Suffering. Moreover, the thoughts and the ; diction must be artistic. In all these respects Homer is our earliest and sufficient model. Indeed each of his poems has a twofold character.^o The Iliad is at once simple and 'pathetic,' and the Odyssey complex (for Recognition scenes run through it), and at the same time 'ethical.' Moreover, in diction and thought they are supreme.

Epic poetry differs from Tragedy in the scale on which it is constructed, and in its metre. As regards scale or length, we have already laid down an adequate limit:—the beginning and the end must be capable of being brought within a single view. This condition will be satisfied by poems on a smaller scale than the old epics, and answering in length to the group of tragedies presented at a single sitting.

Epic poetry has, however, a great-a special—capacity for enlarging its dimensions, and we can see the reason. In Tragedy we cannot imitate several lines of actions carried on at one and the same time; we must confine ourselves to the action on the stage and the part taken by the players. But in Epic poetry, owing to the narrative form, many events simultaneously transacted can be presented; and these, if relevant to the subject, add mass and dignity to the poem. The Epic has here an advantage, and one that conduces to grandeur of effect, to diverting the mind of the hearer, and relieving the story with varying episodes. For sameness of incident soon produces satiety, and makes tragedies fail on the stage.

As for the metre, the heroic measure has proved its fitness by the test of experience. If a narrative poem in any other metre or in many metres were now composed, it would be found incongruous. For of all measures the heroic is the stateliest and the most massive; and hence it most readily admits rare words and metaphors, which is another point in which the narrative form of imitation stands alone. On the other hand, the iambic and the trochaic tetrameter are stirring measures, the latter being akin to dancing, the fonner expressive of action. Still more absurd would it be to mix together different metres, as was done by Chaeremon. Hence no one has ever composed a poem on a great scale in any other than heroic verse. Nature herself, as we have said, teaches the choice of the proper measure.

Homer, admirable in all respects, has the special merit of being the only poet who rightly appreciates the part he should take himself. The poet should speak as little as possible in his own person, for it is not this that makes him an imitator. Other poets appear themselves upon the scene throughout, and imitate but little and rarely. Homer, after a few prefatory words,

1460a15. PURSUIT OF HECTOR ... AND ACHILLES WAVING THEM BACK: It would be ludicrous for none of the Greeks besides Achilles to chase Hector. The standards of probability must be different. Chapter 17 began by saying that the poet should visualize the action. Here we learn that the tragedian trying to adapt for the stage this part of the Iliad would discover that what is absurd in a tragedy can be presented successfully in an epic.

1460a20-25. A FALLACY: The fallacy is a reasoning from signs, as Aristotle will call it in the Rhetoric. Arguments from signs, not always fallacious, form the substance of the art of rhetoric. If people who lie cannot look me in the eye, I may think that anyone who can't look me in the eye must be lying. However, I might not realize that they might be lowering their eyes out of respect and that the best liars look straight at you.

1460a26. BATH SCENE OF THE ODYSSEY: The scene is in book 19 of the Odyssey (Aristotle has already referred to it in chapter 16). Since the stranger, who is really Odysseus in disguise, correctly describes Odysseus to Penelope, she infers that the stranger must have seen Odysseus.

1460a27. POET SHOULD PREFER ... POSSIBILITIES: That is, poetry has its own standards of credibility. If you write a story that readers find unbelievable, it's no excuse to say, "But that's the way it happened." Since Aristotle shifts here from epic back to tragedy, this principle applies to both kinds of art. In chapter 23 we saw how tragedy and epic had their own standards of unity, distinct from actual events. Here tragedy and epic have their own standards of probability. The imitation of actions has different properties from the actions themselves.

1460a30. HERO'S IGNORANCE: Oedipus knows that he killed a man at a crossroads, but he doesn't know that his predecessor was killed in this way.

1460a32. AS IN THE ELECTRA ... OR, AS IN THE MYSIANS: In the Electra Orestes' tutor says that Orestes was killed in a chariot race in the Pythian games, which didn't exist at the time. Many playwrights wrote plays called the Mysians; none survives.

at once brings in a man, or woman, or other personage; none of them wanting in characteristic qualities, but each with a character of his own.

The element of the wonderful is required in Tragedy. The irrational, on which the wonderful depends for its chief effects, has wider scope in Epic poetry, because there the person acting is not seen. Thus, the pursuit of Hector would be ludicrous if placed upon the stage—the Greeks standing still and not joining in the pursuit, and Achilles waving them back.^o But in the Epic poem the absurdity passes unnoticed. Now the wonderful is pleasing: as may be inferred from the fact that every one tells a story with some addition of his own, knowing that his hearers like it. It is Homer who has chiefly taught other poets the art of telling lies skilfully. The secret of it lies in a fallacy.^o For, assuming that if one thing is or becomes, a second is or becomes, men imagine that, if the second is, the first likewise is or becomes. But this is a false inference. Hence, where the first thing is untrue, it is quite unnecessary, provided the second be true, to add that the first is or has become. For the mind, knowing the second to be true, falsely infers the truth of the first. There is an example of this in the Bath Scene of the *Odyssey*.^o

Accordingly, the poet should prefer probable impossibilities to improbable possibilities.^o The tragic plot must not be composed of irrational parts. Everything irrational should, if possible, be excluded; or, at all events, it should lie outside the action of the play (as, in the *Oedipus*, the hero's ignorance^o: as to the manner of Laius' death); not within the drama,—as in the *Electra*, the messenger's account of the Pythian games; or, as in the *Mysians*,^o the man who has come from Tegea to Mysia and is still speechless. The plea that otherwise the plot would have been ruined, is ridiculous; such a plot should not in the first instance be constructed. But once the irrational has been introduced and an air of likelihood imparted to it,

-25-

Aristotle seems to change the subject here to "critical difficulties and their solutions." This chapter follows from the previous two by erecting standards of artistic success different from standards drawn from outside the arts. The theme of the chapter is pressed at 1460b14: "The standard of correctness is not the same in poetry and politics, any more than in poetry and any other art." As in the last two chapters, tragedy and epic are considered together. There is no difference in how tragedy and epic defend themselves against critical attacks.

we must accept it in spite of the absurdity. Take even the irrational incidents in the *Odyssey*, where Odysseus is left upon the shore of Ithaca. How intolerable even these might have been would be apparent if an inferior poet were to treat the subject. As it is, the absurdity is veiled by the poetic charm with which the poet invests it.

The diction should be elaborated in the pauses of the action, where there is no expression of character or thought. For, conversely, character and thought are merely obscured by a diction that is over brilliant.

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WITH RESPECT TO CRITICAL difficulties and their solutions, the number and nature of the sources from which they may be drawn may be thus exhibited.

The poet being an imitator, like a painter or any other artist, must of necessity imitate one of three objects,—things as they were or are, things as they are said or thought to be, or things as they ought to be. The vehicle of expression is language,—either current terms or, it may be, rare words or metaphors. There are also many modifications of language, which we concede to the poets. Add to this, that the standard of correctness is not the same in poetry and politics, any more than in poetry and any other art. Within the art of poetry itself there are two kinds of faults,—those which touch its essence, and those which are accidental. If a poet has chosen to imitate something, but has imitated it incorrectly through want of capacity, the error is inherent in the poetry. But if the failure is due to a wrong choice—if he has represented a horse as throwing out both his off legs at once, or introduced technical inaccuracies in medicine, for example, or in any other art—the error is not essential to the poetry. These are the points of view from which we should consider and answer the objections raised by the critics.

1461a1. XENOPHANES: He was famously the first person to question the existence of the gods and to suggest that our picture of them comes from projecting human beliefs and desires onto the gods.

1461a2. ‘UPRIGHT UPON THEIR BUTT-ENDS STOOD THE SPEARS’: This passage is from the *Iliad* X.152.

1461a10-1461b1. DIFFICULTIES MAY BE RESOLVED BY DUE

REGARD TO THE USAGE OF LANGUAGE ... : All the examples in this section are from the Iliad. Ouraes (ovpfjag) as “mules” or “sentinels” (61all) comes from 1.50. Dolon (61al3) is described in X.316. The mixing of the wine (61al5) is from IX.203.

First as to matters which concern the poet's own art. If he describes the impossible, he is guilty of an error; but the error may be justified, if the end of the art be thereby attained (the end being that already mentioned),-if, that is, the effect of ; this or any other part of the poem is thus rendered more striking. A case in point is the pursuit of Hector. If, however, the end might have been as well, or better, attained without violating the special rules of the poetic art, the error is not justified : for every kind of error should, if possible, be avoided.

Again, does the error touch the essentials of the poetic art, or < some accident of it? For example,-not to know that a hind has no horns is a less serious matter than to paint it inartistically.

Further, if it be objected that the description is not true to fact, the poet may perhaps reply,-‘But the objects are as they ought to be’: just as Sophocles said that he drew men as they ought to be; Euripides, as they are. In this way the objection may be met. If, however, the representation be of neither kind, the poet may answer,-‘This is how men say the thing is.’ This applies to tales about the gods. It may well be that these stories are not higher than fact nor yet true to fact: they are, very possibly, what Xenophanes° says of them. But anyhow, ‘this is what is said.’ Again, a description may be no better than the fact: still, it was the fact’; as in the passage about the arms: ‘Upright upon their butt-ends stood the spears.’° This was the custom then, as it now is among the Illyrians.

Again, in examining whether what has been said or done by some one is poetically right or not, we must not look merely to the particular act or saying, and ask whether it is poetically good or bad. We must also consider by whom it is said or done, to whom, when, by what means, or for what end; whether, for instance, it be to secure a greater good, or avert a greater evil.

Other difficulties may be resolved by due regard to the usage of language.° We may note a rare word. as in *οὐρῆας μὲν πρῶτον*, where the poet perhaps employs *οὐρῆας* not in the sense of mules, but of sentinels. So, again, of Dolon: ‘illfavoured indeed he was to look upon.’ It is not meant that his body was ill-shaped, but that his face was ugly; for the Cretans use the word *εὐειδές*, ‘well-favoured,’ to denote a fair face. Again, *ζωρότερον δὲ κέραε*, ‘mix the drink livelier,’ does not mean ‘mix it stronger’ as for hard drinkers, but ‘mix

it quicker.'

1461a16. 'Now ALL GODS AND MEN WERE SLEEPING THROUGH THE NIGHT': Aristotle here seems to be confusing a number of different passages in the Iliad.

1461a22. HIPPIAS OF THASOS: We don't know who this was. The lines quoted come from the *Iliad* XXI.297 and XIII.328. In the first case, Zeus seems to be assuring Agamemnon that his prayer will be granted, but it wasn't granted, so Hippias changes the accent on the word "grant." In the second case, he changes where the negation (ou) goes so that a stump of wood is described as not rotten rather than rotten.

1461a25. AMBIGUITY OF MEANING: The quoted passage is from the Iliad X.251-253.

1461a27. WINE : Aristotle is quoting from the Iliad XXI.592.

Sometimes an expression is metaphorical, as 'Now all gods and men were sleeping through the night,'^o-while at the same time the poet says: 'Often indeed as he turned his gaze to the Trojan plain, he marvelled at the sound of flutes and pipes.' 'All' is here used metaphorically for 'many,' all being a species of many. So in the verse, —'alone she hath no part ..., *οἷη*, 'alone,' is metaphorical; for the best known may be called the only one.

Again, the solution may depend upon accent or breathing. Thus Hippias of Thasos^o solved the difficulties in the lines,— *δίδομεν* (*διδόμεν*) *δέ* οἱ, and to *μὲν οὖν* (*ov*) *καταπύθεται ὄμβρῳ*.

Or again, the question may be solved by punctuation, as in Empedocles,—'Of a sudden things became mortal that before had learnt to be immortal, and things unmixed before mixed.'

Or again, by ambiguity of meaning,^o-as *παρώχηκε* *νύξ*, *νύξ*, where the word *πλέω* is ambiguous.

Or by the usage of language. Thus any mixed drink is called *οἶνος* 'wine.'^o Hence Ganymede is said 'to pour the wine to Zeus,' though the gods do not drink wine. So too workers in iron are called *χαλκῆας*, or workers in bronze. This, however, may also be taken as a metaphor.

Again, when a word seems to involve some inconsistency of meaning, we should consider how many senses it may bear in the particular passage. For example: 'there was stayed the spear of bronze'^o-we should ask in how many ways we may take 'being checked there.' The true mode of interpretation is the precise opposite

of what Glaucon^o mentions. Critics, he says, jump at certain groundless conclusions; they pass adverse judgment and then proceed to reason on it; and, assuming that the poet has said whatever they happen to think, find fault if a thing is inconsistent with their own fancy. The question about Icarius^o has been treated in this fashion. The critics imagine he was a Lacedaemonian. They think it strange, therefore, that Telemachus should not have met him when he went to Lacedaemon. But the Cephallenian story may perhaps be the true one. They allege that Odysseus took a wife from among themselves, and that her father was Icadius not Icarius. It is merely a mistake, then, that gives plausibility to the objection.

1461a33. 'THERE WAS STAYED THE SPEAR OF BRONZE': Aristotle again quotes from the Iliad X.268ff.

1461b1. GLAUCON: We don't know which Glaucon Aristotle is referring to, and have no idea what he said that Aristotle is refuting.

1461b1-9. QUESTION ABOUT ICARIUS: The question is raised by Homer in the Odyssey.

1461b11. ZEUMS: WE met Zeuxis in chapter 6.

In general, the impossible must be justified by reference to artistic requirements, or to the higher reality, or to received opinion. With respect to the requirements of art, a probable impossibility is to be preferred to a thing improbable and yet possible. Again, it may be impossible that there should be men such as Zeuxis^o painted. 'Yes,' we say, 'but the impossible is the higher thing; for the ideal type must surpass the reality.' To justify the irrational, we appeal to what is commonly said to be. In addition to which, we urge that the irrational sometimes does not violate reason; just as 'it is probable that a thing may happen contrary to probability.'

Things that sound contradictory should be examined by the same rules as in dialectical refutation-whether the same thing is meant, in the same relation, and in the same sense. We should therefore solve the question by reference to what the poet says himself, or to what is tacitly assumed by a person of intelligence.

The element of the irrational, and, similarly, depravity of character, are justly censured when there is no inner necessity

1461b20. AECEUS BY EURIPIDES:] Aegeus is introduced by Euripides in his Medea. By a happy coincidence, he arrives just at the right time to save Medea, and the coincidence feels contrived.

1461b21. BADNESS OF MENELAUS IN THE ORESTES: Aristotle thinks that Euripides, in the Orestes, makes Menelaus worse than the

The Poetics ends with a comparison between tragedy and epic. Their similarities and differences have been collected in chapters 23-25. Now Aristotle raises the difficult question of how to decide whether one of them is better than the other. It would be silly to ask if a knife is better than a fork, or whether comedy is better than photography. For there to be a real comparison there has to be some common standard to compare the two kinds of art. While people can compare tragedy and epic on all kinds of grounds, the only way consistent with Aristotle's treatment in the Poetics is to compare them on how well each achieves a common purpose. Tragedy and epic both aim at a catharsis of pity and fear, and in this chapter Aristotle will demonstrate that tragedy does the job better.

1461b30. BAD FLUTE-PLAYERS TWIST AND TWIRL: Bad flute players apparently didn't let their music speak for itself but added gestures that imitated the actions the music was supposed to represent.

1461b34. MYNNiscus ... PINDARUS: Mynniscus acted from 460 until 420, in the plays of Aeschylus, among others. Callippides performed from 427 until 400. The context suggests that Pindarus was another actor from the same time, but we know nothing more about him.

for introducing them. Such is the irrational element in the introduction of Aegeus by Euripides^o and the badness of Menelaus in the Orestes.^o

Thus, there are five sources from which critical objections are drawn. Things are censured either as impossible, or irrational, or morally hurtful, or contradictory, or contrary to artistic correctness. The answers should be sought under the twelve heads above mentioned.

imitation is the higher. If the more refined art is the higher, and the more refined in every case is that which appeals to the better sort of audience, the art which imitates anything and everything is manifestly most unrefined. The audience is supposed to be too dull to comprehend unless something of their own is thrown in by the performers, who therefore indulge in restless movements. Bad flute-players twist and twirl,^o if they have to represent 'the quoit-throw,' or hustle the coryphaeus when they perform the 'Scylla.' Tragedy, it is said, has this same defect. We may compare the opinion that the older actors entertained of their successors. Mynniscus used to call Callippides *pe'* on account of the extravagance of his action, and the same view was held of Pindarus.^o Tragic art, then, as a whole, stands to Epic in the same relation as the younger to the elder actors. So we are told that Epic poetry is addressed to a cultivated audience, who do not need gesture; Tragedy, to an inferior public. Being then unrefined, it is evidently the lower of the two.

Now, in the first place, this censure attaches not to the poetic but to the histrionic art; for gesticulation may be equally overdone in epic recitation, as by Sosistratus, or in lyrical competition, as by Mnasisheus the Opuntian. Next, all action is

1462a6-10. Epic RECITATION ... CALLIPPIDES: Although epics were not acted out as dramas were, they were recited, so epic was still an oral form of literature. From the context we can tell that Sosistratus was a rhapsode—that is, someone whose profession was to perform Homer's epics. We know nothing about him, nor about Mnasisheus. Callippides was presumably a tragic actor but is otherwise unknown.

not to be condemned—any more than all dancing—but only that of bad performers. Such was the fault found in Callippides, ^o as also in others of our own day, who are censured for representing degraded women. Again, Tragedy like Epic poetry produces its effect even without action; it reveals its power by mere reading. If, then, in all other respects it is superior, this fault, we say, is not inherent in it.

And superior it is, because it has all the epic elements—it may even use the epic metre—with the music and spectacular effects as important accessories; and these produce the most vivid of pleasures. Further, it has vividness of impression in reading as well as in representation. Moreover, the art attains its end within narrower limits; for the concentrated effect is more pleasurable than one which is spread over a long time and so diluted. What, for example, would be the effect of the Oedipus of Sophocles, if it were cast into a form as long as the Iliad? Once more, the Epic imitation has less unity; as is shown by this, that any Epic poem will furnish subjects for several tragedies. Thus if the story adopted by the poet has a strict unity, it

must either be concisely told and appear truncated; or, if it conform to the Epic canon of length, it must seem weak and watery. Such length implies some loss of unity, if, I mean, the poem is constructed out of several actions, like the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, which have many such parts, each with a certain magnitude of its own. Yet these poems are as perfect as possible in structure; each is, in the highest degree attainable, an imitation of a single action.

If, then, Tragedy is superior to Epic poetry in all these respects, and, moreover, fulfils its specific function better as an art—for each art ought to produce, not any chance pleasure, but the pleasure proper to it, as already stated—it plainly follows that Tragedy is the higher art, as attaining its end more perfectly.

Thus much may suffice concerning Tragic and Epic poetry in general; their several kinds and parts, with the number of each and their differences; the causes that make a poem good or bad; the objections of the critics and the answers to these objections....

RHETORIC

translated by W Rhys Roberts

BOOK I

-1-

Rhetoric is the counterpart (antistrophos) of dialectic. Both are universal in two senses: All people practices them, and they are about subjects of common concern, not specialized sciences. In both rhetoric and dialectic, we can determine the causes and success, and therefore there are arts for each. Aristotle dismisses existing treatments of rhetoric for neglecting argument and concentrating instead on irrelevant emotions and the manner of presentation apart from the structure of argument. He concludes by defending the utility of rhetoric and defining its function-not persuading, but seeing in each case the available means of persuasion.

1354a1. RHETORIC IS THE COUNTERPART OF DIALECTIC:

“Counterpart” derives from the word antistrophe, which denotes the physical movement of a chorus while it sings. When it dances in one direction, that is called the strophe. The movement in the opposite direction is the antistrophe. The terms then came to be applied not only to the movements but to what the chorus says. Correspondent, facsimile, or correlative could be translations too. Later in the first book, Aristotle also calls rhetoric the offshoot (paraphues) of dialectic and a part (morion) of dialectic.

Aristotle explores the nature of dialectic in the Topics. That treatise begins with what seems to be a definition of dialectic: “Our treatise proposes to find a line of inquiry whereby we shall be able to reason from opinions that are generally accepted about every problem propounded to us, and also shall ourselves, when standing up to an argument, avoid saying anything that will obstruct us.”

The rest of the first paragraph explores the similarities between rhetoric and dialectic.

1354a1-3. BOTH ALIKE ARE CONCERNED ... : Both of them are general in two different ways: Both argue about anything, and not about any particular subject matter, and both are practices that everyone engages in. The implied contrast is to subjects known only by experts.

1354a6-10. EITHER AT RANDOM OR... ACQUIRED HABIT : That

is, people argue rhetorically and dialectically; therefore there is an art of rhetoric (and of dialectic). There is an ambiguity here. Aristotle says that the art of rhetoric will study how some people argue successfully and others fail, and that could be all that he means. Or he could mean in addition that the art of rhetoric will enable people to do with intelligence what they have previously done only at random or through practice and from acquired habit. The issue is how practical this art will be, how much its study will lead to improved practice.

In the Ethics, Aristotle defines art (techne) as a “power [dynamis] for making, accompanied by true reasoning” (VL4.1140a10).

BOOK I

1

RHETORIC IS THE COUNTERPART of Dialectic.^o Both alike are concerned^o with such things as come, more or less, within the general ken of all men and belong to no definite science. Accordingly all men make use, more or less, of both; for to a certain extent all men attempt to discuss statements and to maintain them, to defend themselves and to attack others. Ordinary people do this either at random or through practice and from acquired habit.^o Both ways being possible, the subject can plainly be handled systematically, for it is possible to inquire the reason why some speakers succeed through practice and others spontaneously; and every one will at once agree that such an inquiry is the function of an art.

Now, the framers of the current treatises on rhetoric have constructed but a small portion of that art. The modes of persuasion^o are the only true constituents of the art: everything else is merely accessory. These writers, however, say nothing about enthymemes,^o which are the substance of rhetorical persuasion,^o but deal mainly with non-essentials. The arousing of prejudice, pity, anger, and similar emotions has nothing to do with the essential facts, but is merely a personal appeal to the man who is judging the case. Consequently if the rules for trials which are now laid down in some states—especially in well-governed states—were applied everywhere, such people would have nothing to say. All men, no doubt, think that the laws should prescribe such rules, but some, as in the court of Areopagus,^o give practical effect to their thoughts and forbid talk about non-essentials. This is sound law and custom. It is not right to pervert the judge by moving him to anger or envy or pity—one might as well warp a carpenter's rule before using it.^o Again, a litigant has clearly nothing to do but to show that the alleged fact is so or is not so, that it has or has not happened. As to whether a thing is important or unimportant, just or unjust, the judge must surely refuse to take his instructions from the litigants: he must decide for himself all such points as the

law-giver has not already defined for him.

1354a13. MODES OF PERSUASION: This phrase translates *pisteis*, the plural of *pistis*. *Pistis* can also be translated as “belief,” “faith,” “trust,” or “credit.” We can’t do anything parallel in English, but in Greek the words for what the speaker does, the structure of the speech, and the effect on the audience are all derivations of *pistis*.

1354a14. ENTHYMEMES: Aristotle will define enthymeme in chapter 2. If rhetoric is the counterpart of dialectic, the enthymeme is the counterpart of dialectical reasoning. The first chapter of the *Topics* helps again. “Reasoning is an argument in which, certain things being laid down, something other than these necessarily comes about through them.... Reasoning is dialectical if it reasons from opinions that are generally accepted.” Reasoning, then, is a matter of inferring something from something else. In the enthymeme, we rarely can infer that something necessarily follows, since rhetoric is concerned with human affairs, in which probability is usually all we have. “Enthymeme” and “reasoning” are the general terms for the activities of rhetorical persuasion and dialectical disputes. However, they are both terms that Aristotle then divides into two species. Dialectical reasoning is divided into reasoning, or deduction, and induction, while rhetoric, as we will see, is divided into enthymeme and example, which will be the rhetorical counterpart of induction.

1354a15. SUBSTANCE OF RHETORICAL PERSUASION: In Greek, this is *soma tes piste* 6s (“the body of persuasion”). While in the *Poetics* Aristotle called the plot the soul of the tragedy, here the enthymeme, which in many ways is the equivalent for the art of rhetoric of the plot, is called the body of proof.

1354a23. COURT OF AREOPAGUS: The Areopagus, named after the hill on which it gathered, was the court that passed judgment in cases of homicide, arson, treason, and some religious violations.

1354a24-25. IT IS NOT RIGHT TO PERVERT ... BEFORE USING IT: In book II Aristotle will show the orator how to move judges to anger, envy, pity, and other emotions, so the reader will have to decide whether Aristotle contradicts himself.

1354b17-19. ANY ONE WHO LAYS DOWN RULES ... OTHER DIVISIONS OF A SPEECH: Aristotle will himself treat these parts of a speech in book III, chapters 13-19.

Now, it is of great moment that well-drawn laws should themselves define all the points they possibly can and leave as few as may be to the decision of the judges; and this for several reasons. First, to find one man, or a few men, who are sensible persons and capable of

legislating and administering justice is easier than to find a large number. Next, laws are made after long consideration, whereas decisions in the courts are given at short notice, which makes it hard for those who try the case to satisfy the claims of justice and expediency. The weightiest reason of all is that the decision of the lawgiver is not particular but prospective and general, whereas members of the assembly and the jury find it their duty to decide on definite cases brought before them. They will often have allowed themselves to be so much influenced by feelings of friendship or hatred or self-interest that they lose any clear vision of the truth and have their judgement obscured by considerations of personal pleasure or pain. In general, then, the judge should, we say, be allowed to decide as few things as possible. But questions as to whether something has happened or has not happened, will be or will not be, is or is not, must of necessity be left to the judge, since the lawgiver cannot foresee them. If this is so, it is evident that any one who lays down rules about other matters, such as what must be the contents of the 'introduction' or the 'narration' or any of the other divisions of a speech,^o is theorizing about non-essentials as if they belonged to the art. The only question with which

1354b22. PRINCIPLES APPLY TO POLITICAL AS TO FORENSIC ORATORY: Aristotle will define these—two of the three kinds of rhetoric—in chapter 3 (1358bfr-8). Apparently political and forensic oratory are well enough understood that Aristotle can mention them here without defining them.

1355a4-8. PERSUASION IS CLEARLY A SORT OF DEMONSTRATION.... SORT OF SYLLOGISM : Two readings are possible here. Either persuasion (*pistis*) is one kind of proof or demonstration, or persuasion is "kind of a demonstration, something like a demonstration. The enthymeme is one kind of syllogism, or the enthymeme is kind of a syllogism. The issue is whether persuasion is like demonstration but not quite measuring up to the logical standards of demonstration, or fully a kind of demonstration, different from but not necessarily inferior to, the kind of demonstration we meet in science.

these writers here deal is how to put the judge into a given frame of mind. About the orator's proper modes of persuasion they have nothing to tell us; nothing, that is, about how to gain skill in enthymemes.

Hence it comes that, although the same systematic principles apply to political as to forensic oratory,^o and although the former is a nobler business, and fitter for a citizen, than that which concerns the relations of private individuals, these authors say nothing about

political oratory, but try, one and all, to write treatises on the way to plead in court. The reason for this is that in political oratory there is less inducement to talk about non-essentials. Political oratory is less given to unscrupulous practices than forensic, because it treats of wider issues. In a political debate the man who is forming a judgement is making a decision about his own vital interests. There is no need, therefore, to prove anything except that the facts are what the supporter of a measure maintains they are. In forensic oratory this is not enough; to conciliate the listener is what pays here. It is other people's affairs that are to be decided, so that the judges, intent on their own satisfaction and listening with partiality, surrender themselves to the disputants instead of judging between them. Hence in many places, as we have said already, irrelevant speaking is forbidden in the law-courts: in the public assembly those who have to form a judgement are themselves well able to guard against that.

It is clear, then, that rhetorical study, in its strict sense, is concerned with the modes of persuasion. Persuasion is clearly a sort of demonstration, since we are most fully persuaded when we consider a thing to have been demonstrated. The orator's demonstration is an enthymeme, and this is, in general, the most effective of the modes of persuasion. The enthymeme is a sort of syllogism,^o and the consideration of syllogisms of all kinds, without distinction, is the business of dialectic, either of dialectic as a whole or of one of its branches. It follows plainly, therefore, that he who is best able to see how and from what elements a syllogism is produced will also be best skilled in the enthymeme, when he has further learnt what its subject-matter is and in what respects it differs from the syllogism of strict logic. The true and the approximately true are apprehended by the same faculty; it may also be noted that men have a sufficient natural instinct for what is true, and usually do arrive at the truth. Hence the man who makes a good guess at truth is likely to make a good guess at probabilities.

It has now been shown that the ordinary writers on rhetoric treat of non-essentials; it has also been shown why they have inclined more towards the forensic branch of oratory.

Rhetoric is useful (1) because things that are true and things that are just have a natural tendency to prevail over their opposites, so that if the decisions of judges are not what they ought to be, the defeat must be due to the speakers themselves, and they must be blamed accordingly. Moreover, (2) before some audiences not even the possession of the exactest knowledge will make it easy for what we say to produce conviction. For argument based on knowledge implies instruction, and there are people whom one cannot instruct. Here,

then, we must use, as our modes of persuasion and argument, notions possessed by everybody, as we observed in the Topics when dealing with the way to handle a popular audience. Further, (3) we must be able to employ persuasion, just as strict reasoning can be employed, on opposite sides of a question, not in order that we may in practice employ it in both ways (for we must not make people believe what is wrong), but in order that we may see clearly what the facts are, and that, if another man argues unfairly, we on our part may be able to confute him. No other of the arts draws opposite conclusions: dialectic and rhetoric alone do this. Both these arts draw opposite conclusions impartially. Nevertheless, the underlying

1355b10. FUNCTION IS NOT SIMPLY... PARTICULAR CASE ALLOW: Stating rhetoric's purpose or function comes close to defining rhetoric. The art of rhetoric aims not to persuade but to "discover the means of coming as near such success as the circumstances of each particular case allow" because that is an end within the speaker's control. Whether someone succeeds at actually persuading an audience depends on many factors apart from his or her command of the art of rhetoric, including the prejudices of the audience and the strength of the case.

1355b15. THE REAL AND THE APPARENT MEANS OF PERSUASION: As 111 English, in Greek the "apparent" (phainomenon) can mean either something that looks like a means of persuasion but really is not, or something that is clearly and evidently a means of persuasion. In this case, because of the contrast to real modes of persuasion, it is probably the first.

1355b17. WHAT MAKES A MAN A 'SOPHIST' ... MORAL PURPOSE: The sophists were people who purported to teach wisdom (sophia). They were taken to have bad moral purposes because they charged for their teaching, which no decent—that is, upper-class-person would do, and because they traveled from city to city, implying that wisdom, especially political wisdom, wasn't strictly tied to citizenship and civic activity.

facts do not lend themselves equally well to the contrary views. No; things that are true and things that are better are, by their nature, practically always easier to prove and easier to believe in. Again, (4) it is absurd to hold that a man ought to be ashamed of being unable to defend himself with his limbs, but not of being unable to defend himself with speech and reason, when the use of rational speech is more distinctive of a human being than the use of his limbs. And if it be objected that one who uses such power of speech unjustly might do great harm, that is a charge which may be made in common against all good things except virtue, and above all against the things that are

most useful, as strength, health, wealth, generalship. A man can confer the greatest of benefits by a right use of these, and inflict the greatest of injuries by using them wrongly.

It is clear, then, that rhetoric is not bound up with a single definite class of subjects, but is as universal as dialectic; it is clear, also, that it is useful. It is clear, further, that its function is not simply to succeed in persuading, but rather to discover the means of coming as near such success as the circumstances of each particular case allow°. In this it resembles all other arts. For example, it is not the function of medicine simply to make a man quite healthy, but to put him as far as may be on the road to health; it is possible to give excellent treatment even to those who can never enjoy sound health. Furthermore, it is plain that it is the function of one and the same art to discern the real and the apparent means of persuasion,° just as it is the function of dialectic to discern the real and the apparent syllogism. What makes a man a ‘sophist’ is not his faculty, but his moral purpose°. In rhetoric, however, the term ‘rhetorician’ may describe either the speaker’s knowledge of the art, or his moral purpose. In dialectic it is different: a man is a ‘sophist’ because he has a certain kind of moral purpose, a ‘dialectician’ in respect, not of his moral purpose, but of his faculty.

-2-

After defining rhetoric, Aristotle distinguishes modes of persuasion that fall within the art from those that are “inartificial,” outside the art. Then, of the modes of persuasion within the art itself, he distinguishes three kinds: proofs from logos, ethos, and pathos. Rhetorical proofs are divided into enthymeme and examples, and then Aristotle explores the materials from which these proofs are built: topics, probabilities., and signs.

1355b26. RHETORIC MAY BE DEFINED ... MEANS OF PERSUASION: The definition is very similar to Aristotle’s statement about the function of rhetoric in chapter I. Here he adds the idea that rhetoric is a faculty—a dynamis, an ability or a power. The next sentence appears to identify faculty with function.

1355b27. THIS IS NOT A FUNCTION OF ANY OTHER ART.... INSTRUCT OR PERSUADE ... : Each other art teaches and persuades about its subject matter, while rhetoric persuades about everything—that is, rhetoric is unique in having no particular subject as its domain. Aristotle does not say that rhetoric persuades while other arts teach. Medicine and geometry teach and persuade listeners about

health and triangles.

1355b27-39. OF THE MODES OF PERSUASION.... HAS TO BE INVENTED: The rest of chapters 2-14 are devoted to modes of persuasion that fall within the art, and chapter 15 to “inartificial” means of persuasion—that is, modes that are not part of the art, such as witnesses and written documents. Much of what we normally think of as evidence, then, does not belong to the art of rhetoric.

1356a3. OF THE MODES OF PERSUASION.... WORDS OF THE SPEECH ITSELF: These are the three basic modes of persuasion, often called ethos, pathos, and logos. Ethos is the Greek word for “character,” pathos the word for “emotion,” and logos for “words,” “speech,” and “thought.” While in the first chapter Aristotle says that putting the judges in the right frame of mind was outside the art of rhetoric, here ethical and emotional persuasion lies within the art, as opposed to proofs through written documents and witnesses.

Let us now try to give some account of the systematic principles of Rhetoric itself—of the right method and means of succeeding in the object we set before us. We must make as if it were a fresh start, and before going further define what rhetoric is.

2

RHETORIC MAY BE DEFINED as the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion.^o This is not a function of any other art. Every other art can instruct or persuade^o about its own particular subject-matter; for instance, medicine about what is healthy and unhealthy, geometry about the properties of magnitudes, arithmetic about numbers, and the same is true of the other arts and sciences. But rhetoric we look upon as the power of observing the means of persuasion on almost any subject presented to us; and that is why we say that, in its technical character, it is not concerned with any special or definite class of subjects.

Of the modes of persuasion some belong strictly to the art of rhetoric and some do not. By the latter I mean such things as are not supplied by the speaker but are there at the outset—witnesses, evidence given under torture, written contracts, and so on. By the former I mean such as we can ourselves construct by means of the principles of rhetoric. The one kind has merely to be used, the other has to be invented. ^o

Of the modes of persuasion furnished by the spoken word there are three kinds. The first kind depends on the personal character of the speaker; the second on putting the audience into a certain frame of mind; the third on the proof, or apparent proof, provided by the words of the speech itself.^o Persuasion is achieved by the speaker's personal character when the speech is so spoken as to make us think him credible. We

1356a3-13. THE THIRD ON THE PROOF... MEANS OF PERSUASION HE POSSESSES: In explaining the nature of ethical proof, or persuasion through character, Aristotle makes two important points: first, that character is the most effective means of persuasion a speaker possesses; and second, that such persuasion through character has to be achieved by the speech itself, not by the speaker's existing reputation. In chapter 1 Aristotle says that the enthymeme is central to persuasion, and here he says that character is the most effective mode of persuasion. We need to decide, as the Rhetoric proceeds, whether these two claims can be squared.

1356a14. PERSUASION MAY COME THROUGH THE HEARERS: Persuasion through emotion is the subject of book II, chapters 1-2.

1356a25. RHETORIC IS AN OFFSHOOT OF DIALECTIC ... ETHICAL STUDIES: It is an offshoot of dialectic and ethics, a part of politics, because dialectic teaches logic, and politics teaches us about ethos and pathos.

1356a27. RHETORIC MASQUERADES AS POLITICAL SCIENCE ... HUMAN FAILINGS: As I mention in the Introduction, the relation between rhetoric and political knowledge is a permanently contested issue.

believe good men more fully and more readily than others: this is true generally whatever the question is, and absolutely true where exact certainty is impossible and opinions are divided. This kind of persuasion, like the others, should be achieved by what the speaker says, not by what people think of his character before he begins to speak. It is not true, as : some writers assume in their treatises on rhetoric, that the personal goodness revealed by the speaker contributes nothing to his power of persuasion; on the contrary, his character may almost be called the most effective means of persuasion he possesses.^o Secondly, persuasion may come through the hearers,^o when the speech stirs their emotions. Our judge ments when we are pleased and friendly are not the same as when we are pained and hostile. It is towards producing these effects, as we maintain, that present-day writers on rhetoric direct the whole of their efforts. This subject shall be treated in detail when we come to speak of the

emotions. Thirdly, persuasion is effected through the speech itself when we have proved a truth or an apparent truth by means of the persuasive arguments suitable to the case in question.

There are, then, these three means of effecting persuasion. The man who is to be in command of them must, it is clear, be able (1) to reason logically, (2) to understand human character and goodness in their various forms, and (3) to understand the emotions—that is, to name them and describe them, to know their causes and the way in which they are excited. It thus appears that rhetoric is an offshoot of dialectic : and also of ethical studies.^o Ethical studies may fairly be called political; and for this reason rhetoric masquerades as political science, and the professors of it as political experts—sometimes from want of education, sometimes from ostentation, sometimes owing to other human failings.^o As a matter of fact, it is a branch of dialectic and similar to it, as we said at the outset. Neither rhetoric nor dialectic is the scientific

1356a36. WITH REGARD TO THE PERSUASION ... APPARENT PROOF ... : Just as in dialectic there is induction on the one hand and syllogism on the other, so it is in rhetoric. The example is an induction; the enthymeme is a syllogism. Induction and example prove something based on similar cases, while syllogism and enthymeme prove through inference.

1356b19. METHODICS: This is a lost work by Aristotle.

study of any one separate subject: both are faculties for providing arguments. This is perhaps a sufficient account of their scope and of how they are related to each other.

With regard to the persuasion achieved by proof or apparent proof:^o just as in dialectic there is induction on the one hand and syllogism or apparent syllogism on the other, so it is in rhetoric. The example is an induction, the enthymeme is a syllogism, and the apparent enthymeme is an apparent syllogism. I call the enthymeme a rhetorical syllogism, and the example a rhetorical induction. Every one who effects persuasion through proof does in fact use either enthymemes or examples: there is no other way. And since every one who proves anything at all is bound to use either syllogisms or inductions (and this is clear to us from the Analytics), it must follow that enthymemes are syllogisms and examples are inductions. The difference between example and enthymeme is made plain by the passages in the Topics where induction and syllogism have already been discussed. When we base the proof of a proposition on a number of similar cases, this is induction in dialectic, example in rhetoric; when it is shown that, certain propositions being true, a further and

quite distinct proposition must also be true in consequence, whether invariably or usually, this is called syllogism in dialectic, enthymeme in rhetoric. It is plain also that each of these types of oratory has its advantages. Types of oratory, I say: for what has been said in the *Methodics* applies equally well here; in some oratorical styles examples prevail, in others enthymemes; and in like manner, some orators are better at the former and some at the latter. Speeches that rely on examples are as persuasive as the other kind, but those which rely on enthymemes excite the louder applause. The sources of examples and enthymemes, and their proper uses, we will discuss later. Our next step is to define the processes themselves more clearly.

1357a1. DUTY OF RHETORIC ... LONG CHAIN OF REASONING: "Duty" here is another translation of *ergon* ("function"). This, then, is a restatement of the nature of rhetoric. Here is another place where Aristotle underlines the centrality of deliberative rhetoric. Rhetoric deals with things we deliberate about, not things we argue or dispute about more generally. We deliberate about things we can do something about.

1357a4. SUBJECTS OF OUR DELIBERATION ... ALTERNATIVE POSSIBILITIES: Rhetoric argues both sides of a question, and so is concerned with questions where it makes sense to have arguments on both sides.

A statement is persuasive and credible either because it is directly self-evident or because it appears to be proved from other statements that are so. In either case it is persuasive because there is somebody whom it persuades. But none of the arts theorize about individual cases. Medicine, for instance, does not theorize about what will help to cure Socrates or Callias, but only about what will help to cure any or all of a given class of patients: this alone is its business: individual cases are so infinitely various that no systematic knowledge of them is possible. In the same way the theory of rhetoric is concerned not with what seems probable to a given individual like Socrates or Hippias, but with what seems probable to men of a given type; and this is true of dialectic also. Dialectic does not construct its syllogisms out of any haphazard materials, such as the fancies of crazy people, but out of materials that call for discussion; and rhetoric, too, draws upon the regular subjects of debate. The duty of rhetoric is to deal with such matters as we deliberate upon without arts or systems to guide us, in the hearing of persons who cannot take in at a glance a complicated argument, or follow a long chain of reasoning.^o The subjects of our deliberation are such as seem to present us with alternative possibilities:^o about things that could not have been, and cannot now or in the future be, other than they are, nobody who takes them to be

of this nature wastes his time in deliberation.

It is possible to form syllogisms and draw conclusions from the results of previous syllogisms; or, on the other hand, from premisses which have not been thus proved, and at the same time are so little accepted that they call for proof. Reasonings of the former kind will necessarily be hard to follow owing to their length, for we assume an audience of untrained thinkers; those of the latter kind will fail to win assent, because they are based on premisses that are not generally admitted or believed.

1357a17. ENTHYMEME.... THE HEARER ADDS IT HIMSELF: In many later rhetorics, this was taken to be the definition of the enthymeme: a syllogism with a missing or suppressed premise. Instead, I think Aristotle's statement signals something of the cooperation between speaker and hearer. The speaker has to say things that the audience will accept and agree with but has to avoid saying things that will seem too obvious. In a true demonstrative science-Euclid's Elements supplies the great Greek model-nothing can be assumed to be known by the audience, and everything has to be proved. Such a procedure will not work for rhetoric.

1357a19. DOPIEUS: He was a famous Olympic athlete.

1357a22. FEW FACTS OF THE 'NECESSARY' TYPE ... RHETORICAL SYLLOGISMS: Most of the things about which we make decisions, and into which therefore we inquire, present us with alternative possibilities: To say that there is an art of rhetoric means that there are standards for better and worse arguments even when there is no necessity. Aristotle will disagree with the sophist who thinks that since there is no necessity and everything is only probable, no one can say for sure that one answer is better than another, and therefore people can believe as they like.

1357a29. ANALYTICS: The Analytics is Aristotle's central logical work. We have two works, which we call the Prior Analytics and the Posterior Analytics, or first and second analytics. The Prior Analytics explores the formal aspects of syllogistic reasoning, while the Posterior Analytics is about demonstrative, scientific reasoning, as opposed to the dialectical reasoning examined in the Topics.

1357a34. MATERIALS OF ENTHYMEMES ARE PROBABILITIES AND SIGNS : Because the subjects of rhetoric are rarely necessary, the materials of persuasion will be probabilities (eikota; eikos in the singular) and signs (semeia; sēmion in the singular), the things we use to understand the contingent world of human deliberation and choice. A probability is what generally happens.

1357a38. [THE PROBABLE] BEARS THE SAME RELATION ... THE PARTICULAR : I take this to mean that we can never simply look at some event and declare that it is probable or not. We have to see it as a case of something more general: It's improbable that rain falls in Greece in the summer; when it does rain in August, that is improbable. Probability here doesn't have the modern sense of a statistical frequency but means what is likely. It is likely that a poor man would steal from a rich man, because he needs money. On the other hand, it is likely that a rich man would steal from a poor man, since he thinks he can get away with it. Rhetoric operates in a field where there are good reasons, but those reasons are never certain and are always subject to counterargument. Presented with competing arguments, the audience has to judge which is more probable. Without a frequency measure of probability, the more probable argument is the one that most coheres with other things the audience believes.

The enthymeme and the example must, then, deal with what is in the main contingent, the example being an induction, and the enthymeme a syllogism, about such matters. The enthymeme must consist of few propositions, fewer often than those which make up the normal syllogism. For if any of these propositions is a familiar fact, there is no need even to mention it; the hearer adds it himself.^o Thus, to show that Dorieus^o has been victor in a contest for which the prize is a crown, it is enough to say 'For he has been victor in the Olympic games', without adding 'And in the Olympic games the prize is a crown', a fact which everybody knows.

There are few facts of the 'necessary' type that can form the basis of rhetorical syllogisms.^o Most of the things about which we make decisions, and into which therefore we inquire, present us with alternative possibilities. For it is about our actions that we deliberate and inquire, and all our actions have a contingent character; hardly any of them are determined by necessity. Again, conclusions that state what is merely usual or possible must be drawn from premisses that do the same, just as 'necessary' conclusions must be drawn from 'necessary' premisses ; this too is clear to us from the Analytics.^o It is evident, therefore, that the propositions forming the basis of enthymemes, though some of them may be 'necessary', will most of them be only usually true. Now the materials of enthymemes are Probabilities and Signs,^o which we can see must correspond respectively with the propositions that are generally and those that are necessarily true. A Probability is a thing that usually happens; not, however, as some definitions would suggest, anything whatever that usually happens, but only if it belongs to the class of the 'contingent' or 'variable'. It bears the same relation to that in respect of which it is

probable as the universal bears to the particular.^o Of Signs, one kind bears the same relation to the statement it supports as the particular bears to the universal, the other the same as the universal bears to the particular. The infallible kind is a ‘complete proof’ (*reT < jt’Ýipwv*); the fallible kind has no specific name. By infallible signs I mean those on which syllogisms proper may be based: and this shows us why this kind of Sign is called ‘complete proof’: when people think that what they have said cannot be refuted, they then think that they are bringing forward a ‘complete proof’, meaning that the matter has now

been demonstrated and completed (*πεπερασμένον*); for the word *zepak* has the same meaning (of ‘end’ or ‘boundary’) as the word

τέκμαρ in the ancient tongue. Now the one kind of Sign (that which bears to the proposition it supports the relation of particular to universal) may be illustrated thus. Suppose it were said, ‘The fact that Socrates was wise and just is a sign that the wise are just’. Here we certainly have a Sign; but even though the proposition be true, the argument is refutable, since it does not form a syllogism. Suppose, on the other hand, it were said, ‘The fact that he has a fever is a sign that he is ill’, or, ‘The fact that she is giving milk is a sign that she has lately borne a child’. Here we have the infallible kind of Sign, the only kind that constitutes a complete proof, since it is the only kind that, if the particular statement is true, is irrefutable. The other kind of Sign, that which bears to the proposition it supports the relation of universal to particular, might be illustrated by saying, ‘The fact that he breathes fast is a sign that he has a fever’. This argument also is refutable, even if the statement about the fast breathing be true, since a man may breathe hard without having a fever.

It has, then, been stated above what is the nature of a Probability, of a Sign, and of a complete proof, and what are the differences between them. In the Analytics a more explicit description has been given of these points; it is there shown why some of these reasonings can be put into syllogisms and some cannot.

The xample’ has already been described as one kind of induction; and the special nature of the subject-matter that

1357b31-33. Dionysius ... THEAGENES: Dionysius of Syracuse obtained a bodyguard in 496, as did Peisistratus in Athens in 560 and Theagenes in Megara sometime in the 600s.

1358a10. LINES OF ARGUMENT: This is the first mention of “topics” (in Greek, *topoi*- *topos* in the singular-is the word for “places”). Our translation is “lines of argument.” The first thing we know about topics is that they are common to different subjects, while there are other modes of reasoning that are specific to one subject or another.

At the end of book II, Aristotle defines a topic as “a general class embracing a large number of particular kinds of enthymeme” (1403a18-19). A topic is an argument form, a template or skeleton of an argument. We rely on the principles of the sciences as premises for drawing scientific conclusions, and on the topics as premises for constructing persuasive speeches. For example, whether in economics, in military strategy, or in educational policy, we use the topic that “if some is good, more is better.” Topics such as “if some is good, more is better” have to be supple enough to let the speaker argue both for and against a given proposition. Such topics constitute common rhetorical knowledge, “what everybody knows,” which is why Aristotle says that using them “will not increase our understanding of any particular class of things.” The speaker will use topics as an organized way of finding things to say on a given subject.

distinguishes it from the other kinds has also been stated above. Its relation to the proposition it supports is not that of part to whole, nor whole to part, nor whole to whole, but of part to part, or like to like. When two statements are of the same order, but one is more familiar than the other, the former is an ‘example’. The argument may, for instance, be that Dionysius, in asking as he does for a bodyguard, is scheming to make himself a despot. For in the past Peisistratus kept asking for a bodyguard in order to carry out such a scheme, and did make himself a despot as soon as he got it; and so did Theagenes^o at Megara; and in the same way all other instances known to the speaker are made into examples, in order to show what is not yet known, that Dionysius has the same purpose in making the same request: all these being instances of the one general principle, that a man who asks for a bodyguard is scheming to make himself a despot. We have now described the sources of those means of persuasion which are popularly supposed to be demonstrative.

There is an important distinction between two sorts of enthymemes that has been wholly overlooked by almost everybody—one that also subsists between the syllogisms treated of in dialectic. One sort of enthymeme really belongs to rhetoric, as one sort of syllogism really belongs to dialectic; but the other sort really belongs to other arts and faculties, whether to those we already exercise or to those we have not yet acquired. Missing this distinction, people fail to notice that the more correctly they handle their particular subject the further they are getting away from pure rhetoric or dialectic. This statement will be clearer if expressed more fully. I mean that the proper subjects of dialectical and rhetorical syllogisms are the things with which we say the regular or universal Lines of Argument are concerned, that is to say those lines of argument that apply equally to questions of right

conduct, natural science, politics, and many other things that have nothing to

1358a17. SPECIAL LINES OF ARGUMENT: This phrase translates *idia* (*idios* in the singular). *Idia* can be an adjective modifying *topoi*, which is how our translation has it. Aristotle also uses the term *eid6* (“species” or “kinds”) for them. Both *idios* and *eidos* ultimately derive from a verb meaning “to see” and so “to know.” *Idios* primarily means what is proper, specific, or private to something; in Greek an idiot was a private person, someone who kept to himself or wasn’t useful to others. The *eidos* of something is its “shape” or “form”; *eidos* is Aristotle’s word for “formal cause.”

1358a25. MOST ENTHYMEMES ARE IN FACT BASED ... SPECIAL LINES OF ARGUMENT ... : Chapter 2 ends with an indication of how supple and variable Aristotle’s use of topics is. Topics, we were just told, are what are common to arguments regardless of subject matter, as opposed to the principles that govern the sciences of particular subjects. But now Aristotle distinguishes “the special and the general Lines of Argument” and is about to explore, in the rest of book I, lines of argument specific to the different species of rhetoric. Such lines of argument are in one respect like the topics: They are not scientific but are rhetorical arguments based on what people believe. In another way, they are specific: How we argue that something will be useful in the future does not help in arguing whether someone is guilty of a crime in the past.

do with one another. Take, for instance, the line of argument concerned with ‘the more or less’. On this line of argument it is equally easy to base a syllogism or enthymeme about any of what nevertheless are essentially disconnected subjects—right conduct, natural science, or anything else whatever. But there are also those special Lines of Argument which are based on such propositions as apply only to particular groups or classes of things. Thus there are propositions about natural science on which it is impossible to base any enthymeme or syllogism about ethics, and other propositions about ethics on which nothing can be based about natural science. The same principle applies throughout. The general Lines of Argument have no special subject-matter, and therefore will not increase our understanding of any particular class of things. On the other hand, the better the selection one makes of propositions suitable for special Lines of Argument, the nearer one comes, unconsciously, to setting up a science that is distinct from dialectic and rhetoric. One may succeed in stating the required principles, but one’s science will be no longer dialectic or rhetoric, but the science to which the principles thus discovered belong. Most enthymemes are in fact based upon these

particular or special Lines of Argument;* comparatively few on the common or general kind. As in the Topics, therefore, so in this work, we must distinguish, in dealing with enthymemes, the special and the general Lines of Argument on which they are to be founded. By special Lines of Argument I mean the propositions peculiar to each several class of things, by general those common to all classes alike. We may begin with the special Lines of Argument. But, first of all, let us classify rhetoric into its varieties. Having distinguished these we may deal with them one by one, and try to discover the elements of which each is composed, and the propositions each must employ.

-3-

Aristotle organizes the rest of book I by outlining the different properties of the three kinds of rhetoric: deliberative, judicial, and epideictic (or ceremonial). As far as we can tell, the division of rhetoric into these three kinds is Aristotle's own innovation. The kinds of rhetoric are distinguished by the kinds of hearers, times, and ends. Their differences can be organized this way:

Deliberative	Judicial	Epideictic
Future	Past	Present
Do or not do something	Attack or defend somebody	Praise or censure somebody
Expediency and harmfulness	Justice and injustice	Honor and shame

When we try to fit epideictic rhetoric into this neat scheme, an ambiguity occurs. While the first two kinds of rhetoric are obviously related to essential apolitical functions, that connection is not so clear for epideictic rhetoric. Some people think its inclusion here simply comes from a need for completeness on Aristotle's part. Epideixis is arguably either about the person praised or blamed, or is a display of skill that draws attention to the speaker. The audience for display oratory is, Aristotle says, an observer rather than a judge : "those who merely decide on the orator's skill are observers." Epideictic rhetoric then opens the way for non-political forms of rhetoric, as we will see.

At the end of the chapter Aristotle shows that all three kinds of rhetoric use certain topics in common—namely, the possible, and the impossible; past, present and future; and "the more and the less." By "the more and the less," Aristotle means such lines of argument (that is, commonplaces)

as *“Richer people should pay more”* or *“The more serious the crime, the bigger the punishment should be.”*

3

RHETORIC FALLS INTO THREE divisions, determined by the three classes of listeners to speeches. For of the three elements in speech-making-speaker, subject, and person addressed it is the last one, the hearer, that determines the speech's end and object. The hearer must be either a judge, with a decision to make about things past or future, or an observer. A member of the assembly decides about future events, a juryman about past events: while those who merely decide on the orator's skill are observers. From this it follows that there are three divisions of oratory-(1) political, (2) forensic, and (3) the ceremonial oratory of display.

Political speaking urges us either to do or not to do something : one of these two courses is always taken by private counsellors, as well as by men who address public assemblies. Forensic speaking either attacks or defends somebody: one or other of these two things must always be done by the parties in a case. The ceremonial oratory of display either praises or censures somebody. These three kinds of rhetoric refer to three different kinds of time. The political orator is concerned with the future: it is about things to be done hereafter that he advises, for or against. The party in a case at law is concerned with the past; one man accuses the other, and the other defends himself, with reference to things already done. The ceremonial orator is, properly speaking, concerned with the present, since all men praise or blame in view of the state of things existing at the time, though they often find it useful also to recall the past and to make guesses at the future. :

Rhetoric has three distinct ends in view, one for each of its three kinds. The political orator aims at establishing the expediency or the harmfulness of a proposed course of action; if he urges its acceptance, he does so on the ground that it will

1359a3. THEY PRAISE ACHILLES BECAUSE ... PATROCLUS: Achilles' decision to avenge the death of his companion Patroclus is the subject of the Iliad.

1359a6. IT IS THESE THREE SUBJECTS ... : The three kinds of rhetoric have different ends and subjects. But there are some

propositions that all speakers, regardless of subject, have to be able to use. These are, as given in the following paragraph, “propositions about the possible and the impossible, and about whether a thing has or has not occurred, will or will not occur” and “about greatness or smallness.”

do good; if he urges its rejection, he does so on the ground that it will do harm; and all other points, such as whether the proposal is just or unjust, honourable or dishonourable, he brings in as subsidiary and relative to this main consideration. Parties in a law-case aim at establishing the justice or injustice of some action, and they too bring in all other points as subsidiary and relative to this one. Those who praise or attack a man aim at proving him worthy of honour or the reverse, and they too treat all other considerations with reference to this one.

That the three kinds of rhetoric do aim respectively at the three ends we have mentioned is shown by the fact that speakers will sometimes not try to establish anything else. Thus, the litigant will sometimes not deny that a thing has happened or that he has done harm. But that he is guilty of injustice he will never admit; otherwise there would be no need of a trial. So too, political orators often make any concession short of admitting that they are recommending their hearers to take an inexpedient course or not to take an expedient one. The question whether it is not unjust for a city to enslave its innocent neighbours often does not trouble them at all. In like manner those who praise or censure a man do not consider whether his acts have been expedient or not, but often make it a ground of actual praise that he has neglected his own interest to do what was honourable. Thus, they praise Achilles because he championed his fallen friend Patroclus, though he knew that this meant death, and that otherwise he need not die: yet while to die thus was the nobler thing for him to do, the expedient thing was to live on.

It is evident from what has been said that it is these three subjects,^o more than any others, about which the orator must be able to have propositions at his command. Now the propositions of Rhetoric are Complete Proofs, Probabilities, and Signs. Every kind of syllogism is composed of propositions,

This chapter introduces deliberative rhetoric first by observing that deliberation is limited to the possible,. No one deliberates on the inevitable or the impossible, nor on what is naturally or fortuitously possible,. Second,

Aristotle shows how rhetoric cannot reach the exactness of science and should not stray far from its domain. Finally, he says that there are five important subjects relative to which men deliberate and on which deliberative orators give counsel: revenue, war and peace, protection of territory, imports and exports, and legislation.

and the enthymeme is a particular kind of syllogism composed of the aforesaid propositions.

Since only possible actions, and not impossible ones, can ever have been done in the past or the present, and since things which have not occurred, or will not occur, also cannot have been done or be going to be done, it is necessary for the political, the forensic, and the ceremonial speaker alike to be able to have at their command propositions about the possible and the impossible, and about whether a thing has or has not occurred, will or will not occur. Further, all men, in giving praise or blame, in urging us to accept or reject proposals for action, in accusing others or defending themselves, attempt not only to prove the points mentioned but also to show that the good or the harm, the honour or disgrace, the justice or injustice, is great or small, either absolutely or relatively ; and therefore it is plain that we must also have at our command propositions about greatness or smallness and the greater or the lesser-propositions both universal and particular. Thus, we must be able to say which is the greater or lesser good, the greater or lesser act of justice or injustice; and so on.

Such, then, are the subjects regarding which we are inevitably bound to master the propositions relevant to them. We must now discuss each particular class of these subjects in turn, namely those dealt with in political, in ceremonial, and lastly in legal, oratory.

4

FIRST, THEN, WE MUST ascertain what are the kinds of things, good or bad, about which the political orator offers counsel. For he does not deal with all things, but only with such as may or may not take place. Concerning things which exist or will exist inevitably, or which cannot possibly exist or take

1359b2-14. NOW TO ENUMERATE AND CLASSIFY ACCURATELY ... : One might think that the more closely a rhetorical argument approaches a scientific one, the better. Instead of making merely

plausible and good-sounding arguments about the effects of changes in tax policy on economic growth, wouldn't it be better to have economists actually figure out what those effects would really be? Aristotle here suggests that such "progress" might not always be an unmixed good. Being more knowledgeable doesn't always make someone more persuasive. And this creates ethical dilemmas: If I have the accurate knowledge of a true economist-assuming that such knowledge exists-but have to persuade an uneducated audience in a limited time, can I make a persuasive case without saying things that I know to be false?

place, no counsel can be given. Nor, again, can counsel be given about the whole class of things which may or may not take place; for this class includes some good things that occur naturally, and some that occur by accident; and about these it is useless to offer counsel. Clearly counsel can only be given on matters about which people deliberate; matters, namely, that ultimately depend on ourselves, and which we have it in our power to set going. For we turn a thing over in our mind until we have reached the point of seeing whether we can do it or not.

Now to enumerate and classify accurately^o the usual subjects of public business, and further to frame, as far as possible, true definitions of them, is a task which we must not attempt on the present occasion. For it does not belong to the art of rhetoric, but to a more instructive art and a more real branch of knowledge; and as it is, rhetoric has been given a far wider subject-matter than strictly belongs to it. The truth is, as indeed we have said already, that rhetoric is a combination of the science of logic and of the ethical branch of politics; and it is partly like dialectic, partly like sophistical reasoning. But the more we try to make either dialectic or rhetoric not, what they really are, practical faculties, but sciences, the more we shall inadvertently be destroying their true nature; for we shall be re-fashioning them and shall be passing into the region of sciences dealing with definite subjects rather than simply with words and forms of reasoning. Even here, however, we will mention those points which it is of practical importance to distinguish, their fuller treatment falling naturally to political science.

The main matters on which all men deliberate and on which political speakers make speeches are some five in number: ways and means, war and peace, national defence, imports and exports, and legislation.

As to Ways and Means, then, the intending speaker will need to know the number and extent of the country's sources of revenue, so that, if any is being overlooked, it may be : added, and, if any is

defective, it may be increased. Further, he should know all the expenditure of the country, in order that, if any part of it is superfluous, it may be abolished, or, if any is too large, it may be reduced. For men become richer not only by increasing their existing wealth but also by reducing their expenditure. A comprehensive view of these questions cannot be gained solely from experience in home affairs; in order to advise on such matters a man must be keenly interested in the methods worked out in other lands.

As to Peace and War, he must know the extent of the military strength of his country, both actual and potential, and also the nature of that actual and potential strength; and further, what wars his country has waged, and how it has waged them. He must know these facts not only about his own country, but also about neighbouring countries; and also about countries with which war is likely, in order that peace may be maintained with those stronger than his own, and that his own may have power to make war or not against those that are weaker. He should know, too, whether the military power of another country is like or unlike that of his own; for this is a matter that may affect their relative strength. With the same end in view he must, besides, have studied the wars of other countries as well as those of his own, and the way they ended; similar causes are likely to have similar results. 5

With regard to National Defence: he ought to know all about the methods of defence in actual use, such as the strength and character of the defensive force and the positions of the forts-this last means that he must be well acquainted with the lie of the country-in order that a garrison may be increased if it is too small or removed if it is not wanted, and that the strategic points may be guarded with special care.

With regard to the Food Supply: he must know what outlay will meet the needs of his country; what kinds of food are produced at home and what imported; and what articles must be exported or imported. This last he must know in order that agreements and commercial treaties may be made with the countries concerned. There are, indeed, two sorts of state to which he must see that his countrymen give no cause for offence, states stronger than his own, and states with which it is advantageous to trade.

But while he must, for security's sake, be able to take all this into account, he must before all things understand the subject of legislation; for it is on a country's laws that its whole welfare depends. He must, therefore, know how many different forms of constitution there are; under what conditions each of these will prosper and by what internal developments or external attacks each of them tends to

be destroyed. When I speak of destruction through internal developments I refer to the fact that all constitutions, except the best one of all, are destroyed both by not being pushed far enough and by being pushed too far. Thus, democracy loses its vigour, and finally passes into oligarchy, not only when it is not pushed far enough, but also when it is pushed a great deal too far; just as the aquiline and the snub nose not only turn into normal noses by not being aquiline or snub enough, but also by being too violently aquiline or snub arrive at a condition in which they no longer look like noses at all.

It is useful, in framing laws, not only to study the past history of one's own country, in order to understand which constitution is desirable for it now, but also to have a knowledge of the constitutions of other nations, and so to learn for what kinds of nation the various kinds of constitution are suited. From this we can see that books of travel are useful aids to legislation, since from these we may learn the laws and customs of different races. The political speaker will also find the

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Since all deliberation aims at the end of happiness, this chapters defines happiness, and explores its parts. Here and in the rest of book I, Aristotle presents common opinions about ethical matters, such as happiness, virtue, pleasures, and justice. His own understanding of these matters, which he presents in his Ethics, is quite different.

researches of historians useful. But all this is the business of political science and not of rhetoric.

These, then, are the most important kinds of information which the political speaker must possess. Let us now go back and state the premisses from which he will have to argue in favour of adopting or rejecting measures regarding these and other matters.

5

IT MAY BE SAID that every individual man and all men in common aim at a certain end which determines what they choose and what they avoid. This end, to sum it up briefly, is happiness and its constituents. Let us, then, by way of illustration only, ascertain what is

in general the nature of happiness, and what are the elements of its constituent parts. For all advice to do things or not to do them is concerned with happiness and with the things that make for or against it; whatever creates or increases happiness or some part of happiness, we ought to do; whatever destroys or hampers happiness, or gives rise to its opposite, we ought not to do.

We may define happiness as prosperity combined with virtue; or as independence of life; or as the secure enjoyment of the maximum of pleasure; or as a good condition of property and body, together with the power of guarding one's property and body and making use of them. That happiness is one or more of these things, pretty well everybody agrees.

From this definition of happiness it follows that its constituent parts are:—good birth, plenty of friends, good friends, wealth, good children, plenty of children, a happy old age, also such bodily excellences as health, beauty, strength, large stature, athletic powers, together with fame, honour, good luck, and virtue. A man cannot fail to be completely independent if he possesses these internal and these external goods; for

1361a11. 1ACEDAEMONIANS: In the Politics Aristotle says that while the Lacedaemonians, also known as the Spartans, narrowed all the virtues in men to what is useful in war, the women became licentious and lovers of luxury.

besides these there are no others to have. (Goods of the soul and of the body are internal. Good birth, friends, money, and honour are external.) Further, we think that he should possess resources and luck, in order to make his life really secure. As we have already ascertained what happiness in general is, so now let us try to ascertain what each of these parts of it is. 3

Now good birth in a race or a state means that its members are indigenous or ancient; that its earliest leaders were distinguished men, and that from them have sprung many who were distinguished for qualities that we admire.

The good birth of an individual, which may come either from the male or the female side, implies that both parents are free citizens, and that, as in the case of the state, the founders 3 of the line have been notable for virtue or wealth or something else which is highly prized, and that many distinguished persons belong to the family, men and women, young and old.

The phrases 'possession of good children' and 'of many children' bear a quite clear meaning. Applied to a community, they mean that

its young men are numerous and of good quality: good in regard to bodily excellences, such as stature, 1 beauty, strength, athletic powers; and also in regard to the excellences of the soul, which in a young man are temperance and courage. Applied to an individual, they mean that his own children are numerous and have the good qualities we 5 have described. Both male and female are here included; the excellences of the latter are, in body, beauty and stature; in soul, self-command and an industry that is not sordid. Communities as well as individuals should lack none of these per- J fections, in their women as well as in their men. Where, as among the Lacedaemonians° the state of women is bad, almost half of human life is spoilt.

The constituents of wealth are: plenty of coined money and territory; the ownership of numerous, large, and beautiful estates; also the ownership of numerous and beautiful implements, live stock, and slaves. All these kinds of property are our own, are secure, gentlemanly, and useful. The useful kinds are those that are productive, the gentlemanly kinds are those that provide enjoyment. By 'productive' I mean those from which we get our income; by 'enjoyable', those from which we get nothing worth mentioning except the use of them. The criterion of 'security' is the ownership of property in such places and under such conditions that the use of it is in our power; and it is 'our own' if it is in our own power to dispose of it or keep it. By 'disposing of it' I mean giving it away or selling it. Wealth as a whole consists in using things rather than in owning them; it is really the activity-that is, the use-of property that constitutes wealth.

Fame means being respected by everybody, or having some quality that is desired by all men, or by most, or by the good, or by the wise.

Honour is the token of a man's being famous for doing good. It is chiefly and most properly paid to those who have already done good; but also to the man who can do good in future. Doing good refers either to the preservation of life and the means of life, or to wealth, or to some other of the good things which it is hard to get either always or at that particular place or time-for many gain honour for things which seem small, but the place and the occasion account for it. The constituents of honour are: sacrifices; commemoration, in verse or prose; privileges; grants of land; front seats at civic celebrations; state burial; statues; public maintenance; among foreigners, obeisances and giving place; and such presents as are among various bodies of men regarded as marks of honour. For a present is not only the bestowal of a piece of property, but also a token of honour; which explains why honour-loving as well as money-loving persons desire it. The present brings to both what they want; it is a piece of property,

1361b5. HERODICUS: According to Plato (Republic III.406a), Herodicus, a doctor, “mixed physical training with medicine and wore out first himself and then many others as well.”

which is what the lovers of money desire; and it brings honour, which is what the lovers of honour desire.

The excellence of the body is health; that is, a condition which allows us, while keeping free from disease, to have the use of our bodies; for many people are ‘healthy’ as we are told Herodicus* was; and these no one can congratulate on their ‘health’, for they have to abstain from everything or nearly everything that men do. Beauty varies with the time of life. In a young man beauty is the possession of a body fit to endure the exertion of running and of contests of strength; which means that he is pleasant to look at; and therefore all-round athletes are the most beautiful, being naturally adapted both for contests of strength and for speed also. For a man in his prime, beauty is fitness for the exertion of warfare, together with a pleasant but at the same time formidable appearance. For an old man, it is to be strong enough for such exertion as is necessary, and to be free from all those deformities of old age which cause pain to others. Strength is the power of moving some one else at will; to do this, you must either pull, push, lift, pin, or grip him; thus you must be strong in all of those ways or at least in some. Excellence in size is to surpass ordinary people in height, thickness, and breadth by just as much as will not make one’s movements slower in consequence. Athletic excellence of the body consists in size, strength, and swiftness; swiftness implying strength. He who can fling forward his legs in a certain way, and move them fast and far, is good at running; he who can grip and hold down is good at wrestling; he who can drive an adversary from his ground with the right blow is a good boxer: he who can do both the last is a good pancratiast, while he who can do all is an ‘allround’ athlete.

Happiness in old age is the coming of old age slowly and painlessly; for a man has not this happiness if he grows old either quickly, or tardily but painfully. It arises both from the excellences of the body and from good luck. If a man is not free from disease, or if he is not strong, he will not be free from suffering; nor can he continue to live a long and painless life unless he has good luck. There is, indeed, a capacity for long life that is quite independent of health or strength; for many people live long who lack the excellences of the body; but for our present purpose there is no use in going into the details of this.

The terms ‘possession of many friends’ and ‘possession of good friends’ need no explanation; for we define a friend as one who will always try, for your sake, to do what he takes to be good for you. The

man towards whom many feel thus has many friends; if these are worthy men, he has good friends.

'Good luck' means the acquisition or possession of all or most, or the most important, of those good things which are due to luck. Some of the things that are due to luck may also be due to artificial contrivance; but many are independent of art, as for example those which are due to nature-though, to be sure, things due to luck may actually be contrary to nature. Thus health may be due to artificial contrivance, but beauty and stature are due to nature. All such good things as excite envy are, as a class, the outcome of good luck. Luck is also the \ cause of good things that happen contrary to reasonable expectation : as when, for instance, all your brothers are ugly, but you are handsome yourself; or when you find a treasure that everybody else has overlooked; or when a missile hits the next man and misses you; or when you are the only man not to go to a place you have gone to regularly, while the others . go there for the first time and are killed. All such things are reckoned pieces of good luck.

As to virtue, it is most closely connected with the subject of Eulogy, and therefore we will wait to define it until we come to discuss that subject.

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Just because happiness is the ultimate end of action, we do not deliberate about it, but we deliberate about the actions that allow us to achieve it-that is, the useful. This chapters gives the topics and elements for arguing about the useful and the good.

6

IT IS NOW PLAIN what our aims, future or actual, should be in urging, and what in deprecating, a proposal; the latter being the opposite of the former. Now the political or deliberative orator's aim is utility: deliberation seeks to determine not ends but the means to ends, i.e. what it is most useful to do. Further, utility is a good thing. We ought therefore to assure ourselves of the main facts about Goodness and Utility in general.

We may define a good thing as that which ought to be chosen for its

own sake; or as that for the sake of which we choose something else; or as that which is sought after by all things, or by all things that have sensation or reason, or which will be sought after by any things that acquire reason; or as that which must be prescribed for a given individual by reason generally, or is prescribed for him by his individual reason, this being his individual good; or as that whose presence brings anything into a satisfactory and self-sufficing condition; or as self-sufficiency; or as what produces, maintains, or entails characteristics of this kind, while preventing and destroying their opposites. One thing may entail another in either of two ways- (1) simultaneously, (2) subsequently. Thus learning entails knowledge subsequently, health entails life simultaneously. Things are productive of other things in three senses: first as being healthy produces health; secondly, as food produces health; and thirdly, as exercise does-i.e. it does so usually. All this being settled, we now see that both the acquisition of good things and the removal of bad things must be good; the latter entails freedom from the evil things simultaneously, while the former entails possession of the good things subsequently. The acquisition of a greater in place of a lesser good, or of a lesser in place of a greater evil, is also good, for in proportion as the greater exceeds the lesser there is acquisition of good or removal of evil. The virtues, too, must be something good; for it is by possessing these that we are in a good condition, and they tend to produce good works and good actions. They must be severally named and described elsewhere. Pleasure, again, must be a good thing, since it is the nature of all animals to aim at it. Consequently both pleasant and beautiful things must be good things, since the former are productive of pleasure, while of the beautiful things some are pleasant and some desirable in and for themselves.

The following is a more detailed list of things that must be good. Happiness, as being desirable in itself and sufficient by itself, and as being that for whose sake we choose many other things. Also justice, courage, temperance, magnanimity, magnificence, and all such qualities, as being excellences of the soul. Further, health, beauty, and the like, as being bodily excellences and productive of many other good things: for instance, health is productive both of pleasure and of life, and therefore is thought the greatest of goods, since these two things which it causes, pleasure and life, are two of the things most highly prized by ordinary people. Wealth, again: for it is the excellence of possession, and also productive of many other good things. Friends and friendship: for a friend is desirable in himself and also productive of many other good things. So, too, honour and reputation, as being pleasant, and productive of many other good things, and usually accompanied by the presence of the good things

that cause them to be bestowed. The faculty of speech and action; since all such qualities are productive of what is good. Further—good parts, strong memory, receptiveness, quickness of intuition, and the like, for all such faculties are productive of what is good. Similarly, all the sciences and arts. And life: since, even if no other good were the result of life, it is desirable in itself. And justice, as the cause of good to the community.

1362b35. ‘SURELY wouLD PRIAM EXULT’: This is a quotation from book I of the *Iliad*, line 255. Priam exults because the Greeks are fighting among themselves. In chapter 20 of the *Poetics*, Aristotle says that to learn about the part of a tragedy called thought we should consult the *Rhetoric*. What he doesn’t say explicitly is that many of the examples he uses in the *Rhetoric* are drawn from tragedy and epic. A contemporary equivalent would be a book about political rhetoric that drew many of its examples from Shakespeare.

1363a6. ‘And FOR PRIAM ...’ [AND] ... AS ERST VYE CAME’: These lines are from the *Iliad* II.160 and 298.

The above are pretty well all the things admittedly good. In dealing with things whose goodness is disputed, we may argue in the following ways:—That is good of which the contrary is bad. That is good the contrary of which is to the advantage of our enemies; for example, if it is to the particular advantage of our enemies that we should be cowards, clearly courage is of particular value to our countrymen. And generally, the contrary of that which our enemies desire, or of that at which they rejoice, is evidently valuable. Hence the passage beginning:

Surely would Priam exult.°

This principle usually holds good, but not always, since it may well be that our interest is sometimes the same as that of our enemies. Hence it is said that ‘evils draw men together’; that is, when the same thing is hurtful to them both.

Further; that which is not in excess is good, and that which is greater than it should be is bad. That also is good on which much labour or money has been spent; the mere fact of this makes it seem good, and such a good is assumed to be an end—an end reached through a long chain of means; and any end is a good. Hence the lines beginning:

And for Priam (and Troy-town’s folk) should they leave behind them a boast;

and

Oh, it were shame

To have tarried so long and return empty-handed as erst we came;⁰

and there is also the proverb about 'breaking the pitcher at the door'.

That which most people seek after, and which is obviously an object of contention, is also a good; for, as has been shown,

1363al6. SIMONIDES : A poet and wise man, Simonides (c.556-c.468) is also famous as the inventor of the rhetorical art of memory.

that is good which is sought after by everybody, and 'most people' is taken to be equivalent to 'everybody'. That which is praised is good, since no one praises what is not good. So, again, that which is praised by our enemies [or by the worthless] ; for when even those who have a grievance think a thing good, it is at once felt that every one must agree with them; our enemies can admit the fact only because it is evident, just as those must be worthless whom their friends censure and their enemies do not. (For this reason the Corinthians conceived themselves to be insulted by Simonides^o when he wrote:

Against the Corinthians hath Ilium no complaint.)

Again, that is good which has been distinguished by the favour of a discerning or virtuous man or woman, as Odysseus was distinguished by Athena, Helen by Theseus, Paris by the goddesses, and Achilles by Homer. And, generally speaking, all things are good which men deliberately choose to do; this will include the things already mentioned, and also whatever may be bad for their enemies or good for their friends, and at the same time practicable. Things are 'practicable' in two senses: (1) it is possible to do them, (2) it is easy to do them. Things are done 'easily' when they are done either without pain or quickly: the 'difficulty' of an act lies either in its painfulness or in the long time it takes. Again, a thing is good if it is as men wish; and they wish to have either no evil at all or at least a balance of good over evil. This last will happen where the penalty is either imperceptible or slight. Good, too, are things that are a man's very own, possessed by no one else, exceptional; for this increases the credit of having them. So are things which befit the possessors, such as whatever is appropriate to their birth or capacity, and whatever they feel they ought to have but lack-such things may indeed be trifling, but none the less men deliberately make them the

In chapters 6, Aristotle showed how to argue about the good. In chapter 7 he shows how to apply the topic of the “the more and the less” to the good and the useful—the two terms are equivalent here—and consequently how to argue about which is the greater good. He first defines what it means to be a greater good. Then, armed with general claims about the greater good and with more specific premises about the greater good, he enumerates a long list of topics from which one can argue that something is a greater good than something else.

goal of their action. And things easily effected; for these are practicable (in the sense of being easy); such things are those in which every one, or most people, or one's equals, or one's inferiors have succeeded. Good also are the things by which we shall gratify our friends or annoy our enemies: and the things chosen by those whom we admire: and the things for \ which we are fitted by nature or experience, since we think we shall succeed more easily in these: and those in which no worthless man can succeed, for such things bring greater praise: and those which we do in fact desire, for what we desire is taken to be not only pleasant but also better. Further, a man of a given disposition makes chiefly for the corresponding things: lovers of victory make for victory, lovers of honour for honour, money-loving men for money, and so with the rest. These, then, are the sources from which we must derive our means of persuasion about Good and Utility.

7

SINCE, HOWEVER, IT OFTEN happens that people agree that \ two things are both useful but do not agree about which is the more so, the next step will be to treat of relative goodness and relative utility.

A thing which surpasses another may be regarded as being that other thing plus something more, and that other thing which is surpassed as being what is contained in the first thing. Now to call a thing ‘greater’ or ‘more’ always implies a comparison of it with one that is ‘smaller’ or ‘less’, while ‘great’ and ‘small’, ‘much’ and ‘little’, are terms used in comparison ; with normal magnitude. The ‘great’ is that which surpasses the normal, the ‘small’ is that which is surpassed by the normal ; and so with ‘many’ and ‘few’.

Now we are applying the term ‘good’ to what is desirable for its own sake and not for the sake of something else; to that at which all

things aim; to what they would choose if they could acquire understanding and practical wisdom; and to that which tends to produce or preserve such goods, or is always accompanied by them. Moreover, that for the sake of which things are done is the end (an end being that for the sake of which all else is done), and for each individual that thing is a good which fulfils these conditions in regard to himself. It follows, then, that a greater number of goods is a greater good than one or than a smaller number, if that one or that smaller number is included in the count; for then the larger number surpasses the smaller, and the smaller quantity : is surpassed as being contained in the larger.

Again, if the largest member of one class surpasses the largest member of another, then the one class surpasses the other; and if one class surpasses another, then the largest member of the one surpasses the largest member of the other. Thus, if the tallest man is taller than the tallest woman, then men in general are taller than women. Conversely, if men in general are taller than women, then the tallest man is taller than the tallest woman. For the superiority of class over class is proportionate to the superiority possessed by their largest specimens. Again, where one good is always accompanied by another, but does not always accompany it, it is greater than the other, for the use of the second thing is implied in the use of the first. A thing may be accompanied by another in three ways, either simultaneously, subsequently, or potentially. Life accompanies health simultaneously (but not health life), knowledge accompanies the act of learning subsequently, cheating accompanies sacrilege potentially, since a man who has committed sacrilege is always capable of cheating. Again, when two things each surpass a third, that which does so by the greater amount is the greater of the two; for it must surpass the greater as well as the less of the other two. A thing productive of a greater good than another is productive of is itself a greater good than that other. For this conception of 'productive of a greater' has been implied in our argument. Likewise, that which is produced by a greater good is itself a greater good; thus, if what is wholesome is more desirable and a greater good than what gives pleasure, health too must be a greater good than pleasure. Again, a thing which is desirable in itself is a greater good than a thing which is not desirable in itself, as for example bodily strength than what is wholesome, since the latter is not pursued for its own sake, whereas the former is; and this was our definition of the good. Again, if one of two things is an end, and the other is not, the former is the greater good, as being chosen for its own sake and not for the sake of something else; as, for example, exercise is chosen for the sake of physical well-being. And of two things that which stands less in need of the other, or of other

things, is the greater good, since it is more self-sufficing. (That which stands 'less' in need of others is that which needs either fewer or easier things.) So when one thing does not exist or cannot come into existence without a second, while the second can exist without the first, the second is the better. That which does not need something else is more self-sufficing than that which does, and presents itself as a greater good for that reason. Again, that which is a beginning of other things is a greater good than that which is not, and that which is a cause is a greater good than that which is not; the reason being the same in each case, namely that without a cause and a beginning nothing can exist or come into existence. Again, where there are two sets of consequences arising from two different beginnings or causes, the consequences of the more important beginning or cause are themselves the more important; and conversely, that beginning or cause is itself the more important which has the more important consequences. Now it is plain, from all that has been said, that one thing may be shown to be more important than another from two opposite

1364a19-22. LEODAMAS, WHEN ACCUSING CALLISTRATUS....

CARRY IT OUT: Leodamas was an orator, Callistratus an orator and politician, and Chabrias a general. This passage gives a nice example of the rhetorical ability to argue both sides of a question.

1364a28. 'THE BEST OF THINGS IS WATER': The quotation is from Pindar's Olympians 1. 1.

points of view: it may appear the more important (1) because it is a beginning and the other thing is not, and also (2) because it is not a beginning and the other thing is-on the ground that the end is more important and is not a beginning. So Leodamas, when accusing Callistratus, said that the man who prompted the deed was more guilty than the doer, since it would not have been done if he had not planned it. On the other hand, when accusing Chabrias he said that the doer was worse than the prompter, since there would have been no deed without some one to do it; men, said he, plot a thing only in order to carry it out.^o 0

Further, what is rare is a greater good than what is plentiful. Thus, gold is a better thing than iron, though less useful: it is harder to get, and therefore better worth getting. Reversely, it may be argued that the plentiful is a better thing than the rare, because we can make more use of it. For what is often useful surpasses what is seldom useful, whence the saying

The best of things is water. ⁰

More generally: the hard thing is better than the easy, because it is

rarer: and reversely, the easy thing is better than the hard, for it is as we wish it to be. That is the greater good whose contrary is the greater evil, and whose loss affects us more. Positive goodness and badness are more important than the mere absence of goodness and badness: for positive goodness and badness are ends, which the mere absence of them cannot be. Further, in proportion as the functions of things are noble or base, the things themselves are good or bad: conversely, in proportion as the things themselves are good or bad, their functions also are good or bad; for the nature of results corresponds with that of their causes and beginnings, and conversely the nature of causes and beginnings corresponds with that of their results. Moreover, those things are greater goods, superiority in which is more desirable or more honourable. Thus, keenness of sight is more desirable than keenness of smell, sight generally being more desirable than smell generally; and similarly, unusually great love of friends being more honourable than unusually great love of money, ordinary love of friends is more honourable than ordinary love of money. Conversely, if one of two normal things is better or nobler than the other, an unusual degree of that thing is better or nobler than an unusual degree of the other. Again, one thing is more honourable or better than another if it is more honourable or better to desire it; the importance of the object of a given instinct corresponds to the importance of the instinct itself; and for the same reason, if one thing is more honourable or better than another, it is more honourable and better to desire it. Again, if one science is more honourable and valuable than another, the activity with which it deals is also more honourable and valuable; as is the science, so is the reality that is its object, each science being authoritative in its own sphere. So, also, the more valuable and honourable the object of a science, the more valuable and honourable the science itself is in consequence. Again, that which would be judged, or which has been judged, a good thing, or a better thing than something else, by all or most people of understanding, or by the majority of men, or by the ablest, must be so; either without qualification, or in so far as they use their understanding to form their judgement. This is indeed a general principle, applicable to all other judgements also; not only the goodness of things, but their essence, magnitude, and general nature are in fact just what knowledge and understanding will declare them to be. Here the principle is applied to judgements of goodness, since one definition of 'good' was 'what beings that acquire understanding will choose in any given case': from which it clearly follows that that thing is better which understanding declares to be so. That, again, is a better thing which attaches to better men, either absolutely, or in virtue of their being better; as courage is better than strength. And

that is a greater good which would be chosen by a better man, either absolutely, or in virtue of his being better: for instance, to suffer wrong rather than to do wrong, for that would be the choice of the juster man. Again, the pleasanter of two things is the better, since all things pursue pleasure, and things instinctively desire pleasurable sensation for its own sake; and these are two of the characteristics by which the 'good' and the 'end' have been defined. One pleasure is greater than another if it is more unmixed with pain, or more lasting. Again, the nobler thing is better than the less noble, since the noble is either what is pleasant or what is desirable in itself. And those things also are greater goods which men desire more earnestly to bring about for themselves or for their friends, whereas those things which they least desire to bring about are greater evils. And those things which are more lasting are better than those which are more fleeting, and the more secure than the less; the enjoyment of the lasting has the advantage of being longer, and that of the secure has the advantage of suiting our wishes, being there for us whenever we like. Further, in accordance with the rule of co-ordinate terms and inflexions of the same stem, what is true of one such related word is true of all. Thus if the action qualified by the term 'brave' is more noble and desirable than the action qualified by the term 'temperate', then 'bravery' is more desirable than 'temperance' and 'being brave' than 'being temperate'. That, again, which is chosen by all is a greater good than that which is not, and that chosen by the majority than that chosen by the minority. For that which all desire is good, as we have said; and so, the more a thing is desired, the better it is. Further, that is the better thing which is considered so by competitors or enemies, or, again, by authorized judges

1365a13-15. 'ALL HORRORS ... (FAIR WOMEN TO SHAME)': These lines are from the Iliad IX. 592-594.

1365a16. EPICHRMUS: A Sicilian poet, Epicharmus wrote comedies during the first quarter of the fifth century.

or those whom they select to represent them. In the first two cases the decision is virtually that of every one, in the last two that of authorities and experts. And sometimes it may be argued that what all share is the better thing, since it is a dishonour not to share in it; at other times, that what none or few share is better, since it is rarer. The more praiseworthy things are, the nobler and therefore the better they are. So with the things that earn greater honours than others honour is, as it were, a measure of value; and the things whose absence involves comparatively heavy penalties; and the things that are better than others admitted or believed to be good. Moreover, things look better merely by being divided into their ; parts, since they then seem to

surpass a greater number of things than before. Hence Homer says that Meleager was roused to battle by the thought of

All horrors that light on a folk whose city is tan of their foes,⁰

When they slaughter the men, when the burg is wasted with ravening flame,^o

When strangers are haling young children to thralldom, fair women to shame. °

The same effect is produced by piling up facts in a climax after the manner of Epicharmus.⁰ The reason is partly the same as in the case of division (for combination too makes the impression of great superiority), and partly that the original thing appears to be the cause and origin of important results. And since a thing is better when it is harder or rarer than other things, its superiority may be due to seasons, ages, places, times, or one's natural powers. When a man ■ accomplishes something beyond his natural power, or beyond his years, or beyond the measure of people like him, or in a special way, or at a special place or time, his deed will have a high degree of nobleness, goodness, and justice, or of

1365a26. 'IN TIME PAST ... TO TEGEA TOWN': This is a quotation from Simonides.

1365a28. IPHICRATES: An Athenian general, Iphicrates (cAI5-c.3 5 3) was of unusually humble origins.

1365a29. 'I HAVE LEARNT FROM NONE BUT MYSELF': The line is from the Odyssey 22.347.

1365a31. PERICLES IN HIS FUNERAL ORATION: Pericles (c.495-429) was the leading Athenian statesman for the thirty years before his death. At the end of -431, the first year of the Peloponnesian War, he gave a speech commemorating the lives of fallen soldiers. A full version of the speech, which does not include the line that follows, appears in Thucydides' History.

their opposites. Hence the epigram on the victor at the Olympic games:

In time past, bearing a yoke on my shoulders, of wood unshaven,

I carried my loads of fish from Argos to Tegea town.°

So Iphicrates' used to extol himself by describing the low estate from which he had risen. Again, what is natural is better than what is acquired, since it is harder to come by. Hence the words of Homer:

I have learnt from none but myself. °

And the best part of a good thing is particularly good; as when Pericles in his funeral oration^o said that the country's loss of its young men in battle was 'as if the spring were taken out of the year'. So with those things which are of service when the need is pressing; for example, in old age and times of sickness. And of two things that which leads more directly to the end in view is the better. So too is that which is better for people generally as well as for a particular individual. Again, what can be got is better than what cannot, for it is good in a given case and the other thing is not. And what is at the end of life is better than what is not, since those things are ends in a greater degree which are nearer the end. What aims at reality is better than what aims at appearance. We may define what aims at appearance as what a man will not choose if nobody is to know of his having it. This would seem to show that to receive benefits is more desirable than to confer them, since a man will choose the former even if nobody is to know of it, but it is not the general view that he will choose the latter if nobody knows of it. What a man wants to be is better than what a man wants to seem, for in aiming at that he is aiming more at reality. Hence men say that justice is of small value,

-8-

In chapters 5 through 7, Aristotle appeals to ethical propositions for political deliberation. In this final chapters about deliberative rhetoric, he briefly looks to specifically political rather than ethical propositions. Since deliberative rhetoric is distinguished from the other kinds by its end of determining the useful, and since the useful is relative to something, political deliberation is about the things that are useful for preserving a given constitution. Therefore, the speakers must understand the four forms of constitution: democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy, and monarchy. Aristotle defines each, giving the characteristics useful for argument. The successful orator will take on the type of character allied to each constitutional form, in order to be in harmony with the audience.

since it is more desirable to seem just than to be just, whereas with health it is not so. That is better than other things which is more useful than they are for a number of different purposes; for example, that which promotes life, good life, pleasure, and noble conduct. For this reason wealth and health are commonly thought to be of the highest value, a possessing all these advantages. Again, that is better than other things which is accompanied both with less pain and with actual pleasure; for here there is more than one advantage; and so here we have the good of feeling pleasure and also the good of not feeling pain. And of two good things that is the better whose addition

to a third thing makes a better whole than the addition of the other to the same thing will make. Again, those things which we are seen to possess are better than those which we are not seen to possess, since the former have the air of reality. Hence wealth may be regarded as a greater good if its existence is known to others. That which is dearly prized is better than what is not-the sort of thing that some people have only one of, though others have more like it. Accordingly, blinding a one-eyed man inflicts worse injury than half-blinding a man with two eyes; for the one-eyed man has been robbed of what he dearly prized.

The grounds on which we must base our arguments, when ; we are speaking for or against a proposal, have now been set forth more or less completely.

8

THE MOST IMPORTANT AND effective qualification for success in persuading audiences and speaking well on public affairs is to understand all the forms of government and to discriminate their respective customs, institutions, and interests. For all men are persuaded by considerations of their ;

366a2-5. WE MUST ALSO NOTICE THE ENDS.... PROTECTION OF THE TYRAN'T: Both Aristotle's overall philosophy and the particular requirements of rhetoric demand that the orator think about the ends or purposes of each form of government. Most other classifications of kinds of governments use factors such as how many rule (for example, democracy versus oligarchy) or their different economic systems (capitalism versus communism). Whatever one thinks is the most revealing way to characterize a government, if the speaker is to be persuasive about means to an end he must be aware of the different ends of different kinds of government.

interest, and their interest lies in the maintenance of the established order. Further, it rests with the supreme authority to give authoritative decisions, and this varies with each form of government; there are as many different supreme authorities as there are different forms of government. The forms of government are four-democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy, monarchy. The supreme right to judge and decide always rests, therefore, with either a part or the whole of one or other of these governing powers.

A Democracy is a form of government under which the citizens distribute the offices of state among themselves by lot, whereas under oligarchy there is a property qualification, under aristocracy one of education. By education I mean that education which is laid down by the law; for it is those who have been loyal to the national institutions that hold office under an aristocracy. These are bound to be looked upon as 'the best men', and it is from this fact that this form of government has derived its name ('the rule of the best'). Monarchy, as the word implies, is the constitution in which one man has authority over all. There are two forms of monarchy : kingship, which is limited by prescribed conditions, and 'tyranny', which is not limited by anything.

We must also notice the ends which the various forms of government pursue, since people choose in practice such actions as will lead to the realization of their ends. The end of democracy is freedom; of oligarchy, wealth; of aristocracy, the maintenance of education and national institutions; of tyranny, the protection of the tyrant.^o It is clear, then, that we must distinguish those particular customs, institutions, and interests which tend to realize the ideal of each constitution, since men choose their means with reference to their ends. But rhetorical persuasion is effected not only by demonstrative but by ethical argument; it helps a speaker to convince us, if we believe that he has certain qualities himself, namely, 1366a8-12. RHETORICAL PERSUASION IS EFFECTED ... OR BOTH TOGETHER: As he did in 1.2 and will do again in 11.1, Aristotle shows that effective persuasion must be not only logical but ethical, persuading audiences because of the character (ethos) of the speaker. In II.1, he says that the persuasive speaker has to have three ethical qualities: virtue, practical wisdom, and goodwill. Different governments themselves have different characters, and the implication is that the effective speaker will share the same character as the government he is trying to persuade: appearing freedom-loving before a democratic audience, looking like his concern is for wealth in front of an oligarchic one, etc.

Chapter 9 turns from deliberation to epideictic rhetoric-the rhetoric of praise and blame. Virtue and vice, the noble and the shameful are the goals for praise and blame, and so Aristotle defines them. In addition, he relates epideictic to deliberative rhetoric and claims that, among the forms of argument common to the three kinds of rhetoric, Amplification is the best suited to epideixis, examples to deliberative rhetoric, and enthymemes to

judicial rhetoric. Display oratory is connected to deliberative rhetoric too because we need to know about virtue to know how to praise people., but also because chapter 5 deftnes happiness, “as prosperity, combined with virtue.” So we need to know the nature of virtue in order to make convincing deliberative speeches too.

1366a28-31. PRAISE, AGAIN, MAY BE SERIOUS ... LOWER ANIMALS: For this reason, later conceptions of rhetoric and literary criticism often connected ceremonial rhetoric to literary fiction.

goodness, or goodwill towards us, or both together.^o Similarly, we should know the moral qualities characteristic of each form of government, for the special moral character of each is bound to provide us with our most effective means of persuasion in dealing with it. We shall learn the qualities of governments in the same way as we learn the qualities of individuals, since they are revealed in their deliberate acts of choice; and these are determined by the end that inspires them.

We have now considered the objects, immediate or distant, at which we are to aim when urging any proposal, and the grounds on which we are to base our arguments in favour of its utility. We have also briefly considered the means and methods by which we shall gain a good knowledge of the moral qualities and institutions peculiar to the various forms of government-only, however, to the extent demanded by the present occasion; a detailed account of the subject has been given in the Politics.

9

WE HAVE NOW TO consider Virtue and Vice, the Noble and the Base, since these are the objects of praise and blame. In doing so, we shall at the same time be finding out how to make our hearers take the required view of our own characters-our second method of persuasion. The ways in which to make them trust the goodness of other people are also the ways in which to make them trust our own. Praise, again, may be serious or frivolous; nor is it always of a human or divine being but often of inanimate things, or of the humblest of the lower animal. Here too we must know on what grounds to argue, and must, therefore, now discuss the subject, though by way of illustration only.

The Noble is that which is both desirable for its own sake and also worthy of praise; or that which is both good and also pleasant because good. If this is a true definition of the Noble, it follows that virtue must be noble, since it is both a good thing and also praiseworthy. Virtue is, according to the usual view, a faculty of providing and preserving good things; or a faculty of conferring many great benefits, and benefits of all kinds on all occasions. The forms of Virtue are justice, courage, temperance, magnificence, magnanimity, liberality, gentleness, prudence, wisdom. If virtue is a faculty of beneficence, the highest kinds of it must be those which are most useful to others, and for this reason men honour most the just and the courageous, since courage is useful to others in war, justice both in war and in peace. Next comes liberality; liberal people let their money go instead of fighting for it, whereas other people care more for money than for anything else. Justice is the virtue through which everybody enjoys his own possessions in accordance with the law; its opposite is injustice, through which men enjoy the possessions of others in defiance of the law. Courage is the virtue that disposes men to do noble deeds in situations of danger, in accordance with the law and in obedience to its commands; cowardice is the opposite. Temperance is the virtue that disposes us to obey the law where physical pleasures are concerned; incontinence is the opposite. Liberality disposes us to spend money for others' good; illiberality is the opposite. Magnanimity is the virtue that disposes us to do good to others on a large scale; [its opposite is meanness of spirit]. Magnificence is a virtue productive of greatness in matters involving the spending of money. The opposites of these two are smallness of spirit and meanness respectively. Prudence is that virtue of the understanding which enables men to come to wise decisions about the relation to happiness of the goods and evils that have been previously mentioned.

The above is a sufficient account, for our present purpose, of virtue and vice in general, and of their various forms. As to

1367a7. ALCAEUS: Alcaeus is a speaker in a poem by Sappho, a poetess (c.612-c.580).

further aspects of the subject, it is not difficult to discern the facts; it is evident that things productive of virtue are noble, as tending towards virtue; and also the effects of virtue, that is, the signs of its presence and the acts to which it leads. And since the signs of virtue, and such acts as it is the mark of a virtuous man to do or have done to him, are noble, it follows that all deeds or signs of courage, and everything done courageously, must be noble things; and so with what is just and actions done justly. (Not, however, actions justly done to us; here justice is unlike the other virtues; 'justly' does not always mean

‘nobly’; when a man is punished, it is more shameful that this should be justly than unjustly done to him). The same is true of the other virtues. Again, those actions are noble for which the reward is simply honour, or honour more than money. So are those in which a man aims at something desirable for some one else’s sake; actions good absolutely, such as those a man does for his country without thinking of himself; actions good in their own nature; actions that are not good simply for the individual, since individual interests are selfish. Noble also are those actions whose advantage may be enjoyed after death, as opposed to those whose advantage is enjoyed during one’s lifetime: for the latter are more likely to be for one’s own sake only. Also, all actions done for the sake of others, since these less than other actions are done for one’s own sake; and all successes which benefit others and not oneself; and services done to one’s benefactors, for this is just; and good deeds generally, since they are not directed to one’s own profit. And the opposites of those things of which men feel ashamed, for men are ashamed of saying, doing, or intending to do shameful things. So when Alcaeus^o said

Something I fain would say to thee,

Only shame restraineth me,

Sappho wrote,

If for things good and noble thou wert yearning,

If to speak baseness were thy tongue not burning,

No load of shame would on thine eyelids weigh;

What thou with honour wishest thou wouldst say.

Those things, also, are noble for which men strive anxiously, without feeling fear; for they feel thus about the good things which lead to fair fame. Again, one quality or action is nobler than another if it is that of a naturally finer being: thus a man’s will be nobler than a woman’s. And those qualities are noble which give more pleasure to other people than to their possessors; hence the nobleness of justice and just actions. It is noble to avenge oneself on one’s enemies and not to come to terms with them; for requital is just, and the just is noble; and not to surrender is a sign of courage. Victory, too, and honour belong to the class of noble things, since they are desirable even when they yield no fruits, and they prove our superiority in good qualities. Things that deserve to be remembered are noble, and the more they deserve this, the nobler they are. So are the things that continue even after death; those which are always attended by honour; those which are exceptional; and those which are possessed by one person alone—these last are more readily remembered than others. So again are

possessions that bring no profit, since they are more fitting than others for a gentleman. So are the distinctive qualities of a particular people, and the symbols of what it specially admires, like long hair in Sparta, where this is a mark of a free man, as it is not easy to perform any menial task when one's hair is long. Again, it is noble not to practise any sordid craft, since it is the mark of a free man not to live at another's beck and call. We are also to assume, when we wish either to praise a man or blame him, that qualities closely allied to those which he actually has are identical with them; for instance, that the cautious man is cold-blooded and treacherous, and that the stupid man is an honest fellow or the thick-skinned man a good-tempered one. We can always idealize any given man by drawing on the virtues akin to his actual qualities; thus we may say that the passionate and excitable man is 'outspoken'; or that the arrogant man is 'superb' or 'impressive'. Those who run to extremes will be said to possess the corresponding good qualities; rashness will be called courage, and extravagance generosity. That will be what most people think; and at the same time this method enables an advocate to draw a misleading inference from the motive, arguing that if a man runs into danger needlessly, much more will he do so in a noble cause; and if a man is open-handed to any one and every one, he will be so to his friends also, since it is the extreme form of goodness to be good to everybody.

We must also take into account the nature of our particular audience when making a speech of praise; for, as Socrates used to say, it is not difficult to praise the Athenians to an Athenian audience. If the audience esteems a given quality, we must say that our hero has that quality, no matter whether we are addressing Scythians or Spartans or philosophers. Everything, in fact, that is esteemed we are to represent as noble. After all, people regard the two things as much the same.

All actions are noble that are appropriate to the man who does them: if, for instance, they are worthy of his ancestors or of his own past career. For it makes for happiness, and is a noble thing, that he should add to the honour he already has. Even inappropriate actions are noble if they are better and nobler than the appropriate ones would be; for instance, if one who was just an average person when all went well becomes a hero in adversity, or if he becomes better and easier to get on with the higher he rises. Compare the saying of Iphicrates, 'Think what I was and what I am'; and the epigram on the victor at the Olympic games,

In time past, bearing a yoke on my shoulders, of wood unshaven;
and the encomium of Simonides,

A woman whose father, whose husband, whose brethren were princes all.

Since we praise a man for what he has actually done, and fine actions are distinguished from others by being intentionally good, we must try to prove that our hero's noble acts are intentional. This is all the easier if we can make out that he has often acted so before, and therefore we must assert coincidences and accidents to have been intended. Produce a number of good actions, all of the same kind, and people will think that they must have been intended, and that they prove the good qualities of the man who did them.

Praise is the expression in words of the eminence of a man's good qualities, and therefore we must display his actions as the product of such qualities. Encomium refers to what he has actually done; the mention of accessories, such as good birth and education, merely helps to make our story credible—good fathers are likely to have good sons, and good training is likely to produce good character. Hence it is only when a man has already done something that we bestow encomiums upon him. Yet the actual deeds are evidence of the doer's character: even if a man has not actually done a given good thing, we shall bestow praise on him, if we are sure that he is the sort of man who would do it. To call any one blest is, it may be added, the same thing as to call him happy; but these are not the same thing as to bestow praise and encomium upon him; the two latter are a part of 'calling happy', just as goodness is a part of happiness.

1368a4-7. 'A MAN SHOULD BE PROUD ... ' [AND] 'SINCE HE IS PROUD ... ': These quotations are from Isocrates (436-338), who was, with Demosthenes, one of the two most famous Athenian orators. He also was an extremely influential theorist and rhetorical teacher.

1368a17. HIPPOLOCHUS... ALUSTOGEITON: We don't know who Hippolochus was. Harmodius and Aristogeiton killed the brother of a tyrant in 514 and so were praised by the democracy.

To praise a man is in one respect akin to urging a course of action. The suggestions which would be made in the latter case become encomiums when differently expressed. When we know what action or character is required, then, in order to express these facts as suggestions for action, we have to change and reverse our form of words. Thus the statement 'A man should be proud not of what he owes to fortune but of what he owes to himself', if put like this, amounts to a suggestion ; to make it into praise we must put it thus, 'Since he is proud not of what he owes to fortune but of what he owes to himself.'^o Consequently, whenever you want to praise any one, think what you would urge people to do; and when you want to urge

the doing of anything, think what you would praise a man for having done. Since suggestion may or may not forbid an action, the praise into which we convert it must have one or other of two opposite forms of expression accordingly.

There are, also, many useful ways of heightening the effect of praise. We must, for instance, point out that a man is the only one, or the first, or almost the only one who has done something, or that he has done it better than any one else; all these distinctions are honourable. And we must, further, make much of the particular season and occasion of an action, arguing that we could hardly have looked for it just then. If a man has often achieved the same success, we must mention this; that is a strong point; he himself, and not luck, will then be given the credit. So, too, if it is on his account that observances have been devised and instituted to encourage or honour such achievements as his own: thus we may praise Hippolochus because the first encomium ever made was for him, or Harmodius and Aristogeiton' because their statues were the first to be put up in the market-place. And we may censure bad men for the opposite reason.

Again, if you cannot find enough to say of a man himself, you may pit him against others, which is what Isocrates used **1368a26. LINES OF ARGUMENT:** This phrase translates *koinos* ("the common"), where "common" is an adjective without a noun specified. These common lines of argument are often translated as "commonplaces" or simply as "topics." Aristotle asserts the following correlation: The line of argument most suited to declamations is maximizing and minimizing, since the facts are given but the speaker has to demonstrate that the person was noble. **1368a30. XAMPLES' ARE MOST SUITABLE ... IT DID HAPPEN:** Aristotle earlier (L2.1356a34-1356b27) tells us that rhetorical proofs were divided into example and enthymeme. Now he says that there are three common devices or modes of demonstration: amplification, example, and enthymeme.

Starting with this chapter, the rest of book I concerns judicial rhetoric. To find the premises for accusation and defense, the speaker must know three things: the motives that make men commit injustice, the state of mind of wrongdoers, and the conditions of the victims of injustice. The causes of injustice are the subject of chapters 10 and 11; the conditions of perpetrators and victims are the subject of chapter 12. Aristotle begins this chapters by defending injustice, which is harmful voluntary illegal action.

Harm itself is treated in chapter 14, in the discussion of aggravating circumstances. Here Aristotle first discusses the illegal, and then the voluntary and the circumstances under which people are and are not responsible. All voluntary actions seem pleasant, and useful to the agent. Since the useful is discussed in chapters 6 and 7, Aristotle will turn next, in chapters 11, to the nature of pleasure.

to do owing to his want of familiarity with forensic pleading. The comparison should be with famous men; that will strengthen your case; it is a noble thing to surpass men who are themselves great. It is only natural that methods of 'heightening the effect' should be attached particularly to speeches of praise; they aim at proving superiority over others, and any such superiority is a form of nobleness. Hence if you cannot compare your hero with famous men, you should at least compare him with other people generally, since any superiority is held to reveal excellence. And, in general, of the lines of argument which are common to all speeches, this 'heightening of effect' is most suitable for declamations, where we take our hero's actions as admitted facts, and our business is simply to invest these with dignity and nobility. Examples' are most suitable to deliberative speeches; for we judge of future events by divination from past events. Enthymemes are most suitable to forensic speeches; it is our doubts about past events that most admit of arguments showing why a thing must have happened or proving that it did happen.0

The above are the general lines on which all, or nearly all, speeches of praise or blame are constructed. We have seen the sort of thing we must bear in mind in making such speeches, and the materials out of which encomiums and censures are made. No special treatment of censure and vituperation is needed. Knowing the above facts, we know their contraries; and it is out of these that speeches of censure are made.

10

WE HAVE NEXT TO treat of Accusation and Defence, and to enumerate and describe the ingredients of the syllogisms used therein. There are three things we must ascertain—first, the nature and number of the incentives to wrongdoing; second,

1368b7. GENERAL LAW, ALL THOSE UNWRITTEN PRINCIPLES ... EVERYV4'HERE: Later thinkers will transform this idea into the idea

of “natural law.” But Aristotle doesn’t say that this general law takes precedence over the written laws of particular communities, as natural law does. Chapter 13 will return to questions about the relation between the two.

1368b16. THE MEAN MAN ... THE COWARD: Such men are examples of vices.

the state of mind of wrongdoers; third, the kind of persons who are wronged, and their condition. We will deal with these questions in order. But before that let us define the act of ‘wrong-doing’.

We may describe ‘wrong-doing’ as injury voluntarily inflicted contrary to law. ‘Law’ is either special or general. By special law I mean that written law which regulates the life of a particular community; by general law, all those unwritten principles which are supposed to be acknowledged everywhere°. We do things ‘voluntarily’ when we do them consciously and without constraint. (Not all voluntary acts are deliberate, but all deliberate acts are conscious-no one is ignorant of what he deliberately intends.) The causes of our deliberately intending harmful and wicked acts contrary to law are (1) vice, (2) lack of self-control. For the wrongs a man does to others will correspond to the bad quality or qualities that he himself possesses. Thus it is the mean man who will wrong others about money, the profligate in matters of physical pleasure, the effeminate in matters of comfort, and the coward° where danger is concerned-his terror makes him abandon those who are involved in the same danger. The ambitious man does wrong for the sake of honour, the quick-tempered from anger, the lover of victory for the sake of victory, the embittered man for the sake of revenge, the stupid man because he has misguided notions of right and wrong, the shameless man because he does not mind what people think of him; and so with the rest-any wrong that any one does to others corresponds to his particular faults of character.

However, this subject has already been cleared up in part in our discussion of the virtues and will be further explained later when we treat of the emotions. We have now to consider the motives and states of mind of wrongdoers, and to whom they do wrong.

Let us first decide what sort of things people are trying to get or avoid when they set about doing wrong to others. For it is plain that the prosecutor must consider, out of all the aims that can ever induce us to do wrong to our neighbours, how many, and which, affect his adversary; while the defendant must consider how many, and which, do not affect him. Now every action of every person either is or is not due to that person himself. Of those not due to himself some are due

to chance, the others to necessity; of these latter, again, some are due to compulsion, the others to nature. Consequently all actions that are not due to a man himself are due either to chance or to nature or to compulsion. All actions that are due to a man himself and caused by himself are due either to habit or to rational or irrational craving. Rational craving is a craving for good, i.e. a wish-nobody wishes for anything unless he thinks it good. Irrational craving is twofold, viz. anger and appetite.

Thus every action must be due to one or other of seven causes: chance, nature, compulsion, habit, reasoning, anger, or appetite. It is superfluous further to distinguish actions according to the doers' ages, moral states, or the like; it is of course true that, for instance, young men do have hot tempers and strong appetites; still, it is not through youth that they act accordingly, but through anger or appetite. Nor, again, is action due to wealth or poverty; it is of course true that poor men, being short of money, do have an appetite for it, and that rich men, being able to command needless pleasures, do have an appetite for such pleasures: but here, again, their actions will be due not to wealth or poverty but to appetite. Similarly, with just men, and unjust men, and all others who are said to act in accordance with their moral qualities, their actions will really be due to one of the causes mentioned-either reasoning or emotion: due, indeed, sometimes to good dispositions and good emotions, and sometimes

1369a18. DUE TO ONE OF THE CAUSES ... SOMETIMES TO BAD: "Dispositions" here translates *ethos* ("character"), so Aristotle here is distinguishing the three sources of proof: *logos* ("reasoning"), *pathos* ("emotion"), and character. Character is connected to habit, a settled disposition, as he will show later in the chapter. But in this passage *ethos*, *logos*, and *pathos* appear not as the three sources of proof but as three internal causes of action.

1369a30. THIS SHALL BE DEALT WITH LATER: Book II, chapters 12-17, will talk about the different ages of men and differences in wealth and status, and how these influence people's behavior, especially how they are persuaded.

1369a32. THINGS THAT HAPPEN BY CHANCE ... : Earlier in the chapter Aristotle says that there are seven causes of actions. Starting here with chance, he analyzes each.

to bad;⁰ but that good qualities should be followed by good emotions, and bad by bad, is merely an accessory fact- it is no doubt true that the temperate man, for instance, because he is temperate, is always and at once attended by healthy opinions and appetites in regard to pleasant things, and the intemperate man by unhealthy ones. So we

must ignore such distinctions. Still we must consider what kinds of actions and of people usually go together; for while there are no definite kinds of action associated with the fact that a man is fair or dark, tall or short, it does make a difference if he is young or old, just or unjust. And, generally speaking, all those accessory qualities that cause distinctions of human character are important: e.g. the sense of wealth or poverty, of being lucky or unlucky. This shall be dealt with later -let us now deal first with the rest of the subject before us.

The things that happen by chance^o are all those whose cause cannot be determined, that have no purpose, and that happen neither always nor usually nor in any fixed way. The definition of chance shows just what they are. Those things happen by nature which have a fixed and internal cause; they take place uniformly, either always or usually. There is no need to discuss in exact detail the things that happen contrary to nature, nor to ask whether they happen in some sense naturally or from some other cause; it would seem that chance is at least partly the cause of such events. Those things happen through compulsion which take place contrary to the desire or reason of the doer, yet through his own agency. Acts are done from habit which men do because they have often done them before. Actions are due to reasoning when, in view of any of the goods already mentioned, they appear useful either as ends or as means to an end, and are performed for that reason: 'for that reason,' since even licentious persons perform a certain number of useful actions, but because they are pleasant and not because they are useful. To passion and

-11-

The chapters begins with a definition of pleasure,. In order to supply propositions, about pleasure., Aristotle shows its connections to other mental conditions, especially desire and imagination. The rest of the chapters then discusses what things are pleasant.

1369b33. PLEASURE IS A MOVEMENT... PAIN IS THE OPPOSITE: Readers of the Rhetoric often have to decide for themselves when Aristotle is saying what he really thinks and when he is presenting the common beliefs of people who need to be persuaded. This statement is a perfect example. Is this a scientific definition of pleasure or a statement of common opinion about it? Which of those understandings of pleasure does the speaker need in order to be persuasive ? The case is difficult. The definitions of the different emotions in book II have to be true for the orator's manipulation of

audiences to work—that is, he must actually know what the emotions are in order to use them. But the list of seven causes of action in chapter 10 seems a loose and unscientific classification, because any more precision would not help the orator. The same holds for the distinction of rational and irrational desires later in this paragraph. It is hard to see this definition of pleasure as either true or helpful.

anger are due all acts of revenge. Revenge and punishment are different things. Punishment is inflicted for the sake of the person punished; revenge for that of the punisher, to satisfy his feelings. (What anger is will be made clear when we come to discuss the emotions.) Appetite is the cause of all actions that appear pleasant. Habit, whether acquired by mere familiarity or by effort, belongs to the class of pleasant things, for there are many actions not naturally pleasant which men perform with pleasure, once they have become used to them. To sum up then, all actions due to ourselves either are or seem to be either good or pleasant. Moreover, as all actions due to ourselves are done voluntarily and actions not due to ourselves are done involuntarily, it follows that all voluntary actions must either be or seem to be either good or pleasant; for I reckon among goods escape from evils or apparent evils and the exchange of a greater evil for a less (since these things are in a sense positively desirable), and likewise I count among pleasures escape from painful or apparently painful things and the exchange of a greater pain for a less. We must ascertain, then, the number and nature of the things that are useful and pleasant. The useful has been previously examined in connexion with political oratory; let us now proceed to examine the pleasant. Our various definitions must be regarded as adequate, even if they are not exact, provided they are clear.

11

WE MAY LAY IT down that Pleasure is a movement, a movement by which the soul as a whole is consciously brought into its normal state of being; and that Pain is the opposite.^o If this is what pleasure is, it is clear that the pleasant is what tends to produce this condition, while that which tends to destroy it, or to cause the soul to be brought into the opposite state, is

1370all. 'ALL THAT IS DONE ON COMPULSION IS BITTERNESS UNTO THE SOUL': We think Aristotle is quoting Evenus of Paros, a rhetorician and poet mentioned disparagingly in Plato's *Phaedrus* and

Apology.

painful. It must therefore be pleasant as a rule to move towards a natural state of being, particularly when a natural process has achieved the complete recovery of that natural state. Habits also are pleasant; for as soon as a thing has become habitual, it is virtually natural; habit is a thing not unlike nature; what happens often is akin to what happens always, natural events happening always, habitual events often. Again, that is pleasant which is not forced on us; for force is unnatural, and that is why what is compulsory is painful, and it has been rightly said,

All that is done on compulsion is bitterness unto the soul.° 0

So all acts of concentration, strong effort, and strain are necessarily painful; they all involve compulsion and force, unless we are accustomed to them, in which case it is custom that makes them pleasant. The opposites to these are pleasant ; and hence ease, freedom from toil, relaxation, amusement, rest, and sleep belong to the class of pleasant things; for these are all free from any element of compulsion. Everything, too, is pleasant for which we have the desire within us, since desire is the craving for pleasure. Of the desires some are irrational, some associated with reason. By irrational I mean those which do not arise from any opinion held by the mind. Of this kind are those known as 'natural'; for instance, those originating in the body, such as the desire for nourishment, namely hunger and thirst, and a separate kind of desire answering to each kind of nourishment; and the desires connected with taste and sex and sensations of touch in general; and those of smell, hearing, and vision. Rational desires are those which we are induced to have; there are many things we desire to see or get because we have been told of them and induced to believe them good. Further, pleasure is the consciousness through the senses of a

1370b4. 'SWEET 'TIS WHEN RESCUED TO REMEMBER PAIN': The line comes from Euripides' *Andromeda*, a play that has been lost.

1370b5. 'EVEN HIS GRIEFS ARE A JOY ... AND ENDURED': This line is from the *Odyssey* 15.400-401.

1370b12. 'SWEETER IT IS ... WITH SWEETNESS': Here Aristotle quotes the *Iliad* XVIII.109.

certain kind of emotion; but imagination is a feeble sort of sensation, and there will always be in the mind of a man who remembers or expects something an image or picture of what he remembers or expects. If this is so, it is clear that memory and expectation also, being accompanied by sensation, may be accompanied by pleasure. It

follows that anything pleasant is either present and perceived, past and remembered, or future and expected, since we perceive present pleasures, remember past ones, and expect future ones. Now the things that are pleasant to remember are not only those that, when actually perceived as present, were pleasant, but also some things that were not, provided that their results have subsequently proved noble and good. Hence the words

Sweet'tis when rescued to remember pain,⁰

and

Even his griefs are a joy long after to one that remembers All that he wrought and endured.⁰

The reason of this is that it is pleasant even to be merely free from evil. The things it is pleasant to expect are those that when present are felt to afford us either great delight or great but not painful benefit. And in general, all the things that delight us when they are present also do so, as a rule, when we merely remember or expect them. Hence even being angry is pleasant—Homer said of wrath that

Sweeter it is by far than the honeycomb dripping with sweetness-°

for no one grows angry with a person on whom there is no prospect of taking vengeance, and we feel comparatively little anger, or none at all, with those who are much our superiors

1370b28. 'HE SPAKE ... LOVE OF LAMENT': This line is used in both the Iliad XXIII.108 and the Odyssey 4.183.

in power. Some pleasant feeling is associated with most of our appetites; we are enjoying either the memory of a past pleasure or the expectation of a future one, just as persons down with fever, during their attacks of thirst, enjoy remembering the drinks they have had and looking forward to having more. So also a lover enjoys talking or writing about his loved one, or doing any little thing connected with him; all these things recall him to memory and make him actually present to the eye of imagination. Indeed, it is always the first sign of love, that besides enjoying some one's presence, we remember him when he is gone, and feel pain as well as pleasure, because he is there no longer. Similarly there is an element of pleasure even in mourning and lamentation for the departed. There is grief, indeed, at his loss, but pleasure in remembering him and as it were seeing him before us in his deeds and in his life. We can well believe the poet when he says

He spake, and in each man's heart he awakened the love of lament. ⁰

Revenge, too, is pleasant; it is pleasant to get anything that it is painful to fail to get, and angry people suffer extreme pain when they

fail to get their revenge; but they enjoy the prospect of getting it. Victory also is pleasant, and not merely to 'bad losers', but to every one; the winner sees himself in the light of a champion, and everybody has a more or less keen appetite for being that. The pleasantness of victory implies of course that combative sports and intellectual contests are pleasant (since in these it often happens that some one wins) and also games like knucklebones, ball, dice, and draughts. And similarly with the serious sports; some of these become pleasant when one is accustomed to them; while others are pleasant from the first, like hunting with hounds, or indeed any kind of hunting. For where there is competition, there is

1371a27. 'CHANGE IS IN ALL THINGS SWEET': Aristotle is quoting Euripides' Orestes.

victory. That is why forensic pleading and debating contests are pleasant to those who are accustomed to them and have the capacity for them. Honour and good repute are among the most pleasant things of all; they make a man see himself in the character of a fine fellow, especially when he is credited with it by people whom he thinks good judges. His neighbours are better judges than people at a distance; his associates and fellow-countrymen better than strangers; his contemporaries better than posterity; sensible persons better than foolish ones; a large number of people better than a small number: those of the former class, in each case, are the more likely to be good judges of him. Honour and credit bestowed by those whom you think much inferior to yourself-e.g. children or animals-you do not value: not for its own sake, anyhow: if you do value it, it is for some other reason. Friends belong to the class of pleasant things; it is pleasant to love-if you love wine, you certainly find it delightful: and it is pleasant to be loved, for this too makes a man see himself as the possessor of goodness, a thing that every being that has a feeling for it desires to possess: to be loved means to be valued for one's own personal qualities. To be admired is also pleasant, simply because of the honour implied. Flattery and flatterers are pleasant: the flatterer is a man who, you believe, admires and likes you. To do the same thing often is pleasant, since, as we saw, anything habitual is pleasant. And to change is also pleasant: change means an approach to nature, whereas invariable repetition of anything causes the excessive prolongation of a settled condition: therefore, says the poet,

Change is in all things sweet.°

That is why what comes to us only at long intervals is pleasant, whether it be a person or a thing; for it is a change

1371b20. SINCE EVERY MAN ... FOND OF OURSELVES: Aristotle does

not view all self-love -being “fond of oneself” in our translation; the Greek is *philiautos*, “self-love or self friendship”-as bad. In the *Ethics*, he distinguishes between the kind of self-love that is the basis for all love of other people from a kind a self-love that is vicious and, we would say, “selfish.” from what we had before, and, besides, what comes only at long intervals has the value of rarity. Learning things and wondering at things are also pleasant as a rule; wondering implies the desire of learning, so that the object of wonder is an object of desire; while in learning one is brought into one’s natural condition. Conferring and receiving benefits belong to the class of pleasant things; to receive a benefit is to get what one desires; to confer a benefit implies both possession and superiority, both of which are things we try to attain. It is because beneficent acts are pleasant that people find it pleasant to put their neighbours straight again and to supply what they lack. Again, since learning and wondering are pleasant, it follows that such things as acts of imitation must be pleasant-for instance, painting, sculpture, poetry-and every product of skilful imitation; this latter, even if the object imitated is not itself pleasant; for it is not the object itself which here gives delight; the spectator draws inferences (“That is a so-and-so”) and thus learns something fresh. Dramatic turns of fortune and hairbreadth escapes from perils are pleasant, because we feel all such things are wonderful.

And since what is natural is pleasant, and things akin to each other seem natural to each other, therefore all kindred and similar things are usually pleasant to each other; for instance, one man, horse, or young person is pleasant to another man, horse, or young person. Hence the proverbs ‘mate delights mate’, ‘like to like’, ‘beast knows beast’, ‘jackdaw to jackdaw’, and the rest of them. But since everything like and akin to oneself is pleasant, and since every man is himself more like and akin to himself than any one else is, it follows that all of us must be more or less fond of ourselves.^o For all this resemblance and kinship is present particularly in the relation of an individual to himself. And because we are all fond of ourselves, it follows that what is our own is pleasant to

1371b32. ‘TO THAT HE BENDS HIMSELF ... BEST PART OF HIMSELF’: The poet quoted is Euripides, from *Antiope*, another play that has been lost.

1372a1. WE HAVE DISCUSSED THE LUDICROUS: The *Poetics* is thought to have had a second book that treated comedy. Fragments of this book are all that we have.

At the beginning of chapter 10 Aristotle said that accusation and defense had to consider the causes of injustice and the conditions and dispositions of wrongdoers and their victims. This latter is the subject of chapter 12. Wrongdoers do what they think is Possible, and so Aristotle supplies propositions for arguing about the possible,. He distinguishes wrongdoing from outrage (hubris), and then turns to the conditions and nature of those who are injured and harmed.

all of us, as for instance our own deeds and words. That is why we are usually fond of our flatterers, [our lovers,] and honour; also of our children, for our children are our own work. It is also pleasant to complete what is defective, for the whole : thing thereupon becomes our own work. And since power over others is very pleasant, it is pleasant to be thought wise, for practical wisdom secures us power over others. (Scientific wisdom is also pleasant, because it is the knowledge of many wonderful things.) Again, since most of us are ambitious, it must be pleasant to disparage our neighbours as well as to have power over them. It is pleasant for a man to spend his ; time over what he feels he can do best; just as the poet says,

To that he bends himself, To that each day allots most time, wherein
He is indeed the best part of himself.°

Similarly, since amusement and every kind of relaxation and laughter too belong to the class of pleasant things, it follows that ludicrous things are pleasant, whether men, words, or deeds. We have discussed the ludicrous° separately in the J treatise on the Art of Poetry.

So much for the subject of pleasant things: by considering their opposites we can easily see what things are unpleasant.

12

THE ABOVE ARE THE motives that make men do wrong to others; we are next to consider the states of mind in which they do it, and the persons to whom they do it. 5

They must themselves suppose that the thing can be done, and done by them: either that they can do it without being found out, or that if they are found out they can escape being punished, or that if they are punished the disadvantage will be less than the gain for themselves or

those they care for. The general subject of apparent possibility and impossibility will be handled later on, since it is relevant not only to forensic but to all kinds of speaking. But it may here be said that people think that they can themselves most easily do wrong to others without being punished for it if they possess eloquence, or practical ability, or much legal experience, or a large body of friends, or a great deal of money. Their confidence is greatest if they personally possess the advantages mentioned: but even without them they are satisfied if they have friends or supporters or partners who do possess them: they can thus both commit their crimes and escape being found out and punished for committing them. They are also safe, they think, if they are on good terms with their victims or with the judges who try them. Their victims will in that case not be on their guard against being wronged, and will make some arrangement with them instead of prosecuting; while their judges will favour them because they like them, either letting them off altogether or imposing light sentences. They are not likely to be found out if their appearance contradicts the charges that might be brought against them: for instance, a weakling is unlikely to be charged with violent assault, or a poor and ugly man with adultery. Public and open injuries are the easiest to do, because nobody could at all suppose them possible, and therefore no precautions are taken. The same is true of crimes so great and terrible that no man living could be suspected of them: here too no precautions are taken. For all men guard against ordinary offences, just as they guard against ordinary diseases; but no one takes precautions against a disease that nobody has ever had. You feel safe, too, if you have either no enemies or a great many; if you have none, you expect not to be watched and therefore not to be detected; if you have a great many, you will be watched, and therefore people will think you can never risk an attempt on them, and

1372b5. ZENO: We have no idea who or what Aristotle is referring to.

you can defend your innocence by pointing out that you could never have taken such a risk. You may also trust to hide your crime by the way you do it or the place you do it in, or by some convenient means of disposal.

You may feel that even if you are found out you can stave off a trial, or have it postponed, or corrupt your judges: or that even if you are sentenced you can avoid paying damages, or can at least postpone doing so for a long time: or that you are so badly off that you will have nothing to lose. You may feel that the gain to be got by wrongdoing is great or certain or immediate, and that the penalty is small or uncertain or distant. It may be that the advantage to be gained is greater than any possible retribution: as in the case of despotic power,

according to the popular view. You may consider your crimes as bringing you solid profit, while their punishment is nothing more than being called bad names. Or the opposite argument may appeal to you: your crimes may bring you some credit (thus you may, incidentally, be avenging your father or [mother, like Zeno^o), whereas the punishment may amount to a fine, or banishment; or something of that sort. People may be led on to wrong others by either of these motives or feelings ; but no man by both-they will affect people of quite opposite characters. You may be encouraged by having often escaped detection or punishment already; or by having often tried and failed; for in crime, as in war, there are men whom will always refuse to give up the struggle. You may get your pleasure on the spot and the pain later, or the gain on the spot and the loss later. That is what appeals to weak-willed persons-and weakness of will may be shown with regard to all the objects of desire. It may on the contrary appeal to you as it does appeal to self-controlled and sensible people-that the pain and loss are immediate, while the pleasure and profit come later and last longer. You may feel able to make it appear that your crime was due to chance, or to necessity, or to

1372b32. 'MYSIAN PREY': The Mysians were thought to be easy prey, easy to defeat. There is controversy over why: either because their king was absent, or because they were an innately cowardly people.

natural causes, or to habit: in fact, to put it generally, as if you had failed to do right rather than actually done wrong. You may be able to trust other people to judge you equitably. You may be stimulated by being in want: which may mean that you want necessities, as poor people do, or that you want luxuries, as rich people do. You may be encouraged by having a particularly good reputation, because that will save you from being suspected: or by having a particularly bad one, because nothing you are likely to do will make it worse.

The above, then, are the various states of mind in which a man sets about doing wrong to others. The kind of people to whom he does wrong, and the ways in which he does it, must be considered next. The people to whom he does it are those who have what he wants himself, whether this means necessities or luxuries and materials for enjoyment. His victims may be far off or near at hand. If they are near, he gets his profit quickly; if they are far off, vengeance is slow, as those think who plunder the Carthaginians. They may be those who are trustful instead of being cautious and watchful, since all such people are easy to elude. Or those who are too easy-going to have enough energy to prosecute an offender. Or sensitive people, who are not apt to show fight over questions of money. Or those who have been wronged already by many people, and yet have not prosecuted;

such men must surely be the proverbial 'Mysian prey'.^o Or those who have either never or often been wronged before; in neither case will they take precautions; if they have never been wronged they think they never will, and if they have often been wronged they feel that surely it cannot happen again. Or those whose character has been attacked in the past, or is exposed to attack in the future: they will be too much frightened of the judges to make up their minds to prosecute, nor can they win their case if they do: this is true of those who are hated or unpopular. Another likely class of victim is those who their injurer

1373a23. 'COTTABUS' PRIZE: Cottabus was a game people played during drinking parties.

can pretend have, themselves or through their ancestors or friends, treated badly, or intended to treat badly, the man himself, or his ancestors, or those he cares for; as the proverb says, 'wickedness needs but a pretext'. A man may wrong his enemies, because that is pleasant: he may equally wrong his friends, because that is easy. Then there are those who have no friends, and those who lack eloquence and practical capacity ; these will either not attempt to prosecute, or they will come to terms, or failing that they will lose their case. There are those whom it does not pay to waste time in waiting for trial or damages, such as foreigners and small farmers; they will settle for a trifle, and always be ready to leave off. Also those who have themselves wronged others, either often, or in the same way as they are now being wronged themselves-for it is felt that next to no wrong is done to people when it is the same wrong as they have often themselves done to others: if, for instance, you assault a man who has been accustomed to behave with violence to others. So too with those who have done wrong to others, or have meant to, or mean to, or are likely to do so; there is something fine and pleasant in wronging such persons, it seems as though almost no wrong were done. Also those by doing wrong to whom we shall be gratifying our friends, or those we admire or love, or our masters, or in general the people by reference to whom we mould our lives. Also those whom we may wrong and yet be sure of equitable treatment. Also those against whom we have had any grievance, or any previous differences with them, as Callippus had when he behaved as he did to Dion: here too it seems as if almost no wrong were being done. Also those who are on the point of being wronged by others if we fail to wrong them ourselves, since here we feel we have no time left for thinking the matter over. So Aenesidemus is said to have sent the cottabus' prize^o to Gelon, who had just reduced a town to slavery, because Gelon had got there first and fore-

Chapters 13 and 14 are devoted to an analysis of guilt and the role of individual judgment in determining it. Since unjust acts are illegal, Aristotle distinguishes two kinds of law, particular and common. Particular laws can be written or unwritten, but the common law is always unwritten. Illegal actions can be directed at an individual or the community. In the rest of this chapter, Aristotle discusses the way unwritten law can excuse an injustice through forgiveness, and so concludes with propositions for arguing about fairness. Because the first part of the discussion of guilt concerns equity, Aristotle is able to connect justice in the judge and justice in the agent.

1373b6. PARTLY UNWRITTEN: There are two kinds of unwritten law. The first applies to actions that we would say go beyond the law or beyond the call of duty, but for Aristotle they don't go beyond law but are right according to unwritten law. Acts of generosity, mercy, and charity might be modern examples. The second kind of unwritten law is equity, which is the subject of the rest of the chapter.

stalled his own attempt. Also those by wronging whom we shall be able to do many righteous acts; for we feel that we can then easily cure the harm done. Thus Jason the Thessalian said that it is a duty to do some unjust acts in order to be able to do many just ones.

Among the kinds of wrong done to others are those that are done universally, or at least commonly: one expects to be forgiven for doing these. Also those that can easily be kept dark, as where things that can rapidly be consumed like eatables are concerned, or things that can easily be changed in shape, colour, or combination, or things that can easily be stowed away almost anywhere -portable objects that you can stow away in small corners, or things so like others of which you have plenty already that nobody can tell the difference. There are also wrongs of a kind that shame prevents the victim speaking about, such as outrages done to the women in his household or to himself or to his sons. Also those for which you would be thought very litigious to prosecute any one—trifling wrongs, or wrongs for which people are usually excused.

The above is a fairly complete account of the circumstances under which men do wrong to others, of the sort of wrongs they do, of the sort of persons to whom they do them, and of their reasons for doing them.

IT WILL NOW BE well to make a complete classification of just and unjust actions. We may begin by observing that they have been defined relatively to two kinds of law, and also relatively to two classes of persons. By the two kinds of law I mean particular law and universal law. Particular law is that which each community lays down and applies to its own members: this is partly written and partly unwritten.^o Universal law is the law of

1373b12. 'NOT OF TO-DAY ... DATE ITS BIRTH': The lines are from Sophocles' *Antigone* 456-45 i .

1373b14. EMPEDOCLES: Empedocles (c.493-c.433) was a materialist philosopher from Sicily and the author of two long philosophical poems.

1373b18. ALCIDAMAS: Alcidamas was a fourth-century orator and sophist. Some lines have dropped out here.

nature. For there really is, as every one to some extent divines, a natural justice and injustice that is binding on all men, even on those who have no association or covenant with each other. It is this that Sophocles' *Antigone* clearly means when she says that the burial of Polyneices was a just act in spite of the prohibition: she means that it was just by nature.

Not of to-day or yesterday it is, But lives eternal: none can date its birth.^o

And so Empedocles,^o when he bid us kill no living creature, says that doing this is not just for some people while unjust for others,

Nay, but, an all-embracing law, through the realms of the sky Unbroken it stretcheth, and over the earth's immensity.

And as Alcidamas' says in his *Messeniac Oration*....

The actions that we ought to do or not to do have also been divided into two classes as affecting either the whole community or some one of its members. From this point of view we can perform just or unjust acts in either of two ways-towards one definite person, or towards the community. The man who is guilty of adultery or assault is doing wrong to some definite person; the man who avoids service in the army is doing wrong to the community.

Thus the whole class of unjust actions may be divided into two classes, those affecting the community, and those affecting one or more other persons. We will next, before going further, remind ourselves of what 'being wronged' means. Since it has already been

settled that 'doing a wrong' must be intentional, 'being wronged' must consist in having an injury done to you by some one who intends to do it. In order to be wronged, a man must (1) suffer actual harm, (2) suffer it against his will. The various possible forms of harm are clearly explained by our previous separate discussion of goods and evils. We have also seen that a voluntary action is one where the doer knows what he is doing. We now see that every accusation must be of an action affecting either the community or some individual. The doer of the action must either understand and intend the action, or not understand and intend it. In the former case, he must be acting either from deliberate choice or from passion. (Anger will be discussed when we speak of the passions; the motives for crime and the state of mind of the criminal have already been discussed.) Now it often happens that a man will admit an act, but will not admit the prosecutor's label for the act nor the facts which that label implies. He will admit that he took a thing but not that he 'stole' it; that he struck some one first, but not that he committed 'outrage'; that he had intercourse with a woman, but not that he committed 'adultery'; that he is guilty of theft, but not that he is guilty of 'sacrilege', the object stolen not being consecrated; that he has encroached, but not that he has 'encroached on State lands'; that he has been in communication with the enemy, but not that he has been guilty of 'treason'. Here therefore we must be able to distinguish what is theft, outrage, or adultery, from what is not, if we are to be able to make the justice of our case clear, no matter whether our aim is to establish a man's guilt or to establish his innocence. Wherever such charges are brought against a man, the question is whether he is or is not guilty of a criminal offence. It is deliberate purpose that constitutes wickedness and criminal guilt, and such names as 'outrage' or 'theft' imply deliberate purpose as well as the mere action. A blow does not always amount to 'outrage', but only if it is struck with some such purpose as to insult the man struck or gratify the striker himself. Nor does taking a thing without the owner's knowledge always amount to 'theft', but only if it is taken with the

1374a26. THIS IS WHAT WE CALL EQUITY; ... BEYOND THE WRITTEN LAW: This is not the same kind of unwritten law that Aristotle mentions in chapter 10, since there is no reason to think that equity—nor, for that matter, the first kind of unwritten law in this chapter—would be the same everywhere, like the general law of chapter 10. For a contemporary example of the kind of thing Aristotle has in mind, we now have laws that mandate an increased penalty for using a gun in a crime. Someone uses a gun as collateral in buying drugs. Does that count as "using a gun" for the purposes of increasing the severity of his sentence? Equity as Aristotle sees it always punishes less, never more, than the written law itself would demand.

intention of keeping it and injuring the owner. And as with these charges, so with all the others.

We saw that there are two kinds of right and wrong conduct towards others, one provided for by written ordinances, the other by unwritten. We have now discussed the kind about which the laws have something to say. The other kind has itself two varieties. First, there is the conduct that springs from exceptional goodness or badness, and is visited accordingly with censure and loss of honour, or with praise and increase of honour and decorations: for instance, gratitude to, or requital of, our benefactors, readiness to help our friends, and the like. The second kind makes up for the defects of a community's written code of law. This is what we call equity; people regard it as just; it is, in fact, the sort of justice which goes beyond the written law.^o Its existence partly is and partly is not intended by legislators; not intended, where they have noticed no defect in the law; intended, where they find themselves unable to define things exactly, and are obliged to legislate as if that held good always which in fact only holds good usually; or where it is not easy to be complete owing to the endless possible cases presented, such as the kinds and sizes of weapons that may be used to inflict wounds—a lifetime would be too short to make out a complete list of these. If, then, a precise statement is impossible and yet legislation is necessary, the law must be expressed in wide terms; and so, if a man has no more than a finger-ring on his hand when he lifts it to strike or actually strikes another man, he is guilty of a criminal act according to the written words of the law; but he is innocent really, and it is equity that declares him to be so. From this definition of equity it is plain what sort of actions, and what sort of persons, are equitable or the reverse. Equity must be applied to forgivable actions; and it must make us distinguish between criminal acts on the one hand, and errors of judgement, or misfortunes, on the other. (A 'misfortune' is an

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Aristotle turns from equity to the determination of guilt in particular circumstances. Aristotle applies the commonplace of "the more and the less" to the act of injustice, as he has Applied it to the usefr.cl in chapter 7. He shows how to produce arguments about aggravating circumstances and what makes something a greater wrong.

1374bZ5. CALLISTRATUS CHARGED MELANOPUS: We don't know about the event referred to, nor about Sophocles' speech, mentioned

ten lines later, on behalf of Euctemon, nor the Argive prison mentioned at 1375a5. The Sophocles mentioned is not the poet but an orator; he is also mentioned in book III, chapter 18.

act, not due to moral badness, that has unexpected results: an 'error of judgement' is an act, also not due to moral badness, that has results that might have been expected: a 'criminal act' has results that might have been expected, but is due to moral badness, for that is the source of all actions inspired by our appetites.) Equity bids us be merciful to the weakness of human nature; to think less about the laws than about the man who framed them, and less about what he said than about what he meant; not to consider the actions of the accused so much as his intentions, nor this or that detail so much as the whole story; to ask not what a man is now but what he has always or usually been. It bids us remember benefits rather than injuries, and benefits received rather than benefits conferred; to be patient when we are wronged; to settle a dispute by negotiation and not by force; to prefer arbitration to litigation-for an arbitrator goes by the equity of a case, a judge by the strict law, and arbitration was invented with the express purpose of securing full power for equity.

The above may be taken as a sufficient account of the nature of equity.

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THE WORSE OF TWO acts of wrong done to others is that which is prompted by the worse disposition. Hence the most trifling acts may be the worst ones; as when Callistratus charged Melanopus^o with having cheated the temple-builders of three consecrated half-obols. The converse is true of just acts. This is because the greater is here potentially contained in the less: there is no crime that a man who has stolen three consecrated half-obols would shrink from committing. Sometimes, however, the worse act is reckoned not in this way but by the greater harm that it does. Or it may be because no punishment for it is severe enough to be adequate; or the harm done may be incurable-a difficult and even hopeless crime to defend; or the sufferer may not be able to get his injurer legally punished, a fact that makes the harm incurable, since legal punishment and chastisement are the proper cure. Or again, the man who has suffered wrong may have inflicted some fearful punishment on himself; then the doer of the wrong ought in justice to receive a still more fearful punishment. Thus

Sophocles, when pleading for retribution to Euctemon, who had cut his own throat because of the outrage done to him, said he would not fix a penalty less than the victim had fixed for himself. Again, a man's crime is worse if he has been the first man, or the only man, or almost the only man, to commit it: or if it is by no means the first time he has gone seriously wrong in the same way: or if his crime has led to the thinking-out and invention of measures to prevent and punish similar crimes—thus in Argos a penalty is inflicted on a man on whose account a law is passed, and also on those on whose account the prison was built: or if a crime is specially brutal, or specially deliberate: or if the report of it awakes more terror than pity. There are also such rhetorically effective ways of putting it as the following: That the accused has disregarded and broken not one but many solemn obligations like oaths, promises, pledges, or rights of intermarriage between states—here the crime is worse because it consists of many crimes; and that the crime was committed in the very place where criminals are punished, as for example perjurers do—it is argued that a man who will commit a crime in a law-court would commit it anywhere. Further, the worse deed is that which involves the doer in special shame; that whereby a man wrongs his benefactors—for he does more than one wrong, by not merely doing them harm but failing to do them good; that which breaks the unwritten laws of justice—the better sort of man will be just without being forced to be so, and the written laws depend on force while the **1375a15. IT MAY HOWEVER BE ARGUED OTHERWISE ...** : The chapter ends with another nice example of arguing both sides of a question.

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Judicial rhetoric is home to atechneical or nonartistic proofs (*atechnoi pisteis*) of five kinds: laws, witnesses, contracts, tortures, and oaths. This discussion on atechneical proofs completes the section (chapters. 10-15) on judicial rhetoric. In book 1, chapter 2 Aristotle distinguishes artistic from inartistic proofs., saying that the rhetorician invented (or found) the former but merely used the latter. At that point he gives witnesses, contracts, and tortures as his examples or kinds of *atechnoi*.

This chapter gives fascinating access into the actual workings of Greek legal procedure. Here are a few things about Athenian procedure that Aristotle takes for granted and that might surprise us: There were no professional judges, only jurors selected by lot; the jurors could number 501 or even more. There were no professional lawyers; each litigant had to speak for himself, even though there were professional speech-writers who could provide them with scripts.

There was little of what we think of as procedural law concerning admissible evidence, burdens of proof etc. Finally, there were no public prosecutors or district attorneys. Any citizen could bring suit against anyone else for behavior he thought was wrong.

unwritten ones do not. It may however be argued otherwise that the crime is worse which breaks the written laws: for the man who commits crimes for which terrible penalties are provided will not hesitate over crimes for which no penalty is provided at all. - So much, then, for the comparative badness of criminal actions.

15

THERE ARE ALSO THE so-called 'non-technical' means of persuasion; and we must now take a cursory view of these, since they are specially characteristic of forensic oratory. They are five in number: laws, witnesses, contracts, tortures, oaths.

First, then, let us take laws and see how they are to be used in persuasion and dissuasion, in accusation and defence. If the written law tells against our case, clearly we must appeal to the universal law, and insist on its greater equity and justice. We must argue that the juror's oath 'I will give my verdict according to my honest opinion' means that one will not simply follow the letter of the written law. We must urge that the principles of equity are permanent and changeless, and that the universal law does not change either, for it is the law of nature, whereas written laws often do change. This is the bearing of the lines in Sophocles' *Antigone*, where Antigone pleads that in burying her brother she had broken Creon's law, but not the unwritten law:

Not of to-day or yesterday they are,
But live eternal: (none can date their birth.)
Not I would fear the wrath of any man,
(And brave Gods' vengeance) for defying these.

We shall argue that justice indeed is true and profitable, but that sham justice is not, and that consequently the written law is not, because it does not fulfil the true purpose of law. Or that justice is like silver, and must be assayed by the judges, if the genuine is to be distinguished from the counterfeit. Or that the better a man is, the more he will follow and abide by the unwritten law in preference to

the written. Or perhaps that the law in question contradicts some other highly-esteemed law, or even contradicts itself. Thus it may be that one law will enact that all contracts must be held binding, while another forbids us ever to make illegal contracts. Or if a law is ambiguous, we shall turn it about and consider which construction best fits the interests of justice or utility, and then follow that way of looking at it. Or if, though the law still exists, the situation to meet which it was passed exists no longer, we must do our best to prove this and to combat the law thereby. If however the written law supports our case, we must urge that the oath 'to give my verdict according to my honest opinion' is not meant to make the judges give a verdict that is contrary to the law, but to save them from the guilt of perjury if they misunderstand what the law really means. Or that no one chooses what is absolutely good, but every one what is good for himself. Or that not to use the laws is as bad as to have no laws at all. Or that, as in the other arts, it does not pay to try to be cleverer than the doctor: for less harm comes from the doctor's mistakes than from the growing habit of disobeying authority. Or that trying to be cleverer than the laws is just what is forbidden by those codes of law that are accounted best.—So far as the laws are concerned, the above discussion is probably sufficient.

As to witnesses, they are of two kinds, the ancient and the recent; and these latter, again, either do or do not share in the risks of the trial. By ancient witnesses I mean the poets and all other notable persons whose judgements are known to all. Thus the Athenians appealed to Homer as a witness about Salamis; and the men of Tenedos not long ago appealed to

1376a]. THEMISTOCLES: The Athenian general and statesman Themistocles (528-462) was told by the oracle at Delphi that Athens' wooden walls would keep the city safe in the war against Persia in 480. He interpreted the oracle to mean not the city walls but the wooden ships of the navy.

1376a9. EUBULUS ... PLATO: Eubulus (c.405-c.335) was an Athenian statesman. We know nothing about Archibius. The Plato referred to may have been a comic poet, not the philosopher.

Periander of Corinth in their dispute with the people of Sigeum; and Cleophon supported his accusation of Critias by quoting the elegiac verse of Solon, maintaining that discipline had long been slack in the family of Critias, or Solon would never have written, tray thee, bid the red-haired Critias do what his father commands him.'

These witnesses are concerned with past events. As to future events we shall also appeal to soothsayers; thus Themistocles ^o quoted the

oracle about 'the wooden wall' as a reason for engaging the enemy's fleet. Further, proverbs are, as has been said, one form of evidence. Thus if you are urging somebody not to make a friend of an old man, you will appeal to the proverb,

Never show an old man kindness.

Or if you are urging that he who has made away with fathers should also make away with their sons, quote,

Fool, who slayeth the father and leaveth his sons to avenge him.

'Recent' witnesses are well-known people who have expressed their opinions about some disputed matter: such opinions will be useful support for subsequent disputants on the same points: thus Eubulus used in the law-courts against Chares the reply Plato' had made to Archibius, 'It has become the regular custom in this country to admit that one is a scoundrel'. There are also those witnesses who share the risk of punishment if their evidence is pronounced false. These are valid witnesses to the fact that an action was or was not done, that something is or is not the case; they are not valid witnesses to the quality of an action, to its being just or unjust, useful or harmful. On such questions of quality the opinion of detached persons is highly trustworthy. Most trustworthy of all are the 'ancient' witnesses, since they cannot be corrupted.

In dealing with the evidence of witnesses, the following are useful arguments. If you have no witnesses on your side, you will argue that the judges must decide from what is probable; that this is meant by 'giving a verdict in accordance with one's honest opinion'; that probabilities cannot be bribed to mislead the court; and that probabilities are never convicted of perjury. If you have witnesses, and the other man has not, you will argue that probabilities cannot be put on their trial, and that we could do without the evidence of witnesses altogether if we need do no more than balance the pleas advanced on either side.

The evidence of witnesses may refer either to ourselves or to our opponent; and either to questions of fact or to questions of personal character: so, clearly, we need never be at a loss for useful evidence. For if we have no evidence of fact supporting our own case or telling against that of our opponent, at least we can always find evidence to prove our own worth or our opponent's worthlessness. Other arguments about a witness that he is a friend or an enemy or neutral, or has a good, bad, or indifferent reputation, and any other such distinctions-we must construct upon the same general lines as we use for the regular rhetorical proofs.

Concerning contracts argument can be so far employed as to increase or diminish their importance and their credibility; we shall try to increase both if they tell in our favour, and to diminish both if they tell in favour of our opponent. Now for confirming or upsetting the credibility of contracts the procedure is just the same as for dealing with witnesses, for the credit to be attached to contracts depends upon the character of those who have signed them or have the custody of them. The contract being once admitted genuine, we must insist on

1376b31. EXAMINATION BY TORTURE: Although Aristotle doesn't say so, torture was used only against slaves, never against citizens.

its importance, if it supports our case. We may argue that a contract is a law, though of a special and limited kind; and that, while contracts do not of course make the law binding, the law does make any lawful contract binding, and that the law itself as a whole is a sort of contract, so that any one who disregards or repudiates any contract is repudiating the law itself. Further, most business relations—those, namely, that are voluntary—are regulated by contracts, and if these lose their binding force, human intercourse ceases to exist. We need not go very deep to discover the other appropriate arguments of this kind. If, however, the contract tells against us and for our opponents, in the first place those arguments are suitable which we can use to fight a law that tells against us. We do not regard ourselves as bound to observe a bad law which it was a mistake ever to pass: and it is ridiculous to suppose that we are bound to observe a bad and mistaken contract. Again, we may argue that the duty of the judge as umpire is to decide what is just, and therefore he must ask where justice lies, and not what this or that document means. And that it is impossible to pervert justice by fraud or by force, since it is founded on nature, but a party to a contract may be the victim of either fraud or force. Moreover, we must see if the contract contravenes either universal law or any written law of our own or another country; and also if it contradicts any other previous or subsequent contract; arguing that the subsequent is the binding contract, or else that the previous one was right and the subsequent one fraudulent—whichever way suits us. Further, we must consider the question of utility, noting whether the contract is against the interest of the judges or not; and so on—these arguments are as obvious as the others.

Examination by torture^o is one form of evidence, to which great weight is often attached because it is in a sense compulsory. Here again it is not hard to point out the available grounds for magnifying its value, if it happens to tell in

1377a19. XENOPHANES: Xenophanes (c.570-500) wrote poems about

nature and the gods.

our favour, and arguing that it is the only form of evidence that is infallible; or, on the other hand, for refuting it if it tells against us and for our opponent, when we may say what is true of torture of every kind alike, that people under its compulsion tell lies quite as often as they tell the truth, sometimes persistently refusing to tell the truth, sometimes recklessly making a false charge in order to be let off sooner. We ought to be able to quote cases, familiar to the judges, in which this sort of thing has actually happened. [We must say that evidence under torture is not trustworthy, the fact being that many men whether thick-witted, tough-skinned, or stout of heart endure their ordeal nobly, while cowards and timid men are full of boldness till they see the ordeal of these others: so that no trust can be placed in evidence under torture.]

In regard to oaths, a fourfold division can be made. A man may either both offer and accept an oath, or neither, or one without the Other—that is, he may offer an oath but not accept one, or accept an oath but not offer one. There is also the situation that arises when an oath has already been sworn either by himself or by his opponent.

If you refuse to offer an oath, you may argue that men do not hesitate to perjure themselves; and that if your opponent does swear, you lose your money, whereas, if he does not, you think the judges will decide against him; and that the risk of an unfavourable verdict is preferable, since you trust the judges and do not trust him.

If you refuse to accept an oath, you may argue that an oath is always paid for; that you would of course have taken it if you had been a rascal, since if you are a rascal you had better make something by it, and you would in that case have to swear in order to succeed. Thus your refusal, you argue, must be due to high principle, not to fear of perjury: and you may aptly quote the saying of Xenophanes,^o

’Tis not fair that he who fears not God should challenge him
who doth.

It is as if a strong man were to challenge a weakling to strike, or be struck by, him.

If you agree to accept an oath, you may argue that you trust yourself but not your opponent; and that (to invert the remark of Xenophanes) the fair thing is for the impious man to offer the oath and for the pious man to accept it; and that it would be monstrous if you yourself were unwilling to accept an oath in a case where you demand that the judges should do so before giving their verdict. If you wish to offer an oath, you may argue that piety disposes you to

commit the issue to the gods; and that your opponent ought not to want other judges than himself, since you leave the decision with him; and that it is outrageous for your opponents to refuse to swear about this question, when they insist that others should do so.

Now that we see how we are to argue in each case separately, we see also how we are to argue when they occur in pairs, namely, when you are willing to accept the oath but not to offer it; to offer it but not to accept it; both to accept and to offer it; or to do neither. These are of course combinations of the cases already mentioned, and so your arguments also must be combinations of the arguments already mentioned.

If you have already sworn an oath that contradicts your present one, you must argue that it is not perjury, since perjury is a crime, and a crime must be a voluntary action, whereas actions due to the force or fraud of others are involuntary. You must further reason from this that perjury depends on the intention and not on the spoken words. But if it is your opponent who has already sworn an oath that contradicts his present one, you must say that if he does not abide by his oaths he is the enemy of society, and that this is the reason why men take an oath before administering the laws. 'My opponents insist that you, the judges, must abide by the oath you have sworn, and yet they are not abiding by their own oaths.' And there are other arguments which may be used to magnify the importance of the oath. -

BOOK II

-1-

To be successful, the orator has to put the audience in a favorable mood, and must appear credible and trustworthy. We can take the means of appearing to have a particular kind of character from the previous discussion of the virtues, but the passions that put the audience in the proper mood have to have their own treatment. Each passion contains three dimensions that the orator can cause, and so the orator has to develop three kinds of argumentative premises to cause the emotions in the audience.

As Aristotle develops his account of each emotion, it becomes clear that they are doubly useful for the orator. The same arguments the speaker can use to cause emotions in the audience he can also employ in causing the audience to believe that another person -for example, someone accused of a crime-has those feelings.

1377b24. HE MUST ALSO MAKE... RIGHT FRAME OF MIND: The persuasive speaker will have to know about the character of the audience too, but he does not directly affect it. He learns about the character of the audience in part from the different forms of government, each of which reflects the character of its people, and in part from considering the characters of the young, the old, those in the prime of life, the wealthy, and the well-born, as discussed in book II, chapters 121-17.

BOOK II

1

WE HAVE NOW CONSIDERED the materials to be used in supporting or opposing a political measure, in pronouncing eulogies or censures, and for prosecution and defence in the law courts. We have considered the received opinions on which we may best base our arguments so as to convince our hearers—those opinions with which our enthymemes deal, and out of which they are built, in each of the three kinds of oratory, according to what may be called the special needs of each.

But since rhetoric exists to affect the giving of decisions—the hearers decide between one political speaker and another, and a legal verdict is a decision—the orator must not only try to make the argument of his speech demonstrative and worthy of belief; he must also make his own character look right and put his hearers, who are to decide, into the right frame of mind.^o Particularly in political oratory, but also in lawsuits, it adds much to an orator's influence that his own character should look right and that he should be thought to entertain the right feelings towards his hearers; and also that his hearers themselves should be in just the right frame of mind. That the orator's own character should look right is particularly important in political speaking: that the audience should be in the right frame of mind, in lawsuits. When people are feeling friendly and placable, they think one sort of thing; when they are feeling angry or hostile, they think either something totally different or the same thing with a different intensity: when they feel friendly to the man who comes before them for judgement, they regard him as having done

1378a6-9. THREE THINGS ... GOOD SENSE, GOOD MORAL CHARACTER, AND GOODWILL: "Good sense" is phronesis, also translated as "practical wisdom." "Good moral character" is aretē, also translated as "moral virtue." Goodwill, finally, is eunoia—literally, to be "well-minded." While in chapters 2-11 Aristotle shows how to cause

particular emotions in the audience, he does not devote a separate section to showing how to cause confidence by means of the orator's own character. Instead he says: We make ourselves seem sensible and morally good by applying what we learned in book I about goodness. We will learn how to create feelings of goodwill and friendliness by looking at the emotions. Since friendship, as Aristotle discusses it in book II, chapter 4, is similar to goodwill, and is paired with it here—"goodwill and friendliness of disposition"—we could understand him as saying that one of the emotions will be equivalent to this aspect of the orator's character. Or we could think that the ability to cause all the emotions appropriately makes the audience think that the speaker has goodwill toward them.

1378a]9. EMOTIONS ... PAIN OR PLEASURE: "Emotion" here translates pathos. The word can have more general meanings in Greek, such as "suffering" or "being affected": Passion is the opposite of action. Passions of any kind change people, and Aristotle is interested in the narrower phenomenon, relevant to rhetoric, of emotions changing people's judgments. If an emotion changes someone, for example, by making him blush, this would not be relevant to rhetoric.

If the speaker can cause an emotion in the audience, he can get them to change their judgment toward, for example, a defendant or victim in a criminal case. For rhetorical purposes, Aristotle is also interested in the opposite process, by which affecting the judgment can change the emotions. The rhetorician will argue and so change people's judgments, and thereby change their emotions. All emotions, or all the emotions covered in the *Rhetoric*, are accompanied by pleasure or pain. Some emotions, we will see, are contraries of each other. But this doesn't mean that if one emotion is painful, its opposite will be pleasant. Sometimes that is true, as for love and hate. But pity and envy are opposites, and both are painful. And some emotions could be both pleasant and painful. Anger is painful but includes thoughts of revenge, which are pleasant. Hatred, we will see, is an interesting challenge to Aristotle's general thesis, since he says that it is not a painful emotion, as anger is.

Aristotle presents a practical account of how to cause those emotions most useful in rhetorical argument. The emotions discussed in the *Rhetoric* are the emotions of citizens in a particular society, one concerned with status and appearance. This is not designed as a general theory of the emotions, and so the reader has to decide whether to extend the account beyond what Aristotle himself does with it.

While Aristotle complained in L about earlier writers about rhetoric

who talked about nothing but how to move the passions, his own systematic analysis of the emotions is almost certainly an original contribution.

little wrong, if any; when they feel hostile, they take the opposite view. Again, if they are eager for, and have good hopes of, a thing that will be pleasant if it happens, they think that it certainly will happen and be good for them: whereas if they are indifferent or annoyed, they do not think so.

There are three things which inspire confidence in the orator's own character—the three, namely, that induce us to believe a thing apart from any proof of it: good sense, good moral character, and goodwill.^o False statements and bad advice are due to one or more of the following three causes. Men either form a false opinion through want of good sense; or they form a true opinion, but because of their moral badness do not say what they really think; or finally, they are both sensible and upright, but not well disposed to their hearers, and may fail in consequence to recommend what they know to be the best course. These are the only possible cases. It follows that any one who is thought to have all three of these good qualities will inspire trust in his audience. The way to make ourselves thought to be sensible and morally good must be gathered from the analysis of goodness already given: the way to establish your own goodness is the same as the way to establish that of others. Good will and friendliness of disposition will form part of our discussion of the emotions, to which we must now turn.

The Emotions are all those feelings that so change men as to affect their judgements, and that are also attended by pain or pleasure.^o Such are anger, pity, fear and the like, with their opposites. We must arrange what we have to say about each of them under three heads.^o Take, for instance, the emotion of anger: here we must discover (1) what the state of mind of angry people is, (2) who the people are with whom they usually get angry, and (3) on what grounds they get angry with them. It is not enough to know one or even two of these points; unless we know all three, we shall be unable to arouse

1378a22. WHAT WE HAVE TO SAY ABOUT EACH OF THEM UNDER THREE HEADS: Aristotle gives three examples for the emotion of anger. These are three of Aristotle's four causes. The definition of each emotion is the formal cause, which says what that emotion is. The disposition or state of mind of the person who gets angry is the material *cause*— the material on which the speaker, seeking to stimulate anger, works. The person at whom we get angry is the moving or efficient cause. The grounds of anger are its reasons, its purposes and final cause. Aristotle says here that to provoke an

emotion, one has to know all these causes, but in fact in his treatments of the individual emotions, he does not always give all the causes.

-2-

The first emotion treated is anger. After defining anger, Aristotle notes that anger is always directed against an individual, not an abstraction or a kind of person. He then treats the three dimensions or causes of anger in order. Anger is a response to an insult, and there are three kinds of insult. He next looks at the dispositions of people who get angry, and finally at the kind of people at whom people get angry.

Anger is always anger at someone. Something similar will be true for all the emotions. They all have objects. If there are emotions without objects-anxiety might be one for people today-they are not part of Aristotle's subject here.

It is significant that Aristotle's treatment of the emotions begins with anger. Anger is the most useful emotion for an orator in a society where honor and status are so important. Insults to honor are thought to be central to the idea of crime. If jurors feel insulted by someone's behavior, they will be willing to have that person suffer punishment. If a defendant can show that he was motivated by anger in response to an insult, then what otherwise would be criminal behavior might be excused or justified. Anger is also the emotion most likely to overwhelm self control. That is, it makes sense to say that I did what I knew was wrong because I was overcome by anger, but not because I was overcome by hatred.

Anger has another important feature: When we want revenge, we want something that may have nothing to do with advancing our own self-interest. I can pursue revenge and vindication at a large personal cost. The same seems generally true of all Aristotle's emotions. When I act on them, I am doing something different from acting on self interest. In deliberative rhetoric, the speaker can count on the audience being motivated by self interest in deciding which policy to choose. In judicial rhetoric, the jury has to make judgments apart from their own interest about the accused party and any victims.

1378b6-7. 'SWEETER IT IS ... THE HEARTS OF MEN': The lines are from the Iliad XVIII.109.

anger in any one. The same is true of the other emotions. So just as earlier in this work we drew up a list of useful propositions for the

orator, let us now proceed in the same way to analyse the subject before us.

2

ANGER MAY BE DEFINED as an impulse, accompanied by pain, to a conspicuous revenge for a conspicuous slight directed without justification towards what concerns oneself or towards what concerns one's friends. If this is a proper definition of anger, it must always be felt towards some particular individual, e.g. Cleon, and not 'man' in general. It must be felt because the other has done or intended to do something to him or one of his friends. It must always be attended by a certain pleasure—that which arises from the expectation of revenge. For since nobody aims at what he thinks he cannot attain, the angry man is aiming at what he can attain, and the belief that you will attain your aim is pleasant. Hence it has been well said about wrath,

Sweeter it is by far than the honeycomb dripping with sweetness, And spreads through the hearts of men.^o

It is also attended by a certain pleasure because the thoughts dwell upon the act of vengeance, and the images then called up cause pleasure, like the images called up in dreams.

Now slighting is the actively entertained opinion of something as obviously of no importance. We think bad things, as well as good ones, have serious importance; and we think the same of anything that tends to produce such things, while those which have little or no such tendency we consider unimportant. There are three kinds of slighting—contempt, spite, and insolence. (1) Contempt is one kind of slighting:

1378b23. INSOLENT: "Insolence" translates hubris. The Greek dictionary begins its definition with: "wanton violence, arising from the pride of strength, passion, etc.; riotousness, insolence, lewdness, licentiousness." Hubris was the formal name for a crime we would describe as an aggravated and usually violent assault on a person. But note that Aristotle thinks one can commit hubris by words as well as deeds. An insult can thus be insolent, and in a world as concerned with honor and status as that of the Greeks, insulting words can be enough to constitute a crime.

1378b28. YOUTHS AND RICH MEN ... SHOW INSOLENT: Young

and wealthy people are in a position to show their superiority to others, but they also need to show it in order to convince themselves that they are superior. Directly below (79a36-79b2) Aristotle says that those who are confident that they are superior don't get angry—that is, they are not overly troubled by insults-while people who are insecure are more likely to get angry.

1378b32-34. 'HE HATH TAKEN MY PRIZE ... ' [AND] 'LIKE AN ALIEN HONOURED BY NONE': The lines are from the *Iliad* 1356 and IX.648.

you feel contempt for what you consider unimportant, and it is just such things that you slight. (2) Spite is another kind; it is a thwarting another man's wishes, not to get something yourself but to prevent his getting it. The slight arises just from the fact that you do not aim at something for yourself: clearly you do not think that he can do you harm, for then you would be afraid of him instead of slighting him, nor yet that he can do you any good worth mentioning, for then you would be anxious to make friends with him. (3) Insolence^o is also a form of slighting, since it consists in doing and saying things that cause shame to the victim, not in order that anything may happen to yourself, or because anything has happened to yourself, but simply for the pleasure involved. (Retaliation is not 'insolence', but vengeance.) The cause of the pleasure thus enjoyed by the insolent man is that he thinks himself greatly superior to others when ill-treating them. That is why youths and rich men are insolent; they think themselves superior when they show insolence.^o One sort of insolence is to rob people of the honour due to them; you certainly slight them thus; for it is the unimportant, for good or evil, that has no honour paid to it. So Achilles says in anger:

He hath taken my prize for himself and hath done me dishonour,
and

Like an alien honoured by none,^o

meaning that this is why he is angry. A man expects to be specially respected by his inferiors in birth, in capacity, in goodness, and generally in anything in which he is much their superior: as where money is concerned a wealthy man

1379a5-7. 'GREAT IS THE WRATH OF KINGS ... ' [AND] ' ' ... ABIDETH LONG AFTERWARD ALSO': These lines are from the *Iliad* II. 196 and I.82.

looks for respect from a poor man; where speaking is concerned, the man with a turn for oratory looks for respect from one who cannot speak; the ruler demands the respect of the ruled, and the man who thinks he ought to be a ruler demands the respect of the man whom

he thinks he ought to be ruling. Hence it has been said

Great is the wrath of kings, whose father is Zeus almighty,

and

Yea, but his rancour abideth long afterward also,°

their great resentment being due to their great superiority. Then again a man looks for respect from those who he thinks owe him good treatment, and these are the people whom he has treated or is treating well, or means or has meant to treat well, either himself, or through his friends, or through others at his request.

It will be plain by now, from what has been said, (1) in what frame of mind, (2) with what persons, and (3) on what grounds people grow angry. (1) The frame of mind is that in which any pain is being felt. In that condition, a man is always aiming at something. Whether, then, another man opposes him either directly in any way, as by preventing him from drinking when he is thirsty, or indirectly, the act appears to him just the same; whether some one works against him, or fails to work with him, or otherwise vexes him while he is in this mood, he is equally angry in all these cases. Hence people who are afflicted by sickness or poverty or love or thirst or any other unsatisfied desires are prone to anger and easily roused: especially against those who slight their present distress. Thus a sick man is angered by disregard of his illness, a poor man by disregard of his poverty, a man waging war by disregard of the war he is waging, a lover by disregard of his love, and so throughout, any other sort of slight being enough if special slights are wanting. Each man is predisposed, by the emotion now controlling him, to his own particular anger. Further, we are angered if we happen to be expecting a contrary result: for a quite unexpected evil is specially painful, just as the quite unexpected fulfilment of our wishes is specially pleasant. Hence it is plain what seasons, times, conditions, and periods of life tend to stir men easily to anger, and where and when this will happen; and it is plain that the more we are under these conditions the more easily we are stirred.

These, then, are the frames of mind in which men are easily stirred to anger. The persons with whom we get angry are those who laugh, mock, or jeer at us, for such conduct is insolent. Also those who inflict injuries upon us that are marks of insolence. These injuries must be such as are neither retaliatory nor profitable to the doers: for only then will they be felt to be due to insolence. Also those who speak ill of us, and show contempt for us, in connexion with the things we ourselves most care about: thus those who are eager to win fame as philosophers get angry with those who show contempt for their philosophy; those who pride themselves upon their appearance get

angry with those who show contempt for their appearance ; and so on in other cases. We feel particularly angry on this account if we suspect that we are in fact, or that people think we are, lacking completely or to any effective extent in the qualities in question. For when we are convinced that we excel in the qualities for which we are jeered at, we can ignore the jeering. Again, we are angrier with our friends than with other people, since we feel that our friends ought to treat us well and not badly. We are angry with those who have usually treated us with honour or regard, if a change comes and they behave to us otherwise: for we think that they feel

1379b PLEXIPPUS IS ANGRY WITH MELEAGER: The reference is to Antiphon's tragedy *Meleager*.

contempt for us, or they would still be behaving as they did before. And with those who do not return our kindnesses or fail to return them adequately, and with those who oppose us though they are our inferiors: for all such persons seem to feel contempt for us; those who oppose us seem to think us inferior to themselves, and those who do not return our kindnesses seem to think that those kindnesses were conferred by inferiors. And we feel particularly angry with men of no account at all, if they slight us. For, by our hypothesis, the anger caused by the slight is felt towards people who are not justified in slighting us, and our inferiors are not thus justified. Again, we feel angry with friends if they do not speak well of us or treat us well; and still more, if they do the contrary; or if they do not perceive our needs, which is why Plexippus is angry with Meleager in Antiphon's play; for this want of perception shows that they are slighting us—we do not fail to perceive the needs of those for whom we care. Again, we are angry with those who rejoice at our misfortunes or simply keep cheerful in the midst of our misfortunes, since this shows that they either hate us or are slighting us. Also with those who are indifferent to the pain they give us: this is why we get angry with bringers of bad news. And with those who listen to stories about us or keep on looking at our weaknesses; this seems like either slighting us or hating us; for those who love us share in all our distresses and it must distress any one to keep on looking at his own weaknesses. Further, with those who slight us before five classes of people: namely, (1) our rivals, (2) those whom we admire, (3) those whom we wish to admire us, (4) those for whom we feel reverence, (5) those who feel reverence for us: if any one slights us before such persons, we feel particularly angry. Again, we feel angry with those who slight us in connexion with what we are as honourable men bound to champion—our parents, children, wives, or subjects. And with those who do not return a favour, since such a slight is unjustifiable. Also

Aristotle next treats calm, the absence of anger. He considers two of the dimensions of calm that he had explored for *anger*—the people with whom we are calm and the dispositions that make people calm. Most people would not regard “calm” as an emotion at all. Either Aristotle is badly translated here or there is a real difference between how he understands emotions and how we do today. When in his other works Aristotle gives a list of emotions, calm never appears as one of them, which leads me to think that calm is an emotion for the specific purposes of the Rhetoric. For a speaker to make an audience feel calm is for him to take away feelings of anger.

with those who reply with humorous levity when we are speaking seriously, for such behaviour indicates contempt. And with those who treat us less well than they treat everybody else; it is another mark of contempt that they should think we do not deserve what every one else deserves. Forgetfulness, too, causes anger, as when our own names are forgotten, trifling as this may be; since forgetfulness is felt to be another sign that we are being slighted; it is due to negligence, and to neglect us is to slight us.

The persons with whom we feel anger, the frame of mind in which we feel it, and the reasons why we feel it, have now all been set forth. Clearly the orator will have to speak so as to bring his hearers into a frame of mind that will dispose them to anger, and to represent his adversaries as open to such charges and possessed of such qualities as do make people angry.

3

SINCE GROWING CALM IS the opposite of growing angry, and calmness the opposite of anger, we must ascertain in what frames of mind men are calm, towards whom they feel calm, and by what means they are made so. Growing calm may be defined as a settling down or quieting of anger. Now we get angry with those who slight us; and since slighting is a voluntary act, it is plain that we feel calm towards those who do nothing of the kind, or who do or seem to do it involuntarily. Also towards those who intended to do the opposite of what they did do. Also towards those who treat themselves as they have treated us: since no one can be supposed to slight himself. Also

towards those who admit their fault and are sorry: since we accept their grief at what they have done as satisfaction, and cease to be angry. The punishment of servants shows this: those who contradict us and deny

1380a25. THAT OUR ANGER CEASES ... SHOWN EVEN BY DOGS: This is a reference to the arrival of Odysseus in book 14 of the *Odyssey*.

their offence we punish all the more, but we cease to be incensed against those who agree that they deserved their punishment. The reason is that it is shameless to deny what is obvious, and those who are shameless towards us slight us and show contempt for us: anyhow, we do not feel shame before ; those of whom we are thoroughly contemptuous. Also we feel calm towards those who humble themselves before us and do not gainsay us; we feel that they thus admit themselves our inferiors, and inferiors feel fear, and nobody can slight any one so long as he feels afraid of him. That our anger ceases towards those who humble themselves before us is shown even by dogs,^o who do not bite people when they sit down. ; We also feel calm towards those who are serious when we are serious, because then we feel that we are treated seriously and not contemptuously. Also towards those who have done us more kindnesses than we have done them. Also towards those who pray to us and beg for mercy, since they humble themselves by doing so. Also towards those who do not insult or mock at or slight any one at all, or not any worthy person : or any one like ourselves. In general, the things that make us calm may be inferred by seeing what the opposites are of those that make us angry. We are not angry with people we fear or respect, as long as we fear or respect them; you cannot be afraid of a person and also at the same time angry with him. Again, we feel no anger, or comparatively little, with those who have done what they did through anger; we do not feel that they have done it from a wish to slight us, for no one slights people when angry with them, since slighting is painless, and anger is painful. Nor do we grow angry with those who reverence us.

As to the frame of mind that makes people calm, it is plainly the opposite to that which makes them angry, as when they are amusing themselves or laughing or feasting; when they are feeling prosperous or successful or satisfied;

1380b8. PHILOCRATES: He was a famous Athenian orator and statesman of the fourth century.

1380b12-13. ERGOPHILUS ... CALLISTHENES: These men were generals accused of treason in 362. Demosthenes tells the story in

more detail and somewhat differently from Aristotle's version.

1380b23. 'SAY THAT IT WAS ODYSSEUS, SACKER OF CITIES': The line is from the *Odyssey* 9.504.

when, in fine, they are enjoying freedom from pain, or inoffensive pleasure, or justifiable hope. Also when time has passed and their anger is no longer fresh, for time puts an end to anger. And vengeance previously taken on one person puts an end to even greater anger felt against another person. Hence Philocrates,^o being asked by some one, at a time when the public was angry with him, 'Why don't you defend yourself?' did right to reply, 'The time is not yet.' 'Why, when is the time?' 'When I see some one else calumniated.' For men become calm when they have spent their anger on somebody else. This happened in the case of Ergophilus: though the people were more irritated against him than against Callisthenes, ^o they acquitted him because they had condemned Callisthenes to death the day before. Again, men become calm if they have convicted the offender; or if he has already suffered worse things than they in their anger would have themselves inflicted upon him; for they feel as if they were already avenged. Or if they feel that they themselves are in the wrong and are suffering justly (for anger is not excited by what is just), since men no longer think then that they are suffering without justification; and anger, as we have seen, means this. Hence we ought always to inflict a preliminary punishment in words: if that is done, even slaves are less aggrieved by the actual punishment. We also feel calm if we think that the offender will not see that he is punished on our account and because of the way he has treated us. For anger has to do with individuals. This is plain from the definition. Hence the poet has well written:

Say that it was Odysseus, sacker of cities,^o

implying that Odysseus would not have considered himself avenged unless the Cyclops perceived both by whom and for what he had been blinded. Consequently we do not get angry

1380b29. 'FOR BEHOLD ... THE SENSELESS CLAY': The passage is from the *Iliad* XXIV.54.

Friendship is the next emotion. The Greek word *philia* is broader than the English "friendship." It can include love, so that in the *Ethics* Aristotle speaks of *philia* with oneself rather than "self-love," as we would say in English. There doesn't have to be a feeling of affection between *philoi* ("those who love")-allies, for example, are *philoi*. And

in the Ethics Aristotle says that *philia* is a virtue, not an emotion. But here in the Rhetoric, when Aristotle treats *philia* as an emotion, he has to be more narrowly concerned with its affective aspects. In addition, just as with anger, at least for purposes of the Rhetoric, friendship includes moral evaluations of the object of friendship; this may make Aristotle's analysis different from contemporary ideas about these feelings, in which an attitude toward friends does not always involve making moral judgments about them. As we will see, the difference it makes to include moral evaluations within the emotions is especially prominent when we come to his consideration of pity.

As an emotion, *philia* is very close to the goodwill Aristotle singled out in book II, chapter I as one of the three ethical sources of persuasion, alongside virtue and practical wisdom. In this chapter, he focuses on the people who are the objects of friendship, and indicates the causes and dispositions of friendship indirectly. He then looks at the kinds of friendship and their factors. The discussion turns to hate, the contrary of friendship, and after looking at the causes of hatred, he contrasts hatred and anger. Almost the entire discussion concerns the kind of people with whom we are friendly, and the other two causes mentioned in book II, chapter I are ignored.

1380b36-81a1. WE MAY DESCRIBE FRIENDLY FEELING ... BRING THESE THINGS ABOUT: "Friendly feeling" translates *philia*. Actually, the Greek here does not describe "friendly feeling" but the act of befriending. The relationship of friendship will be understood in terms of that activity. Thus Aristotle next says that a friend is someone who engages in befriending and who is also befriended. In this sense, friendship is not a feeling but a relationship. The Rhetoric will look at the emotional side of this relationship.

with any one who cannot be aware of our anger, and in particular we cease to be angry with people once they are dead, for we feel that the worst has been done to them, and that they will neither feel pain nor anything else that we in our anger aim at making them feel. And therefore the poet has well made Apollo say, in order to put a stop to the anger of Achilles against the dead Hector,

For behold in his fury he doeth despite to the senseless clay.^o 0

It is now plain that when you wish to calm others you must draw upon these lines of argument; you must put your hearers into the corresponding frame of mind, and represent those with whom they are angry as formidable, or as worthy of reverence, or as benefactors, or as involuntary agents, or as much distressed at what they have done.

LET US NOW TURN to Friendship and Enmity, and ask towards whom these feelings are entertained, and why. We will begin by defining friendship and friendly feeling. We may describe friendly feeling towards any one as wishing for him what you believe to be good things, not for your own sake but for his, and being inclined, so far as you can, to bring these things about.^o A friend is one who feels thus and excites these feelings in return: those who think they feel thus towards each other think themselves friends. This being assumed, it follows that your friend is the sort of man who shares your pleasure in what is good and your pain in what is unpleasant, for your sake and for no other reason. This pleasure and pain of his will be the token of his good wishes for you, since we all feel glad at getting what we wish for, and pained at getting what we do not. Those, then, are friends to whom the same things are good and evil; and those who are, moreover, friendly or unfriendly to the same people; for in that case they must have the same wishes, and thus by wishing for each other what they wish for themselves, they show themselves each other's friends. Again, we feel friendly to those who have treated us well, either ourselves or those we care for, whether on a large scale, or readily, or at some particular crisis; provided it was for our own sake. And also to those who we think wish to treat us well. And also to our friends' friends, and to those who like, or are liked by, those whom we like ourselves. And also to those who are enemies to those whose enemies we are, and dislike, or are disliked by, those whom we dislike. For all such persons think the things good which we think good, so that they wish what is good for us; and this, as we saw, is what friends must do. And also to those who are willing to treat us well where money or our personal safety is concerned: and therefore we value those who are liberal, brave, or just. The just we consider to be those who do not live on others; which means those who work for their living, especially farmers and others who work with their own hands. We also like temperate men, because they are not unjust to others; and, for the same reason, those who mind their own business. And also those whose friends we wish to be, if it is plain that they wish to be our friends: such are the morally good, and those well thought of by every one, by the best men, or by those whom we admire or who admire us. And also those with whom it is pleasant to live and spend our days: such are the good-tempered, and those who

are not too ready to show us our mistakes, and those who are not cantankerous or quarrelsome—such people are always wanting to fight us, and those who fight us we feel wish for the opposite of what we wish for ourselves—and those who have the tact to make and take a joke; here both parties have the same object in view, when they can stand being made fun

1381b16. 'POTTER TO potter ... THEIR REWARD': The quotation is from Hesiod's *Works and Days* 25.

of as well as do it prettily themselves. And we also feel friendly towards those who praise such good qualities as we possess, and especially if they praise the good qualities that we are not too sure we do possess. And towards those who are cleanly in their person, their dress, and all their way of life. And towards those who do not reproach us with what we have done amiss to them or they have done to help us, for both actions show a tendency to criticize us. And towards those who do not nurse grudges or store up grievances, but are always ready to make friends again; for we take it that they will behave to us just as we find them behaving to every one else. And towards those who are not evil speakers and who are aware of neither their neighbours' bad points nor our own, but of our good ones only, as a good man always will be. And towards those who do not try to thwart us when we are angry or in earnest, which would mean being ready to fight us. And towards those who have some serious feeling towards us, such as admiration for us, or belief in our goodness, or pleasure in our company; especially if they feel like this about qualities in us for which we especially wish to be admired, esteemed, or liked. And towards those who are like ourselves in character and occupation, provided they do not get in our way or gain their living from the same source as we do—for then it will be a case of 'potter against potter':

Potter to potter and builder to builder begrudge their reward.°

And those who desire the same things as we desire, if it is possible for us both to share them together; otherwise the same trouble arises here too. And towards those with whom we are on such terms that, while we respect their opinions, we need not blush before them for doing what is conventionally wrong: as well as towards those before whom we should be ashamed to do anything really wrong. Again, our rivals, and

1382a1-14. ENMITY AND HATRED SHOULD CLEARLY BE STUDIED ... : The entire discussion of hatred is only fifteen lines long. It is entirely organized as a contrast between hatred and anger, and it contains some very shrewd psychological insights. We are always

angry, Aristotle says, because of a slight directed against us (see also chapter II.1378a34-35), while hatred can be quite impersonal. We are always angry at individuals but can hate types of people.

those whom we should like to envy us-though without illfeeling—either we like these people or at least we wish them to like us. And we feel friendly towards those whom we help to secure good for themselves, provided we are not likely to suffer heavily by it ourselves. And those who feel as friendly to us when we are not with them as when we are-which is why all men feel friendly towards those who are faithful to their dead friends. And, speaking generally, towards those who are really fond of their friends and do not desert them in trouble; of all good men, we feel most friendly to those who show their goodness as friends. Also towards those who are honest with us, including those who will tell us of their own weak points: it has just been said that with our friends we are not ashamed of what is conventionally wrong, and if we do have this feeling, we do not love them; if therefore we do not have it, it looks as if we did love them. We also like those with whom we do not feel frightened or uncomfortable-nobody can like a man of whom he feels frightened. Friendship has various forms-comradeship, intimacy, kinship, and so on.

Things that cause friendship are: doing kindnesses; doing them unasked; and not proclaiming the fact when they are done, which shows that they were done for our own sake and not for some other reason.

Enmity and Hatred should clearly be studied^o by reference to their opposites. Enmity may be produced by anger or spite or calumny. Now whereas anger arises from offences against oneself, enmity may arise even without that; we may hate people merely because of what we take to be their character. Anger is always concerned with individuals-a Callias or a Socrates-whereas hatred is directed also against classes: we all hate any thief and any informer. Moreover, anger can be cured by time; but hatred cannot. The one aims at giving pain to its object, the other at doing him harm; the angry man wants his victims to feel; the hater does not mind whether

Chapter 5 concerns fear and confidence. It explores the objects that cause fear, the *people* we fear, degrees of fear, and the dispositions favorable to fear. The second half of the chapters turns to confidence, defining it and exploring the objects that reassure us, and the

dispositions that make People confident. Fear seems different from the other emotions Aristotle looks at; it is the one emotion that has nothing to do with desert or merit. The other emotions are specifically the emotions of citizens and people concerned with their rank and status, and the other emotions are all directed at other people. There is a similar worry about fear in the Ethics. Courage is the virtue concerned with fear and confidence, but Aristotle narrows its scope; the central form of courage has to do with the fear of death in battle, fear of an evil caused by other people., as opposed to fear of poverty, shipwreck, and other candidates. In the same way, although the definition of fear is quite broad—"a pain or disturbance due to a mental picture of some destructive or painful evil in the future"—the chapter discusses only fear of people.

they feel or not. All painful things are felt; but the greatest evils, injustice and folly, are the least felt, since their presence causes no pain. And anger is accompanied by pain, hatred is not; the angry man feels pain, but the hater does not. Much may happen to make the angry man pity those who offend him, but the hater under no circumstances wishes to pity a man whom he has once hated: for the one would have the offenders suffer for what they have done; the other would have them cease to exist.

It is plain from all this that we can prove people to be friends or enemies; if they are not, we can make them out to be so; if they claim to be so, we can refute their claim; and if it is disputed whether an action was due to anger or to hatred, we can attribute it to whichever of these we prefer.

5

To TURN NEXT TO Fear, what follows will show the things and persons of which, and the states of mind in which, we feel afraid. Fear may be defined as a pain or disturbance due to a mental picture of some destructive or painful evil in the future. Of destructive or painful evils only; for there are some evils, e.g. wickedness or stupidity, the prospect of which does not frighten us: I mean only such as amount to great pains or losses. And even these only if they appear not remote but so near as to be imminent: we do not fear things that are a very long way off: for instance, we all know we shall die, but we are not

troubled thereby, because death is not close at hand. From this definition it will follow that fear is caused by whatever we feel has great power of destroying us, or of harming us in ways that tend to cause us great pain. Hence the very indications of such things are terrible, making us feel that the terrible thing itself is close at hand; the approach of what is terrible is just what we mean by 'danger'. Such indications are the enmity and anger of people who have power to do something to us; for it is plain that they have the will to do it, and so they are on the point of doing it. Also injustice in possession of power; for it is the unjust man's will to do evil that makes him unjust. Also outraged virtue in possession of power; for it is plain that, when outraged, it always has the will to retaliate, and now it has the power to do so. Also fear felt by those who have the power to do something to us, since such persons are sure to be ready to do it. And since most men tend to be bad-slaves to greed, and cowards in danger-it is, as a rule, a terrible thing to be at another man's mercy; and therefore, if we have done anything horrible, those in the secret terrify us with the thought that they may betray or desert us. And those who can do us wrong are terrible to us when we are liable to be wronged; for as a rule men do wrong to others whenever they have the power to do it. And those who have been wronged, or believe themselves to be wronged, are terrible; for they are always looking out for their opportunity. Also those who have done people wrong, if they possess power, since they stand in fear of retaliation: we have already said that wickedness possessing power is terrible. Again, our rivals for a thing cause us fear when we cannot both have it at once; for we are always at war with such men. We also fear those who are to be feared by stronger people than ourselves: if they can hurt those stronger people, still more can they hurt us; and, for the same reason, we fear those whom those stronger people are actually afraid of. Also those who have destroyed people stronger than we are. Also those who are attacking people weaker than we are: either they are already formidable, or they will be so when they have thus grown stronger. Of those we have wronged, and of our enemies or rivals, it is not the passionate and outspoken whom we have to fear, but the quiet, dissembling, unscrupulous; since we never know when they are upon us,

1383a5. FEAR SETS US THINKING WHAT CAN BE DONE: That is, fear makes people deliberate about what to do, and so to act deliberately. This may explain the exceptional nature of fear in comparison to the other emotions Aristotle treats. Since we are so familiar with ways that emotions can cloud our thinking, this line is a useful reminder that the emotions can focus our attention too.

we can never be sure they are at a safe distance. All terrible things are more terrible if they give us no chance of retrieving a blunder-either no chance at all, or only one that depends on our enemies and not ourselves. Those things are also worse which we cannot, or cannot easily, help. Speaking generally, anything causes us to feel fear that when it happens to, or threatens, others causes us to feel pity.

The above are, roughly, the chief things that are terrible and are feared. Let us now describe the conditions under which we ourselves feel fear. If fear is associated with the expectation that something destructive will happen to us, plainly nobody will be afraid who believes nothing can happen to him; we shall not fear things that we believe cannot happen to us, nor people who we believe cannot inflict them upon us; nor shall we be afraid at times when we think ourselves safe from them. It follows therefore that fear is felt by those who believe something to be likely to happen to them, at the hands of particular persons, in a particular form, and at a particular time. People do not believe this when they are, or think they are, in the midst of great prosperity, and are in consequence insolent, contemptuous, and reckless-the kind of character produced by wealth, physical strength, abundance of friends, power: nor yet when they feel they have experienced every kind of horror already and have grown callous about the future, like men who are being flogged and are already nearly dead-if they are to feel the anguish of uncertainty, there must be some faint expectation of escape. This appears from the fact that fear sets us thinking what can be done,^o which of course nobody does when things are hopeless. Consequently, when it is advisable that the audience should be frightened, the orator must make them feel that they really are in danger of something, pointing out that it has happened to others who were stronger than they are, and is happening, or has happened, to people like themselves, at the hands of unexpected people, in an unexpected form, and at an unexpected time.

Having now seen the nature of fear, and of the things that cause it, and the various states of mind in which it is felt, we can also see what Confidence is, about what things we feel it, and under what conditions. It is the opposite of fear, and what causes it is the opposite of what causes fear; it is, therefore, the expectation associated with a mental picture of the nearness of what keeps us safe and the absence or remoteness of what is terrible: it may be due either to the near presence of what inspires confidence or to the absence of what causes alarm. We feel it if we can take steps-many, or important, or both-to cure or prevent trouble; if we have neither wronged others nor been wronged by them; if we have either no rivals at all or no strong ones;

if our rivals who are strong are our friends or have treated us well or been treated well by us; or if those whose interest is the same as ours are the more numerous party, or the stronger, or both.

As for our own state of mind, we feel confidence if we believe we have often succeeded and never suffered reverses, or have often met danger and escaped it safely. For there are two reasons why human beings face danger calmly: they may have no experience of it, or they may have means to deal with it: thus when in danger at sea people may feel confident about what will happen either because they have no experience of bad weather, or because their experience gives them the means of dealing with it. We also feel confident whenever there is nothing to terrify other people like ourselves, or people weaker than ourselves, or people than whom we believe ourselves to be stronger- and we believe this if we have conquered them, or conquered others who are as strong as they are, or stronger. Also if we believe ourselves superior to our rivals in the number and importance of the advantages that make men formidable-wealth, physical strength, strong

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Shame comes next. Aristotle defines it, indicates the subjects of shame, the people before whom we are ashamed, and the dispositions of people who tend to be ashamed. He then treats the contrary of shame-shamelessness or impudice-in the rest of the chapter. There is no distinct word for guilt in Greek, so we can ask whether the shame Aristotle discusses covers what we mean by both shame and guilt. If not, from our perspective we can ask whether there is a reason for shame to be relevant to the orator's job, while guilt is invisible in this context. Or would a contemporary rhetoric devote a separate chapters to guilt?

bodies of supporters, extensive territory, and the possession of all, or the most important, appliances of war. Also if we have wronged no one, or not many, or not those of whom we are afraid; and generally, if our relations with the gods are satisfactory, as will be shown especially by signs and oracles. The fact is that anger makes us confident-that anger is excited by our knowledge that we are not the wrongers but the wronged, and that the divine power is always supposed to be on the side of the wronged. Also when, at the outset of an enterprise, we believe that we cannot and shall not fail, or that we shall succeed completely.-So much for the causes of fear and confidence.

WE NOW TURN TO Shame and Shamelessness; what follows will explain the things that cause these feelings, and the persons before whom, and the states of mind under which, they are felt. Shame may be defined as pain or disturbance in regard to bad things, whether present, past, or future, which seem likely to involve us in discredit; and shamelessness as contempt or indifference in regard to these same bad things. If this definition be granted, it follows that we feel shame at such bad things as we think are disgraceful to ourselves or to those we care for. These evils are, in the first place, those due to moral badness. Such are throwing away one's shield or taking to flight; for these bad things are due to cowardice. Also, withholding a deposit or otherwise wronging people about money; for these acts are due to injustice. Also, having carnal intercourse with forbidden persons, at wrong times, or in wrong places; for these things are due to licentiousness. Also, making profit in petty or disgraceful ways, or out of helpless persons, e. g. the poor, or the dead—whence the proverb 'He would pick a corpse's pocket'; for all this is due to low greed and meanness. Also, in money matters, giving less help than you might, or none at all, or accepting help from those worse off than yourself; so also borrowing when it will seem like begging; begging when it will seem like asking the return of a favour; asking such a return when it will seem like begging; praising a man in order that it may seem like begging; and going on begging in spite of failure: all such actions are tokens of meanness. Also, praising people to their face, and praising extravagantly a man's good points and glozing over his weaknesses, and showing extravagant sympathy with his grief when you are in his presence, and all that sort of thing; all this shows the disposition of a flatterer. Also, refusing to endure hardships that are endured by people who are older, more delicately brought up, of higher rank, or generally less capable of endurance than ourselves: for all this shows effeminacy. Also, accepting benefits, especially accepting them often, from another man, and then abusing him for conferring them: all this shows a mean, ignoble disposition. Also, talking incessantly about yourself, making loud professions, and appropriating the merits of others; for this is due to boastfulness. The same is true of the actions due to any of the other forms of badness of moral character, of the tokens of such badness, &c.: they are all disgraceful and shameless. Another sort of bad thing at which we feel shame is, lacking a share in the honourable things shared by every one else, or by all or nearly all who are like ourselves. By 'those like ourselves' I mean those of our own race or country or age or family, and generally those who are on

our own level. Once we are on a level with others, it is a disgrace to be, say, less well educated than they are; and so with other advantages: all the more so, in each case, if it is seen to be our own fault: wherever we are ourselves to blame for our present, past, or future circumstances, it follows at once that this is to a greater extent due to our moral badness. We are moreover ashamed of having done to us, having had done, or being about to have done to us acts that involve us in dishonour and reproach; as when we surrender our persons, or lend ourselves to vile deeds, e.g. when we submit to outrage. And acts of yielding to the lust of others are shameful whether willing or unwilling (yielding to force being an instance of unwillingness), since unresisting submission to them is due to unmanliness or cowardice.

These things, and others like them, are what cause the feeling of shame. Now since shame is a mental picture of disgrace, in which we shrink from the disgrace itself and not from its consequences, and we only care what opinion is held to us because of the people who form that opinion, it follows that the people before whom we feel shame are those whose opinion of us matters to us. Such persons are: those who admire us, those whom we admire, those by whom we wish to be admired, those with whom we are competing, and those whose opinion of us we respect. We admire those, and wish those to admire us, who possess any good thing that is highly esteemed; or from whom we are very anxious to get something that they are able to give us—as a lover feels. We compete with our equals. We respect, as true, the views of sensible people, such as our elders and those who have been well educated. And we feel more shame about a thing if it is done openly, before all men's eyes. Hence the proverb, 'shame dwells in the eyes'. For this reason we feel most shame before those who will always be with us and those who notice what we do, since in both cases eyes are upon us. We also feel it before those not open to the same imputation as ourselves: for it is plain that their opinions about it are the opposite of ours. Also before those who are hard on any one whose conduct they think wrong; for what a man does himself, he is said not to resent when his neighbours do it: so that of course he does resent their doing what he does not do himself. And

1384b15-16. EURIPIDES: We are not sure that the Euripides referred to here is the tragic poet. Since his plays were popular in Syracuse, it could well have been.

before those who are likely to tell everybody about you; not telling others is as good as not believing you wrong. People are likely to tell others about you if you have wronged them, since they are on the look out to harm you; or if they speak evil of everybody, for those

who attack the innocent will be still more ready to attack the guilty. And before those whose main occupation is with their neighbours' failings—people like satirists and writers of comedy; these are really a kind of evil-speakers and tell-tales. And before those who have never yet known us come to grief, since their attitude to us has amounted to admiration so far: that is why we feel ashamed to refuse those a favour who ask one for the first time—we have not as yet lost credit with them. Such are those who are just beginning to wish to be our friends; for they have seen our best side only (hence the appropriateness of Euripides'^o reply to the Syracusans): and such also are those among our old acquaintances who know nothing to our discredit. And we are ashamed not merely of the actual shameful conduct mentioned, but also of the evidences of it: not merely, for example, of actual sexual intercourse, but also of its evidences; and not merely of disgraceful acts but also of disgraceful talk. Similarly we feel shame not merely in presence of the persons mentioned but also of those who will tell them what we have done, such as their servants or friends. And, generally, we feel no shame before those upon whose opinions we quite look down as untrustworthy (no one feels shame before small children or animals); nor are we ashamed of the same things before intimates as before strangers, but before the former of what seem genuine faults, before the latter of what seem conventional ones.

The conditions under which we shall feel shame are these: first, having people related to us like those before whom, as has been said, we feel shame. These are, as was stated, persons whom we admire, or who admire us, or by whom we

1384b32. CYDIAS: An Athenian orator, he made the argument about Samos in 365.

1385a9. ANTIPHON: A tragic poet, he was put to death for criticizing the tragedies written by the tyrant Dionysius the elder (430-367).

1385a14-15. TO UNDERSTAND SHAMELESSNESS ... ALL WE NEED: As in the case of calm in chapter 3, we can wonder whether shamelessness is an emotion at all, since it is a state of indifference, which in Greek is *apatheia* ("apathy") that is, the absence of passion.

wish to be admired, or from whom we desire some service that we shall not obtain if we forfeit their good opinion. These persons may be actually looking on (as Cydias^o represented them in his speech on land assignments in Samos, when he told the Athenians to imagine the Greeks to be standing all around them, actually seeing the way they voted and not merely going to hear about it afterwards): or again they may be near at hand, or may be likely to find out about what we do.

This is why in misfortune we do not wish to be seen by those who once wished themselves like us; for such a feeling implies admiration. And men feel shame when they have acts or exploits to their credit on which they are bringing dishonour, whether these are their own, or those of their ancestors, or those of other persons with whom they have some close connexion. Generally, we feel shame before those for whose own misconduct we should also feel it-those already mentioned; those who take us as their models; those whose teachers or advisers we have been; or other people, it may be, like ourselves, whose rivals we are. For there are many things that shame before such people makes us do or leave undone. And we feel more shame when we are likely to be continually seen by, and go about under the eyes of, those who know of our disgrace. Hence, when Antiphon^o the poet was to be cudgelled to death by order of Dionysius, and saw those who were to perish with him covering their faces as they went through the gates, he said, 'Why do you cover your faces? Is it lest some of these spectators should see you to-morrow?'

So much for Shame; to understand Shamelessness, we need only consider the converse cases, and plainly we shall have all we need.^{o o}

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Kindness is the next feeling presented to the orator. Aristotle defines kindness and the gifts that express it, and then the chapters continues by looking at the arguments used concerning kindness and its contrary, and the different classes of kindness. Like the other emotions Aristotle presents, kindness has an object: I feel kindly toward this person. It isn't a general feeling of benevolence toward the world. The Greek here is charis, which can also mean "charm," "grace," "favor," or "gratitude."

7

To TAKE KINDNESS NEXT: the definition of it will show us towards whom it is felt, why, and in what frames of mind. Kindness-under the influence of which a man is said to 'be kind'-may be defined as helpfulness towards some one in need, not in return for anything, nor for the advantage of the helper himself, but for that of the person helped. Kindness is great if shown to one who is in great need, or who needs what is important and hard to get, or who needs it at an

important and difficult crisis; or if the helper is the only, the first, or the chief person to give the help. Natural cravings constitute such needs; and in particular cravings, accompanied by pain, for what is not being attained. The appetites are cravings of this kind: sexual desire, for instance, and those which arise during bodily injuries and in dangers; for appetite is active both in danger and in pain. Hence those who stand by us in poverty or in banishment, even if they do not help us much, are yet really kind to us, because our need is great and the occasion pressing; for instance, the man who gave the mat in the Lyceum. The helpfulness must therefore meet, preferably, just this kind of need; and failing just this kind, some other kind as great or greater. We now see to whom, why, and under what conditions kindness is shown; and these facts must form the basis of our arguments. We must show that the persons helped are, or have been, in such pain and need as has been described, and that their helpers gave, or are giving, the kind of help described, in the kind of need described. We can also see how to eliminate the idea of kindness and make our opponents appear unkind: we may maintain that they are being or have been helpful simply to promote their own interest—this, as has been stated, is not kindness: or that their action was accidental, or was forced upon them; or that they

1385b5. CATEGORIES: In his book the Categories, Aristotle lists ten categories, or basic kinds of predicates (things said of a subject). (A category is also the legal term for an accusation, in which we tie an act to a person.) Aristotle lists five of them here as places for deriving arguments about kindness. The other five are relation, place, condition, action, and passion.

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Chapters 8-11 treat a quartet of emotions—pity, indignation, envy, and zeal or emulation—that have complex interrelations to one another. Of special interest is the fact that Aristotle sees these emotions, and not the earlier ones, as themselves signs of good and bad character. In the Ethics, for example, there is a virtue concerned with anger. The virtuous person is angry at the right people, at the right times, for the right reasons. Many people today might think that the good person doesn't hate anyone, but this is not Aristotle's idea. While we can pity the right or wrong People, just as we can be angry at or hate the right or wrong People, feeling pity itself is a characteristic of the good person, and feeling envy a sign of wickedness. Of these four, pity comes first. After defining it, the chapters discusses the dispositions of people who pity others, and the objects of pity—the things and people that are pitiful.

One difference between Aristotle's conception of pity and a modern idea

of pity is that Aristotle connects pity, like the other three emotions that follow, with the idea of what people deserve. We feel pity, he thinks, only at undeserved suffering. He does not speak of any painful feeling people have when presented with suffering as such. The same is true for pity in the Poetics; it is a response to undeserved suffering, although the Poetics allows tragedies to explore the ambiguities about who deserves what, while the Rhetoric shows the orator how to exploit such ambiguities by arguing for and against different aspects of the pitiful. The difference between Aristotelian pity and the pain we feel when others suffer is important. That more general sort of pity related to compassion, sympathy, empathy, etc. - does not seem characteristic of good character, as Aristotle says his idea of pity is. If one can, and maybe even should, feel pity for anyone, then pity has nothing to do with character.

1385b13-15. PITY MAY BE DEFINED ... BEFALL US SOON: In the next chapter, Aristotle will say that pity is an emotion characteristic of the good person. What is missing from other people-the capacity to be pained at undeserved suffering, or the capacity to think that the same thing might happen to them?

1385b23. PRESUMPTUOUS INSOLENCES: This phrase translates hubris.

were not doing a favour, but merely returning one, whether they know this or not-in either case the action is a mere return, and is therefore not a kindness even if the doer does not know how the case stands. In considering this subject we must look at all the 'categories':⁰ an act may be an act of kindness because (1) it is a particular thing, (2) it has a particular magnitude or (3) quality, or (4) is done at a particular time or (5) place. As evidence of the want of kindness, we may point out that a smaller service had been refused to the man in need; or that the same service, or an equal or greater one, has been given to his enemies; these facts show that the service in question was not done for the sake of the person helped. Or we may point out that the thing desired was worthless and that the helper knew it: no one will admit that he is in need of what is worthless.

asking ourselves what things excite pity, and for what persons, and in what states of our mind pity is felt. Pity may be defined as a feeling of pain caused by the sight of some evil, destructive or painful, which befalls one who does not deserve it, and which we might expect to befall ourselves or some friend of ours, and moreover to befall us soon.^o In order to feel pity, we must obviously be capable of supposing that some evil may happen to us or some friend of ours, and moreover some such evil as is stated in our definition or is more or less of that kind. It is therefore not felt by those completely ruined, who suppose that no further evil can befall them, since the worst has befallen them already; nor by those who imagine themselves immensely fortunate—their feeling is rather presumptuous insolence,^o for when they think they possess all the good things of life, it is clear that the

1386a4-9. PAINFUL AND DESTRUCTIVE EVILS ... DISEASES: If we can pity death, old age, and disease, what has happened to the connection between pity and undeserved suffering? It doesn't seem to make sense to think of someone undeservedly growing old.

1386a]2. EVIL COMING FROM A SOURCE ... TO HAVE COME: This is similar to Aristotle's definition of reversal at Poetics 1452a22.

impossibility of evil befalling them will be included, this being one of the good things in question. Those who think evil may befall them are such as have already had it befall ; them and have safely escaped from it; elderly men, owing to their good sense and their experience; weak men, especially men inclined to cowardice; and also educated people, since these can take long views. Also those who have parents living, or children, or wives; for these are our own, and the evils mentioned above may easily befall them. And those who are neither moved by any courageous emotion such as anger or confidence (these emotions take no account of the future), nor by a disposition to presumptuous insolence (insolent men, too, take no account of the possibility that something evil will happen to them), nor yet by great fear (panic-stricken people do not feel pity, because they are taken up with what is happening to themselves); only those feel pity who are between these two extremes. In order to feel pity we must also believe in the goodness of at least some people; if you think nobody good, you will believe that everybody deserves evil fortune. And, generally, we feel pity whenever we are in the condition of remembering that similar misfortunes have happened to us or ours, or expecting them to happen in future.

So much for the mental conditions under which we feel pity. What we pity is stated clearly in the definition. All unpleasant and painful things excite pity if they tend to destroy and annihilate; and all such evils as are due to chance, if they are serious. The painful and

destructive evils are: death in its various forms, bodily injuries and afflictions, old age, diseases,^o lack of food. The evils due to chance are: friendless-ness, scarcity of friends (it is a pitiful thing to be torn away from friends and companions), deformity, weakness, mutilation ; evil coming from a source from which good ought to have come;^o and the frequent repetition of such misfortunes.

1386a14. DIOPEITHES: Diopeithes of Sounian was a general who died around 340.

1386a19. AMASIS: Herodotus tells the story of Amasis in book III of the Histories. He was pharaoh of Egypt from 569 until 526.

1386a23. THE TERRIBLE IS DIFFERENT FROM THE PITIFUL: That is, we cannot experience both pity and fear. We should try to understand what this has to do with the discussion of pity and fear in the Poetics.

1386a25-27. WE PITY THOSE WHO ARE LIKE US IN AGE ... OR BIRTH: As in the Poetics (chapter 13), we can only pity people we think of as similar to ourselves.

Also the coming of good when the worst has happened: e.g. the arrival of the Great King's gifts for Diopeithes^o after his death. Also that either no good should have befallen a man at all, or that he should not be able to enjoy it when it has.

The grounds, then, on which we feel pity are these or like these. The people we pity are: those whom we know, if only they are not very closely related to us-in that case we feel about them as if we were in danger ourselves. For this reason Amasis^{*} did not weep, they say, at the sight of his son being led to death, but did weep when he saw his friend begging: the latter sight was pitiful, the former terrible, and the terrible is different from the pitiful;^o it tends to cast out pity, and often helps to produce the opposite of pity. Again, we feel pity when the danger is near ourselves. Also we pity those who are like us in age, character, disposition, social standing, or birth;^o for in all these cases it appears more likely that the same misfortune may befall us also. Here too we have to remember the general principle that what we fear for ourselves excites our pity when it happens to others. Further, since it is when the sufferings of others are close to us that they excite our pity (we cannot remember what disasters happened a hundred centuries ago, nor look forward to what will happen a hundred centuries hereafter, and therefore feel little pity, if any, for such things): it follows that those who heighten the effect of their words with suitable gestures, tones, dress, and dramatic action generally, are especially successful in exciting pity: they thus put the disasters before our eyes, and make them seem close to us, just coming or just past. Anything that has just happened, or is going to happen soon, is

particularly piteous: so too therefore are the tokens and the actions of sufferers-the garments and the like of those who have already suffered; the words and the like of those actually suffering of those, for instance, who are on the point of death. Most piteous of all is it when, in such times of trial, the victims are

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Indignation (nemesis) is the next emotion. Aristotle shows how indignation differs from both pity and envy, which will be the subject of chapter 10. He indicates the kind of people who cause indignation, and the dispositions of people who feel it.

persons of noble character: whenever they are so, our pity is especially excited, because their innocence, as well as the setting of their misfortunes before our eyes, makes their misfortunes seem close to ourselves.

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MOST DIRECTLY OPPOSED TO pity is the feeling called Indignation. Pain at unmerited good fortune is, in one sense, opposite to pain at unmerited bad fortune, and is due to the same moral qualities. Both feelings are associated with good moral character; it is our duty both to feel sympathy and pity for unmerited distress, and to feel indignation at unmerited prosperity; for whatever is undeserved is unjust, and that is why we ascribe indignation even to the gods. It might indeed be thought that envy is similarly opposed to pity, on the ground that envy is closely akin to indignation, or even the same thing. But it is not the same. It is true that it also is a disturbing pain excited by the prosperity of others. But it is excited not by the prosperity of the undeserving but by that of people who are like us or equal with us. The two feelings have this in common, that they must be due not to some untoward thing being likely to befall ourselves, but only to what is happening to our neighbour. The feeling ceases to be envy in the one case and indignation in the other, and becomes fear, if the pain and disturbance are due to the prospect of something bad for ourselves as the result of the other man's good fortune. The feelings of pity and indignation will obviously be attended by the converse feelings of satisfaction. If you are pained by the unmerited

distress of others, you will be pleased, or at least not pained, by their merited distress. Thus no good man can be pained by the punishment of parricides or murderers. These are things we are bound to rejoice at, as we must at the prosperity of the deserving; both

1387a8-12. INDIGNATION IS PAIN ... UNDESERVED GOOD FORTUNE: It is, in one sense, opposite to pain at unmerited bad fortune, and is due to the same moral qualities. Both feelings are associated with good moral character. This might be a place where Aristotle's conceptions of the emotions, or his moral values, differ from ours. We might blame someone who is insensitive to the undeserved suffering of others, but do we feel the same way about people who aren't bothered by undeserved good fortune? Pity has two requirements: We have to feel pain for someone who suffers undeservedly, and we have to imagine that the same could happen to us. Aristotle says nothing about this second factor for indignation. I don't feel indignant when you win the lottery, although that is clearly undeserved good fortune. I might be pained when you undeservedly get a job that I want, but is that indignation or envy? Is it characteristic of a good person or a bad one? The rest of Aristotle's paragraph seems to address this question, but what, finally, is the answer?

In his Eudemian Ethics, Aristotle says that nemesis includes not only pain at someone else's undeserved good fortune, but pain at either good or bad fortune that is undeserved and pleasure at deserved good and bad fortune (1233b16-34). He narrows the emotion here, I think, in order to place it in relation to envy, pity, and emulation.

1387a16-19. WHAT IS LONG ESTABLISHED ... LONG STANDING AND INHERITED: This is a clear example of the Rhetoric presenting what people believe, and therefore what will persuade them, rather than anything that Aristotle himself thinks is true. It is a clear example, too, of the way people usually put together ideas of merit and moral goodness with ideas of social class and standing.

these things are just, and both give pleasure to any honest man, since he cannot help expecting that what has happened to a man like him will happen to him too. All these feelings are associated with the same type of moral character. And their contraries are associated with the contrary type; the man who is delighted by others' misfortunes is identical with the man who envies others' prosperity. For any one who is pained by the occurrence or existence of a given thing must be pleased by that thing's non-existence or destruction. We can now see that all these feelings tend to prevent pity (though they differ among themselves, for the reasons given), so that all are equally useful for neutralizing an appeal to pity.

We will first consider Indignation-reserving the other emotions for subsequent discussion-and ask with whom, on what grounds, and in what states of mind we may be indignant. These questions are really answered by what has been said already. Indignation is pain caused by the sight of undeserved good fortune.⁹ It is, then, plain to begin with that there are some forms of good the sight of which cannot cause it. Thus a man may be just or brave, or acquire moral goodness: but we shall not be indignant with him for that reason, any more than we shall pity him for the contrary reason. Indignation is roused by the sight of wealth, power, and the like-by all those things, roughly speaking, which are deserved by good men and by those who possess the goods of nature noble birth, beauty, and so on. Again, what is long established seems akin to what exists by nature; and therefore we feel more indignation at those possessing a given good if they have as a matter of fact only just got it and the prosperity it brings with it. The newly rich give more offence than those whose wealth is of long standing and inherited.⁰ The same is true of those who have office or power, plenty of friends, a fine family, &c. We feel the same when these advantages of theirs secure them others. For here again, the newly rich give us more

1387a33-34. 'ONLY FROM BATTLE HE SHRANK ... A MIGHTIER ONE': The lines are from the Iliad IX.542.

offence by obtaining office through their riches than do those whose wealth is of long standing; and so in all other cases. The reason is that what the latter have is felt to be really their own, but what the others have is not: what appears to have been always what it is is regarded as real, and so the possessions of the newly rich do not seem to be really their own. Further, it is not any and every man that deserves any given kind of good; there is a certain correspondence and appropriateness in such things; thus it is appropriate for brave men, not for just men, to have fine weapons, and for men of family, not for parvenus, to make distinguished marriages. Indignation may therefore properly be felt when any one gets what is not appropriate for him, though he may be a good man enough. It may also be felt when any one sets himself up against his superior, especially against his superior in some particular respect-whence the lines

Only from battle he shrank with Aias Telamon's son; Zeus had been angered with him, had he fought with a mightier one;

but also, even apart from that, when the inferior in any sense contends with his superior; a musician, for instance, with a just man, for justice is a finer thing than music.

Enough has been said to make clear the grounds on which, and the

persons against whom, Indignation is felt-they are those mentioned, and others like them. As for the people who feel it; we feel it if we do ourselves deserve the greatest possible goods and moreover have them, for it is an injustice that those who are not our equals should have been held to deserve as much as we have. Or, secondly, we feel it if we are really good and honest people; our judgement is then sound, and we loathe any kind of injustice. Also if we are ambitious and eager to gain particular ends, especially if we

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This chapter defines envy, and describes the dispositions of people who feel envy, the objects of envy, and the people who are envied. Envy is the only emotion Aristotle discusses that he says is characteristic only of bad people.

1387b22-24. ENVY IS PAIN ... BECAUSE THE OTHER PEOPLE HAVE IT: Bad people feel envy, while good people feel pity and indignation, because when I envy you, I don't care whether you deserve what you have or not; I only want the thing because you have it. However, what's wrong with envy isn't just that it ignores whether something is deserved, since, we will see, the next emotion does so too.

are ambitious for what others are getting without deserving to get it. And, generally, if we think that we ourselves deserve a thing and that others do not, we are disposed to be indignant with those others so far as that thing is concerned. Hence servile, worthless, unambitious persons are not inclined to Indignation, since there is nothing they can believe themselves to deserve.

From all this it is plain what sort of men those are at whose misfortunes, distresses, or failures we ought to feel pleased, or at least not pained: by considering the facts described we see at once what their contraries are. If therefore our speech puts the judges in such a frame of mind as that indicated and shows that those who claim pity on certain definite grounds do not deserve to secure pity but do deserve not to secure it, it will be impossible for the judges to feel pity.

TO TAKE ENVY NEXT: we can see on what grounds, against what persons, and in what states of mind we feel it. Envy is pain at the sight of such good fortune as consists of the good things already mentioned; we feel it towards our equals; not with the idea of getting something for ourselves, but because the other people have it.^o We shall feel it if we have, or think we have, equals; and by quals' I mean equals in birth, relationship, age, disposition, distinction, or wealth. We feel envy also if we fall but a little short of having everything; which is why people in high place and prosperity feel it they think every one else is taking what belongs to themselves. Also if we are exceptionally distinguished for some particular thing, and especially if that thing is wisdom or good fortune. Ambitious men are more envious than those who are not. So also those who profess wisdom; they are ambitious-to be thought wise. Indeed, generally, those who aim at a reputation

1388a8. 'Ay, KIN CAN EVEN BE JEALOUS OF THEIR KIN': The line comes, we think, from a lost play of Aeschylus.

1388a16. 'POTTER AGAINST POTTER': The quotation is from Hesiod's Works and Days 25.

for anything are envious on this particular point. And small-minded men are envious, for everything seems great to them. The good things which excite envy have already been mentioned. The deeds or possessions which arouse the love of reputation and honour and the desire for fame, and the various gifts of fortune, are almost all subject to envy; and particularly if we desire the thing ourselves, or think we are entitled to it, or if having it puts us a little above others, or not having it a little below them. It is clear also what kind of people we envy; that was included in what has been said already: we envy those who are near us in time, place, age, or reputation. Hence the line:

Ay, kin can even be jealous of their kin.^o

Also our fellow-competitors, who are indeed the people just mentioned-we do not compete with men who lived a hundred centuries ago, or those not yet born, or the dead, or those who dwell near the Pillars of Hercules, or those whom, in our opinion or that of others, we take to be far below us or far above us. So too we compete with those who follow the same ends as ourselves: we compete with our rivals in sport or in love, and generally with those who are after the same things; and it is therefore these whom we are bound to envy beyond all others. Hence the saying:

Potter against potter.^o 0

We also envy those whose possession of or success in a thing is a reproach to us: these are our neighbours and equals; for it is clear that

it is our own fault we have missed the good thing in question; this annoys us, and excites envy in us. We also envy those who have what we ought to have, or have got what we did have once. Hence old men envy younger men,

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*The last emotion Aristotle treats is emulation. The Greek word is *zelos*, from which we get the English word “zeal.” Even in Greek, the word could mean any strong, active emotion, any form of eagerness, but here Aristotle takes it in a narrower sense, so that he can compare it to envy, pity, and indignation. Here too he looks at the dispositions and subjects of the feeling, and the people whom we want to emulate. We learn that despising is the contrary of emulating.*

1388a30-33. EMULATION IS PAIN ... NOT GOT THEM OURSELVES: The definition of “emulation” says nothing about whether the goods the other person has are deserved or not. In this way emulation and envy differ from pity and indignation. If you are a better swimmer than I am, I could either try to do something to you so you can’t swim as well, or I could become a better swimmer myself. The first of these is envy, the second emulation. Envy is characteristic of bad people, emulation of good people.

and those who have spent much envy those who have spent little on the same thing. And men who have not got a thing, or not got it yet, envy those who have got it quickly. We can also see what things and what persons give pleasure to envious people, and in what states of mind they feel it: the states of mind in which they feel pain are those under which they will feel pleasure in the contrary things. If therefore we ourselves with whom the decision rests are put into an envious state of mind, and those for whom our pity, or the award of something desirable, is claimed are such as have been described, it is obvious that they will win no pity from us.

11

WE WILL NEXT CONSIDER Emulation, showing in what follows its causes and objects, and the state of mind in which it is felt. Emulation

is pain caused by seeing the presence, in persons whose nature is like our own, of good things that are highly valued and are possible for ourselves to acquire; but it is felt not because others have these goods, but because we have not got them ourselves. It is therefore a good feeling felt by good persons, whereas envy is a bad feeling felt by bad persons. Emulation makes us take steps to secure the good things in question, envy makes us take steps to stop our neighbour having them. Emulation must therefore tend to be felt by persons who believe themselves to deserve certain good things that they have not got, it being understood that no one aspires to things which appear impossible. It is accordingly felt by the young and by persons of lofty disposition. Also by those who possess such good things as are deserved by men held in honour—these are wealth, abundance of friends, public office, and the like; on the assumption that they ought to be good men, they are emulous to gain such goods because they ought, in their belief, to belong to men whose state of mind is good. Also by those whom all others think deserving. We also feel it about anything for which our ancestors, relatives, personal friends, race, or country are specially honoured, looking upon that thing as really our own, and therefore feeling that we deserve to have it. Further, since all good things that are highly honoured are objects of emulation, moral goodness in its various forms must be such an object, and also all those good things that are useful and serviceable to others: for men honour those who are morally good, and also those who do them service. So with those good things our possession of which can give enjoyment to our neighbours—wealth and beauty rather than health. We can see, too, what persons are the objects of the feeling. They are those who have these and similar things—those already mentioned, as courage, wisdom, public office. Holders of public office—generals, orators, and all who possess such powers—can do many people a good turn. Also those whom many people wish to be like; those who have many acquaintances or friends; those whom many admire, or whom we ourselves admire; and those who have been praised and eulogized by poets or prose-writers. Persons of the contrary sort are objects of contempt: for the feeling and notion of contempt are opposite to those of emulation. Those who are such as to emulate or be emulated by others are inevitably disposed to be contemptuous of all such persons as are subject to those bad things which are contrary to the good things that are the objects of emulation: despising them for just that reason. Hence we often despise the fortunate, when luck comes to them without their having those good things which are held in honour.

This completes our discussion of the means by which the several emotions may be produced or dissipated, and upon which depend the

persuasive arguments connected with the emotions.

- 12-

After this series of emotions, Aristotle turns to the differences in human characters that the orator should take into account. In chapters 12-14 he looks, respectively, at the character of young people, old people, and those in the prime of life. In each case, he shows the orator how to think different. These chapters concern the ethos of the character of the should

1389a16. PITTACUS' REMARK ABOUT AMPHIARAUS: Pittacus of Mytilene (c.650-570), a politician known for his wise sayings, is often included as one of the seven sages (seventh- and sixth-century men with a reputation for practical wisdom; exactly which seven people are counted as the seven sages varies in different accounts). Aristotle assumes that his audience knows what Pittacus said about Amphiaraus, but we don't know.

12

LET US NOW CONSIDER the various types of human character, in relation to the emotions and moral qualities, showing how they correspond to our various ages and fortunes. By emotions I mean anger, desire, and the like; these we have discussed already. By moral qualities I mean virtues and vices; these also have been discussed already, as well as the various things that various types of men tend to will and to do. By ages I mean youth, the prime of life, and old age. By fortune I mean birth, wealth, power, and their opposites—in fact, good fortune and ill fortune.

To begin with the Youthful type of character. Young men have strong passions, and tend to gratify them indiscriminately. Of the bodily desires, it is the sexual by which they are most swayed and in which they show absence of self-control. They are changeable and fickle in their desires, which are violent while they last, but quickly over: their impulses are keen but not deep-rooted, and are like sick people's attacks of hunger and thirst. They are hot-tempered and quick-tempered, and apt to give way to their anger; bad temper often gets the better of them, for owing to their love of honour they cannot bear

being slighted, and are indignant if they imagine themselves unfairly treated. While they love honour, they love victory still more; for youth is eager for superiority over others, and victory is one form of this. They love both more than they love money, which indeed they love very little, not having yet learnt what it means to be without it—this is the point of Pittacus’ remark about Amphiaras. “They look at the good side rather than the bad, not having yet witnessed many instances of wickedness. They trust others readily, because they have not yet often been cheated. They are sanguine ; nature warms their blood as though with excess of

1389a29. THEY ARE SHY : “Shy” could also be translated as “sensitive to shame.” The young care about the opinion of others.

1389a34-37. THEY WOULD ALWAYS RATHER DO ... WHAT IS NOBLE: This series of contrasts reflects what people believe, not necessarily what Aristotle himself thinks about the relation between moral goodness and intelligence. In book III he says that people become suspicious of a speaker who appears too logical, since they think such a speaker isn’t arguing from his character—as we could say, from the heart. We will find similar ideas at work in the discussion of maxims in book II, chapter 21. Recall, in Poetics 6, that he describes character as “that in virtue of which we ascribe certain [moral] qualities to the agents” (Poetics 6.1450a5). From that, it seems to follow that reasoning doesn’t lead us to ascribe moral qualities to a speaker.

1389b3. CHILON’S PRECEPT: A sixth-century Spartan politician, his name is also sometimes included in the list of the seven sages of Greece.

wine; and besides that, they have as yet met with few disappointments. Their lives are mainly spent not in memory but in expectation; for expectation refers to the future, memory to the past, and youth has a long future before it and a short past behind it: on the first day of one’s life one has nothing at all to remember, and can only look forward. They are easily cheated, owing to the sanguine disposition just mentioned. Their hot tempers and hopeful dispositions make them more courageous than older men are; the hot temper prevents fear, and the hopeful disposition creates confidence; we cannot feel fear so long as we are feeling angry, and any expectation of good makes us confident. They are shy,^o accepting the rules of society in which they have been trained, and not yet believing in any other standard of honour. They have exalted notions, because they have not yet been humbled by life or learnt its necessary limitations; moreover, their hopeful disposition makes them think themselves equal to great things—and that means having exalted notions. They

would always rather do noble deeds than useful ones: their lives are regulated more by moral feeling than by reasoning; and whereas reasoning leads us to choose what is useful, moral goodness leads us to choose what is noble.^o They are fonder of their friends, intimates, and companions than older men are, because they like spending their days in the company of others, and have not yet come to value either their friends or anything else by their usefulness to themselves. All their mistakes are in the direction of doing things excessively and vehemently. They disobey Chilon's precept^o by overdoing everything ; they love too much and hate too much, and the same with everything else. They think they know everything, and are always quite sure about it; this, in fact, is why they overdo everything. If they do wrong to others, it is because they mean to insult them, not to do them actual harm. They are ready to pity others, because they think every one an honest man, or

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What values do old people have that the speaker can appeal to? Young people are more motivated by nobility

anyhow better than he is: they judge their neighbour by their own harmless natures, and so cannot think he deserves to be treated in that way. They are fond of fun and therefore witty, wit being well-bred insolence.

13

SUCH, THEN, IS THE character of the Young. The character of Elderly Men—men who are past their prime—may be said to be formed for the most part of elements that are the contrary of all these. They have lived many years; they have often been taken in, and often made mistakes; and life on the whole is a bad business. The result is that they are sure about nothing and *under-do* everything. They 'think', but they never 'know'; and because of their hesitation they always add a 'possibly' or a 'perhaps', putting everything this way and nothing positively. They are cynical; that is, they tend to put the worse construction on everything. Further, their experience makes them distrustful and therefore suspicious of evil. Consequently they neither love warmly nor hate bitterly, but following the hint of Bias they love

as though they will some day hate and hate as though they will some day love. They are small-minded, because they have been humbled by life: their desires are set upon nothing more exalted or unusual than what will help them to keep alive. They are not generous, because money is one of the things they must have, and at the same time their experience has taught them how hard it is to get and how easy to lose. They are cowardly, and are always anticipating danger; unlike that of the young, who are warm-blooded, their temperament is chilly; old age has paved the way for cowardice; fear is, in fact, a form of chill. They love life; and all the more when their last day has come, because the object of all desire is something we have not got, and also because we desire most strongly that which we need most urgently. They are too fond of themselves; this is one form that small-mindedness takes. Because of this, they guide their lives too much by considerations of what is useful and too little by what is noble—for the useful is what is good for oneself, and the noble what is good absolutely. They are not shy, but shameless rather; caring less for what is noble than for what is useful, they feel contempt for what people may think of them. They lack confidence in the future; partly through experience—for most things go wrong, or anyhow turn out worse than one expects; and partly because of their cowardice. They live by memory rather than by hope; for what is left to them of life is but little as compared with the long past; and hope is of the future, memory of the past. This, again, is the cause of their loquacity; they are continually talking of the past, because they enjoy remembering it. Their fits of anger are sudden but feeble. Their sensual passions have either altogether gone or have lost their vigour: consequently they do not feel their passions much, and their actions are inspired less by what they do feel than by the love of gain. Hence men at this time of life are often supposed to have a self-controlled character; the fact is that their passions have slackened, and they are slaves to the love of gain. They guide their lives by reasoning more than by moral feeling; reasoning being directed to utility and moral feeling to moral goodness. If they wrong others, they mean to injure them, not to insult them. Old men may feel pity, as well as young men, but not for the same reason. Young men feel it out of kindness; old men out of weakness, imagining that anything that befalls any one else might easily happen to them, which, as we saw, is a thought that excites pity. Hence they are querulous, and not disposed to jesting or laughter—the love of laughter being the very opposite of querulousness.

The prime of life combines the good qualities of youth and those of age. This brief chapter seems to say that the prime of life has no characteristic properties of its own; it is simply a happy medium between the excesses of youth and the experiences of old age.

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There are three more properties of people that influence how they respond to arguments: nobility, wealth, and power. Aristotle looks at them in the next three chapters. In each case he examines, among other things, the kinds of errors or vices that the given property is prone to. First he discusses nobility, with its tendency to ambition and arrogance.

Such are the characters of Young Men and Elderly Men. People always think well of speeches adapted to, and reflecting, their own character: and we can now see how to compose our speeches so as to adapt both them and ourselves to our audiences.

14

As FOR MEN IN their Prime, clearly we shall find that they have a character between that of the young and that of the old, free from the extremes of either. They have neither that excess of confidence which amounts to rashness, nor too much timidity, but the right amount of each. They neither trust everybody nor distrust everybody, but judge people correctly. Their lives will be guided not by the sole consideration either of what is noble or of what is useful, but by both; neither by parsimony nor by prodigality, but by what is fit and proper. So, too, in regard to anger and desire; they will be brave as well as temperate, and temperate as well as brave; these virtues are divided between the young and the old; the young are brave but intemperate, the old temperate but cowardly. To put it generally, all the valuable qualities that youth and age divide between them are united in the prime of life, while all their excesses or defects are replaced by moderation and fitness. The body is in its prime from thirty to five-and-thirty; the mind about forty-nine.

SO MUCH FOR THE types of character that distinguish youth, old age, and the prime of life. We will now turn to those Gifts of Fortune by which human character is affected. First let us consider Good Birth. Its effect on character is to make those who have it more ambitious; it is the way of all men who have

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What difference does wealth make to the arguments an audience will find appealing? something to start with to add to the pile, and good birth implies ancestral distinction. The well-born man will look down even on those who are as good as his own ancestors, because any far-off distinction is greater than the same thing close to us, and better to boast about. Being well-born, which means coming of a fine stock, must be distinguished from nobility, which means being true to the family nature—a quality not usually found in the wellborn, most of whom are poor creatures. In the generations of men as in the fruits of the earth, there is a varying yield; now and then, where the stock is good, exceptional men are produced for a while, and then decadence sets in. A clever stock will degenerate towards the insane type of character, like the descendants of Alcibiades or of the elder Dionysius; a steady stock towards the fatuous and torpid type, like the descendants of Cimon, Pericles, and Socrates.

16

THE TYPE OF CHARACTER produced by Wealth lies on the surface for all to see. Wealthy men are insolent and arrogant; their possession of wealth affects their understanding; they feel as if they had every good thing that exists; wealth becomes a sort of standard of value for everything else, and therefore they imagine there is nothing it cannot buy. They are luxurious and ostentatious; luxurious, because of the luxury in which they live and the prosperity which they display; ostentatious and vulgar, because, like other people's, their minds are regularly occupied with the object of their love and admiration, and also because they think that other people's idea of happiness is the same as their own. It is indeed quite natural that they should be

affected thus; for if you have money, there are always plenty of people who come begging from you. Hence the saying of Simonides about wise men and rich men, in answer to Hiero's wife, who asked him whether it was better to grow rich or wise.

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Aristotle asks the same question about power: What difference does power make to the arguments an audience will find appealing?

'Why, rich,' he said; 'for I see the wise men spending their days at the rich men's doors.' Rich men also consider themselves worthy to hold public office; for they consider they already have the things that give a claim to office. In a word, the type of character produced by wealth is that of a prosperous fool. There is indeed one difference between the type of the newly-enriched and those who have long been rich: the newly-enriched have all the bad qualities mentioned in an exaggerated and worse form—to be newly-enriched means, so to speak, no education in *riches*. The wrongs they do others are not meant to injure their victims, but spring from insolence or self-indulgence, e.g. those that end in assault or in adultery.

17

As TO POWER: HERE too it may fairly be said that the type of character it produces is mostly obvious enough. Some elements in this type it shares with the wealthy type, others are better. Those in power are more ambitious and more manly in character than the wealthy, because they aspire to do the great deeds that their power permits them to do. Responsibility makes them more serious: they have to keep paying attention to the duties their position involves. They are dignified rather than arrogant, for the respect in which they are held inspires them with dignity and therefore with moderation—dignity being a mild and becoming form of arrogance. If they wrong others, they wrong them not on a small but on a great scale.

Good fortune in certain of its branches produces the types of character belonging to the conditions just described, since these conditions are in fact more or less the kinds of good fortune that are regarded as most important. It may be added that good fortune leads us to gain all we can in the way of family happiness and bodily

advantages. It does indeed make

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This chapter summarizes what has come before: the treatment of the three kinds of rhetoric in book I, and of the three kinds of proof- logical, ethical, and emotional-in book II. For the rest of book II Aristotle will consider facets of persuasion common to all the kinds of rhetoric.

men more supercilious and more reckless; but there is one excellent quality that goes with it—piety, and respect for the divine power, in which they believe because of events which are really the result of chance.

This account of the types of character that correspond to differences of age or fortune may end here; for to arrive at the opposite types to those described, namely, those of the poor, the unfortunate, and the powerless, we have only to ask what the opposite qualities are.

18

THE USE OF PERSUASIVE speech is to lead to decisions. (When we know a thing, and have decided about it, there is no further use in speaking about it.) This is so even if one is addressing a single person and urging him to do or not to do something, as when we scold a man for his conduct or try to change his views: the single person is as much your 'judge' as if he were one of many; we may say, without qualification, that any one is your judge whom you have to persuade. Nor does it matter whether we are arguing against an actual opponent or against a mere proposition; in the latter case we still have to use speech and overthrow the opposing arguments, and we attack these as we should attack an actual opponent. Our principle holds good of ceremonial speeches also; the 'onlookers' for whom such a speech is put together are treated as the judges of it. Broadly speaking, however, the only sort of person who can strictly be called a judge is the man who decides the issue in some matter of public controversy; that is, in law suits and in political debates, in both of which there are issues to be decided. In the section on political oratory an account has already been given of the ; types of character that mark the different constitutions.

Aristotle lists, and gives examples for, the three commonplaces- that is, the sources of argument useful in all kinds of rhetoric. They are the possible and the impossible; the actual and the non-existent, in both past and future; and amplification ("the more and the less").

The manner and means of investing speeches with moral character may now be regarded as fully set forth.

Each of the main divisions of oratory has, we have seen, its own distinct purpose. With regard to each division, we have noted the accepted views and propositions upon which we may base our arguments—for political, for ceremonial, and for forensic speaking. We have further determined completely by what means speeches may be invested with the required moral character. We are now to proceed to discuss the arguments common to *all* oratory. All orators, besides their special lines of argument, are bound to use, for instance, the topic of the Possible and Impossible; and to try to show that a thing has happened, or will happen in future. Again, the topic of Size is common to all oratory; all of us have to argue that things are bigger or smaller than they seem, whether we are making political speeches, speeches of eulogy or attack, or prosecuting or defending in the law-courts. Having analysed these subjects, we will try to say what we can about the general principles of arguing by 'enthymeme' and 'example', by the addition of which we may hope to complete the project with which we set out. Of the above-mentioned general lines of argument, that concerned with Amplification is—as has been already said—most appropriate to ceremonial speeches; that concerned with the Past, to forensic speeches, where the required decision is always about the past; that concerned with Possibility and the Future, to political speeches.

19

LET US FIRST SPEAK of the Possible and Impossible. It may plausibly be argued: that if it is possible for one of a pair of contraries to be or happen, then it is possible for the other: e.g. if a man can be cured, he can also fall ill; for any two contraries are equally possible, in so far as they are contraries.

That if of two similar things one is possible, so is the other. That if the

harder of two things is possible, so is the easier. That if a thing can come into existence in a good and beautiful form, then it can come into existence generally; thus a house can exist more easily than a beautiful house. That if the beginning of a thing can occur, so can the end; for nothing impossible occurs or begins to occur; thus the commensurability of the diagonal of a square with its side neither occurs nor can begin to occur. That if the end is possible, so is the beginning; for all things that occur have a beginning. That if that which is posterior in essence or in order of generation can come into being, so can that which is prior: thus if a man can come into being, so can a boy, since the boy comes first in order of generation; and if a boy can, so can a man, for the man also is first. That those things are possible of which the love or desire is natural; for no one, as a rule, loves or desires impossibilities. That things which are the object of any kind of science or art are possible and exist or come into existence. That anything is possible the first step in whose production depends on men or things which we can compel or persuade to produce it, by our greater strength, our control of them, or our friendship with them. That where the parts are possible, the whole is possible; and where the whole is possible, the parts are usually possible. For if the slit in front, the toe-piece, and the upper leather can be made, then shoes can be made; and if shoes, then also the front slit and toe-piece. That if a whole genus is a thing that can occur, so can the species; and if the species can occur, so can the genus: thus, if a sailing vessel can be made, so also can a trireme; and if a trireme, then a sailing vessel also. That if one of two things whose existence depends on each other is possible, so is the other; for instance, if 'double', then 'half, and if 'half', then 'double'. That if a thing can be produced without art or preparation, it can be produced still more certainly by the careful application of art to it. Hence Agathon has said:

To some things we by art must needs attain, Others by destiny or luck we gain.

That if anything is possible to inferior, weaker, and stupider people, it is more so for their opposites; thus Isocrates said that it would be a strange thing if he could not discover a thing that Euthynus had found out. As for Impossibility, we can clearly get what we want by taking the contraries of the arguments stated above.

Questions of Past Fact may be looked at in the following ways: First, that if the less likely of two things has occurred, the more likely must have occurred also. That if one thing that usually follows another has happened, then that other thing has happened; that, for instance, if a man has forgotten a thing, he has also once learnt it. That if a man

had the power and the wish to do a thing, he has done it; for every one does do whatever he intends to do whenever he can do it, there being nothing to stop him. That, further, he has done the thing in question either if he intended it and nothing external prevented him; or if he had the power to do it and was angry at the time; or if he had the power to do it and his heart was set upon it—for people as a rule do what they long to do, if they can; bad people through lack of self-control; good people, because their hearts are set upon good things. Again, that if a thing was ‘going to happen’, it has happened; if a man was ‘going to do something’, he has done it, for it is likely that the intention was carried out. That if one thing has happened which naturally happens before another or with a view to it, the other has happened; for instance, if it has lightened, it has also thundered; and if an action has been attempted, it has been done. That if one thing has happened which naturally happens after another, or with a view to which that other happens, then that other (that which happens first, or happens with a view to this thing) has also happened; thus, if it has thundered it has also lightened, and if an action has been done it has been attempted. Of all these sequences some are inevitable and some merely usual. The arguments for the non-occurrence of anything can obviously be found by considering the opposites of those that have been mentioned.

How questions of Future Fact should be argued is clear from the same considerations: that a thing will be done if there is both the power and the wish to do it; or if along with the power to do it there is a craving for the result, or anger, or calculation, prompting it. That the thing will be done, in these cases, if the man is actually setting about it, or even if he means to do it later—for usually what we mean to do happens rather than what we do not mean to do. That a thing will happen if another thing which naturally happens before it has already happened; thus, if it is clouding over, it is likely to rain. That if the means to an end have occurred, then the end is likely to occur; thus, if there is a foundation, there will be a house.

For arguments about the Greatness and Smallness of things, the greater and the lesser, and generally great things and small, what we have already said will show the line to take. In discussing deliberative oratory we have spoken about the relative greatness of various goods, and about the greater and lesser in general. Since therefore in each type of oratory the object under discussion is some kind of good—whether it is utility, nobleness, or justice—it is clear that every orator must obtain the materials of amplification through these channels. To go further than this, and try to establish abstract laws of greatness and superiority, is to argue without an

There are two common modes of proof, the example and the enthymeme. This chapter concerns the example. Chapters 22-26 explore the enthymeme. There are two kinds of example, historical and invented. There are two kinds of invented example, parable ("illustrative parallel") and fable.

1393a30. FABLE: The word translated as "fable" is *logos*. Aesop's fables seem to have been collected first as a resource for orators, and only then became a set of stories to be enjoyed by themselves.

1393b1-3. DARIUS...XERXES : Darius and Xerxes were Persian kings who attacked Greece in 490 and 480. In Aristotle's time, the Persian king was Artaxerxes III, who conquered Egypt in 343 and so could be thought to be getting ready to attack Greece.

object; in practical life, particular facts count more than generalizations.

Enough has now been said about these questions of possibility and the reverse, of past or future fact, and of the relative greatness or smallness of things.

20

THE SPECIAL FORMS OF oratorical argument having now been discussed, we have next to treat of those which are common to all kinds of oratory. These are of two main kinds, 'Example' and 'Enthymeme'; for the 'Maxim' is part of an enthymeme.

We will first treat of argument by Example, for it has the nature of induction, which is the foundation of reasoning. This form of argument has two varieties; one consisting in the mention of actual past facts, the other in the invention of facts by the speaker. Of the latter, again, there are two varieties, the illustrative parallel and the fable° (e.g. the fables of Aesop, or those from Libya). As an instance of the mention of actual facts, take the following. The speaker may argue thus: 'We must prepare for war against the king of Persia and not let him subdue Egypt. For Darius of old did not cross the Aegean until he had seized Egypt; but once he had seized it, he did cross. And Xerxes,°

again, did not attack us until he had seized Egypt; but once he had seized it, he did cross. If therefore the present king seizes Egypt, he also will cross, and therefore we must not let him.'

The illustrative parallel is the sort of argument Socrates used: e.g. 'Public officials ought not to be selected by lot. That is like using the lot to select athletes, instead of choosing those who are fit for the contest; or using the lot to select a steersman from among a ship's crew, as if we ought to take the man on whom the lot falls, and not the man who knows most about it.'

1393b9. STESICHORUS ... PHALARIS: Stesichorus was an Italian or Sicilian poet who lived from around 632 until 556. Phalaris was tyrant of what is now Agrigento in Sicily around the period 570-554.

Instances of the fable are that of Stesichorus about Phalaris,^o and that of Aesop in defence of the popular leader. When the people of Himera had made Phalaris military dictator, and were going to give him a bodyguard, Stesichorus wound up a long talk by telling them the fable of the horse who had a field all to himself. Presently there came a stag and began to spoil his pasturage. The horse, wishing to revenge himself on the stag, asked a man if he could help him to do so. The man said, 'Yes, if you will let me bridle you and get on to your back with javelins in my hand'. The horse agreed, and the man mounted; but instead of getting his revenge on the stag, the horse found himself the slave of the man. 'You too', said Stesichorus, 'take care lest, in your desire for revenge on your enemies, you meet the same fate as the horse. By making Phalaris military dictator, you have already let yourselves be bridled. If you let him get on to your backs by giving him a bodyguard, from that moment you will be his slaves.'

Aesop, defending before the assembly at Samos a popular leader who was being tried for his life, told this story: A fox, in crossing a river, was swept into a hole in the rocks; and, not being able to get out, suffered miseries for a long time through the swarms of fleas that fastened on her. A hedgehog, while roaming around, noticed the fox; and feeling sorry for her asked if he might remove the fleas. But the fox declined the offer; and when the hedgehog asked why, she replied, 'These fleas are by this time full of me and not sucking much blood; if you take them away, others will come with fresh appetites and drink up all the blood I have left.' 'So, men of Samos', said Aesop, 'my client will do you no further harm; he is wealthy already. But if you put him to death, others will come along who are not rich, and their speculations will empty your treasury completely.'

Fables are suitable for addresses to popular assemblies; and they have one advantage—they are comparatively easy to

Chapter 21 looks at maxims. These seem to be a third kind of proof alongside example and enthymeme but are actually the premises or conclusions of enthymemes without the syllogism. The chapter shows the use and the power of maxims.

invent, whereas it is hard to find parallels among actual past events. You will in fact frame them just as you frame illustrative parallels: all you require is the power of thinking out your analogy, a power developed by intellectual training. But while it is easier to supply parallels by inventing fables, it is more valuable for the political speaker to supply them by quoting what has actually happened, since in most respects the future will be like what the past has been.

Where we are unable to argue by Enthymeme, we must try to demonstrate our point by this method of Example, and to convince our hearers thereby. If we can argue by Enthymeme, we should use our Examples as subsequent supplementary evidence. They should not precede the Enthymemes: that will give the argument an inductive air, which only rarely suits the conditions of speech-making. If they follow the enthymemes, they have the effect of witnesses giving evidence, and this always tells. For the same reason, if you put your examples first you must give a large number of them; if you put them last, a single one is sufficient; even a single witness will serve if he is a good one. It has now been stated how many varieties of argument by Example there are, and how and when they are to be employed.

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WE NOW TURN TO the use of Maxims, in order to see upon what subjects and occasions, and for what kind of speaker, they will appropriately form part of a speech. This will appear most clearly when we have defined a maxim. It is a statement; not about a particular fact, such as the character of Iphicrates, but of a general kind; nor is it about any and every subject—e.g. 'straight is the contrary of curved' is not a maxim—but only about questions of practical conduct, courses of conduct to be

1394a29-b7. 'NEVER SHOULD ANY MAN ...' [THROUGH] '... OF CHANCE': These examples are all from Euripides, the first two from *Medea* 295 and 297, the last from *Hecuba*, 864-865. "There is no man

in all things prosperous” is from an unknown tragedy.

1394b12. ‘CHIEFEST OF BLESSINGS IS HEALTH FOR A MAN...’: This maxim might come from Epicharmus or from Simonides.

chosen or avoided. Now an Enthymeme is a syllogism dealing with such practical subjects. It is therefore roughly true that the premisses or conclusions of Enthymemes, considered apart from the rest of the argument, are Maxims: e.g.

Never should any man whose wits are sound Have his sons taught more wisdom than their fellows.

Here we have a Maxim; add the reason or explanation, and the whole thing is an Enthymeme; thus—

It makes them idle; and therewith they earn

Ill-will and jealousy throughout the city.

Again,

There is no man in all things prosperous,

and

There is no man among us all is free,

are maxims; but the latter, taken with what follows it, is an Enthymeme—

For all are slaves of money or of chance.°

From this definition of a maxim it follows that there are four kinds of maxims. In the first place, the maxim may or may not have a supplement. Proof is needed where the statement is paradoxical or disputable; no supplement is wanted where the statement contains nothing paradoxical, either because the view expressed is already a known truth, e.g.

Chiefest of blessings is health for a man, as it seemeth to me,°

1394b16. ‘No LOVE IS TRUE SAVE THAT WHICH LOVES FOR EVER’: This one is from Euripides’ Troades 1061.

1394b22, 24. ‘O MORTAL MAN, NURSE NOT ...’ [AND] ‘MORTAL CREATURES ...’: The sources of these lines are not known.

this being the general opinion: or because, as soon as the view is stated, it is clear at a glance, e.g.

No love is true save that which loves for ever.°

Of the Maxims that do have a supplement attached, some are part of an Enthymeme, e.g.

Never should any man whose wits are sound, &c.

Others have the essential character of Enthymemes, but are not stated as parts of Enthymemes; these latter are reckoned the best; they are those in which the reason for the view expressed is simply implied, e.g.

O mortal man, nurse not immortal wrath.°

To say 'it is not right to nurse immortal wrath' is a maxim; the added words 'O mortal man' give the reason. Similarly, with the words

Mortal creatures ought to cherish mortal, not immortal thoughts.°

What has been said has shown us how many kinds of Maxim there are, and to what subjects the various kinds are appropriate. They must not be given without supplement if they express disputed or paradoxical views: we must, in that case, either put the supplement first and make a maxim of the conclusion, e.g. you might say, 'For my part, since both unpopularity and idleness are undesirable, I hold that it is better not to be educated'; or you may say this first, and then add the previous clause. Where a statement, without being paradoxical, is not obviously true, the reason should be added as concisely as possible. In

1395a14, 15. 'ONE OMEN OF ALL ... ' [AND] ' ' ... SHOWETH NO FAVOUR': These two are from the *Iliad* XII.243 and XVIII.309.

1395a18. 'FOOL, WHO SLAYETH THE FATHER ... AVENGE HIM': This line is thought to come from Stasinus' Cyprian Songs, probably written in the eighth century.

such cases both laconic and enigmatic sayings are suitable: thus one might say what Stesichorus said to the Locrians, 'Insolence is better avoided, lest the cicadas chirp on the ground'.

The use of Maxims is appropriate only to elderly men, and in handling subjects in which the speaker is experienced. For a young man to use them is—like telling stories—unbecoming; to use them in handling things in which one has no experience is silly and ill-bred: a fact sufficiently proved by the special fondness of country fellows for striking out maxims, and their readiness to air them.

To declare a thing to be universally true when it is not is most appropriate when working up feelings of horror and indignation in our hearers; especially by way of preface, or after the facts have been proved. Even hackneyed and commonplace maxims are to be used, if they suit one's purpose: just because they are commonplace, every one seems to agree with them, and therefore they are taken for truth. Thus, any one who is calling on his men to risk an engagement

without obtaining favourable omens may quote

One omen of all is best, that we fight for our fatherland.°

Or, if he is calling on them to attack a stronger force—

The War-God showeth no favour.°

Or, if he is urging people to destroy the innocent children of their enemies-

Fool, who slayeth the father and leaveth his sons to avenge him.°

Some proverbs are also maxims, e.g. the proverb 'An Attic neighbour'. You are not to avoid uttering maxims that contradict such sayings as have become public property (I mean

1395b9. 'NOTHING IS MORE ANNOYING THAN HAVING NEIGHBOURS': This probably comes from Hesiod's Works and Days.

such sayings as 'know thyself' and 'nothing in excess'), if doing so will raise your hearers' opinion of your character, or convey an effect of strong emotion—e.g. an angry speaker might well say, 'It is not true that we ought to know ourselves: anyhow, if this man had known himself, he would never have thought himself fit for an army command.' It will raise people's opinion of our character to say, for instance, 'We ought not to follow the saying that bids us treat our friends as future enemies: much better to treat our enemies as future friends.' The moral purpose should be implied partly by the very wording of our maxim. Failing this, we should add our reason: e.g. having said 'We should treat our friends, not as the saying advises, but as if they were going to be our friends always', we should add 'for the other behaviour is that of a traitor': or we might put it, 'I disapprove of that saying. A true friend will treat his friend as if he were going to be his friend for ever'; and again, 'Nor do I approve of the saying "nothing in excess": we are bound to hate bad men excessively.'

One great advantage of Maxims to a speaker is due to the want of intelligence in his hearers, who love to hear him succeed in expressing as a universal truth the opinions which they hold themselves about particular cases. I will explain what I mean by this, indicating at the same time how we are to hunt down the maxims required. The maxim, as has been already said, is a general statement, and people love to hear stated in general terms what they already believe in some particular connexion: e.g. if a man happens to have bad neighbours or bad children, he will agree with any one who tells him, 'Nothing is more annoying than having neighbours',° or, 'Nothing is more foolish than to be the parent of children.' The orator has therefore to guess the subjects on which his hearers really hold views already, and what

those views are, and then must express, as general truths, these same views on these same subjects. This is one advantage of using maxims.

395b10-16. ORATOR HAS THEREFORE TO GUESS ... SOUND MORAL CHARACTER: Aristotle gives two advantages to the uses of maxims. The first is that audiences like them because “people love to hear stated in general terms what they already believe in some particular connexion.” The second is that use of a maxim gives the speech moral character by displaying the speaker’s ethical purpose. This is another example of the way the Rhetoric often shows how the art of rhetoric both persuades and gives people good reason to be persuaded.

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Aristotle returns to consider enthymemes in detail, and first asks the practical question of how to be ready with enthymemes about any subject on any occasion. The chapter ends by outlining the program for the rest of book II.

1395b29. ‘CHARM THE CROWD’S EARS MORE FINELY’: The line comes from Euripides’ *Hippolytus* 989.

There is another which is more important—it invests a speech with moral character. There is moral character in every speech in which the moral purpose is conspicuous: and maxims always produce this effect, because the utterance of them amounts to a general declaration of moral principles: so that, if the maxims are sound, they display the speaker as a man of sound moral character.^o So much for the Maxim—its nature, varieties, proper use, and advantages.

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WE NOW COME TO the Enthymemes, and will begin the subject with some general consideration of the proper way of looking for them, and then proceed to what is a distinct question, the lines of argument to be embodied in them. It has already been pointed out that the Enthymeme is a syllogism, and in what sense it is so. We have also noted the differences between it and the syllogism of dialectic. Thus we must not carry its reasoning too far back, or the length of our argument will cause obscurity: nor must we put in all the steps that

lead to our conclusion, or we shall waste words in saying what is manifest. It is this simplicity that makes the uneducated more effective than the educated when addressing popular audiences—makes them, as the poets tell us, ‘charm the crowd’s ears more finely’.⁰ Educated men lay down broad general principles; uneducated men argue from common knowledge and draw obvious conclusions. We must not, therefore, start from any and every accepted opinion, but only from those we have denned—those accepted by our judges or by those whose authority they recognize: and there must, moreover, be no doubt in the minds of most, if not all, of our judges that the opinions put forward really are of this sort. We should also base our arguments upon probabilities as well as upon certainties.

1396a4-6. WHETHER OUR ARGUMENT ... TO CONSTRUCT ARGUMENTS: Unlike conceptions of rhetoric that make eloquence a substitute for knowledge, Aristotle starts from the assertion that the persuasive speaker actually has to know what he or she is talking about.

1396a13. SALAMIS: Salamis was the site of the great naval victory of the Greeks, and especially the Athenians, against the Persians in 480. Marathon was the place of the land victory against the Persians ten years earlier.

1396a20. AEGINA, POTIDAEA, &c.: Aegina is an island not far from Athens; the contribution of its citizens to the victory at Salamis was significant. Potidaea was a colony of Corinth but an ally of Athens; Athenian demands that it sever its historical—and financial—ties to Corinth was one of the precipitating causes of the Peloponnesian War.

The first thing we have to remember is this. Whether our argument concerns public affairs or some other subject, we must know some, if not all, of the facts about the subject on which we are to speak and argue. Otherwise we can have no materials out of which to construct arguments.^o I mean, for instance, how could we advise the Athenians whether they should go to war or not, if we did not know their strength, whether it was naval or military or both, and how great it is; what their revenues amount to; who their friends and enemies are; what wars, too, they have waged, and with what success; and so on? Or how could we eulogize them if we knew nothing about the sea-fight at Salamis,^o or the battle of Marathon, or what they did for the Heracleidae, or any other facts like that? All eulogy is based upon the noble deeds—real or imaginary—that stand to the credit of those eulogized. On the same principle, invectives are based on facts of the opposite kind: the orator looks to see what base deeds—real or imaginary—stand to the discredit of those he is attacking, such as treachery to the cause of Hellenic freedom, or the enslavement of their

gallant allies against the barbarians (Aegina, Potidaea, &c.^o), or any other misdeeds of this kind that are recorded against them. So, too, in a court of law: whether we are prosecuting or defending, we must pay attention to the existing facts of the case. It makes no difference whether the subject is the Lacedaemonians or the Athenians, a man or a god; we must do the same thing. Suppose it to be Achilles whom we are to advise, to praise or blame, to accuse or defend; here too we must take the facts, real or imaginary; these must be our material, whether we are to praise or blame him for the noble or base deeds he has done, to accuse or defend him for his just or unjust treatment of others, or to advise him about what is or is not to his interest. The same thing applies to any subject whatever. Thus, in handling the question whether justice is or is not a good, we must start with the real facts about justice and

1396b30. IN HANDLING THE QUESTION ... JUSTICE AND GOODNESS: After giving several examples of the need for mastery of the facts in deliberative, judicial, and ceremonial rhetoric, Aristotle extends that claim to philosophical questions one might think are outside the scope of rhetoric.

1396b12. ‘COMMONPLACES’: “Commonplaces” (koina) is used here in the pejorative sense of thoughts that do not take any specific knowledge.

1396b20-21. ‘ELEMENTARY CLASS’ OF ENTHYMEME ... ‘LINE OF ARGUMENT’: “Elementary class” *translates stoicheion*, the word for element. “Line of argument” translates *topikos* (the adjective form of *topos*).

goodness.^o We see, then, that this is the only way in which any one ever proves anything, whether his arguments are strictly cogent or not: not all facts can form his basis, but only those that bear on the matter in hand: nor, plainly, can proof be effected otherwise by means of the speech. Consequently, as appears in the Topics, we must first of all have by us a selection of arguments about questions that may arise and are suitable for us to handle; and then we must try to think out arguments of the same type for special needs as they emerge; not vaguely and indefinitely, but by keeping our eyes on the actual facts of the subject we have to speak on, and gathering in as many of them as we can that bear closely upon it: for the more actual facts we have at our command, the more easily we prove our case; and the more closely they bear on the subject, the more they will seem to belong to that speech only instead of being commonplaces. By ‘commonplaces’^o I mean, for example, eulogy of Achilles because he is a human being or a demi-god, or because he joined the expedition against Troy: these things are true of many others, so that this kind of eulogy applies no

better to Achilles than to Diomedes. The special facts here needed are those that are true of Achilles alone; such facts as that he slew Hector, the bravest of the Trojans, and Cycnus the invulnerable, who prevented all the Greeks from landing, and again that he was the youngest man who joined the expedition, and was not bound by oath to join it, and so on.

Here, then, we have our first principle of selection of Enthymemes—that which refers to the lines of argument selected. We will now consider the various elementary classes of enthymemes. (By an ‘elementary class’ of enthymeme I mean the same thing as a ‘line of argument’.) We will begin, as we must begin, by observing that there are two kinds of enthymemes. One kind proves some affirmative or negative proposition; the other kind disproves one. The difference between the two kinds is the same as that between syllogistic

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All enthymemes, even those that rely on the orator's knowledge of particular facts, appeal to common lines of argument. This chapter lists, and gives examples of, twenty-eight of them.

1397all. MESSENIAN SPEECH: The speech was written by Alcidas around 366.

1397a13. ‘FOR IF NOT EVEN EVIL-DOERS ... THE GOOD THEY DID US’: This quotation is from an unknown tragedy.

proof and disproof in dialectic. The demonstrative enthymeme is formed by the conjunction of compatible propositions; the refutative, by the conjunction of incompatible propositions.

We may now be said to have in our hands the lines of argument for the various special subjects that it is useful or necessary to handle, having selected the propositions suitable in various cases. We have, in fact, already ascertained the lines of argument applicable to enthymemes about good and evil, the noble and the base, justice and injustice, and also to those about types of character, emotions, and moral qualities. Let us now lay hold of certain facts about the whole subject, considered from a different and more general point of view. In the course of our discussion we will take note of the distinction between lines of proof and lines of disproof: and also of those lines of argument used in what seem to be enthymemes, but are not, since they do not represent valid syllogisms. Having made all this clear, we

will proceed to classify Objections and Refutations, showing how they can be brought to bear upon enthymemes.

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1. ONE LINE OF POSITIVE proof is based upon consideration of the opposite of the thing in question. Observe whether that opposite has the opposite quality. If it has not, you refute the original proposition; if it has, you establish it. E.g. 'Temperance is beneficial; for licentiousness is hurtful'. Or, as in the Messenian speech,^o 'If war is the cause of our present troubles, peace is what we need to put things right again'. Or-

For if not even evil-doers should
Anger us if they meant not what they did,
Then can we owe no gratitude to such
As were constrained to do the good they did us.^o

1397a17. 'SINCE IN THIS WORLD ... AND BELIEVES IT NOT': The speech is from Euripides' *Thyestes*.

1397a26. DIOMEDON: We don't know anything about Diomedon.

1397b3. THEODECTES: He was a student of Isocrates, and possibly of Plato and even Aristotle as well, and so an instance of a student of a rhetorician who wrote tragedies. This example of a connection between rhetoric and tragedy is hard to imagine today.

Or-

Since in this world liars may win belief,
Be sure of the opposite likewise-that this world
Hears many a true word and believes it not.^o

2. Another line of proof is got by considering some modification of the key-word, and arguing that what can or cannot be said of the one, can or cannot be said of the other: e.g. 'just' does not always mean 'beneficial', or 'justly' would always mean 'beneficially', whereas it is not desirable to be justly put to death.

3. Another line of proof is based upon correlative ideas. If it is true that one man gave noble or just treatment to another, you argue that the other must have received noble or just treatment; or that where it is right to command obedience, it must have been right to obey the command. Thus Diomedon, ^o the tax-farmer, said of the taxes: 'If it is

no disgrace for you to sell them, it is no disgrace for us to buy them'. Further, if 'well' or 'justly' is true of the person to whom a thing is done, you argue that it is true of the doer. But it is possible to draw a false conclusion here. It may be just that A should be treated in a certain way, and yet not just that he should be so treated by B. Hence you must ask yourself two distinct questions: (1) Is it right that A should be thus treated? (2) Is it right that B should thus treat him? and apply your results properly, according as your answers are Yes or No. Sometimes in such a case the two answers differ: you may quite easily have a position like that in the Alcmaeon of Theodectes:°

And was there none to loathe thy mother's crime?

to which question Alcmaeon in reply says,

Why, there are two things to examine here.

1397b7. DEMOSTHENES ... NICANOR: We cannot tell whether the Demosthenes referred to here is the orator or the general. Since Nicanor is unknown, the mention of him doesn't help.

1397b] 9-20. 'THOSE HAST PITY ... WHOSE BRAVE SON IS DEAD?': These lines might be from either Antiphon's or Euripides' Meleager.

1397b21-25. 'IF THESEUS DID NO WRONG ... ' [THROUGH] ' ' ... THE REPUTATION OF GREECE AS A WHOLE': We also don't know the source of the quotations in this paragraph.

1397b21. PARIS: Paris was son of Priam and Hecuba and husband of Helen. After the action of the Iliad is over, he is said, along with Apollo, to kill Achilles.

And when Alpheisiboea asks what he means, he rejoins:

They judged her fit to die, not me to slay her.

Again there is the lawsuit about Demosthenes and the men who killed Nicanor;° as they were judged to have killed him justly, it was thought that he was killed justly. And in the case of the man who was killed at Thebes, the judges were requested to decide whether it was unjust that he should be killed, since if it was not, it was argued that it could not have been unjust to kill him.

4. Another line of proof is the *a fortiori*. Thus it may be argued that if even the gods are not omniscient, certainly human beings are not. The principle here is that, if a quality does not in fact exist where it is more likely to exist, it clearly does not exist where it is less likely. Again, the argument that a man who strikes his father also strikes his neighbours follows from the principle that, if the less likely thing is true, the more likely thing is true also; for a man is less likely to strike

his father than to strike his neighbours. The argument, then, may run thus. Or it may be urged that, if a thing is not true where it is more likely, it is not true where it is less likely; or that, if it is true where it is less likely, it is true where it is more likely: according as we have to show that a thing is or is not true. This argument might also be used in a case of parity, as in the lines:

Thou hast pity for thy sire, who has lost his sons:

Hast none for Oeneus, whose brave son is dead ?°

And, again, 'if Theseus did no wrong,° neither did Paris'; or 'if the sons of Tyndareus did no wrong, neither did Paris'; or 'if Hector did well to slay Patroclus, Paris did well to slay Achilles'. And 'if other followers of an art are not bad men, neither are philosophers'. And 'if generals are not bad men

1397b28. IPHICRATES ... HARMODIUS: Iphicrates was an Athenian general, Har-II 1011111S the descendant of a tyrannicide of the same name, who attacked as illegal the erection of a statue to Iphicrates.

1398a4. TEUCER: Both Sophocles and Ion wrote tragedies called *Teucer*. There is no way to tell which Aristotle refers to.

1398a5-8. EMPLOYED BY IPHICRATES IN HIS REPLY TO AUSTOPHON: After the defeat at Embata in 356, Aristophon accused of treason the three losing generals. Iphicrates was the only one found guilty.

1398a10. ARISTEIDES: Aristides (520-468; sometimes spelled as in the text) was called Aristides the just.

because it often happens that they are condemned to death, neither are sophists'. And the remark that 'if each individual among you ought to think of his own city's reputation, you ought all to think of the reputation of Greece as a whole'.°

5. Another line of argument is based on considerations of time. Thus Iphicrates, in the case against Harmodius,° said, 'if before doing the deed I had bargained that, if I did it, I should have a statue, you would have given me one. Will you not give me one now that I have done the deed? You must not make promises when you are expecting a thing to be done for you, and refuse to fulfil them when the thing has been done.' And, again, to induce the Thebans to let Philip pass through their territory into Attica, it was argued that 'if he had insisted on this before he helped them against the Phocians, they would have promised to do it. It is monstrous, therefore, that just because he threw away his advantage then, and trusted their honour, they should not let him pass through now'.

6. Another line is to apply to the other speaker what he has said against yourself. It is an excellent turn to give to a debate, as may be seen in the *Teucer*.^o It was employed by Iphicrates in his reply to Aristophon.^o ‘Would you’, he asked, ‘take a bribe to betray the fleet?’ ‘No’, said Aristophon; and Iphicrates replied, ‘Very good: if you, who are Aristophon, would not betray the fleet, would I, who am Iphicrates?’ Only, it must be recognized before-hand that the other man is more likely than you are to commit the crime in question. Otherwise you will make yourself ridiculous; if it is Aristoides’ who is prosecuting, you cannot say that sort of thing to him. The purpose is to discredit the prosecutor, who as a rule would have it appear that his character is better than that of the defendant, a pretension which it is desirable to upset. But the use of such an argument is in all cases ridiculous if you are attacking others for what you do or would do yourself, or are urging others to do what you neither do nor would do yourself.

1398a16. THE SUPERNATURAL: “The supernatural” translates daimonion, from which we get the English word “demon.” Socrates refers to his daimonion in the *Apology* as a divine voice that warns him against doing something wrong. Socrates uses this argument in the *Apology* 27c-e.

1398a24-25. REASON GIVEN BY SOCRATES: This may be a reference to Plato’s *Crito*. Archelaus was king of Macedon from 413-399.

7. Another line of proof is secured by defining your terms. Thus, ‘What is the supernatural?’ Surely it is either a god or the work of a god. Well, any one who believes that the work of a god exists, cannot help also believing that gods exist’. Or take the argument of Iphicrates, ‘Goodness is true nobility; neither Harmodius nor Aristogeiton had any nobility before they did a noble deed’. He also argued that he himself was more akin to Harmodius and Aristogeiton than his opponent was. ‘At any rate, my deeds are more akin to those of Harmodius and Aristogeiton than yours are.’ Another example may be found in the *Alexander*. ‘Every one will agree that by incontinent people we mean those who are not satisfied with the enjoyment of one love.’ A further example is to be found in the reason given by Socrates^o for not going to the court of Archelaus. He said that ‘one is insulted by being unable to requite benefits, as well as by being unable to requite injuries’. All the persons mentioned define their term and get at its essential meaning, and then use the result when reasoning on the point at issue.

8. Another line of argument is founded upon the various senses of a word. Such a word is ‘rightly’, as has been explained in the *Topics*.

9. Another line is based upon logical division. Thus, 'All men do wrong from one of three motives, A, B, or C: in my case A and B are out of the question, and even the accusers do not allege C'.

10. Another line is based upon induction. Thus from the case of the woman of Peparethus it might be argued that women everywhere can settle correctly the facts about their children. Another example of this occurred at Athens in the case between the orator Mantias and his son, when the boy's mother revealed the true facts: and yet another at Thebes, in the case between Ismenias and Stilbon, when Dodonis proved that it was Ismenias who was the father of her son

1398b5. LAwoF TheODECTES: The Law is a fiction, maybe like Plato's Laws, written by the Athenian politician Theodectes.

Thettaliscus, and he was in consequence always regarded as being so. A further instance of induction may be taken from the Law of Theodectes: 'If we do not hand over our horses to the care of men who have mishandled other people's horses, nor ships to those who have wrecked other people's ships, and if this is true of everything else alike, then men who have failed to secure other people's safety are not to be employed to secure our own.' Another instance is the argument of Alcidas: 'Every one honours the wise. Thus the Parians have honoured Archilochus, in spite of his bitter tongue; the Chians Homer, though he was not their countryman; the Mytilenaeans Sappho, though she was a woman; the Lacedaemonians actually made Chilon a member of their senate, though they are the least literary of men; the Italian Greeks honoured Pythagoras; the inhabitants of Lampsacus gave public burial to Anaxagoras, though he was an alien, and honour him even to this day. It may be argued that peoples for whom philosophers legislate are always prosperous on the ground that the Athenians became prosperous under Solon's laws and the Lacedaemonians under those of Lycurgus, while at Thebes no sooner did the leading men become philosophers than the country began to prosper.

11. Another line of argument is founded upon some decision already pronounced, whether on the same subject or on one like it or contrary to it. Such a proof is most effective if every one has always decided thus; but if not every one, then at any rate most people; or if all, or most, wise or good men have thus decided, or the actual judges of the present question, or those whose authority they accept, or any one whose decision they cannot gainsay because he has complete control over them, or those whom it is not seemly to gainsay, as the gods, or one's father, or one's teachers. Thus Autocles said, when attacking Mixidemides, that it was a strange thing that the Dread Goddesses could without loss

1399a4-7. ISOCRATES ... EVAGORAS: Isocrates' orations Helen and Evagoras are Aristotle's references here.

1399a16. CALLIPPUS: He was a student of Isocrates.

of dignity submit to the judgement of the Areopagus, and yet Mixidemides could not. Or as Sappho said, 'Death is an evil thing; the gods have so judged it, or they would die'. Or again as Aristippus said in reply to Plato when he spoke somewhat too dogmatically, as Aristippus thought: 'Well, anyhow, our friend', meaning Socrates, 'never spoke like that'. And Hegesippus, having previously consulted Zeus at Olympia, asked Apollo at Delphi 'whether his opinion was the same as his father's', implying that it would be shameful for him to contradict his father. Thus too Isocrates argued that Helen must have been a good woman, because Theseus decided that she was; and Paris a good man, because the goddesses chose him before all others; and Evagoras^o also, says Isocrates, was good, since when Conon met with his misfortune he betook himself to Evagoras without trying any one else on the way.

12. Another line of argument consists in taking separately the parts of a subject. Such is that given in the Topics. 'What sort of motion is the soul? for it must be this or that.' The Socrates of Theodectes provides an example: 'What temple has he profaned? What gods recognized by the state has he not honoured?'

13. Since it happens that any given thing usually has both good and bad consequences, another line of argument consists in using those consequences as a reason for urging that a thing should or should not be done, for prosecuting or defending any one, for eulogy or censure. E.g. education leads both to unpopularity, which is bad, and to wisdom, which is good. Hence you either argue, 'It is therefore not well to be educated, since it is not well to be unpopular': or you answer, 'No, it is well to be educated, since it is well to be wise'. The Art of Rhetoric of Callippus^o is made up of this line of argument, with the addition of those of Possibility and the others of that kind already described.

14. Another line of argument is used when we have to urge or discourage a course of action that may be done in either of two opposite ways, and have to apply the method just mentioned to both. The difference between this one and the last is that, whereas in the last any two things are contrasted, here the things contrasted are opposites. For instance, the priestess enjoined upon her son not to take to public speaking: 'For', she said, 'if you say what is right, men will hate you; if you say what is wrong, the gods will hate you.' The reply might be, 'On the contrary, you ought to take to public speaking: for if

you say what is right, the gods will love you; if you say what is wrong, men will love you.' This amounts to the proverbial 'buying the marsh with the salt'. It is just this situation, viz. when each of two opposites has both a good and a bad consequence opposite respectively to each other, that has been termed *divarication*.

15. Another line of argument is this: the things people approve of openly are not those which they approve of secretly: openly, their chief praise is given to justice and nobleness; but in their hearts they prefer their own advantage. Try, in face of this, to establish the point of view which your opponent has not adopted. This is the most effective of the forms of argument that contradict common opinion.

16. Another line is that of rational correspondence. E.g. Iphicrates, when they were trying to compel his son, a youth under the prescribed age, to perform one of the state duties because he was tall, said, 'If you count tall boys men, you will next be voting short men boys'. And Theodectes in his Law said, 'You make citizens of such mercenaries as Strabax and Charidemus, as a reward of their merits; will you not make exiles of such citizens as those who have done irreparable harm among the mercenaries?'

17. Another line is the argument that if two results are the same their antecedents are also the same. For instance, it was a

1399b16. STRANGE TO CHOOSE EXILE IN ORDER NOT TO HAVE TO FIGHT: This is from a fragment written by Lysias (459-380), a wealthy politician and speech-writer.

1399b24. 'GOD GIVES TO MANY... MORE CONSPICUOUS': The source is unknown.

saying of Xenophanes that to assert that the gods had birth is as impious as to say that they die; the consequence of both statements is that there is a time when the gods do not exist. This line of proof assumes generally that the result of any given thing is always the same: e.g. 'you are going to decide not about Isocrates, but about the value of the whole profession of philosophy'. Or, 'to give earth and water' means slavery; or; 'to share in the Common Peace' means obeying orders. We are to make either such assumptions or their opposite, as suits us best.

18. Another line of argument is based on the fact that men do not always make the same choice on a later as on an earlier occasion, but reverse their previous choice. E.g. the following enthymeme: 'When we were exiles, we fought in order to return ; now we have returned, it would be strange to choose exile in order not to have to fight.'⁰ On one occasion, that is, they chose to be true to their homes at the cost

of fighting, and on the other to avoid fighting at the cost of deserting their homes.

19. Another line of argument is the assertion that some possible motive for an event or state of things is the real one: e.g. that a gift was given in order to cause pain by its withdrawal. This notion underlies the lines:

God gives to many great prosperity,
Not of good will towards them, but to make
The ruin of them more conspicuous.^o

Or take the passage from the Meleager of Antiphon:

To slay no boar, but to be witnesses
Of Meleager's prowess unto Greece.

Or the argument in the Ajax of Theodectes, that Diomedes chose out Odysseus not to do him honour, but in order that his companion might be a lesser man than himself—such a motive for doing so is quite possible.

20. Another line of argument is common to forensic and deliberative oratory, namely, to consider inducements and deterrents, and the motives people have for doing or avoiding the actions in question. These are the conditions which make us bound to act if they are for us, and to refrain from action if they are against us: that is, we are bound to act if the action is possible, easy, and useful to ourselves or our friends or hurtful to our enemies; this is true even if the action entails loss, provided the loss is outweighed by the solid advantage. A speaker will urge action by pointing to such conditions, and discourage it by pointing to the opposite. These same arguments also form the materials for accusation or defence—the deterrents being pointed out by the defence, and the inducements by the prosecution. As for the defence, ... This topic forms the whole Art of Rhetoric both of Pamphilus and of Callippus.

21. Another line of argument refers to things which are supposed to happen and yet seem incredible. We may argue that people could not have believed them, if they had not been true or nearly true: even that they are the more likely to be true because they are incredible. For the things which men believe are either facts or probabilities: if, therefore, a thing that is believed is improbable and even incredible, it must be true, since it is certainly not believed because it is at all probable or credible. An example is what Androcles of the deme Pitthus said in his well-known arraignment of the law. The audience tried to shout him down when he observed that the laws required a law to set them right. 'Why,' he went on, 'fish need salt, improbable and incredible as

this might seem for creatures reared in salt water; and olive-cakes need oil, incredible as it is that what produces oil should need it.'

22. Another line of argument is to refute our opponent's case by noting any contrasts or contradictions of dates, acts, or words that it anywhere displays; and this in any of the three following connexions. (1) Referring to our opponent's conduct, e.g. 'He says he is devoted to you, yet he conspired with the Thirty.' (2) Referring to our own conduct, e.g. 'He says I am litigious, and yet he cannot prove that I have been engaged in a single lawsuit.' (3) Referring to both of us together, e.g. 'He has never even lent any one a penny, but I have ransomed quite a number of you.'

23. Another line that is useful for men and causes that have been really or seemingly slandered, is to show why the facts are not as supposed; pointing out that there is a reason for the false impression given. Thus a woman, who had palmed off her son on another woman, was thought to be the lad's mistress because she embraced him; but when her action was explained the charge was shown to be groundless. Another example is from the Ajax of Theodectes, where Odysseus tells Ajax the reason why, though he is really braver than Ajax, he is not thought so.

24. Another line of argument is to show that if the cause is present, the effect is present, and if absent, absent. For by proving the cause you at once prove the effect, and conversely nothing can exist without its cause. Thus Thrasybulus accused Leodamas of having had his name recorded as a criminal on the slab in the Acropolis, and of erasing the record in the time of the Thirty Tyrants: to which Leodamas replied, 'Impossible: for the Thirty would have trusted me all the more if my quarrel with the commons had been inscribed on the slab.'

25. Another line is to consider whether the accused person can take or could have taken a better course than that which he is recommending or taking, or has taken. If he has not taken this better course, it is clear that he is not guilty, since no one deliberately and consciously chooses what is bad. This argument is, however, fallacious, for it often becomes clear after the event how the action could have been done better, though before the event this was far from clear.

1400b10. CARCINUS: He was a fourth-century tragedian.

1400b17. THIS SPECIAL LINE OF ARGUMENT FOR ENTHYMEME ... BEFORE THEODORUS: This is the third time in this chapter that Aristotle points to one of the twenty-eight lines of argument and says that it comprised the entire art of rhetoric of some earlier writer. The Art of Rhetoric of Callippus is made up of the argument from

consequences (1399a 17). Inducements and deterrents form the whole Art of Rhetoric both of Pamphilus and of Callippus (1400a4). Making previous mistakes the grounds of accusation or defense forms the whole of the Art of Rhetoric in use before Theodorus (1400b16).

1400b18. 'O STEEL IN HEART AS THOU ART STEEL IN NAME': The lines are from Sophocles' Tyro, which is lost.

1400b26. 'HER NAME AND FOLLY's ... ': The line is from Euripides' Trojan Women 990.

1400b24. CHAEREMON: He was a fourth-century tragedian.

26. Another line is, when a contemplated action is inconsistent with any past action, to examine them both together. Thus, when the people of Elea asked Xenophanes if they should or should not sacrifice to Leucothea and mourn for her, he advised them not to mourn for her if they thought her a goddess, and not to sacrifice to her if they thought her a mortal woman.

27. Another line is to make previous mistakes the grounds of accusation or defence. Thus, in the Medea of Carcinus' the accusers allege that Medea has slain her children; 'at all events', they say, 'they are not to be seen'-Medea having made the mistake of sending her children away. In defence she argues that it is not her children, but Jason, whom she would have slain; for it would have been a mistake on her part not to do this if she had done the other. This special line of argument for enthymeme forms the whole of the Art of Rhetoric in use before Theodorus.°

28. Another line is to draw meanings from names. Sophocles, for instance, says,

O steel in heart as thou art steel in name.°

This line of argument is common in praises of the gods. Thus, too, Conon called Thrasybulus rash in counsel.. And Herodicus said of Thrasymachus, 'You are always bold in battle'; of Polus, 'you are always a colt'; and of the legislator Draco that his laws were those not of a human being but of a dragon, so savage were they. And, in Euripides, Hecuba says of Aphrodite,

Her name and Folly's (ἀφροσύνης) rightly begin alike,
and Chaeremon° writes

Pentheus-a name foreshadowing grief (πένθος) to come.

1400b32. MOST APPLAUDED: The most successful enthymemes are

those that please the audience because of the pleasures of understanding. In spite of the power of emotions that can lead an audience off the point, there are also pleasures that come from following an argument and appreciating its structure and its movement.

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The enthymeme is a sort of syllogism. Since rhetoric aims at persuasion, one might think that all enthymemes are apparent syllogisms, since all the speaker cares about is appearing cogent enough to be convincing. But Aristotle here shows that there is a difference within enthymemes between real and apparent enthymemes. Just because +n enthymeme draws only a probably, not a necessary, conclusion, doesn't mean that it isn't a good argument.

The Refutative Enthymeme has a greater reputation than the Demonstrative, because within a small space it works out two opposing arguments, and arguments put side by side are clearer to the audience. But of all syllogisms, whether refutative or demonstrative, those are most applauded of which we foresee the conclusions from the beginning, so long as they are not obvious at first sight-for part of the pleasure we feel is at our own intelligent anticipation; or those which we follow well enough to see the point of them as soon as the last word has been uttered.

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BESIDES GENUINE SYLLOGISMS, THERE may be syllogisms that look genuine but are not; and since an enthymeme is . merely a syllogism of a particular kind, it follows that, besides genuine enthymemes, there may be those that look genuine but are not.

1. Among the lines of argument that form the Spurious Enthymeme the first is that which arises from the particular words employed.

(a) One variety of this is when-as in dialectic, without having gone through any reasoning process, we make a final statement as if it were the conclusion of such a process, 'Therefore so-and-so is not true', 'Therefore also so-and-so must be true'-so too in rhetoric a compact

and antithetical utterance passes for an enthymeme, such language being the proper province of enthymeme, so that it is seemingly the form of wording here that causes the illusion mentioned. In order to produce the effect of genuine reasoning by our form of wording it is useful to summarize the results of a number of previous reasonings: as 'some he saved-others he avenged- the Greeks he freed'. Each of these statements has

1401a22. SPEECH IS A VERY EXCELLENT THING: Understanding this argument depends on knowing that "speech" translates *logos*, but that the Greek word also means "esteem."

1401a27. EUTHYDEMUS: Euthydemus of Chios is portrayed as a sophist in Plato's dialogue named after him.

been previously proved from other facts; but the mere collocation of them gives the impression of establishing some fresh conclusion.

(b) Another variety is based on the use of similar words for different things; e.g. the argument that the mouse must be a noble creature, since it gives its name to the most august of all religious rites-for such the Mysteries are. Or one may introduce, into a eulogy of the dog, the dog-star; or Pan, because Pindar said:

O thou blessed one!
Thou whom they of Olympus call
The hound of manifold shape
That follows the Mother of Heaven;

or we may argue that, because there is much disgrace in there not being a dog about, there is honour in being a dog. Or that Hermes is readier than any other god to go shares, since we never say 'shares all round' except of him. Or that speech is a very excellent thing,^o since good men are not said to be worth money but to be worthy of esteem-the phrase 'worthy of esteem' also having the meaning of 'worth speech'.

2. Another line is to assert of the whole what is true of the parts, or of the parts what is true of the whole. A whole and its parts are supposed to be identical, though often they are not. You have therefore to adopt whichever of these two lines better suits your purpose. That is how Euthydemus^o argues: e.g. that any one knows that there is a trireme in the Peiraeus, since he knows the separate details that make up this statement. There is also the argument that one who knows the letters knows the whole word, since the word is the same thing as the letters which compose it; or that, if a double portion of a certain thing is harmful to health, then a single portion must not be called wholesome, since it is absurd that two good things

should make one bad thing. Put thus, the enthymeme

1401a34. PolYcRATES: He is another sophist.

1401b13. Dionysius,: There are at least two people whom Aristotle could be referring to. The most likely are a father and son who were fourth-century tyrants of Syracuse.

is refutative; put as follows, demonstrative: 'For one good thing cannot be made up of two bad things.' The whole line of argument is fallacious. Again, there is Polycrates'* saying that Thrasybulus put down thirty tyrants, where the speaker adds them up one by one. Or the argument in the Orestes of Theodectes, where the argument is from part to whole:

'Tis right that she who slays her lord should die.

'It is right, too, that the son should avenge his father. Very good: these two things are what Orestes has done.' Still, perhaps the two things, once they are put together, do not form a right act. The fallacy might also be said to be due to omission, since the speaker fails to say by whose hand a husband-slayer should die.

3. Another line is the use of indignant language, whether to support your own case or to overthrow your opponent's. We do this when we paint a highly-coloured picture of the situation without having proved the facts of it: if the defendant does so, he produces an impression of his innocence; and if the prosecutor goes into a passion, he produces an impression of the defendant's guilt. Here there is no genuine enthymeme : the hearer infers guilt or innocence, but no proof is given, and the inference is fallacious accordingly.

4. Another line is to use a 'Sign', or single instance, as certain evidence; which, again, yields no valid proof. Thus, it might be said that lovers are useful to their countries, since the love of Harmodius and Aristogeiton caused the downfall of the tyrant Hipparchus. Or, again, that Dionysius^O is a thief, since he is a vicious man-there is, of course, no valid proof here; not every vicious man is a thief, though every thief is a vicious man.

5. Another line represents the accidental as essential. An instance is what Polycrates says of the mice, that they me to the rescue' because they gnawed through the bowstrings.

Or it might be maintained that an invitation to dinner is a great honour, for it was because he was not invited that Achilles was ngered' with the Greeks at Tenedos. As a fact, what angered him was the insult involved; it was a mere accident that this was the particular form that the insult took.

6. Another is the argument from consequence. In the *Alexander*, for instance, it is argued that Paris must have had a lofty disposition, since he despised society and lived by himself on Mount Ida: because lofty people do this kind of thing, therefore Paris too, we are to suppose, had a lofty soul. Or, if a man dresses fashionably and roams around at night, he is a rake, since that is the way rakes behave. Another similar argument points out that beggars sing and dance in temples, and that exiles can live wherever they please, and that such privileges are at the disposal of those we account happy; and therefore every one might be regarded as happy if only he has those privileges. What matters, however, is the circumstances under which the privileges are enjoyed. Hence this line too falls under the head of fallacies by omission.

7. Another line consists in representing as causes things which are not causes, on the ground that they happened along with or before the event in question. They assume that, because B happens after A, it happens because of A. Politicians are especially fond of taking this line. Thus Demades said that the policy of Demosthenes was the cause of all the mischief, 'for after it the war occurred'.

8. Another line consists in leaving out any mention of time and circumstances. E.g. the argument that Paris was justified in taking Helen, since her father left her free to choose: here the freedom was presumably not perpetual; it could only refer to her first choice, beyond which her father's authority could not go. Or again, one might say that to strike a free man is an act of wanton outrage; but it is not so in every case—only when it is unprovoked.

1402t!i 7. CoRAX's ART OF RHETORIC: In the last chapter Aristotle pointed to three lines of argument that he said constituted the entire arts of rhetoric of some of his predecessors. Here he finds another. The art of rhetoric of Corax consists in mistaking general for particular probabilities. The improbable does happen. Therefore what is improbable is probable. We see something similar today in arguments such as: Since no one can prove conclusively that evolution is true, it is only probable. Since creationism isn't impossible, it's probable too. Therefore they are equally probable. Aristotle ends the chapter by saying, "This sort of argument illustrates what is meant by making the worse argument seem the better." Aristotle returns to the ambiguity of probability in the next chapter.

9. Again, a spurious syllogism may, as in 'ristical' discussions, be based on the confusion of the absolute with that which is not absolute but particular. As, in dialectic, for instance, it may be argued that what-is-not is, on the ground that what-is-not is what-is-not; or that the unknown can be known, on the ground that it can be known to be

unknown: so also in rhetoric a spurious enthymeme may be based on the confusion of some particular probability with absolute probability. Now no particular probability is universally probable : as Agathon says,

One might perchance say this was probable-
That things improbable oft will hap to men.

For what is improbable does happen, and therefore it is probable that improbable things will happen. Granted this, one might argue that 'what is improbable is probable'. But this is not true absolutely. As, in eristic, the imposture comes from not adding any clause specifying relationship or reference or manner; so here it arises because the probability in question is not general but specific. It is of this line of argument that Corax's Art of Rhetoric is composed. If the accused is not open to the charge—for instance if a weakling be tried for violent assault—the defence is that he was not likely to do such a thing. But if he is open to the charge—i.e. if he is a strong man—the defence is still that he was not likely to do such a thing, since he could be sure that people would think he was likely to do it. And so with any other charge: the accused must be either open or not open to it: there is in either case an appearance of probable innocence, but whereas in the latter case the probability is genuine, in the former it can only be asserted in the special sense mentioned. This sort of argument illustrates what is meant by making the worse argument seem the better. Hence people

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There are two kinds of refutation: counter-argument and counter-example. The chapter presents the lines of reasoning used in counter-argument.

1402b2. 'Caunian love': According to Ovid, Byblis loved her brother Caunus, and then wept herself to death and as a result was changed into a fountain. Caunian love seems to be a proverbial expression for an "evil love," one that is wrong and ends badly.

were right in objecting to the training Protagoras undertook to give them. It was a fraud; the probability it handled was not genuine but spurious, and has a place in no art except Rhetoric and Eristic.

ENTHYMEMES, GENUINE AND APPARENT, have now been described; the next subject is their Refutation.

An argument may be refuted either by a counter-syllogism or by bringing an objection. It is clear that counter-syllogisms can be built up from the same lines of arguments as the original syllogisms: for the materials of syllogisms are the ordinary opinions of men, and such opinions often contradict each other. Objections, as appears in the Topics, may be raised in four ways—either by directly attacking your opponent's own statement, or by putting forward another statement like it, or by putting forward a statement contrary to it, or by quoting previous decisions.

1. By 'attacking your opponent's own statement' I mean, for instance, this: if his enthymeme should assert that love is always good, the objection can be brought in two ways, either by making the general statement that 'all want is an evil', or by making the particular one that there would be no talk of 'Caunian love'° if there were not evil loves as well as good ones.

2. An objection 'from a contrary statement' is raised when, for instance, the opponent's enthymeme having concluded that a good man does good to all his friends, you object, 'That proves nothing, for a bad man does not do evil to all his friends'.

3. An example of an objection 'from a like statement' is, the enthymeme having shown that ill-used men always hate their ill-users, to reply, 'That proves nothing, for well-used men do not always love those who used them well'.

1402b13. INFALLIBLE SicNS ... ORDINARY SIGNS : We met infallible and ordinary signs in book I, chapter 2. A necessary sign is irrefutable, while ordinary signs are merely probable, not necessary. In book I Aristotle also told us both that the enthymeme is the body of persuasion and that there are two methods of persuasion, enthymeme and example. Here there are enthymemes based on examples, which is a way of reconciling those two ideas from book I.

4. The 'decisions' mentioned are those proceeding from well-known men; for instance, if the enthymeme employed has concluded that 'Some allowance ought to be made for drunken offenders, since they did not know what they were doing', the objection will be, Pittacus, then, deserves no approval, or he would not have prescribed specially severe penalties for offences due to drunkenness'.

Enthymemes are based upon one or other of four kinds of alleged fact: (1) Probabilities, (2) Examples, (3) Infallible Signs, (4) Ordinary Signs.^o (1) Enthymemes based upon Probabilities are those which argue from what is, or is supposed to be, usually true. (2) Enthymemes based upon Example are those which proceed by induction from one or more similar cases, arrive at a general proposition, and then argue deductively to a particular inference. (3) Enthymemes based upon Infallible Signs are those which argue from the inevitable and invariable. (4) Enthymemes based upon ordinary Signs are those which argue from some universal or particular proposition, true or false.

Now (1) as a Probability is that which happens usually but not always, Enthymemes founded upon Probabilities can, it is clear, always be refuted by raising some objection. The refutation is not always genuine: it may be spurious: for it consists in showing not that your opponent's premiss is not probable, but only in showing that it is not inevitably true. Hence it is always in defence rather than in accusation that it is possible to gain an advantage by using this fallacy. For the accuser uses probabilities to prove his case: and to refute a conclusion as improbable is not the same thing as to refute it as not inevitable. Any argument based upon what usually happens is always open to objection: otherwise it would not be a probability but an invariable and necessary truth. But the judges think, if the refutation takes this form, either that the accuser's case is not probable or that they must not decide it; which, as we said, is a false piece of reasoning. For they ought to decide by considering not merely what must be true but also what is likely to be true: this is, indeed, the meaning of 'giving a verdict in accordance with one's honest opinion'. Therefore it is not enough for the defendant to refute the accusation by proving that the charge is not bound to be true: he must do so by showing that it is not likely to be true. For this purpose his objection must state what is more usually true than the statement attacked. It may do so in either of two ways: either in respect of frequency or in respect of exactness. It will be most convincing if it does so in both respects; for if the thing in question both happens oftener as we represent it and happens more as we represent it, the probability is particularly great.

(2) Fallible Signs, and Enthymemes based upon them, can be refuted even if the facts are correct, as was said at the outset. For we have shown in the Analytics that no Fallible Sign can form part of a valid logical proof.

(3) Enthymemes depending on examples may be refuted in the same way as probabilities. If we have a negative instance, the argument is

refuted, in so far as it is proved not inevitable, even though the positive examples are more similar and more frequent. And if the positive examples are more numerous and more frequent, we must contend that the present case is dissimilar, or that its conditions are dissimilar, or that it is different in some way or other.

(4) It will be impossible to refute Infallible Signs, and Enthymemes resting on them, by showing in any way that they do not form a valid logical proof: this, too, we see from the Analytics. All we can do is to show that the fact alleged does not exist. If there is no doubt that it does, and that it is an Infallible Sign, refutation now becomes impossible: for this is equivalent to a demonstration which is clear in every respect.

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Book II ends with a consideration of errors to be avoided: errors in amplification, in refutation, and in examples.

26

AMPLIFICATION AND DEPRECIATION ARE not an element of enthymeme. By 'an element of enthymeme' I mean the same thing as 'a line of enthymematic argument'-a general class embracing a large number of particular kinds of enthymeme. Amplification and Depreciation are one kind of enthymeme, viz. the kind used to show that a thing is great or small; just as there are other kinds used to show that a thing is good or bad, just or unjust, and anything else of the sort. All these things are the subjectmatter of syllogisms and enthymemes; none of these is the line of argument of an enthymeme; no more, therefore, are Amplification and Depreciation.

Nor are Refutative Enthymemes a different species from Constructive. For it is clear that refutation consists either in offering positive proof or in raising an objection. In the first case we prove the opposite of our adversary's statements. Thus, if he shows that a thing has happened, we show that it has not; if he shows that it has not happened, we show that it has. This, then, could not be the distinction if there were one, since the same means are employed by both parties, enthymemes being adduced to show that the fact is or is not so-and-so. An objection, on the other hand, is not an enthymeme at all, but,

as was said in the Topics, it consists in stating some accepted opinion from which it will be clear that our opponent has not reasoned correctly or has made a false assumption.

Three points must be studied in making a speech; and we have now completed the account of (1) Examples, Maxims, Enthymemes, and in general the thought element-the way to invent and refute arguments. We have next to discuss (2) Style, and (3) Arrangement.

-1-

Book III is concerned with style (lexis) and arrangement (taxis). In addition to these, delivery (hypokrisis) is a factor in persuading audiences. This chapters discusses how delivery persuades, and notes that a rhetorical art of delivery has not yet been developed. Recall that style was also one of the six parts of a tragedy listed in the Poetics 6 and discussed in chapters. 21-23.

BOOK III

1

IN MAKING A SPEECH one must study three points: first, the means of producing persuasion; second, the style, or language, to be used; third, the proper arrangement of the various parts of the speech. We have already specified the sources of persuasion. We have shown that these are three in number; what they are; and why there are only these three: for we have shown that persuasion must in every case be effected either (1) by working on the emotions of the judges themselves, (2) by giving them the right impression of the speakers' character, or (3) by proving the truth of the statements made.

Enthymemes also have been described, and the sources from which they should be derived; there being both special and general lines of argument for enthymemes.

Our next subject will be the style of expression. For it is not enough to know what we ought to say; we must also say it as we ought; much help is thus afforded towards producing the right impression of a speech. The first question to receive attention was naturally the one that comes first naturally-how persuasion can be produced from the facts themselves. The second is how to set these facts out in language. A third would be the proper method of delivery; this is a thing that affects the success of a speech greatly; but hitherto the subject has been neglected. Indeed, it was long before it found a way into the arts of tragic drama and epic recitation: at first poets acted their tragedies themselves. It is plain that delivery has just as much to do with oratory as with poetry. (In connexion with poetry, it has been studied by Glaucon of Teos among others.)

1403b33. DRAMATIC CONTESTS: Aristotle's reference to "contests of public life" suggests that it is tempting, but wrong, to think that whatever makes someone win such a contest is also what is most powerful about rhetoric in general. We shouldn't extrapolate from the artificial circumstances of a contest to what happens in oratory when

real interests are at stake. "It is those who do bear them in mind who usually win prizes in the dramatic contests; and just as in drama the actors now count for more than the poets, so it is in the contests of public life, owing to the defects of our political institutions." Just as in the Poetics, where the plot was the most important part of the tragedy, even if audiences were more moved by spectacle, so here in the Rhetoric, reasoning should be more powerful than delivery, and presentation. If it isn't, the fault lies in the political institutions.

1404a11. NOBODY USES FINE LANGUAGE WHEN TEACHING GEOMETRY: Style and, to an even greater extent, delivery shouldn't be necessary and so shouldn't be part of the art of rhetoric. Argument ought to be enough. Because of the "defects of our hearers," speakers do have to take these things into account, but they are less important than many people think. Even when examining style and arrangement, Aristotle continues to insist that reasoning is the heart of persuasion. This doesn't mean, though, that teaching geometry should be the model for all rhetorical persuasion.

1404a14. THRASYMACHUS IN HIS 'APPEALS TO PITY': Thrasymachus, a sophist and rhetorician, appears in Plato's Republic. The whole discussion of delivery and style is another intersection of oratory and dramatic performance.

1404a15. DRAMATIC ABILITY IS A NATURAL GIFT ... SYSTEMATICALLY TAUGHT: Since readers of the Rhetoric should want to know what aspects of rhetorical power can be taught through a book like the Rhetoric, off-hand remarks like this are significant.

It is, essentially, a matter of the right management of the voice to express the various emotions-of speaking loudly, softly, or between the two; of high, low, or intermediate pitch; of the various rhythms that suit various subjects. These are the three things-volume of sound, modulation of pitch, and rhythm-that a speaker bears in mind. It is those who do bear them in mind who usually win prizes in the dramatic contests; ° and just as in drama the actors now count for more than the poets, so it is in the contests of public life, owing to the defects of our political institutions. No systematic treatise upon the rules of delivery has yet been composed; indeed, even the study of language made no progress till late in the day. Besides, delivery is very properly-not regarded as an elevated subject of inquiry. Still, the whole business of rhetoric being concerned with appearances, we must pay attention to the subject of delivery, unworthy though it is, because we cannot do without it. The right thing in speaking really is that we should be satisfied not to annoy our hearers, without trying to delight them: we ought in fairness to fight our case with no help beyond the bare facts: nothing, therefore, should matter except the

proof of those facts. Still, as has been already said, other things affect the result considerably, owing to the defects of our hearers. The arts of language cannot help having a small but real importance, whatever it is we have to expound to others: the way in which a thing is said does affect its intelligibility. Not, however, so much importance as people think. All such arts are fanciful and meant to charm the hearer. Nobody uses fine language when teaching geometry.°

When the principles of delivery have been worked out, they will produce the same effect as on the stage. But only very slight attempts to deal with them have been made and by a few people, as by Thrasymachus in his 'Appeals to Pity'.° Dramatic ability is a natural gift, and can hardly be systematically taught.° The principles of good diction can be so taught, and

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The virtue of good style is clarity. Aristotle gives style a rhetorical definition and concentrates on word choice as the key to clarity. While the section on style might seem of interest only for people using the Greek language, it is worth looking at because only at this time did people begin to think about style as something that could apply to prose at all.

therefore we have men of ability in this direction too, who win prizes in their turn, as well as those speakers who excel in delivery-speeches of the written or literary kind owe more of their effect to their diction than to their thought.

It was naturally the poets who first set the movement going; for words represent things, and they had also the human voice at their disposal, which of all our organs can best represent other things. Thus the arts of recitation and acting were formed, and others as well. Now it was because poets seemed to win fame through their fine language when their thoughts were simple enough, that the language of oratorical prose at first took a poetical colour, e.g. that of Gorgias. Even now most uneducated people think that poetical language makes the finest discourses. That is not true: the language of prose is distinct from that of poetry. This is shown by the state of things to-day, when even the language of tragedy has altered its character. Just as iambics were adopted, instead of tetrameters, because they are the most prose-like of all metres, so tragedy has given up all those words, not used in ordinary talk, which decorated the early drama and are still used by the writers of hexameter poems. It is therefore ridiculous to imitate a poetical manner which the poets themselves have dropped; and it is now plain that we have not to treat in detail the whole question of

style, but may confine ourselves to that part of it which concerns our present subject, rhetoric. The other—the poetical-part of it has been discussed in the treatise on the Art of Poetry.

2

WE MAY, THEN, START from the observations there made, including the definition of style. Style to be good must be clear, as is proved by the fact that speech which fails to convey a plain meaning will fail to do just what speech has to do. It

1404b5. POETICAL LANGUAGE ... NOT APPROPRIATE TO PROSE: The contrast translated as between poetry and prose is, in Greek, between poetry and logos.

1404b19-21. WE CAN NOW SEE THAT A WRITER ... THEIR WINES FOR THEM: That speakers should conceal their artfulness is an important, perennial rhetorical principle. Aristotle is presenting an art of rhetoric while aware that art is itself grounds for suspicion in a rhetorician. If audiences are naturally suspicious they “think we have some design against them”—then obvious artifice is unpersuasive. It’s worthy to compare this case with the oratorical contests mentioned in the last chapter. In a contest, everyone knows that speakers are competing against each other for the audience’s favor, so the audience takes the artificial nature of the contest for granted.

1404b22. THEODORUS: An actor of the mid-fourth century, he was also mentioned by Aristotle in Politics VII.

must also be appropriate, avoiding both meanness and undue elevation; poetical language is certainly free from meanness, but it is not appropriate to prose.^o Clearness is secured by using the words (nouns and verbs alike) that are current and ordinary. Freedom from meanness, and positive adornment too, are secured by using the other words mentioned in the Art of Poetry. Such variation from what is usual makes the language appear more stately. People do not feel towards strangers as they do towards their own countrymen, and the same thing is true of their feeling for language. It is therefore well to give to everyday speech an unfamiliar air: people like what strikes them, and are struck by what is out of the way. In verse such effects are common, and there they are fitting: the persons and things there spoken of are comparatively remote from ordinary life. In prose passages they are far less often fitting because the subject-matter is

less exalted. Even in poetry, it is not quite appropriate that fine language should be used by a slave or a very young man, or about very trivial subjects: even in poetry the style, to be appropriate, must sometimes be toned down, though at other times heightened. We can now see that a writer must disguise his art and give the impression of speaking naturally and not artificially. Naturalness is persuasive, artificiality is the contrary; for our hearers are prejudiced and think we have some design against them, as if we were mixing their wines for them.⁰ It is like the difference between the quality of Theodorus' voice and the voices of all other actors: his really seems to be that of the character who is speaking, theirs do not. We can hide our purpose successfully by taking the single words of our composition from the speech of ordinary life. This is done in poetry by Euripides, who was the first to show the way to his successors.

Language is composed of nouns and verbs. Nouns are of the various kinds considered in the treatise on Poetry. Strange

1405a3. ART OF POETRY Aristotle refers back to chapters 21 and 22 of the Poetics.

1405a9. NOT A THING WHOSE USE CAN BE TAUGHT: Metaphor is something else that, while powerful, cannot be taught. Book III will have a lot to say about metaphor, but according to this statement, none of what Aristotle says will make people better at inventing metaphors, but only at understanding how they work.

words, compound words, and invented words must be used sparingly and on few occasions: on what occasions we shall state later. The reason for this restriction has been already indicated: they depart from what is suitable, in the direction of excess. In the language of prose, besides the regular and proper terms for things, metaphorical terms only can be used with advantage. This we gather from the fact that these two classes of terms, the proper or regular and the metaphorical-these and no others-are used by everybody in conversation. We can now see that a good writer can produce ■ a style that is distinguished without being obtrusive, and is at the same time clear, thus satisfying our definition of good oratorical prose. Words of ambiguous meaning are chiefly useful to enable the sophist to mislead his hearers. Synonyms are useful to the poet, by which I mean words whose ordinary meaning is the same, e.g.

πορεύεσθαι (advancing) and *βαδίζειν* (proceeding); these two are ordinary words and have the same meaning.

In the Art of Poetry^o as we have already said, will be found definitions of these kinds of words; a classification of Metaphors ; and mention of the fact that metaphor is of great value both in poetry and

in prose. Prose-writers must, however, pay i specially careful attention to metaphor, because their other resources are scantier than those of poets. Metaphor, moreover, gives style clearness, charm, and distinction as nothing else can: and it is not a thing whose use can be taught° by one man to another. Metaphors, like epithets, must be fitting, which means that they must fairly correspond to the thing signified: failing this, their inappropriateness will be conspicuous : the want of harmony between two things is emphasized by their being placed side by side. It is like having to ask ourselves what dress will suit an old man; certainly not the crimson cloak that suits a young man. And if you wish to pay a compliment, you must take your metaphor from something

1405a20. IPHICRATES ... CALLIAS : Iphicrates (c.415-c.353) was a general who reformed the Athenian army. Callias (450-370) was the wealthy host of the sophists in Plato's *Protagoras*.

1405a33. DIONYSIUS THE BRAZEN: He was a poet in the middle of the fifth century. He was called the brazen because he advised the Athenians to mint bronze coins.

1405b1. 'I MARKED HOW A MAN ... ANOTHER MAN'S BODY': The line seems to come from someone named Cleobulina.

better in the same line; if to disparage, from something worse. To illustrate my meaning: since opposites are in the same class, you do what I have suggested if you say that a man who begs 'prays', and a man who prays 'begs'; for praying and begging are both varieties of asking. So Iphicrates called Callias° a 'mendicant priest' instead of a 'torch-bearer', and Callias replied that Iphicrates must be uninitiated or he would have called him not a 'mendicant priest' but a 'torch-bearer'. Both are religious titles, but one is honourable and the other is not. Again, somebody calls actors 'hangers-on of Dionysus', but they call themselves 'artists': each of these terms is a metaphor, the one intended to throw dirt at the actor, the other to dignify him. And pirates now call themselves 'purveyors'. We can thus call a crime a mistake, or a mistake a crime. We can say that a thief 'took' a thing, or that he 'plundered' his victim. An expression like that of Euripides' Telephus,

King of the oar, on Mysia's coast he landed,

is inappropriate; the word 'king' goes beyond the dignity of the subject, and so the art is not concealed. A metaphor may be amiss because the very syllables of the words conveying it fail to indicate sweetness of vocal utterance. Thus Dionysius the Brazen° in his elegies calls poetry 'Calliope's screech'. Poetry and screeching are both, to be sure, vocal utterances. But the metaphor is bad, because the sounds of

‘screeching’, unlike those of poetry, are discordant and unmeaning. Further, in using metaphors to give names to nameless things, we must draw them not from remote but from kindred and similar things, so that the kinship is clearly perceived as soon as the words are said. Thus in the celebrated riddle

I marked how a man glued bronze with fire to another man’s body,°

1405b7. LICYMNIUS: He was a poet and orator from Chios.

the process is nameless; but both it and gluing are a kind of application, and that is why the application of the cupping-glass is here called a ‘gluing’. Good riddles do, in general, provide us with satisfactory metaphors: for metaphors imply riddles, and therefore a good riddle can furnish a good metaphor. Further, the materials of metaphors must be beautiful; and the beauty, like the ugliness, of all words may, as Licymnius° says, lie in their sound or in their meaning. Further, there is a third consideration—one that upsets the fallacious argument of the sophist Bryson, that there is no such thing as foul language, because in whatever words you put a given thing your meaning is the same. This is untrue. One term may describe a thing more truly than another, may be more like it, and set it more intimately before our eyes. Besides, two different words will represent a thing in two different lights; so on this ground also one term must be held fairer or fouler than another. For both of two terms will indicate what is fair, or what is foul, but not simply their fairness or their foulness, or if so, at any rate not in an equal degree. The materials of metaphor must be beautiful to the ear, to the understanding, to the eye or some other physical sense. It is better, for instance, to say ‘rosy-fingered morn’ than ‘crimson-fingered’ or, worse still, ‘red-fingered morn’. The epithets that we apply, too, may have a bad and ugly aspect, as when Orestes is called a ‘mother-slayer’; or a better one, as when he is called his ‘father’s avenger’. Simonides, when the victor in the mule-race offered him a small fee, refused to write him an ode, because, he said, it was so unpleasant to write odes to half-asses: but on receiving an adequate fee, he wrote

Hail to you, daughters of storm-footed steeds,

though of course they were daughters of asses too. The same effect is attained by the use of diminutives, which make a bad

After looking at the virtues of style, Aristotle now looks at stylistic vices, which are forms of “bad taste in language”—more literally, “frigidity.” There

are four causes of frigidity: double words, glosses, periphrasis, and metaphors.

1405b35. LYCOPHRON: There are several Lycophrons, and it isn't clear which Aristotle is referring to.

1405b37. GORGIAS: Gorgias, who came from Leontini in Sicily, lived from around 483 until 376. He was one of the most influential and important of the sophists and teachers of rhetoric. We meet him in Plato's Gorgias.

1405a1. ALCIDAMAS: He was an orator from Elia who lived in the second half of the fifth century.

thing less bad and a good thing less good. Take, for instance, the banter of Aristophanes in the *Babylonians* where he uses 'goldlet' for 'gold', 'cloaklet' for 'cloak', 'scofflet' for 'scoff', and 'plaguelet'. But alike in using epithets and in using diminutives we must be wary and must observe the mean.

3

BAD TASTE IN LANGUAGE may take any of four forms:-

(1) The misuse of compound words. Lycophron,^o for instance, talks of the 'many visaged heaven' above the giant crested earth', and again the 'strait pathed shore'; and Gorgias^o of the 'pauper-poet flatterer' and 'oath-breaking and over-oath-keeping'. Alcidamas uses such expressions as 'the soul filling with rage and face becoming flame-flushed', and 'he thought their enthusiasm would be issue fraught' and 'issue fraught he made the persuasion of his words', and '*sombre hued* is the floor of the sea'. The way all these words are compounded makes them, we feel, fit for verse only. This, then, is one form in which bad taste is shown.

(2) Another is the employment of strange words. For instance, Lycophron talks of 'the prodigious Xerxes' and 'spoliative Sciron'; Alcidamas of 'a toy for poetry' and 'the witlessness of nature', and says 'whetted with the unmitigated temper of his spirit'.

(3) A third form is the use of long, unseasonable, or frequent epithets. It is appropriate enough for a poet to talk of 'white milk', but in prose such epithets are sometimes lacking in appropriateness or,

when spread too thickly, plainly reveal the author turning his prose into poetry. Of course we must use some epithets, since they lift our style above the usual level and give it an air of distinction. But we must aim at the due mean, or the result will be worse than if we took no trouble at all; we shall get something actually bad instead of something merely not good. That is why the epithets of Alcidas seem so tasteless; he does not use them as the seasoning of the meat, but as the meat itself, so numerous and swollen and aggressive are they. For instance, he does not say ‘sweat’, but ‘the moist sweat’; not ‘to the Isthmian games’, but ‘to the world-concourse of the Isthmian games’; not ‘laws’, but ‘the laws that are monarchs of states’; not ‘at a run’, but ‘his heart impelling him to speed of foot’; not ‘a school of the Muses’, but ‘azures school of the Muses had he inherited’; and so ‘frowning care of heart’, and ‘achiever’ not of ‘popularity’ but of ‘universal popularity’, and ‘dispenser of pleasure to his audience’, and ‘he concealed it’ not ‘with boughs’ but ‘with boughs of the forest trees’, and ‘he clothed’ not ‘his body’ but ‘his body’s nakedness; and ‘his soul’s desire was counterimitative’ (this is at one and the same time a compound and an epithet, so that it seems a poet’s effort), and ‘so extravagant the excess of his wickedness’. We thus see how the inappropriateness of such poetical language imports absurdity and tastelessness into speeches, as well as the obscurity that comes from all this verbosity-for when the sense is plain, you only obscure and spoil its clearness by piling up words.

The ordinary use of compound words is where there is no term for a thing and some compound can be easily formed, like ‘pastime’ (*χρονотριβεῖν*); but if this is much done, the prose character disappears entirely. We now see why the language of compounds is just the thing for writers of dithyrambs, who love sonorous noises; strange words for writers of epic poetry, which is a proud and stately affair; and metaphor for iambic verse, the metre which (as has been already said) is widely used to-day.

(4) There remains the fourth region in which bad taste may be shown, metaphor. Metaphors like other things may be inappropriate. Some are so because they are ridiculous;

1406b17. ‘NAY, SHAME, O PHILOMELA’: Philomela was turned into a swallow by the gods.

Chapter 4 turns to similes (the Greek word for “simile” is icon). Aristotle treats simile as an expended metaphor, and the chapter ends by looking at

metaphors.

1406b23. THE POET SAYS OF ACHILLES : Homer compared Achilles to a lion in the Iliad 20.164.

1406b27. ANDROTION: A fourth-century Athenian politician and orator, he was best known for being attacked in a speech of Demosthenes.

they are indeed used by comic as well as tragic poets. Others are too grand and theatrical; and these, if they are far-fetched, may also be obscure. For instance, Gorgias talks of ‘events that are green and full of sap’, and says ‘foul was the deed you sowed and evil the harvest you reaped’. That is too much like poetry. Alcidamas, again, called philosophy ‘a fortress that threatens the power of law’, and the Odyssey ‘a goodly looking-glass of human life’, and talked about ‘offering no such toy to poetry’: all these expressions fail, for the reasons given, to carry the hearer with them. The address of Gorgias ; to the swallow, when she had let her droppings fall on him as she flew overhead, is in the best tragic manner. He said, ‘Nay, shame, O Philomela’.° Considering her as a bird, you could not call her act shameful; considering her as a girl, you could; and so it was a good gibe to address her as what she was once and not as what she is.

4

THE SIMILE ALSO IS a metaphor; the difference is but slight. When the poet says of Achilles° that he

Leapt on the foe as a lion,

this is a simile; when he says of him ‘the lion leapt’, it is a metaphor—here, since both are courageous, he has transferred to Achilles the name of ‘lion’. Similes are useful in prose as well as in verse; but not often, since they are of the nature of poetry. They are to be employed just as metaphors are : employed, since they are really the same thing except for the difference mentioned.

The following are examples of similes. Androtion° said of Idrieus that he was like a terrier let off the chain, that flies at you and bites you—Idrieus too was savage now that he was let

1406b30. IDRIEUS ... EUXENUS: None of these characters is known.

1406b32. IN PLATO’S REPUBLIC. Aristotle alludes to books V, VI, and

X of the Republic.

1407a2. PERICLES COMPARED THE SAMIANS ... : Pericles led Athenian troops against the island of Samos in 440.

1407a5. DEMOSTHENES: This is probably not the famous orator Demosthenes.

1407a7. DEMOCRATES: We are not sure who he was.

1407a9. ANTISTHENES ... CEPHISODOTUS: He was a student of Socrates and founder of the Cynic school of philosophy. Cephisodotes was probably a fourth-century orator.

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The first four chapters looked at style in terms of the choices of individual words. The rest of the treatment of style looks at how words are put together. Aristotle turns first to correctness in putting words together. The chapters ends by looking at some of the stylistic considerations that are unique to written and to spoken language. Since prose designed to be read rather than heard was a fairly new development, these comments are interesting as one of the first attempts at understanding what difference writing makes. Some of Aristotle's considerations are peculiar to Greek, but others are still of interest in any language.

out of his chains. Theodamas compared Archidamus to an Euxenus^O who could not do geometry-a proportional simile, implying that Euxenus is an Archidamus who can do geometry. In Plato's Republic those who strip the dead are compared to curs which bite the stones thrown at them but do not touch the thrower; and there is the simile about the Athenian people, who are compared to a ship's captain who is strong but a little deaf; and the one about poets' verses, which are likened to persons who lack beauty but possess youthful freshness-when the freshness has faded the charm perishes, and so with verses when broken up into prose. Pericles compared the Samians^O to children who take their pap but go on crying; and the Boeotians to holm-oaks, because they were ruining one another by civil wars just as one oak causes another oak's fall. Demosthenes^O said that the Athenian people were like sea-sick men on board ship. Again, Democrates^O compared the political orators to nurses who swallow the bit of food themselves and then smear the children's lips with the spittle. Antisthenes compared the lean Cephisodotus^O to frankincense, because it was his consumption that gave one pleasure. All these ideas may be expressed either as similes or as metaphors; those which

succeed as metaphors will obviously do well also as similes, and similes, with the explanation omitted, will appear as metaphors. But the proportional metaphor must always apply reciprocally to either of its co-ordinate terms. For instance, if a drinking-bowl is the shield of Dionysus, a shield may fittingly be called the drinking-bowl of Ares.

5

SUCH, THEN, ARE THE ingredients of which speech is composed. The foundation of good style is correctness of language, which falls under five heads. (1) First, the proper use of connecting words, and the arrangement of them in the

1407a39. 'CROESUS BY CROSSING ... A MIGHTY REALM': Herodotus tells the story the oracle told Croesus-that if he attacked Persia, a great empire would fall. Croesus thinks this means that the Persians will fall, but it actually meant that his empire would be destroyed.

natural sequence which some of them require. For instance, the connective *flÉV* (e.g. *eycb* (*jlev*) requires the correlative (e.g. *éγὼ μέν*) (e.g. 6 de). The answering word must be brought in before the first has been forgotten, and not be widely separated from it; nor, except in the few cases where this is appropriate, is another connective to be introduced before the one required. Consider the sentence, 'But I, as soon as he told me (for Cleon had come begging and praying), took them along and set out.' In this sentence many connecting words are inserted in front of the one required to complete the sense; and if there is a long interval before 'set out', the result is obscurity. One merit, then, of good style lies in the right use of connecting words. (2) The second lies in calling things by their own special names and not by vague general ones. (3) The third is to avoid ambiguities; unless, indeed, you definitely desire to be ambiguous, as those do who have nothing to say but are pretending to mean something. Such people are apt to put that sort of thing into verse. Empedocles, for instance, by his long circumlocutions imposes on his hearers; these are affected in the same way as most people are when they listen to diviners, whose ambiguous utterances are received with nods of acquiescence-

Croesus by crossing the Halys will ruin a mighty realm.0

Diviners use these vague generalities about the matter in hand

because their predictions are thus, as a rule, less likely to be falsified. We are more likely to be right, in the game of 'odd and even', if we simply guess 'even' or 'odd' than if we guess at the actual number; and the oracle-monger is more likely to be right if he simply says that a thing will happen than if he says when it will happen, and therefore he refuses to add a definite date. All these ambiguities have the same sort of effect, and are to be avoided unless we have some such

1407b14. HERACLEITUS: A philosopher from Ephesus, Heracleitus wrote a famous treatise on the nature of the universe around 500.

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Impressiveness and conciseness are rhetorical contraries: We aim at one by doing the opposite of what we do in aiming at the other.

object as that mentioned. (4) A fourth rule is to observe Protagoras' classification of nouns into male, female, and inanimate; for these distinctions also must be correctly given. 'Upon her arrival she said

her sav and departed (ή δ' ἐλθοῦσα καὶ διαλεχθεῖσα ὥχεται).' (5) A fifth rule is to express plurality, fewness, and unity by the correct wording, e.g. 'Having come, they struck me (οἱ δ' ἐλθόντες ἔτηπτόν με).'

It is a general rule that a written composition should be easy to read and therefore easy to deliver. This cannot be so where there are many connecting words or clauses, or where punctuation is hard, as in the writings of Heracleitus.^o To punctuate Heracleitus is no easy task, because we often cannot tell whether a particular word belongs to what precedes or what follows it. Thus, at the outset of his treatise he says, 'Though this truth is always men understand it not', where it is not clear with which of the two clauses the word 'always' should be joined by the punctuation. Further, the following fact leads to solecism, viz. that the sentence does not work out properly if you annex to two terms a third which does not suit them both. Thus either 'sound' or 'colour' will fail to work out properly with some verbs: 'perceive' will apply to both, 'see' will not. Obscurity is also caused if, when you intend to insert a number of details, you do not first make your meaning clear; for instance, if you say, 'I meant, after telling him this, that, and the other thing, to set out', rather than something of this kind: 'I meant to set out after telling him; then this, that, and the other thing occurred.'

THE FOLLOWING SUGGESTIONS WILL help to give your language impressiveness. (1) Describe a thing instead of naming it: do not say 'circle', but 'that surface which extends equally from the middle every way'. To achieve conciseness,

1407b34-35. 'UNTO HAVENS ACHAEAN' ... 'HERE ARE MY LETTER'S MANY-LEAVED FOLDS': We don't know where the first line comes from; the second is from Euripides' Iphigenia in Tauris.

1408a1. ANTIMACHUS: Antimachus of Colophon wrote an epic cycle around the end of the fifth century or the beginning of the fourth.

do the opposite-put the name instead of the description. When mentioning anything ugly or unseemly, use its name if it is the description that is ugly, and describe it if it is the name that is ugly. (2) Represent things with the help of metaphors and epithets, being careful to avoid poetical effects. (3) Use plural for singular, as in poetry, where one finds

Unto havens Achaean,°

though only one haven is meant, and

Here are my letter's many-leaved folds.°

(4) Do not bracket two words under one article, but put one article with each; e.g. *τῆς γυναικὸς τῆς ἡμετέρας*. The reverse to secure conciseness; e.g. *τῆς ἡμετέρας γυναικός*.

(5) Use plenty of connecting words; conversely, to secure conciseness, dispense with connectives, while still preserving connexion; e.g. 'having gone and spoken', and 'having gone, I spoke', respectively. (6) And the practice of Antimachus,° too, is useful-to describe a thing by mentioning attributes it does not possess; as he does in talking of Teumessus-

There is a little wind-swept knoll ...

A subject can be developed indefinitely along these lines. You may apply this method of treatment by negation either to good or to bad qualities, according to which your subject requires. It is from this source that the poets draw expressions such as the 'stringless' or 'lyreless' melody, thus forming epithets out of negations. This device is popular in proportional metaphors, as when the trumpet's note is called 'a lyreless melody'.

An appropriate style is one that is appropriate, to its subject matter, to the emotions expressed, and to the character the speakers is trying to convey. The idea of propriety to prepon ("the fitting") in Greek-becomes more fundamental in later Greek and Roman rhetories. Here, though, it is worth seeing how Aristotle thinks that appropriate style makes a speakers convincing.

1408a15. CLEOPHON: A tragic poet, he is also referred to in the Poetics.

1408a19-23. THIS APTNESS OF LANGUAGE ... WHETHER IT IS SO OR NOT: This is a fallacy on which a lot of false rhetoric depends: Since someone telling the truth uses appropriate language-neither, for example, boasting nor jumping too fast over the details-so someone who uses that kind of language must be speaking the truth. Aristotle simply describes the way audiences behave, without telling the orator that he should exploit this fallacy. The same applies to the next point—that using the appropriate language makes people think you are speaking sincerely, from your character.

7

YOUR LANGUAGE WILL BE appropriate if it expresses emotion and character, and if it corresponds to its subject. 'Correspondence to subject' means that we must neither speak casually about weighty matters, nor solemnly about trivial ones; nor must we add ornamental epithets to commonplace nouns, or the effect will be comic, as in the works of Cleophon,^o who can use phrases as absurd as 'O queenly fig-tree'. To express emotion, you will employ the language of anger in speaking of outrage; the language of disgust and discreet reluctance to utter a word when speaking of impiety or foulness; the language of exultation for a tale of glory, and that of humiliation for a tale of pity; and so in all other cases.

This aptness of language is one thing that makes people : believe in

the truth of your story: their minds draw the false conclusion that you are to be trusted from the fact that others behave as you do when things are as you describe them; and therefore they take your story to be true, whether it is so or not.^o Besides, an emotional speaker always makes his audience feel with him, even when there is nothing in his arguments ; which is why many speakers try to overwhelm their audience by mere noise. ,

Furthermore, this way of proving your story by displaying these signs of its genuineness expresses your personal character. Each class of men, each type of disposition, will have its own appropriate way of letting the truth appear. Under 'class' I include differences of age, as boy, man, or old man; of sex, as man or woman; of nationality, as Spartan or Thessalian. By 'dispositions' I here mean those dispositions only which determine the character of a man's life, for it is not every disposition that does this. If, then, a speaker uses the very words

1408b1. ALL THE VARIATIONS OF ORATORICAL STYLE ... OUT OF SEASON: That is, any of the devices Aristotle has mentioned can be used appropriately or not. His advice on how to use them appropriately seems manipulative and cynical here. The appearance of sincerity and truth comes from disguising one's use of rhetorical devices.

which are in keeping with a particular disposition, he will reproduce the corresponding character; for a rustic and an educated man will not say the same things nor speak in the same way. Again, some impression is made upon an audience by a device which speech-writers employ to nauseous excess, when they say, 'Who does not know this?' or 'It is known to everybody.' The hearer is ashamed of his ignorance, and agrees with the speaker, so as to have a share of the knowledge that everybody else possesses.

All the variations of oratorical style are capable of being used in season or out of season.^o The best way to counteract any exaggeration is the well-worn device by which the speaker puts in some criticism of himself; for then people feel it must be all right for him to talk thus, since he certainly knows what he is doing. Further, it is better not to have everything always just corresponding to everything else-your hearers will see through you less easily thus. I mean for instance, if your words are harsh, you should not extend this harshness to your voice and your countenance and have everything else in keeping. If you do, the artificial character of each detail becomes apparent; whereas if you adopt one device and not another, you are using art all the same and yet nobody notices it. (To be sure, if mild sentiments are expressed in harsh tones and harsh sentiments in mild tones, you become comparatively unconvincing.) Compound words, fairly

plentiful epithets, and strange words best suit an emotional speech. We forgive an angry man for talking about a wrong as 'heaven-high' or 'colossal'; and we excuse such language when the speaker has his hearers already in his hands and has stirred them deeply either by praise or blame or anger or affection, as Isocrates, for instance, does at the end of his Panegyric, with his 'name and fame' and 'in that they brooked'. Men do speak in this strain when they are deeply stirred, and so, once the audience is in a like state of feeling,

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Chapter 8 looks at rhythm as a feature of style. The idea that not only poetry but prose can have rhythm was originally a rhetorical idea, which then became a resource for all sorts of prose. Here Aristotle wants to understand the sort of rhythm that is appropriate to prose as oppose to poetry,.

1408b21-23. FORM OF A PROSE COMPOSITION ... : Prose must achieve rhythm without meter, which is what poetry uses to achieve rhythm. The demands of prose are different because the orator's speech cannot look artificial, while the poet's can.

approval of course follows. This is why such language is fitting in poetry, which is an inspired thing. This language, then, should be used either under stress of emotion, or ironically, after the manner of Gorgias and of the passages in the Phaedrus.

8

THE FORM OF A prose composition^o should be neither metrical nor destitute of rhythm. The metrical form destroys the hearer's trust by its artificial appearance, and at the same time it diverts his attention, making him watch for metrical recurrences, just as children catch up the herald's question, 'Whom does the freedman choose as his advocate?', with the answer 'Cleon!' On the other hand, unrhythmical language is too unlimited; we do not want the limitations of metre, but some limitation we must have, or the effect will be vague and unsatisfactory. Now it is number that limits all things; and it is the numerical limitation of the form of a composition that constitutes

rhythm, of which metres are definite sections.

Prose, then, is to be rhythmical, but not metrical, or it will become not prose but verse. It should not even have too precise a prose rhythm, and therefore should only be rhythmical to a certain extent.

Of the various rhythms, the heroic has dignity, but lacks the tones of the spoken language. The iambic is the very language of ordinary people, so that in common talk iambic lines occur oftener than any others: but in a speech we need dignity and the power of taking the hearer out of his ordinary self. The trochee is too much akin to wild dancing: we can see this in tetrameter verse, which is one of the trochaic rhythms.

1409a2. PAEAN ... IN THE TIME OF THRASYMACHUS: The paean is much older than Thrasymachus. It was first a hymn to Apollo the healer. Aristotle must mean that Thrasymachus was the first to use its rhythms in rhetoric. It may be that Thrasymachus figured out how to use a poetic rhythm in prose.

1409a15. The Greek translates as “O, man from Delos or perhaps Lycia.”

1409a16. The Greek translates as “Golden-haired archer, son of Zeus.”

1409a]8. The Greek translates as “After earth and its waters, night covered Ocean from sight.” These three lines are all thought to come from Simonides’ Paeans.

There remains the paean, which speakers began to use in the time of Thrasymachus,^o though they had then no name to give it. The paean is a third class of rhythm, closely akin to both the two already mentioned; it has in it the ratio of three to two, whereas the other two kinds have the ratio of one to one, and two to one respectively. Between the two last ratios comes the ratio of one-and-a-half to one, which is that of the paean.

Now the other two kinds of rhythm must be rejected in writing prose, partly for the reasons given, and partly because they are too metrical; and the paean must be adopted, since from this alone of the rhythms mentioned no definite metre arises, and therefore it is the least obtrusive of them. At present the same form of paean is employed at the beginning as at the end of sentences, whereas the end should differ from the beginning. There are two opposite kinds of paean, one of which is suitable to the beginning of a sentence, where it is indeed actually used; this is the kind that begins with a long syllable and ends with three short ones, as

Δαλογενὲς | εἴτε Λυκί | αν,°

and Χρυσεοκόμα Ἑκατε | παῖ Διός.
°

The other paeon begins, conversely, with three short syllables and ends with a long one, as μετὰ δὲ γὰν | ὕδατά τ' ὥκεανὸν ᾗ
φάνισε νύξ.°

This kind of paeon makes a real close: a short syllable can give no effect of finality, and therefore makes the rhythm appear truncated. A sentence should break off with the long syllable: the fact that it is over should be indicated not by the

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Aristotle now looks at different kinds of style based on the discussion of rhythm. As with the preceding chapter, the challenge seems to be to find prosaic equivalents of what comes easily to poetry,.

scribe, or by his period-mark in the margin, but by the rhythm itself.

We have now seen that our language must be rhythmical and not destitute of rhythm, and what rhythms, in what particular shape, make it so.

9

THE LANGUAGE OF PROSE must be either free-running, with its parts united by nothing except the connecting words, like the preludes in dithyrambs; or compact and antithetical, like the strophes of the old poets. The free-running style is the ancient one, e.g. 'Herein is set forth the inquiry of Herodotus the Thurian.' Every one used this method formerly; not many do so now. By ree-running' style I mean the kind that has no natural stopping-places, and comes to a stop only because there is no more to say of that subject. This style is unsatisfying just because it goes on indefinitely-one always likes to sight a stopping-place in front of one: it is only at the goal that men in

a race faint and collapse; while they see the end of the course before them, they can keep going. Such, then, is the free-running kind of style; the compact is that which is in periods. By a period I mean a portion of speech that has in itself a beginning and an end, being at the same time not too big to be taken in at a glance. Language of this kind is satisfying and easy to follow. It is satisfying, because it is just the reverse of indefinite; and moreover, the hearer always feels that he is grasping something and has reached some definite conclusion; whereas it is unsatisfactory to see nothing in front of you and get nowhere. It is easy to follow, because it can easily be remembered; and this because language when in periodic form can be numbered, and number is the easiest of all things to remember. That is why verse, which is measured, is always more easily remembered

1409b6. VERSE ... PROSE, WHICH IS NOT: The periodic style is the best prose can do to make itself memorable, by feeling definite and well-shaped.

1409b9-10. 'CnLYDOrr's SOIL ... ACROSS THE STRAIT': This seems to be the first line of Euripides' *Meleager*, which Aristotle wrongly attributes to Sophocles.

1409b26. DEMOCRITUS OF CHIOS ... MELANIPPIDES: Democritus of Chios was a musician, Melanippides a fifth-century poet. The verses that follow are a parody of Hesiod.

than prose, which is not:° the measures of verse can be numbered. The period must, further, not be completed until the sense is complete: it must not be capable of breaking off abruptly, as may happen with the following iambic lines of Sophocles-

Calydon's soil is this; of Pelops' land

The smiling plains face us across the strait.°

By a wrong division of the words the hearer may take the meaning to be the reverse of what it is: for instance, in the passage quoted, one might imagine that Calydon is in the Peloponnesus.

A Period may be either divided into several members or simple. The period of several members is a portion of speech (1) complete in itself, (2) divided into parts, and (3) easily delivered at a single breath-as a whole, that is; not by fresh breath being taken at the division. A member is one of the two parts of such a period. By a 'simple' period, I mean that which has only one member. The members, and the whole periods, should be neither curt nor long. A member which is too short often makes the listener stumble; he is still expecting the rhythm to go on to the limit his mind has fixed for it; and if meanwhile he is pulled back by the speaker's stopping, the shock is bound to make him, so to

1409b36-1410a17. 'I HAVE OFTEN WONDERED ...' [THROUGH] '... BEQUEATH AT DEATH': All these quotations are from Isocrates' Panegyricus.

1410a17. PEITHOLAUS AND LYCOPHRON: In 358 these men killed the tyrant Alexander of Pherai.

He that sets traps for another man's feet Is like to fall into them first;

And long-winded preludes do harm to us all, But the prelude catches it worst.

Which applies likewise to long-membered orators. Periods whose members are altogether too short are not periods at all; and the result is to bring the hearer down with a crash.

The periodic style which is divided into members is of two kinds. It is either simply divided, as in 'I have often wondered at the conveners of national gatherings and the founders of athletic contests';^o or it is antithetical, where, in each of the two members, one of one pair of opposites is put along with one of another pair, or the same word is used to bracket two opposites, as 'They aided both parties-not only those who stayed behind but those who accompanied them: for the latter they acquired new territory larger than that at home, and to the former they left territory at home that was large enough'. Here the contrasted words are 'staying behind' and 'accompanying', 'enough' and 'larger'. So in the example, 'Both to those who want to get property and to those who desire to enjoy it', where 'enjoyment' is contrasted with 'getting'. Again, 'it often happens in such enterprises that the wise men fail and the fools succeed'; 'they were awarded the prize of valour immediately, and won the command of the sea not long afterwards'; 'to sail through the mainland and march through the sea, by bridging the Hellespont and cutting through Athos'; 'nature gave them their country and law took it away again'; 'some of them perished in misery, others were saved in disgrace'; 'Athenian citizens keep foreigners in their houses as servants, while the city of Athens allows her allies by thousands to live as the foreigner's slaves'; and 'to possess in life or to bequeath at death'.^o There is also what some one said about Peitholaus and Lycophron^o in a law-court, 'These men used to sell you when they were at home, and now they have come to you

here and bought you'. All these passages

1410a20-23. SUCH A FORM OF SPEECH ... LOGICAL ARGUMENT: This is an unusually concise statement of an idea that lies behind a great deal of the Rhetoric-that logic, or reasoning, is a source of pleasure and satisfaction. Recall that in Poetics 4 Aristotle tells us that learning is a source of the pleasures of imitation.

1410a30. This Greek line probably comes from a lost play by Aristophanes. It translates as "An unfertile land is what they got from him."

1410a31. This line, from the Iliad IX.526, means "One could defeat them by presents, and capture them by words."

1410a32. This and the next four examples come from unknown sources. This one means "In the midst of plenteous cares and exiguous hopes."

1410a34. The Greek translates as "Is he worthy to have a copper statue, when he isn't worth a copper penny?" have the structure described above. Such a form of speech is satisfying, because the significance of contrasted ideas is easily felt, especially when they are thus put side by side, and also because it has the effect of a logical argument; it is by putting two opposing conclusions side by side that you prove one of them false.

Such, then, is the nature of antithesis. Parisosis is making the two members of a period equal in length. Paromoeosis is making the extreme words of both members like each other. This must happen either at the beginning or at the end of each member. If at the beginning, the resemblance must always be between whole words; at the end, between final syllables or inflexions of the same word or the same word repeated. Thus, at the beginning *ἀργὸν γὰρ ἔλαβεν ἀργὸν παρ' αὐτοῦ* and

δωρητοὶ τ' ἐπέλοντο παρὰ ρρητοὶ τ' ἐπέεσσιν.

At the end *οὐκ ᾤθησαν αὐτὸν παιδίον τε το κέναι, ἀλλ' αὐτοῦ αἴτιον γεγονέναι,*

and *ἐν πλείσταις δὲ φροντίσι καὶ ἐν ἐλαχίσταις ἐλπίσιν.*

An example of inflexions of the same word is

ἄξιός δ' ἐσταθῆναι χαλκοῦς, οὐκ ἄξιός ὦν χαλκοῦ;°

1410a35. The line means “While he lived you spoke evil of him, and now you write evil of him.”

1410a36. The Greek translates as “Would you have been very shocked if you saw a man idling?”

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“Lively and taking sayings”-a more literal translation would be “urbanities and well-regarded sayings”-are another facet of style that makes a speaker persuasive. The entire Rhetoric raises the problem of whether being a convincing speaker is really something that can be taught, or is rather a matter of natural talent, or practice, or something else. While Aristotle doesn’t confront the problems head-on for rhetoric overall, the beginning of this chapter gives a hint. He says that with regard to lively and taking sayings, “their actual invention can only come through natural talent or long practice; but this treatise may indicate the way it is done.” At least for this part of being persuasive, the Rhetoric will not help us to do it, but only to understand how it is done. We should worry about whether the same is true for the whole treatise and the whole art of rhetoric, or whether there is something special about this aspect of style that makes it not teachable.

1410b14. THE POET: “The poet” is always Homer; here the reference is to the Odyssey 14.

Of the same word repeated, σὺ δ’ αὐτὸν καὶ ζῶντα ἔλεγες κακῶς
καὶ νῦν γράφεις κακῶς.°

Of one syllable, τί δ’ ἀνέπαθες δεινόν, εἰ ἄνδρ’ εἶδες ἄργόν;°

It is possible for the same sentence to have all these features together-antithesis, parison, and homoeoteleuton. (The possible beginnings of periods have been pretty fully enumerated in the Theodectea.) There are also spurious antitheses, like that of Epicharmus-

There one time I as their guest did stay, And they were my hosts on another day.

10

WE MAY NOW CONSIDER the above points settled, and pass on to say something about the way to devise lively and taking sayings. Their actual invention can only come through natural talent or long practice; but this treatise may indicate the way it is done. We may deal with them by enumerating the different kinds of them. We will begin by remarking that we all naturally find it agreeable to get hold of new ideas easily: words express ideas, and therefore those words are the most agreeable that enable us to get hold of new ideas. Now strange words simply puzzle us; ordinary words convey only what we know already; it is from metaphor that we can best get hold of something fresh. When the poet^o calls old age ‘a withered stalk’, he conveys a new idea, a new fact, to us by means of the general notion of ‘lost bloom’, which is

1410b17. AS HAS BEEN SAID BEFORE: That is, in Rhetoric III.4. 1406b20 and 1407a14-15.

FOURKINDS OF METAPHOR: The four kinds were also listed in Poetls 21.

1411a4. THUS PERICLES, FOR INSTANCE, SAID ... : In the ensuing section, it is worth noticing that Aristotle’s examples come from political and ceremonial rhetoric, rather than forensic oratory.

common to both things. The similes of the poets do the same, and therefore, if they are good similes, give an effect of brilliance. The simile, as has been said before, is a metaphor, differing from it only in the way it is put; and just because it is longer it is less attractive. Besides, it does not say outright that ‘this’ is ‘that’, and therefore the hearer is less interested in the idea. We see, then, that both speech and reasoning are lively in proportion as they make us seize a new idea promptly. For this reason people are not much taken either by obvious arguments (using the word ‘obvious’ to mean what is plain to everybody and needs no investigation), nor by those which puzzle us when we hear them stated, but only by those which convey their information to us as soon as we hear them, provided we had not the information already; or which the mind only just fails to keep up with. These two kinds do convey to us a sort of information: but the obvious

and the obscure kinds convey nothing, either at once or later on. It is these qualities, then, that, so far as the meaning of what is said is concerned, make an argument acceptable. So far as the style is concerned, it is the antithetical form that appeals to us, e.g. 'judging that the peace common to all the rest was a war upon their own private interests,' where there is an antithesis between war and peace. It is also good to use metaphorical words; but the metaphors must not be far-fetched, or they will be difficult to grasp, nor obvious, or they will have no effect. The words, too, ought to set the scene before our eyes; for events ought to be seen in progress rather than in prospect. So we must aim at these three points: Antithesis, Metaphor, and Actuality.

Of the four kinds of Metaphor^o the most taking is the proportional kind. Thus Pericles, for instance, said^o that the vanishing from their country of the young men who had fallen in the war was 'as if the spring were taken out of the year'. Leptines, speaking of the Lacedaemonians, said that he would not have the Athenians let Greece 'lose one of her two eyes'. When Chares was pressing for leave to be examined upon his share in the Olynthiac war, Cephisodotus was indignant, saying that he wanted his examination to take place 'while he had his fingers upon the people's throat'. The same speaker once urged the Athenians to march to Euboea, 'with Miltiades' decree as their rations'. Iphicrates, indignant at the truce made by the Athenians with Epidaurus and the neighbouring sea-board, said that they had stripped themselves of their travelling-money for the journey of war. Peitholaus called the state-galley 'the people's big stick', and Sestos 'the corn-bin of the Peiraeus'. Pericles bade his countrymen remove Aegina, 'that eyesore of the Peiraeus.' And Moerocles said he was no more a rascal than was a certain respectable citizen he named, 'whose rascality was worth over thirty per cent. per annum to him, instead of a mere ten like his own'. There is also the iambic line of Anaxandrides about the way his daughters put off marrying-

My daughters' marriage-bonds are overdue.

Polyeuctus said of a paralytic man named Speusippus that he could not keep quiet, 'though fortune had fastened him in the pillory of disease'. Cephisodotus called warships 'painted millstones'. Diogenes the Dog called taverns 'the mess-rooms of Attica'. Aesion said that the Athenians had 'emptied' their town into Sicily: this is a graphic metaphor. 'Till all Hellas shouted aloud' may be regarded as a metaphor, and a graphic one again. Cephisodotus bade the Athenians take care not to hold too many 'parades'. Isocrates used the same word of those who 'parade' at the national festivals. Another example occurs in the Funeral Speech: 'It is fitting that Greece should cut off

her hair beside the tomb of those who fell at Salamis, since her freedom and their valour are buried in the same

-11-

Vividness or liveliness is a related virtue of style. As the discussion of style has continued, it becomes more and more a source of persuasion in itself, rather than an aid to some more specific, rhetorical purpose that a speaker might have. These last four chapters make good style a more general phenomenon than one restricted to oratory.

grave.’ Even if the speaker here had only said that it was right to weep when valour was being buried in their grave, it would have been a metaphor, and a graphic one; but the coupling of ‘their valour’ and ‘her freedom’ presents a kind of antithesis as well. ‘The course of my words’, said Iphicrates, ‘lies straight through the middle of Chares’ deeds’: this is a proportional metaphor, and the phrase ‘straight through the middle’ makes it graphic. The expression ‘to call in one danger to rescue us from another’ is a graphic metaphor. Lycoleon said, defending Chabrias, ‘They did not respect even that bronze statue of his that intercedes for him yonder’. This was a metaphor for the moment, though it would not always apply; a vivid metaphor, however; Chabrias is in danger, and his statue intercedes for him—that lifeless yet living thing which records his services to his country. ‘Practising in every way littleness of mind’ is metaphorical, for practising a quality implies increasing it. So is ‘God kindled our reason to be a lamp within our souls’, for both reason and light reveal things. So is ‘we are not putting an end to our wars, but only postponing them’, for both literal postponement and the making of such a peace as this apply to future action. So is such a saying as ‘This treaty is a far nobler trophy than those we set up on fields of battle; they celebrate small gains and single successes; it celebrates our triumph in the war as a whole’; for both trophy and treaty are signs of victory. So is ‘A country pays a heavy reckoning in being condemned by the judgement of mankind’, for a reckoning is damage deservedly incurred.

11

IT HAS ALREADY BEEN mentioned that liveliness is got by using the proportional type of metaphor and by being graphic (i.e. making your

hearers see things). We have still to explain what we mean by their ‘seeing things’, and what must be done to

1411b24. ACTMTY: “Activity” is the translation of *energeia*, which also means “actuality” or “realization.” It is opposed to *dynamis* (“power”).

1411 b28-29. ‘WITH HIS VIGOUR IN FULL BLOOM’ ... ‘BUT YOU MUST ROAM ...’: These quotations are from Isocrates’s *Philippus* 10 and 127.

1411b30. ‘THEREAT UP SPRANG THE HELLENES TO THEIR FEET’: Here Aristotle quotes Euripides’ *Iphigenia at Aulis* 80.

1411b32. REMORSELESS: Homer uses the word in the *Odyssey* 11.598.

1411b33-1412a2. ‘THE BITTER ARROW FLEW [THROUGH]’ ‘... HIS BREASTBONE’: These four quotations are from the *Iliad* XIII.587, IV.126, XI.574, and XV.542.

effect this. By ‘making them see things’ I mean using expressions that represent things as in a state of activity.^o Thus, to say that a good man is ‘four-square’ is certainly a metaphor; both the good man and the square are perfect; but the metaphor does not suggest activity. On the other hand, in the expression ‘with his vigour in full bloom’ there is a notion of activity; and so in ‘But you must roam as free as a sacred victim’,“ and in

Thereat up sprang the Hellenes to their feet,^o °

where ‘up sprang’ gives us activity as well as metaphor, for it at once suggests swiftness. So with Homer’s common practice of giving metaphorical life to lifeless things: all such passages are distinguished by the effect of activity they convey. Thus,

Downward anon to the valley rebounded the boulder
remorseless;“

and

The bitter arrow flew, °

and

Flying on eagerly;

and

Stuck in the earth, still panting to feed on the flesh of the
heroes;

and

And the point of the spear in its fury drove full through his breastbone.^o

1412a12. Archytas : Archytas of Tarantus, a philosopher and mathematician, lived in the first half of the fourth century.

1412a23. 'THE CICALAS WILL CHIRP TO THEMSELVES ON THE GROUND': The line from Stesichorus is also quoted at IL21.1395a1-2. Cicalas (cicadas or grasshoppers) will chirp on the ground when there are no trees on which they can perch.

In all these examples the things have the effect of being active because they are made into living beings; shameless behaviour and fury and so on are all forms of activity. And the poet has attached these ideas to the things by means of proportional metaphors: as the stone is to Sisyphus, so is the shameless man to his victim. In his famous similes, too, he treats inanimate things in the same way:

Curving and crested with white, host following host without ceasing.

Here he represents everything as moving and living; and activity is movement.

Metaphors must be drawn, as has been said already, from things that are related to the original thing, and yet not obviously so related—just as in philosophy also an acute mind will perceive resemblances even in things far apart. Thus Archytas^o said that an arbitrator and an altar were the same, since the injured fly to both for refuge. Or you might say that an anchor and an overhead hook were the same, since both are in a way the same, only the one secures things from below and the other from above. And to speak of states as 'levelled' is to identify two widely different things, the equality of a physical surface and the equality of political powers.

Liveliness is specially conveyed by metaphor, and by the further power of surprising the hearer; because the hearer expected something different, his acquisition of the new idea impresses him all the more. His mind seems to say, 'Yes, to be sure; I never thought of that'. The liveliness of epigrammatic remarks is due to the meaning not being just what the words say: as in the saying of Stesichorus that 'the cicalas will chirp to themselves on the ground'.^o Well-constructed riddles are attractive for the same reason; a new idea is conveyed, and there is metaphorical expression. So with the 'novelties' of

1412a25. THEODORUS: Theodorus of Byzantium was a teacher of rhetoric in the late fifth century.

Theodorus.' In these the thought is startling, and, as Theodorus puts it, does not fit in with the ideas you already have. They are like the

burlesque words that one finds in the comic writers. The effect is produced even by jokes depending upon changes of the letters of a word; this too is a surprise. You find this in verse as well as in prose. The word which comes is not what the hearer imagined: thus

Onward he came, and his feet were shod with his-chilblains,

where one imagined the word would be 'sandals'. But the point should be clear the moment the words are uttered. Jokes made by altering the letters of a word consist in meaning, not just what you say, but something that gives a twist to the word used; e.g. the remark of

Theodorus about Nikon the harpist ^{Θράττ'} ('you Thracian slavey'), where he pretends to mean ^{θραττεις} ('you harp-player'), ■ and surprises us when we find he means something else. So you enjoy the point when you see it, though the remark will fall flat unless you are aware that Nikon is a Thracian. Or again: ^{βούλει} In both these cases the saying must fit the facts. This is also true of such lively remarks as

the one to the effect that to the Athenians their empire ^(ἀρχή) of the sea was not the beginning ^(ἀρχή) of their troubles, since they gained by it. Or the opposite one of Isocrates, that their empire ^(ἀρχή) was

the beginning ^(ἀρχή) of their troubles. Either way, the speaker says something unexpected, the soundness of which is thereupon recognized. There would be nothing clever in saying 'empire is empire'. Isocrates means more than that, and uses the word with a

new meaning. So too with the former saying, which denies that ^{ἀρχή} in one sense was ^{ἀρχή} in another sense. In all these jokes, whether a word is used in a second sense or metaphorically, the joke is good if it

fits the facts. For instance, ^{'Ανάσχετος} (proper name) ^{δὺκ' ἀνασχετός:} where you say that what is so-and-so in one sense is not so-and-so in another; well, if the man is unpleasant, the joke fits the facts. Again, take-

Thou must not be a stranger stranger than Thou should'st.

Do not the words 'thou must not be', &c., amount to saying that the stranger must not always be strange? Here again is the use of one word in different senses. Of the same kind also is the much-praised verse of Anaxandrides:

Death is most fit before you do

Deeds that would make death fit for you.

This amounts to saying 'it is a fit thing to die when you are not fit to die', or 'it is a fit thing to die when death is not fit for you', i.e. when death is not the fit return for what you are doing. The type of

language employed is the same in all these examples; but the more briefly and antithetically such sayings can be expressed, the more taking they are, for antithesis impresses the new idea more firmly and brevity more quickly. They should always have either some personal application or some merit of expression, if they are to be true without being commonplace—two requirements not always satisfied simultaneously. Thus ‘a man should die having done no wrong’ is true but dull: ‘the right man should marry the right woman’ is also true but dull. No, there must be both good qualities together, as in ‘it is fitting to die when you are not fit for death’. The more a saying has these qualities, the livelier it appears: if, for instance, its wording is metaphorical, metaphorical in the right way, antithetical, and balanced, and at the same time it gives an idea of activity.

Successful similes also, as has been said above, are in a sense metaphors, since they always involve two relations like the proportional metaphor. Thus: a shield, we say, is the ‘drinking-bowl of Ares’, and a bow is the ‘chordless lyre’. This way of putting a metaphor is not ‘simple’, as it would be if we called the bow a lyre or the shield a drinking-bowl. There are ‘simple’ similes also: we may say that a flute-player is like a monkey, or that a short-sighted man’s eyes are like a lampflame with water dropping on it, since both eyes and flame keep winking. A simile succeeds best when it is a converted metaphor, for it is possible to say that a shield is like the drinking-bowl of Ares, or that a ruin is like a house in rags, and to say that Niceratus is like a Philoctetes stung by Pratys—the simile made by Thrasymachus when he saw Niceratus, who had been beaten by Pratys in a recitation competition, still going about unkempt and unwashed. It is in these respects that poets fail worst when they fail, and succeed best when they succeed, i.e. when they give the resemblance pat, as in
Those legs of his curl just like parsley leaves;

and

Just like Philammon struggling with his punch-ball.

These are all similes; and that similes are metaphors has been stated often already.

Proverbs, again, are metaphors from one species to another. Suppose, for instance, a man to start some undertaking in hope of gain and then to lose by it later on. ‘Here we have once more the man of Carpathus and his hare’, says he. For both alike went through the said experience.

It has now been explained fairly completely how liveliness is secured and why it has the effect it has. Successful hyperboles are also

metaphors, e.g. the one about the man with a

1413a32-35. 'NOT THOUGH HE GAVE ME ... DEFTER OF HAND THAN ATHENE ... ': The lines are from the Iliad IX.385-390.

-12-

Now Aristotle returns to his more narrowly rhetorical considerations by looking at the kinds of style-oral versus written-and the kinds of style useful for the three kinds of rhetoric: deliberative, forensic, and ceremonial or epideictic.

black eye, 'you would have thought he was a basket of mulberries' ; here the 'black eye' is compared to a mulberry because of its colour, the exaggeration lying in the quantity of mulberries suggested. The phrase 'like so-and-so' may introduce a hyperbole under the form of a simile. Thus

Just like Philammon struggling with his punch-ball

is equivalent to 'you would have thought he was Philammon struggling with his punch-ball'; and

Those legs of his curl just like parsley leaves

is equivalent to 'his legs are so curly that you would have thought they were not legs but parsley leaves'. Hyperboles are for young men to use; they show vehemence of character; and this is why angry people use them more than other people.

Not though he gave me as much as the dust or the sands of the sea...
But her, the daughter of Atreus' son, I never will marry, Nay, not though she were fairer than Aphrodite the Golden, Defter of hand than Athene ... ⁰

(The Attic orators are particularly fond of this method of speech.)
Consequently it does not suit an elderly speaker.

12

IT SHOULD BE OBSERVED that each kind of rhetoric has its own appropriate style. The style of written prose is not that of spoken oratory, nor are those of political and forensic speaking the same. Both written and spoken have to be known. To know the latter is to

know how to speak good

Mi3bj10. KIND OF ORATORY THAT REFLECTS CHARACTER ... EMOTION: Aristotle seems to be dividing spoken style into two kinds—not political and judicial but ethical (reflecting character) and emotional.

14]3b]3. CHAEREMON ... LicymNius: Chaeremon was a tragic poet from the middle of the fourth century. Licymnius of Chios was a poet and rhetorician whose dates are unknown; Aristotle frequently uses examples from poetry to make points about rhetoric, and at least in this case we have someone who practiced both.

Greek. To know the former means that you are not obliged, as otherwise you are, to hold your tongue when you wish to communicate something to the general public.

The written style is the more finished: the spoken better admits of dramatic delivery—like the kind of oratory that reflects character and the kind that reflects emotion.^o Hence actors look out for plays written in the latter style, and poets for actors competent to act in such plays. Yet poets whose plays are meant to be read are read and circulated: Chaeremon, for instance, who is as finished as a professional speech-writer; and Licymnius' among the dithyrambic poets. Compared with those of others, the speeches of professional writers sound thin in actual contests. Those of the orators, on the other hand, are good to hear spoken, but look amateurish enough when they pass into the hands of a reader. This is just because they are so well suited for an actual tussle, and therefore contain many dramatic touches, which, being robbed of all dramatic rendering, fail to do their own proper work, and consequently look silly. Thus strings of unconnected words, and constant repetitions of words and phrases, are very properly condemned in written speeches: but not in spoken speeches—speakers use them freely, for they have a dramatic effect. In this repetition there must be variety of tone, paving the way, as it were, to dramatic effect; e.g. 'This is the villain among you who deceived you, who cheated you, who meant to betray you completely'. This is the sort of thing that Philemon the actor used to do in the Old Men's Madness of Anaxandrides, whenever he spoke the words 'Rhodamanthus and Palamedes', and also in the prologue to the Saints whenever he pronounced the pronoun 'I'. If one does not deliver such things cleverly, it becomes a case of 'the man who swallowed a poker'. So too with strings of unconnected words, e.g. 'I came to him; I met him; I besought him'. Such passages must be acted, not delivered with the same quality and pitch

1414a4. 'NIREUS LIKEWISE... TO ILIUM'S STRAND': The quotation is

from the Iliad 11.671-673.

of voice, as though they had only one idea in them. They have the further peculiarity of suggesting that a number of separate statements have been made in the time usually occupied by one. Just as the use of conjunctions makes many statements into a single one, so the omission of conjunctions acts in the reverse way and makes a single one into many. It thus makes everything more important: e.g. 'I came to him; I talked to him; I entreated him'-what a lot of facts! the hearer thinks-'he paid no attention to anything I said'. This is the effect which Homer seeks when he writes,

Nireus likewise from Syme three well-fashioned ships did bring,
Nireus, the son of Aglaia and Charopus, bright-faced king,
Nireus, the comeliest man of all that to Ilium's strand.^o

If many things are said about a man, his name must be mentioned many times; and therefore people think that, if his name is mentioned many times, many things have been said about him. So that Homer, by means of this illusion, has made a great deal of Nireus, though he has mentioned him only in this one passage, and has preserved his memory, though he nowhere says a word about him afterwards.

Now the style of oratory addressed to public assemblies is really just like scene-painting. The bigger the throng, the more distant is the point of view: so that, in the one and the other, high finish in detail is superfluous and seems better away. The forensic style is more highly finished; still more so is the style of language addressed to a single judge, with whom there is very little room for rhetorical artifices, since he can take the whole thing in better, and judge of what is to the point and what is not; the struggle is less intense and so the judgement is undisturbed. This is why the same speakers do not distinguish themselves in all these branches at once; high finish is wanted least where dramatic delivery is wanted most, and here the speaker must have a good voice, and above

1414a18. IT IS CEREMONIAL ORATORY ... MEANT TO BE READ:
When literary critics after Aristotle applied rhetorical principles to literature, they turned especially to ceremonial rhetoric.

Chapter 13 turns from style to arrangement, which is the subject of the rest of the Rhetoric. In this chapters Aristotle looks at the parts necessary to every speech: exposition and demonstration, statement of the case, and proof He criticizes those who want to make more subtle categories of the

parts of a speech. This criticism takes up most of the chapter. It is only very occasionally that Aristotle in the Rhetoric makes his own points by attacking other thinkers, so it is always worth asking why he should do so when he does. I think in this case Aristotle dismisses other teachers of rhetoric who think they have something specialize and difficult to teach. Aristotle thinks that the art of rhetoric holds no secrets, and that successful persuasion uses principles that everyone, in some sense, already knows.

all, a strong one. It is ceremonial oratory that is most literary, for it is meant to be read;’ and next to it forensic oratory.

To analyse style still further, and add that it must be agreeable or magnificent, is useless; for why should it have these traits any more than ‘restraint’, ‘liberality’, or any other moral excellence? Obviously agreeableness will be produced by the qualities already mentioned, if our definition of excellence of style has been correct. For what other reason should style be ‘clear’, and ‘not mean’ but ‘appropriate’? If it is prolix, it is not clear; nor yet if it is curt. Plainly the middle way suits best. Again, style will be made agreeable by the elements mentioned, namely by a good blending of ordinary and unusual words, by the rhythm, and by the persuasiveness that springs from appropriateness.

This concludes our discussion of style, both in its general aspects and in its special applications to the various branches of rhetoric. We have now to deal with Arrangement.

13

A SPEECH HAS TWO parts. You must state your case, and you must prove it. You cannot either state your case and omit to prove it, or prove it without having first stated it; since any proof must be a proof of something, and the only use of a preliminary statement is the proof that follows it. Of these two parts the first part is called the Statement of the case, the second part the Argument, just as we distinguish between Enunciation and Demonstration. The current division is absurd. For ‘narration’ surely is part of a forensic speech only: how in a political speech or a speech of display can there be ‘narration’ in the technical sense? or a reply to a forensic opponent? or an epilogue in closely-reasoned speeches? Again, introduction, comparison of conflicting arguments, and recapitulation are only found in political speeches when

Aristotle begins at the beginning of a speech, by looking at the kinds of introductions and the purposes. they serve. The different kinds of rhetoric- ceremonial, forensic, and political- have different needs for introductions.

there is a struggle between two policies. They may occur then; so may even accusation and defence, often enough; but they form no essential part of a political speech. Even forensic speeches do not always need epilogues; not, for instance, a short speech, nor one in which the facts are easy to remember, the effect of an epilogue being always a reduction in the apparent length. It follows, then, that the only necessary parts of a speech are the Statement and the Argument. These are the essential features of a speech; and it cannot in any case have more than Introduction, Statement, Argument, and Epilogue. 'Refutation of the Opponent' is part of the arguments: so is 'Comparison' of the opponent's case with your own, for that process is a magnifying of your own case and therefore a part of the arguments, since one who does this proves something. The Introduction does nothing like this; nor does the Epilogue-it merely reminds us of what has been said already. If we make such distinctions we shall end, like Theodorus and his followers, by distinguishing 'narration' proper from 'post-narration' and 'pre-narration', and

'refutation' from 'final refutation'. But we ought only to bring in a new name if it indicates a real species with distinct specific qualities; otherwise the practice is pointless and silly, like the way Licymnius invented names in his Art of Rhetoric 'Secundation', 'Divagation', 'Ramification'.

14

THE INTRODUCTION IS THE beginning of a speech, corresponding to the prologue in poetry and the prelude in flute-music; they are all beginnings, paving the way, as it were, for what is to follow. The musical prelude resembles the introduction to speeches of display; as flute-players play first some brilliant passage they know well and then fit it on to the opening notes of the piece itself, so in speeches of display the

1414b33. IsocRATES: The quotation from Isocrates comes from his Panegyric.

1415a4. CHOERILUS: Choerilus of Samos was an epic poet in the fifth century. The quotation is from his Persiad.

writer should proceed in the same way; he should begin with what best takes his fancy, and then strike up his theme and lead into it; which is indeed what is always done. (Take as an example the introduction to the Helen of Isocrates—there is nothing in common between the Persians and Helen.) And here, even if you travel far from your subject, it is fitting, rather than that there should be sameness in the entire speech.

The usual subject for the introductions to speeches of display is some piece of praise or censure. Thus Gorgias writes in his Olympic Speech, ‘You deserve widespread admiration, men of Greece’, praising thus those who started the festival gatherings. Isocrates,^o on the other hand, censures them for awarding distinctions to fine athletes but giving no prize for intellectual ability. Or one may begin with a piece of advice, thus: ‘We ought to honour good men and so I myself am praising Aristides’ or ‘We ought to honour those who are unpopular but not bad men, men whose good qualities have never been noticed, like Alexander son of Priam.’ Here the orator gives advice. Or we may begin as speakers do in the law-courts; that is to say, with appeals to the audience to excuse us if our speech is about something paradoxical, difficult, or hackneyed; like Choerilus^o in the lines—

But now when allotment of all has been made ...

Introductions to speeches of display, then, may be composed of some piece of praise or censure, of advice to do or not to do something, or of appeals to the audience; and you must choose between making these preliminary passages connected or disconnected with the speech itself.

Introductions to forensic speeches, it must be observed, have the same value as the prologues of dramas and the introductions to epic poems; the dithyrambic prelude resembling the introduction to a speech of display, as

1415a15-18. ‘SING, O GODDESS OF SONG, OF THE WRATH’ ... ‘TELL ME, O MUSE, OF THE HERO ... ’: Aristotle quotes the beginnings of the Iliad and the Odyssey.

1415a21. ‘POLYBUS WAS MY FATHER... ’ : The quotation is from Sophocles’ Oedipus the King.

1415a11. ‘FOR THEE, AND THY GIFTS, AND THY BATTLE-SPOILS’: This is a fragment thought to come from Timotheus’ Skilla.

For thee, and thy gifts, and thy battle-spoils ...^o

In prologues, and in epic poetry, a foretaste of the theme is given, intended to inform the hearers of it in advance instead of keeping their minds in suspense. Anything vague puzzles them: so give them a grasp of the beginning, and they can hold fast to it and follow the argument. So we find-

Sing, O goddess of song, of the Wrath ...

Tell me, O Muse, of the hero ...⁰ Lead me to tell a new tale, how there came great warfare to Europe

Out of the Asian land ...

The tragic poets, too, let us know the pivot of their play; if not at the outset like Euripides, at least somewhere in the preface to a speech like Sophocles^o-

Polybus was my father ... ;^o

and so in Comedy. This, then, is the most essential function and distinctive property of the introduction, to show what the aim of the speech is; and therefore no introduction ought to be employed where the subject is not long or intricate.

The other kinds of introduction employed are remedial in purpose, and may be used in any type of speech. They are concerned with the speaker, the hearer, the subject, or the speaker's opponent. Those concerned with the speaker himself or with his opponent are directed to removing or exciting prejudice. But whereas the defendant will begin by dealing with this sort of thing, the prosecutor will take quite another line and deal with such matters in the closing part of his speech. The reason for this is not far to seek. The defendant, when he is going to bring himself on the stage, must clear

1415b15. PRODICUS: Prodicus of Ceos, who appears in Plato's *Protagoras*, was a sophist quoted by Socrates in several dialogues.

away any obstacles, and therefore must begin by removing any prejudice felt against him. But if you are to excite prejudice, you must do so at the close, so that the judges may more easily remember what you have said.

The appeal to the hearer aims at securing his goodwill, or at arousing his resentment, or sometimes at gaining his serious attention to the case, or even at distracting it-for gaining it is not always an advantage, and speakers will often for that reason try to make him laugh.

You may use any means you choose to make your hearer receptive ;

among others, giving him a good impression of your character, which always helps to secure his attention. He will be ready to attend to anything that touches himself, and to anything that is important, surprising, or agreeable; and you should accordingly convey to him the impression that what you have to say is of this nature. If you wish to distract his attention, you should imply that the subject does not affect him, or is trivial or disagreeable. But observe, all this has nothing to do with the speech itself. It merely has to do with the weak-minded tendency of the hearer to listen to what is beside the point. Where this tendency is absent, no introduction is wanted beyond a summary statement of your subject, to put a sort of head on the main body of your speech. Moreover, calls for attention, when required, may come equally well in any part of a speech; in fact, the beginning of it is just where there is least slackness of interest; it is therefore ridiculous to put this kind of thing at the beginning, when every one is listening with most attention. Choose therefore any point in the speech where such an appeal is needed, and then say 'Now I beg you to note this point-it concerns you quite as much as myself'; or

I will tell you that whose like you have never yet

heard for terror, or for wonder. This is what Prodicus called

1415b20. '1VIY LORD, I WILL NOT SAY THAT EAGERLY ...': The line is from Sophocles' *Antigone* 223.

1415b21. Why ALL THIS PREFACE?': The line is from Euripides' *Iphigenia in Tauris* 1162.

1415b26. 'MAY I FIND ... GOODWILL AND COMPASSION': The line is from the *Odyssey* 6.327.

1415b30. 'THE DIFFICULTY IS NOT ... BUT AT SPARTA': The passage is from Socrates in Plato's *Menexenus*.

1415b33. INTRODUCTIONS OF POLITICAL ORATORY ... VERY RARE: Political rhetoric needs an introduction least of all. Since introductions are concessions to the weakness of hearers, and therefore (according to Aristotle) are not essential to persuasion, the fact that political rhetoric uses introductions less than the other kinds shows why Aristotle thinks that this form of rhetoric is the most important and best kind.

'slipping in a bit of the fifty-drachma show-lecture for the audience whenever they began to nod'. It is plain that such introductions are addressed not to ideal hearers, but to hearers as we find them. The use of introductions to excite prejudice or to dispel misgivings is universal

My lord, I will not say that eagerly ... °

or

Why all this preface?⁰

Introductions are popular with those whose case is weak, or looks weak; it pays them to dwell on anything rather than the actual facts of it. That is why slaves, instead of answering the questions put to them, make indirect replies with long preambles. The means of exciting in your hearers goodwill and various other feelings of the same kind have already been described. The poet finely says

May I find in Phaeacian hearts, at my coming, goodwill and compassion; °

and these are the two things we should aim at. In speeches of display we must make the hearer feel that the eulogy includes either himself or his family or his way of life or something or other of the kind. For it is true, as Socrates says in the Funeral Speech, that ‘the difficulty is not to praise the Athenians at Athens but at Sparta’.⁰

The introductions of political oratory will be made out of the same materials as those of the forensic kind, though the nature of political oratory makes them very rare. ° The subject is known already, and therefore the facts of the case need no introduction; but you may have to say something on account of yourself or your opponents; or those present may be in-

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One important function an introduction can have is to remove the prejudices of an audience; if they aren't removed at the beginning of the speech, they will infect the audience's judgment of the entire presentation.

1416a10. IPHICRATES, REPLYING TO NAUSICRATES : Nausicrates was a student of Isocrates. We met Iphicrates in 1.7.

clined to treat the matter either more or less seriously than you wish them to. You may accordingly have to excite or dispel some prejudice, or to make the matter under discussion seem more or less important than before: for either of which purposes you will want an introduction. You may also want one to add elegance to your remarks, feeling that otherwise they will have a casual air, like Gorgias' eulogy of the Eleans, in which, without any preliminary sparring or fencing, he begins straight off with 'Happy city of Elis!'

IN DEALING WITH PREJUDICE, one class of argument is that whereby you can dispel objectionable suppositions about yourself. It makes no practical difference whether such a supposition has been put into words or not, so that this distinction may be ignored. Another way is to meet any of the issues directly: to deny the alleged fact; or to say that you have done no harm, or none to him, or not as much as he says; or that you have done him no injustice, or not much; or that you have done nothing disgraceful, or nothing disgraceful enough to matter: these are the sort of questions on which the dispute hinges. Thus Iphicrates, replying to Nausicrates,' admitted that he had done the deed alleged, and that he had done Nausicrates harm, but not that he had done him wrong. Or you may admit the wrong, but balance it with other facts, and say that, if the deed harmed him, at any rate it was honourable; or that, if it gave him pain, at least it did him good; or something else like that. Another way is to allege that your action was due to mistake, or bad luck, or necessity-as Sophocles said he was not trembling, as his traducer maintained, in order to make people think him an old man, but because he could not help it; he would rather not be eighty years old. You may balance your motive against your actual

1416a29. HYGIAENON: We don't know who he was.

14]6a32. 'MY TONGUE HATH SWORN: NO OATH IS ON MY SOUL': The line is from Euripides' Hippolytus 612.

1416b1-3. TEUCER: The reference is to a lost play of Sophocles.

deed; saying, for instance, that you did not mean to injure him but to do so-and-so; that you did not do what you are falsely charged with doing-the damage was accidental-'I should indeed be a detestable person if I had deliberately intended this result.' Another way is open when your calumniator, or any of his connexions, is or has been subject to the same grounds for suspicion. Yet another, when others are subject to the same grounds for suspicion but are admitted to be in fact innocent of the charge: e.g. 'Must I be a profligate because I am well-groomed? Then so-and-so must be one too.' Another, if other people have been calumniated by the same man or some one else, or, without being calumniated, have been suspected, like yourself now, and yet have been proved innocent. Another way is to return calumny

for calumny and say, 'It is monstrous to trust the man's statements when you cannot trust the man himself.' Another is when the question has been already decided. So with Euripides' reply to Hygiaenon,* who, in the action for an exchange of properties, accused him of impiety in having written a line encouraging perjury-

My tongue hath sworn: no oath is on my soul.

Euripides said that his opponent himself was guilty in bringing into the law-courts cases whose decision belonged to the Dionysiac contests. 'If I have not already answered for my words there, I am ready to do so if you choose to prosecute me there.' Another method is to denounce calumny, showing what an enormity it is, and in particular that it raises false issues, and that it means a lack of confidence in the merits of his case. The argument from evidential circumstances is available for both parties: thus in the Teucer^O Odysseus says that Teucer is closely bound to Priam, since his mother Hesione was Priam's sister. Teucer replies that Telamon his father was Priam's enemy, and

1416b12. THUS ONE MIGHT ARGUE THAT DIOMEDES ... : The reference is to the Iliad X.

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Narrative is an especially important part of epideictic (ceremonial) and judicial oratory. This chapter is interesting, as Aristotle shows the connection between narrative and demonstrations of character and of emotion.

that he himself did not betray the spies to Priam. Another method, suitable for the calumniator, is to praise some trifling merit at great length, and then attack some important failing concisely; or after mentioning a number of good qualities to attack one bad one that really bears on the question. This is the method of thoroughly skilful and unscrupulous prosecutors. By mixing up the man's merits with what is bad, they do their best to make use of them to damage him.

There is another method open to both calumniator and apologist. Since a given action can be done from many motives, the former must try to disparage it by selecting the worse motive of two, the latter to put the better construction on it. Thus one might argue that Diomedes* chose Odysseus as his companion because he supposed Odysseus to be the best man for the purpose; and you might reply to this that it was, on the contrary, because he was the only hero so worthless that Diomedes need not fear his rivalry.

WE MAY NOW PASS from the subject of calumny to that of Narration.

Narration in ceremonial oratory is not continuous but intermittent. There must, of course, be some survey of the actions that form the subject-matter of the speech. The speech is a composition containing two parts. One of these is not provided by the orator's art, viz. the actions themselves, of which the orator is in no sense author. The other part is provided by his art, namely, the proof (where proof is needed) that the actions were done, the description of their quality or of their extent, or even all these three things together. Now the reason why sometimes it is not desirable to make the whole narrative continuous is that the case thus expounded is hard to keep in mind. Show, therefore, from one set of facts that your hero is,

1417a7. arrswER HERODOTUS RECORDS: The reference is to book II of Herodotus' Histories.

e.g. brave, and from other sets of facts that he is able, just, &c. A speech thus arranged is comparatively simple, instead of being complicated and elaborate. You will have to recall well-known deeds among others; and because they are well-known, the hearer usually needs no narration of them; none, for instance, if your object is the praise of Achilles; we all know the facts of his life-what you have to do is to apply those facts. But if your object is the praise of Critias, you must narrate his deeds, which not many people know of ...

Nowadays it is said, absurdly enough, that the narration should be rapid. Remember what the man said to the baker who asked whether he was to make the cake hard or soft: 'What, can't you make it right?' Just so here. We are not to make long narrations, just as we are not to make long introductions or long arguments. Here, again, rightness does not consist either in rapidity or in conciseness, but in the happy mean; that is, in saying just so much as will make the facts plain, or will lead the hearer to believe that the thing has happened, or that the man has caused injury or wrong to some one, or that the facts are really as important as you wish them to be thought: or the opposite facts to establish the opposite arguments.

You may also narrate as you go anything that does credit to

yourself, e.g. 'I kept telling him to do his duty and not abandon his children'; or discredit to your adversary, e.g. 'But he answered me that, wherever he might find himself, there he would find other children', the answer Herodotus records⁰ of the Egyptian mutineers. Slip in anything else that the judges will enjoy.

The defendant will make less of the narration. He has to maintain that the thing has not happened, or did no harm, or was not unjust, or not so bad as is alleged. He must therefore not waste time about what is admitted fact, unless this bears on his own contention; e.g. that the thing was done, but was

1417a14. STORY TOLD TO ALCINOUS ... SIXTY LINES: The reference is to the Odyssey XXI I I.

1417a15. PHAYLLUS: We know almost nothing about him.

1417a19-21. THUS IT IS THAT MATHEMATICAL DISCOURSES.... MORAL QUESTIONS : The contrast between mathematical works and the Socratic dialogues says that works that represent moral choices themselves have an ethical aspect to them. How the speaker chooses to represent other people's actions and choices is an indication of the speaker's own character and moral values.

1417a26-27. GOOD SENSE MAKING US GO AFTER ... NOBLE: Aristotle here draws a contrast between what in the Ethics he calls the virtues of intellect and the virtues of character. In 11.1 1 of the Rhetoric, he says that a successful speaker has to demonstrate three aspects of his character: good sense, virtue, and goodwill. Here he argues that persuading an audience that you have good character is more important than convincing them of your intelligence.

1417a31. 'Bur SINCE MY FATHER AND MOTHER ... BE BORN TO ME': The lines are from Sophocles' Antigone 911-912.

not wrong. Further, we must speak of events as past and gone, except where they excite pity or indignation by being represented as present. The Story told to Alcinoos is an example of a brief chronicle, when it is repeated to Penelope in sixty lines.⁰ Another instance is the Epic Cycle as treated by Phayllus,⁰ and the prologue to the Oeneus.

The narration should depict character; to which end you must know what makes it do so. One such thing is the indication of moral purpose; the quality of purpose indicated determines the quality of character depicted and is itself determined by the end pursued. Thus it is that mathematical discourses depict no character: they have nothing to do with moral purpose for they represent nobody as pursuing any end. On the other hand, the Socratic dialogues do depict character, being concerned with moral questions.⁰ This end will also be gained

by describing the manifestations of various types of character, e.g. 'he kept walking along as he talked', which shows the man's recklessness and rough manners. Do not let your words seem inspired so much by intelligence, in the manner now current, as by moral purpose: e.g. 'I willed this; aye, it was my moral purpose; true, I gained nothing by it, still it is better thus.' For the other way shows good sense, but this shows good character; good sense making us go after what is useful, and good character after what is noble.^o Where any detail may appear incredible, then add the cause of it; of this Sophocles provides an example in the Antigone, where Antigone says she had cared more for her brother than for husband or children, since if the latter perished they might be replaced,

But since my father and mother in their graves Lie dead, no brother can be born to me.^o

If you have no such cause to suggest, just say that you are aware that no one will believe your words, but the fact

1417b1. AESCHINES: He wrote Socratic dialogues.

141ib4. 'THUS DID SHE SAY ... HANDS OVER THEIR EYES': The lines are from the Odyssey 19.361.

1417b . DO NOT LET THEM SEE WHAT YOU ARE ABOUT: This is another example of Aristotle showing that the best art disguises the fact that it is art.

117b20. AND SO WITH HAEMON IN SOPHOCLES : The reference is to Sophocles' Antigone.

remains that such is your nature, however hard the world may find it to believe that a man deliberately does anything except what pays him.

Again, you must make use of the emotions. Relate the familiar manifestations of them, and those that distinguish yourself and your opponent; for instance, 'he went away scowling at me'. So Aeschines^o described Cratylus as 'hissing with fury and shaking his fists'. These details carry conviction: the audience take the truth of what they know as so much evidence for the truth of what they do not. Plenty of such details may be found in Homer:

Thus did she say: but the old woman buried her face in her hands:^{o o}

a true touch-people beginning to cry do put their hands over their eyes.

Bring yourself on the stage from the first in the right character, that people may regard you in that light; and the same with your adversary; but do not let them see what you are about.^{o o} How easily

such impressions may be conveyed we can see from the way in which we get some inkling of things we know nothing of by the mere look of the messenger bringing news of them. Have some narrative in many different parts of your speech; and sometimes let there be none at the beginning of it.

In political oratory there is very little opening for narration; nobody can 'narrate' what has not yet happened. If there is narration at all, it will be of past events, the recollection of which is to help the hearers to make better plans for the future. Or it may be employed to attack some one's character, or to eulogize him—only then you will not be doing what the political speaker, as such, has to do.

If any statement you make is hard to believe, you must guarantee its truth, and at once offer an explanation, and then furnish it with such particulars as will be expected. Thus

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Here Aristotle looks at the uses of proofs in the three kinds of rhetoric, once again showing the value of different kinds of proofs. in establishing character and in causing emotion.

1417b2Z. ONE OF FOUR HEADS : In later rhetorics, these became the four stases ("issues"). Especially in judicial rhetoric, people could disagree about (1) whether something happened, (2) what happened, (3) what its quality was—for example, how serious—and (4) whether this is the right forum in which to hear the issue. Aristotle doesn't say here that four heads apply only in judicial rhetoric, but he goes on to talk about ceremonial and political rhetoric in different terms, so it is fair to say that he does think the four headings are restricted to judicial rhetoric.

1417b36. NOTE ANY FALSEHOODS ... OTHER STATEMENTS ALSO ARE FALSE: Occasionally Aristotle gives advice that seems oriented to winning the case, rather than proving and persuading through argument. This is one of those cases.

Carcinus' Jocasta, in his Oedipus, keeps guaranteeing the truth of her answers to the inquiries of the man who is seeking her son; and so with Haemon in Sophocles.°

THE DUTY OF THE Arguments is to attempt demonstrative proofs. These proofs must bear directly upon the question in dispute, which must fall under one of four heads.^o (1) If you maintain that the act was not *committed*, your main task in court is to prove this. (2) If you maintain that the act did no harm, prove this. If you maintain that (3) the act was less than is alleged, or (4) justified, prove these facts, just as you would prove the act not to have been committed if you were maintaining that.

It should be noted that only where the question in dispute falls under the first of these heads can it be true that one of the two parties is necessarily a rogue. Here ignorance cannot be pleaded, as it might if the dispute were whether the act was justified or not. This argument must therefore be used in this case only, not in the others.

In ceremonial speeches you will develop your case mainly by arguing that what has been done is, e.g., noble and useful. The facts themselves are to be taken on trust; proof of them is only submitted on those rare occasions when they are not easily credible or when they have been set down to some one else.

In political speeches you may maintain that a proposal is impracticable; or that, though practicable, it is unjust, or will do no good, or is not so important as its proposer thinks. Note any falsehoods about irrelevant matters—they will look like proof that his other statements also are false.^o Argument by ‘example’ is highly suitable for political oratory, argument by ‘enthymeme’ better suits forensic. Political oratory deals with

1418a8. ‘FRIEND, YOU HAVE SPOKEN ... WOULD HAVE SPOKEN’: The line is from the *Odyssey* 4.204.

1418a9-1 l. NOR SHOULD YOU TRY TO MAKE ENTHYMEMES ... DRAW THEM: This is a common dilemma for philosophy. We are much more confident in the fact that murder is wrong, that rape is more serious than theft, that free speech is valuable, than we are in any justifications we can offer for these conclusions.

1418a12-14. AND AVOID THE ENTHYMEME ... MORAL CHARACTER NOR MORAL PURPOSE: This passage raises an important question for persuasion: Is it possible to be too logical? I become unpersuasive by arguing that some disputed question should be settled by reasoning alone.

future events, of which it can do no more than quote past events as

examples. Forensic oratory deals with what is or is not now true, which can better be demonstrated, because not contingent—there is no contingency in what has now already happened. Do not use a continuous succession of enthymemes : intersperse them with other matter, or they will spoil one another's effect. There are limits to their number-

Friend, you have spoken as much as a sensible man would have spoken-

'as much,' says Homer, not 'as well'. Nor should you try to make enthymemes on every point; if you do, you will be acting just like some students of philosophy, whose conclusions are more familiar and believable than the premisses from which they draw them.^o And avoid the enthymeme form when you are trying to rouse feeling; for it will either kill the feeling or will itself fall flat: all simultaneous motions tend to cancel each other either completely or partially. Nor should you go after the enthymeme form in a passage where you are depicting character-the process of demonstration can express neither moral character nor moral purpose.^o Maxims should be employed in the Arguments-and in the Narration toosince these do express character: 'I have given him this, though I am quite aware that one should "Trust no man".' Or if you are appealing to the emotions: 'I do not regret it, though I have been wronged; if he has the profit on his side, I have justice on mine.'

Political oratory is a more difficult task than forensic; and naturally so, since it deals with the future, whereas the pleader deals with the past, which, as Epimenides of Crete said, even the diviners already know. (Epimenides did not practise divination about the future; only about the obscurities of the past.) Besides, in forensic oratory you have a basis in the law; and

1418a38-41. IF YOU HAVE PROOFS ... THAN AS A SUBTLE REASONER: If we should fall back on moral discourse only when we don't have arguments, that seems to make arguments the preferred method of persuasion. But the lines quoted directly above (18a 12-14) seem to make the opposite case.

1418b10. CALLISTRAT'US: We met him in 1.7.

once you have a starting point, you can prove anything with comparative ease. Then again, political oratory affords few chances for those leisurely digressions in which you may attack your adversary, talk about yourself, or work on your hearers' emotions; fewer chances, indeed, than any other affords, unless your set purpose is to divert your hearers' attention. Accordingly, if you find yourself in difficulties, follow the lead of the Athenian speakers, and that of

Isocrates, who makes regular attacks upon people in the course of a political speech, e.g. upon the Lacedaemonians in the *Panegyricus*, and upon Chares in the speech about the allies. In ceremonial oratory, intersperse your speech with bits of episodic eulogy, like Isocrates, who is always bringing some one forward for this purpose. And this is what Gorgias meant by saying that he always found something to talk about. For if he speaks of Achilles, he praises Peleus, then Aeacus, then Zeus; and in like manner the virtue of valour, describing its good results, and saying what it is like.

Now if you have proofs to bring forward, bring them forward, and your moral discourse as well; if you have no enthymemes, then fall back upon moral discourse: after all, it is more fitting for a good man to display himself as an honest fellow than as a subtle reasoner.⁹ Refutative enthymemes are more popular than demonstrative ones: their logical cogency is more striking: the facts about two opposites always stand out clearly when the two are put side by side.

The 'Reply to the Opponent' is not a separate division of the speech; it is part of the Arguments to break down the opponent's case, whether by objection or by counter-syllogism. Both in political speaking and when pleading in court, if you are the first speaker you should put your own arguments forward first, and then meet the arguments on the other side by refuting them and pulling them to pieces beforehand. If, however, the case for the other side contains a great variety of arguments, begin with these, like Callistratus' in the Messenian assembly,

I418b20-21. 'FIRST, CHAMPION WILL I BE ... ' [AND] 'NEVER, I WEEN ... ': From Euripides' *Trojan Women* 969, 971.

1418b28. ARCHILOCHUS: Archilochus of Paros was a poet who wrote possibly as early as the eighth century. Fragments of his poems survive.

when he demolished the arguments likely to be used against him before giving his own. If you speak later, you must first, by means of refutation and counter-syllogism, attempt some answer to your opponent's speech, especially if his arguments have been well received. For just as our minds refuse a favourable reception to a person against whom they are prejudiced, so they refuse it to a speech when they have been favourably impressed by the speech on the other side. You should, therefore, make room in the minds of the audience for your coming speech; and this will be done by getting your opponent's speech out of the way. So attack that first-either the whole of it, or the most important, successful, or vulnerable points in it, and thus inspire confidence in what you have to say yourself-

First, champion will I be of Goddesses ...

Never, I ween, would Hera ... :°

where the speaker has attacked the silliest argument first. So much for the Arguments.

With regard to the element of moral character: there are assertions which, if made about yourself, may excite dislike, appear tedious, or expose you to the risk of contradiction; and other things which you cannot say about your opponent without seeming abusive or ill-bred. Put such remarks, therefore, into the mouth of some third person. This is what Isocrates does in the *Philippus* and in the *Antidosis*, and Archilochus in his satires. The latter represents the father himself as attacking his daughter in the lampoon

Think nought impossible at all,

Nor swear that it shall not befall ...

and puts into the mouth of Charon the carpenter the lampoon which begins

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Interrogation is the next part of the speech, and Aristotle presents four different cases where interrogation of one's opponent is useful.

1419a8-12. MELETUS DENIED THAT SOCRATES BELIEVED... : Socrates' interrogation and refutation of Meletus is presented in Plato's *Apology*, his account of Socrates' trial.

Not for the wealth of Gyges....

So too Sophocles makes Haemon appeal to his father on behalf of Antigone as if it were others who were speaking.

Again, sometimes you should restate your enthymemes in the form of maxims; e.g. 'Wise men will come to terms in the hour of success; for they will gain most if they do'. Expressed as an enthymeme, this would run, 'If we ought to come to terms when doing so will enable us to gain the greatest advantage, then we ought to come to terms in the hour of success.'

NEXT AS TO INTERROGATION. The best moment to employ this is when your opponent has so answered one question that the putting of just one more lands him in absurdity. Thus Pericles questioned Lampon about the way of celebrating the rites of the Saviour Goddess. Lampon declared that no uninitiated person could be told of them. Pericles then asked, 'Do you know them yourself?' 'Yes', answered Lampon. 'Why,' said Pericles, 'how can that be, when you are uninitiated?':

Another good moment is when one premiss of an argument is obviously true, and you can see that your opponent must say 'yes' if you ask him whether the other is true. Having first got this answer about the other, do not go on to ask him about the obviously true one, but just state the conclusion yourself. Thus, when Meletus denied that Socrates believed^o in the existence of gods but admitted that he talked about a supernatural power, Socrates proceeded to ask whether 'supernatural beings were not either children of the gods or in some way divine?' 'Yes', said Meletus. 'Then', replied Socrates, 'is there any one who believes in the existence of children of the gods and yet not in the existence of the gods themselves?' Another good occasion

1419a26. SOPHOCLES ... PEISANDER: This isn't Sophocles the tragedian but a politician or orator. Peisander was one of the oligarchs who overthrew Athenian democracy in 411.

is when you expect to show that your opponent is contradicting either his own words or what every one believes. A fourth is when it is impossible for him to meet your question except by an evasive answer. If he answers 'True, and yet not true', or 'Partly true and partly not true', or 'True in one sense but not in another', the audience thinks he is in difficulties, and applauds his discomfiture. In other cases do not attempt interrogation; for if your opponent gets in an objection, you are felt to have been worsted. You cannot ask a series of questions owing to the incapacity of the audience to follow them; and for this reason you should also make your enthymemes as compact as possible.

In replying, you must meet ambiguous questions by drawing reasonable distinctions, not by a curt answer. In meeting questions that seem to involve you in a contradiction, offer the explanation at the outset of your answer, before your opponent asks the next question or draws his conclusion. For it is not difficult to see the drift of his argument in advance. This point, however, as well as the various means of refutation, may be regarded as known to us from the

Topics.

When your opponent in drawing his conclusion puts it in the form of a question, you must justify your answer. Thus when Sophocles was asked by Peisander^o whether he had, like the other members of the Board of Safety, voted for setting up the Four Hundred, he said 'Yes.' 'Why, did you not think it wicked?'—'Yes.'—'So you committed this wickedness?'—'Yes', said Sophocles, 'for there was nothing better to do.' Again, the Lacedaemonian, when he was being examined on his conduct as ephor, was asked whether he thought that the other ephors had been justly put to death. 'Yes', he said. 'Well then', asked his opponent, 'did not *you* propose the same measures as they?'—'Yes.'—'Well then, would not *you* too be justly put to death?'—'Not at all', said he; 'they were bribed to do it, and I did it from conviction'. Hence you should not ask any further questions after drawing the conclusion, nor put the conclusion

1419b6. JESTS HAVE BEEN CLASSIFIED IN THE POETICS:

Aristotle must be referring to a part of the Poetics that we no longer have. There is reason to think that after treating tragedy in the part of the Poetics we do have, he went on to look at comedy.

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The Rhetoric ends with a consideration of the last part of a speech, the epilogue.

itself in the form of a further question, unless there is a large balance of truth on your side.

As to jests. These are supposed to be of some service in controversy. Gorgias said that you should kill your opponents' earnestness with jesting and their jesting with earnestness; in which he was right. Jests have been classified in the Poetics.^o Some are becoming to a gentleman, others are not; see that you choose such as become you. Irony better befits a gentleman than buffoonery; the ironical man jokes to amuse himself, the buffoon to amuse other people.

19

THE EPILOGUE HAS FOUR parts. You must (1) make the audience

well-disposed towards yourself and ill-disposed towards your opponent, (2) magnify or minimize the leading facts, (3) excite the required state of emotion in your hearers, and (4) refresh their memories.

(1) Having shown your own truthfulness and the untruthfulness of your opponent, the natural thing is to commend yourself, censure him, and hammer in your points. You must aim at one of two objects-you must make yourself out a good man and him a bad one either in yourselves or in relation to your hearers. How this is to be managed-by what lines of argument you are to represent people as good or bad-this has been already explained.

(2) The facts having been proved, the natural thing to do next is to magnify or minimize their importance. The facts must be admitted before you can discuss how important they are; just as the body cannot grow except from something already present. The proper lines of argument to be used for this purpose of amplification and depreciation have already been set forth.

(3) Next, when the facts and their importance are clearly

1420b3. 'I HAVE DONE.... I ASK FOR YOUR JUDGEMENT': Aristotle seems to quote Lysias' Against Eratosthenes.

understood, you must excite your hearers' emotions. These emotions are pity, indignation, anger, hatred, envy, emulation, pugnacity. The lines of argument to be used for these purposes also have been previously mentioned.

(4) Finally you have to review what you have already said. Here you may properly do what some wrongly recommend doing in the introduction-repeat your points frequently so as to make them easily understood. What you should do in your introduction is to state your subject, in order that the point to be judged may be quite plain; in the epilogue you should summarize the arguments by which your case has been proved. The first step in this reviewing process is to observe that you have done what you undertook to do. You must, then, state what you have said and why you have said it. Your method may be a comparison of your own case with that of your opponent; and you may compare either the ways you have both handled the same point or make your comparison less direct: 'My opponent said so-and-so on this point; I said so-and-so, and this is why I said it'. Or with modest irony, e.g. 'He certainly said so-and-so, but I said so-and-so'. Or 'How vain he would have been if he had proved all this instead of that!' Or put it in the form of a question, 'What has not been proved by me?' or 'What has my opponent proved?' You may proceed, then, either in this way by setting point against point, or by following the natural order

of the arguments as spoken, first giving your own, and then separately, if you wish, those of your opponent.

For the conclusion, the disconnected style of language is appropriate, and will mark the difference between the oration and the peroration. 'I have done. You have heard me. The facts are before you. I ask for your judgement.'^o

Glossary

Aitia Cause, explanation.

Arete Virtue; moral virtue; also translated as good moral character.

Axiopistos Credible; worth believing.

Dianoia Thought.

Dithyramb Choral lyric originally connected with the religious rites of the god Dionysus.

Dynamis Power; also translated as ability or essential quality.

Efficient Cause See Moving Cause.

Eidos (plural: eide) Kind or species; in the Rhetoric, sometimes opposed to *koinos* (the common).

Eikos Probability, the probable; what generally happens.

Enthymeme (enthymema) A rhetorical syllogism or deduction.

Epic Long narrative poem describing heroic actions. The most famous Greek epics are the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*.

Epideixis Display, ceremonial, or demonstrative rhetoric.

Ethos Character.

Eunoia Goodwill; the speaker's loyalty to the same causes as the audience.

Example (*paradeigma*) A rhetorical inductive argument; it proceeds from one case or instance to another, without invoking a general rule.

Final Cause Purpose; end; "that for the sake of which."

Formal Cause The shape or essence of something.

Hamartia Error, mistake.

Hubris Outrage; also insolence, lewdness, licentiousness, and the crime of aggravated assault.

Idios (plural: idia) What is proper, specific, or private to something—

its unique property; as opposed to *koinos* (the common).

Invention (*heuresis*) The Greek word can be translated as discovery.

Katharsis Catharsis; also purgation, purification, clarification.

Koinos (**plural: koina**) The common; as opposed to *idios* (the proper or specific).

Lexis Diction.

Logos Argument; also translated as reason or formula, as well as word, thought, speech, sentence, and prose. In Ilhetoric 11.20 *logos* is the word for fable.

Material Cause What something is made of.

Maxim (*gnome*) A statement of general practical opinion.

Melos Music, melody.

Mimesis Imitation; also depiction, representation, portrayal.

Moving Cause, or Efficient Cause That which causes a movement, puts form and matter together, or activates some power.

Mythos Plot; “the soul of the tragedy,” what makes one tragedy different from another.

Opsis Spectacle.

Pathos Emotion; also suffering or being affected.

Peripeteia Reversal; a change in the plot that upsets the plans and expectations of the characters in the drama.

Philanthropic Sympathy; love or regard for other people.

Phronesis Practical wisdom; also translated as practical reason and good sense.

Pistis (plural: *pisteis*) Means of persuasion; also translated as belief, credit, trust, proof, faith, or conviction.

Pithanon That which is persuasive.

Poiesis Poetry; making.

Premise (protasis) The starting point of reasoning.

Recognition (anagnorisis) An event in the plot of a tragedy when someone learns something with consequences for the action of the play.

Syllogism Deduction; see Enthymeme.

Techne Art; defined in Aristotle's Ethics as a rational power of making.

Topos (plural: topoi) Place; topic, theme. Aristotle sometimes talks about koine topoi (singular: koinos topos), which literally means "commonplaces." Koine topoi is sometimes translated as "general lines of argument" or simply "lines of argument." Idioi topoi are "special lines of argument."

Comments & Questions

In this section, we aim to provide the reader with an array of perspectives on the texts, as well as questions that challenge those perspectives. The commentary has been culled from sources as diverse as comments contemporaneous with the works, literary criticism of later generations, and appreciations written throughout the works' histories. Following the commentary, a series of questions seeks to filter the Poetics and the Rhetoric of Aristotle through a variety of voices and bring about a richer understanding of these enduring works.

Comments

BEN JONSON

Aristotle was the first accurate critic, and truest judge; nay, the greatest philosopher the world ever had: for he noted the vices of all knowledges, in all creatures; and out of many men's perfections in a science, he formed still one art. So he taught us two offices together, how we ought to judge rightly of others, and what we ought to imitate specially in ourselves. But all this in vain, without a natural wit, and a poetical nature in chief. For no man, so soon as he knows this, or reads it, shall be able to write the better; but as he is adapted to it by nature, he shall grow the perfecter writer.

-from Discoveries (c.1640)

JOHN MILTON

I mean ... that sublime art which in Aristotle's poetics, in Horace, and the Italian commentaries of Castelvetro, Tasso, Mazzoni, and others, teaches what the laws are of a true epic poem, what of a dramatic, what of a lyric, what decorum is, which is the grand master-piece to observe. This would make them soon perceive what despicable creatures our common rhymers and play-writers be; and shew them

what religious, what glorious and magnificent use might be made of poetry, both in divine and human things.

-from Letter to Samuel Hartlib, of Education (1644)

THOMAS GRAY

In the first place [Aristotle] is the hardest author by far I ever meddled with. Then he has a dry conciseness that makes one imagine one is perusing a table of contents rather than a book; it tastes for all the world like chopped hay, or rather like chopped logic; for he has a violent affection to that art, being in some sort his own invention ; so that he often loses himself in little trifling distinctions and verbal niceties, and what is worse, leaves you to extricate yourself as you can. Thirdly, he has suffered vastly by his transcribers, as all authors of great brevity necessarily must. Fourthly and lastly, he has abundance of fine, uncommon things, which make him well worth the pains he gives one. You see what you have to expect.

-from a letter to Richard Wharton (September 1746)

LORD CHESTERFIELD

All your Greek will never advance you from Secretary to Envoy, or from Envoy to Ambassador; but your address, your manner, your air, if good, very probably may. [The dance master] Marcel can be of much more use to you than Aristotle. I would, upon my word, much rather that you had Lord Bolingbroke's style, and eloquence, in speaking and writing, than all the learning of the Academy of Sciences, the Royal Society, and the two Universities united.

-from a letter to his son, Philip Stanhope (March 18, 1751)

HORACE WALPOLE

But you must remember, Sir, that whatever good sense we have, we are not yet in any light chained down to precepts and inviolable laws. All that Aristotle or his superior commentators, your authors, have taught us, has not yet subdued us to regularity: we still prefer the extravagant beauties of Shakespeare and Milton to the cold and well-disciplined merit of Addison, and even to the sober and correct march

of Pope.

-from a letter to Elie de Beaumont (March 18, 1765)

WILLIAM WORDSWORTH

Aristotle, I have been told, has said, that Poetry is the most philosophic of all writing: it is so: its object is truth, not individual and local, but general, and operative.... The Poet writes under one restriction only, namely, the necessity of giving immediate pleasure to a human Being possessed of that information which may be expected from him, not as a lawyer, a physician, a mariner, an astronomer, or a natural philosopher, but as a Man.

-from Observations Prefixed to "Lyrical Ballads" (1800)

GEORGE SAINTSBURY

Yet the value of the two main documents is so inestimable, that if the incompleteness and the shortcomings of the Poetics, the unavoidable irrelevance of much of the Rhetoric, were far greater than they are, our gratitude for both would still be hard to exaggerate. We have here not merely the first constituting documents, the earliest charters at once and discussions of European criticism, but we have them from the hand of a master whose very weaknesses make him, as compared with some other masters, specifically fit for the office of critic.... His own conclusions, only sometimes inadequate, very seldom positively erroneous, exhibit the true modes of criticism as perhaps they have never been exhibited since-with an equal combination of patience and power. It is impossible for Aristotle to do harm, unless his principles are not merely taken too literally, but augmented and falsified, as was done by the "classical" criticism of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It is impossible for any one who undertakes the office of a critic to omit the study of him without great harm....

But enough of this. It is the pleasanter, and, though not in kind, yet in degree, the more important, business of the historian, to call attention to the enormous positive advance which we make with these two books. It is almost the advance from chaos to cosmos; and we shall find nothing in all the rest of history quite to match it, though the resurrection of Criticism with the revival of learning, and the reformation of it at the Romantic era, come nearest.

-from A History of Criticism and Literary Taste in Europe, Volume 1

BRANDER MATTHEW

Aristotle's attitude is the same as Lessing's in the eighteenth century and Sarcey's in the nineteenth. He did not retire within himself and weave theories out of thin air. He was no closet-critic of a closet-drama. He sat himself down in the theater itself to see plays performed by actors before an audience, and the principles he lays down are the logical deduction from his observation of the effect produced on him by the actual performance of the particular kind of tragic drama he is analyzing. He is no spinner of theories in a vacuum ; and he kept himself in close contact with the realities of the theater. He came early in the development of the drama; and the plays of the Greeks were all that he knew. With his marvelous acuteness of insight, he mastered the mechanism of Attic tragedy; he discovered the principles which had governed its makers and according to which they had worked,-more or less unconsciously, as is the wont of artists. If Aristotle had known any other type of drama than that of the Greeks, he would have had standards of comparison ; and his deductions would have been different. As it was, he handled the matter before him with incomparable certainty. Even though he was acquainted with only one form of tragedy, he pierced to the center and said many things which are applicable to every form of tragedy, ancient and modern. It is true that he also said many things which are applicable only to the tragic drama of the Athenians.

-from A Study of the Drama (1910)

WILLIAM ARCHER

A great deal of ink has been wasted in controversy over a remark of Aristotle's that the action or *rrwthos*, not the character or *ethos*, is the essential element in drama. The statement is absolutely true and wholly unimportant. A play can exist without anything that can be called character, but not without some sort of action. This is implied in the very word "drama," which means a doing, not a mere saying or existing. It would be possible, no doubt, to place Don Quixote, or Falstaff, or Peer Gynt, on the stage, and let him develop his character in mere conversation, or even monologue, without ever moving from his chair. But it is a truism that deeds, not words, are the demonstration and test of character; wherefore, from time

immemorial, it has been the recognized business of the theater to exhibit character in action.

-from Play making (1912)

T. S. ELIOT

Aristotle is a person who has suffered from the adherence of persons who must be regarded less as his disciples than as his sectaries. One must be firmly distrustful of accepting Aristotle in a canonical spirit; this is to lose the whole living force of him. He was primarily a man of not only remarkable but universal intelligence; and universal intelligence means that he could apply his intelligence to anything. The ordinary intelligence is good only for certain classes of objects; a brilliant man of science, if he is interested in poetry at all, may conceive grotesque judgments: like one poet because he reminds him of himself, or another because he expresses emotions which he admires; he may use art, in fact, as the outlet for the egotism which is suppressed in his own speciality. But Aristotle had none of these impure desires to satisfy; in whatever sphere of interest, he looked solely and steadfastly at the object; in his short and broken treatise he provides an eternal example-not of laws, or even of method, for there is no method except to be very intelligent, but of intelligence itself swiftly operating the analysis of sensation to the point of principle and definition.

-from The Sacred Wood (1920)

HAROLD LASKI

Of reading I've done a good deal this week-above all, Aristotle's Rhetoric (Ed. Cope) which I swear is among the first half-dozen things in the world. Let me swear also that it is from Aristotle that Machiavelli must have got that magic and dispassionate style as though of a skilled anatomist whose weapon is the pen instead of the scalpel.

-from a letter to Oliver Wendell Holmes (August 14, 1921)

W. D. ROSS

The Greeks were both a politically-minded and a litigious race, and the arts of speech were as useful a passport to influence with them as they are in a modern democracy; while it was in accordance with their restless spirit of intellectual curiosity that the theory of speaking received from them more attention than it does in modern communities in which its practice is no less important.

-from Aristotle (1923)

W. B. YEATS

You have the best language among us because you most completely follow Aristotle's advice and write 'like the common people'.

-from a letter to Dorothy Wellesley (December 21, 1935)

Questions

1. The Poetics says nothing about the moral or political effects of tragedy. How can we use the Poetics to think about the moral and political implications of works of art?
2. Aristotle says that the plot is the soul of the tragedy, and more important than character, thought, and the rest. Does this mean that all tragedies should emphasize plot, and that only inferior tragedies focus on the other parts? Must all works of art make their equivalent of plot of first importance? Or are there other possibilities-tragedies or works of art that see character or thought as the fundamental part?
3. Aristotle defines tragedy, and indeed all works of art, as imitations. What room does the Poetics make for imagination, creativity, and expression?
4. The Rhetoric apparently looks at persuasion from the point of view of the speaker. What lessons can we draw from it in order to be intelligent listeners to persuasive speech?
5. The Rhetoric shows that audiences are persuaded when they trust a speaker. Aristotle wrote, though, in a context in which persuasion was primarily oral, and primarily among people in a small enough community that speakers and hearers might actually know each other. What can we learn about trust for a world in which the written word and electronic media predominate, in which persuaders and audiences are never in the same place together?

For Further Reading

The books listed are recent publications in English that do not assume the reader knows Greek. More ambitious readers can find additional references within these volumes.

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